


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


*Journal of*  
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## Note to Contributors

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
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J.B. KRIPALANI, an Independent Member of Parliament, was with Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, closely associated with Mahatma Gandhi and is one of the greatest exponents of the Gandhian philosophy. He was President of the Indian National Congress at the time of India's independence.

N.K. BOSE is Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Government of India.

## **Seminar on "Indians Abroad— Asia and Africa" : A Brief Report**

(We give below a short summary of the proceedings of the Seminar on "Indians Abroad—Asia and Africa" held in New Delhi from April 7 to 11, 1969. A full report of the discussions at the seminar will be published by the end of the year in the form of a book which will be a priced publication.—Ed)

THE five-day Seminar on "Indians Abroad—Asia and Africa", organised jointly by the Indian Council for Africa and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations in New Delhi from April 7 to 11, 1969, spotlighted the problems of Indians who have settled abroad. The Seminar studied the situation in almost 16 countries—Ceylon Nepal, West Asia, Singapore, Malaysia and Guyana, East Africa and Mauritius, South Africa and Central Africa, Pakistan and China. A number of Indian and foreign experts and scholars took part in the discussions which were spread over six sessions. About 24 papers were discussed.

### **Inaugural Session**

Welcoming the participants to the Seminar, Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Indian Council for Africa, set the tone for the discussions at the Seminar. He said the Seminar was not concerned with "partisan politics, but was engaged in an earnest quest. "We have a large number of Indians in our country—there are over 500 million of us—and there are 5 million people of Indian origin across the seas. We have tried to get scholars from the countries concerned to come together and look at this problem from every possible point of view, constructively, in a meaningful manner.

"The world in which we are living is a multi-racial community. Many countries in the world, many societies in the world, are multi-racial today and there are many problems that are worth looking at with seriousness and purposiveness. In India, though we may not claim to be a multi-racial community, we are a multi-lingual, multi-religious and a multi-cultural community and we have contributed some strands in the multi-racial tapestries of many countries. We have invited a group of distinguished scholars, Indian as well as foreign, to look at this problem in order that we may know how people of one country living in some other countries can provide, can become, a bond of friendship between the countries rather than a source of tension. These difficult problems are to be examined by competent scholars in order that one may be able to transform possible sources of tension into areas of cooperation".

Inaugurating the Seminar, Mr. M. Hidayatullah, Chief Justice of India, said the problem of Indians abroad was not a single problem. The



problem in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania was not the same as the problem in Ceylon, Burma or Mauritius. There were as many problems as there were countries. There were, however, some common aspects of the problem and it was of these that he would speak.

"Before our independence," he said, "the responsibility for looking after the interests of Indians abroad was the concern of the British Government. There was then no problem of nationality as it is today. It was only a question of protection of Indian communities abroad. Britain was primarily interested in her own trade and commerce and did not seek to embroil foreign markets, at least not more than was necessary. Thus Indians abroad had to face their own problems. It may, however, be admitted that Britain did lodge strong protests whenever Indians had difficulties. But it seldom went beyond that posture. Today the position is different. We are morally bound to look after the interests of our brethren wherever they are found. We cannot be silent spectators when Indians abroad have problems. And it is this which gives the problem its magnitude with all its diversities and variations.

"The magnitude of the problem is apparent if we consider what are the likely subjects of our concern. There are five million Indians abroad, or should I have said, five million persons of Indian origin residing in different countries. That roughly represents one in every hundred Indians. These are not uniformly distributed. In some places they are more and in some places they are less. For example, in Mauritius, Guyana and Fiji, they represent almost half the population. In other places, they are fewer, sometimes as few as 2 per cent of the local population but in most places they are a significant minority.

"Now the Indian Constitution made rules of nationality which had to take into account the partition of the country. The rules which have been incorporated in the Constitution created citizenship of India with relation to the commencement of the Constitution. To be an Indian citizen a person has to have his domicile in the territory of India or he must have been born in India or the person must have been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years before the 26th day of January 1960. Most of the Indians abroad thus could not get Indian citizenship. The problem is that many of our brethren had not acquired the nationality of the countries of their domicile. They did not possess citizenship rights even in those countries. More than that, they also remained aloof in spirit and culture. In a word, they did not become Indian citizens and were not assimilated into the general population in the countries in which they found themselves. They were thus strangers to India and strangers in the countries of their domicile.

"I do not blame the Indians for having kept their culture. They still remain Indians at heart and in their manners, customs, food and outlook. Lord Milner, writing years ago, described the Asiatics as strangers forcing themselves upon communities reluctant to receive them and the position has hardly altered since. But no country likes to have a significant population of foreigners to make pockets in the country. When we add to it the fact that the Indians are by and large more affluent than the local

population and economically of great affluence you have the problem in a nutshell.....

"The position of Indians in Africa is most poignant. For several hundred years, Indians have been living there....Most of the Indians went there first as indentured labour but many went as traders. It would not be wrong to say that the Dark Continent was opened by Indian pioneers... They went not in a spirit of colonisation but only to trade....Theirs was only an economic enterprise. They rarely took part in political activity. Their strength lay in this that they became economically indispensable in the country in which they had settled down. The white peoples had other ideas. They were out to colonise. Thus Africa became a white man's country and was colonised by them.

"With the colonisation of Africa, a new phase began for India. The Indians were not part of the ruling powers and they were not a part of the local population. For a considerable time, the Indians held aloof and did not take part in any nationalist movement. They were indifferent. The Indian nationalists at home also misunderstood the true position of Indians abroad. They regarded every Indian as part of India and made him a true foreigner where he was. They sympathised with Indian interests more than the interests of the local population. As a result Indians abroad sympathised with the white population whose manners and customs they aped and looked down upon the local population. All this passed muster so long as the colonies lasted. When the local population began a struggle for freedom, the position of Indians became doubtful.

"Indians had to take sides. The Mahatma had already given to Africa the weapon of *satyagraha* and this was the only weapon in the armoury of the Africans. The Indians could help by joining the local population. Fortunately, in the forties, the Indians changed the attitude. The credit for this goes to the farsightedness of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. He advised the Indians to throw their weight with the local people in their demand for freedom... The question was not simply of Indian help in the movement but the position of Indians. Nehru made it clear to the Indians that they had nothing to expect from India but he did not clearly advise them to take a complete share in this struggle as members of African communities. He described the Indians as the 'guests of Africans'. Indians thus had a dual position of some doubt and this doubt had remained till today.

"If the Indians had given up their insularity and accepted the citizenship of the various new States, they would not have faced half the problems they are facing today. But the Indians were reluctant to do so. The decolonisation of Africa is one of the most significant events of our age. Although it is customary to treat the achievement as a feather in our cap we cannot truthfully say that Indians in Africa were substantially instrumental in this phenomenon. All that we did was to lend our support to the nationalist movement. We taught the weapon of *satyagraha*. We demonstrated to the world that in international law there is no such thing as the right by prescription to a territory and that freedom cannot be contained by any passage of time. The Indians no doubt identified them-

selves with the aspirations of the local population. Whether with the effort of the local population or with the effort of the Indians we need not try to establish. Africa is now almost completely rid of old colonialisation.

“But the position of Indians, however, has not changed. The causes of this are as much social as they are political.... Their economic superiority over the local population is a matter for jealousy and their monopoly in trade is being snapped by nationalisation and other measures. It is only a question of time when this superiority will disappear. When their economic superiority is taken away (and that is almost certain to happen one day) the position of Indians will be miserable indeed.

“The problem thus is two-fold. Politically, it is the question of citizenship. The present happenings in which the Indians find themselves ground between the region's Acts and the immigration laws and find themselves tossed between Seylla and Charybdis must make us think. They do not know where they belong. The Constitutions which the ex-colonies have evolved also do not contain adequate provisions for the integration of settlers with the local population. These settlers also looked at Britain rather than India in their hours of trouble. What then is to happen?

“The Indians could never take the place of the white rulers. They are not expected now to step into the shoes of the white people. While the white people are capable of withdrawing to their own respective countries, this is not the case with the persons of Indian origin. India should, therefore, play a real role at this time. We must regard them as Indians and fit them in our foreign policy. They must have a status conferred in terms of citizenship so that they may come under Indian protection. Then they must be made the pioneers of trade in foreign lands. We must not distinguish between an Indian who has settled in a foreign land and one who has merely gone there. For us an Indian is an Indian, wherever he be, provided he wishes to throw in his lot with us. The task is delicate. While we cannot afford to embroil the local population, we can by diplomacy obtain a compromise in which the position of Indian settlers in foreign countries will be safeguarded. We must take a second look at our rules of nationality and citizenship and see where we can fit in such settlers. This calls for action of high priority for at the moment we have left them exposed to the winds of chance. No single formula will obviously work and each country's problem will have to be separately dealt with. The papers which we have at the conference highlight the variety of problems and their ramifications. The problem of nationality and citizenship is just one of the facets. There is the economic problem, the problem of foreign trade and so on. But the most important by far is the problem I have outlined above. The Transfer of Residence Concession Rules for Asian migrants whether they have become stateless or opted for British nationality is one way of meeting the situation. But a larger view of the matter, in my opinion, is necessary. The problem is two-fold, improving the conditions of Indians where they presently are and affording them conditions to get back to India. These two matters require different treatments. We must look at our nationality and citizenship laws to see what we can do for them in our society”.

In his speech of thanks, Dr. J.N. Khosla, President of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, said the problem of the people of Indian origin settled abroad had been engaging the attention of the people and the Government of India even before independence. Indeed, the attitude of our leaders during the freedom struggle was consistently one of great sympathy for Indians overseas. This was eloquently expressed in the 1930's by Jawaharlal Nehru when he said : "Wherever there is an Indian there also goes a bit of India with him". But it was sometimes argued that after independence there was a change in this attitude, at least on the part of the Government of India, if not the people at large, when Indian overseas were advised to identify themselves with the people of the countries of their settlement. To his mind, this advice was based on a realistic assessment of the prevailing situation and did not necessarily go against the basic policy of the Government of India which had been to see that the interests of Indians overseas were safeguarded.

#### **Trend of Discussion**

The General Session of the Seminar was held on April 8 with Professor M.N. Srinivasa of the Department of Sociology, Delhi University, in the Chair. In his initial remarks on the aims and scope of the Seminar, Dr. Anirudha Gupta, Coordinator of the Seminar, said : "The aim and scope of the Seminar is to lift the problems of the people of Indian origin from newspaper headlines and to root them in reality". This could be done if a three-dimensional approach to the problem was adopted. First, a broad historical view to examine the inherited structures of the post-colonial societies; second, the diplomatic aspect of relations between India and these countries, and, third, to focus attention on the processes of integration and social change in Asian and African countries. "One should try to find out the differences in the conditions of Indians in Britain and, in such racist societies as South Africa and Rhodesia with those found in the new States. This will allow us also to obtain guidelines in the formulation of our diplomatic relations with all countries, specially our neighbours".

In his paper on "British Policy of Immigration in the Colonies", Dr. Pillay of the University of Halifax, Canada, formulated the theory that there was nothing like a monistic approach of the British Colonial Office in the matter of emigration of Indians abroad.

The participants however felt that it was necessary to look into the different patterns of settlements in the colonies which the British encouraged.

Dr. V. S. D. Souza of the Punjab University said that integration could come about in pluralist societies without the minorities giving up their own separate cultural entities. Mr. Rana of Nepal said that pure integration had taken place only when the minorities had been totally eliminated. This was what happened to Red Indians in America who were killed by cowboys.

Mr. G.S. Aurora of Delhi University in his paper on "Indian Immigrant Workers in Britain" pointed out that the British Government was

doing enough to integrate the emigrant Indians. This provoked Mr. Essop Pahad from South Africa to say, "In Britain this paper would be thrown out of hand". Dr. Yash Tandon of the Makerere University, Uganda, said that we could not lightly treat the threat of Powell and his brand of racialism in Britain. The consensus in the Seminar was that the economic position of Indians in Britain had now merged with racial and cultural discrimination. This had created an explosive situation.

In his concluding remarks Prof. Srinivasa said that the discussion was most stimulating. He emphasised that a comparative study of different colonial governments on the problem of emigration would be of immense value. In any study of integration of plural societies, the focus should always be on understanding the future and in this connection the patterns of integration in the new nations should be studied as they were in fact occurring. This was where scholars and their studies could contribute a lot to the processes of integration. The strain on such processes could be seen, as in Britain, in the phenomenon of "Powellism".

On April 9, the Seminar discussed the problems of the peoples of Indian origin in Malaysia, Singapore and Guyana.

On Malaysia there were three papers : that of Dr. S. Arasaratnam, Professor of History, University of Malaya, on "Recent Political Movements among Indians in Malaysia". The paper concerned itself with the problem of opinion formation or politicising of Indians in Malaysia and the related problems in a situation where powerful majority communities dominated the political scene.

The paper of Prof. Thangaraj, Department of Indian Studies, University of Malaya, on "Social Problems of the People of Indian Origin in Malaysia and Singapore" dealt with the problem of adjustment of the minority community in a situation of rapid technological and social changes.

Dr. V. Selvaratnam, of the University of Malaya, in his paper "Social Problems of Indians in Singapore and Malaysia" discussed the problems of Indians arising from the changing economic situation in these countries.

Dr. Arasaratnam, initiating the discussion, stressed the shift in Malaysian politics from Indo-polycentricism to Malay centricism. Was this an indication of the political ambivalence of a minority community, a participant asked. Dr. Arasaratnam clarified that the Indians were not facing any particular hardships in Malaysia. The alliance of the leaders of different racial groups indicated that they were trying to reach a solution typical of the Malaysian situation. A participant however dissented by pointing out that Indians too often adopted the "pilgrim attitude". It was asked whether this attitude continued to exist today and if so what were its causes? "Maybe it is true that Hinduism prevents integration of the Indians in Malaysia".

Dr. Suresh Shukla wanted to know whether there was any differential increase in the population of the racial groups—Malays, Chinese and

Indians, Dr. Arasaratnam said that the politics in Malaysia was still on communal lines and could be expected to remain so for another ten-twenty years, "unless, of course, Indians identify themselves with the aspirations of other communities".

Dr. Thangaraj raised a pertinent question. What could India do for the minority community of Indians abroad and in what capacity she should help them?

Prof. George Thomson, Director, Political Study Centre, Singapore, emphasised the unique multi-racial society of Singapore. He stressed that there was no Indian problem in Singapore and the problem was one of integration and nation-building. The question to be posed was not "what India had contributed to Malaysia, but what she could actually give?"

Dr. Pillay in his comments on the recent Guyanese elections pointed out the influence of America and the working of the CIA in that country. Mr. R. Narayan, of the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, in his paper on "Indians in Guyana" stated that political developments there showed a trend towards the accentuation of the racial factor. Mr. Essop Pahad disagreed that ideological lines coincided with racial divisions in Guyana and he also stressed the role of the CIA in the trade union activities of Guyana.

The Chairman, Dr. Pillay, stated that two approaches emerged from the discussion: first, that the problem of Indians should be viewed as a separate entity and, second, that it was a part of India's foreign relations with the countries which had sizeable Indian populations.

On April 10 the problem of Indians in East Africa holding British passports was highlighted. The Chairman, Mr. M. N. Rattansey, M.P. (Tanzania), pleaded that the past should be forgotten and the attempt to apportion blame should also no longer be pursued. Instead emphasis should now be on the present and the future. He, however, stressed the need to reorganise Indian missions in East African countries, with a view to project a more dynamic image of India. He pointed out that career diplomats and bureaucrats should be kept out of this part of Indian diplomatic representation abroad. His advice to Indians in Africa was to live and behave as Africans and not to look up to the country of their origin.

Four papers were submitted. In the absence of Mr. Justice Chanan Singh of Kenya, his paper on "Problem of Citizenship in East Africa" was presented by Dr. Anirudha Gupta. The paper highlighted the historical and legal aspects of the problem of citizenship as accentuated by British legislation, specially the Act of 1968. The Act restricted the entry of Kenyan Asians holding British passports to 1,500 a year.

Mr. Yashpal Ghai, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University College, Dar-es-Salaam, in his paper criticised the British policy of compartmentalisation of various racial groups in the ex-colonies. Although he admitted Asian domination of the African economy, he also stressed the importance

of Asian skills for the developmental projects of Africa. He deplored the lack of significant Asian support to African aspirations. In regard to Indian missions in East African countries, he pointed out that the Indian diplomats limited their activities to "inter-dining and inter-drinking" with rich Asians, instead of helping the poorer section of the Asians and keeping the home Government informed of the developments.

Dr. Yash Tandon of the University of Makerere, Uganda, said that India had no moral responsibility towards Indians who held British passports but were offered citizenship on generous terms by the African governments and did not avail of the offer. He stressed the differences in the political ideologies of the three African countries. "Whereas", he said, "the trend in Kenya and Uganda is one of Africanising the capitalist sector of the economy, in Tanzania it is one of socialism. Hence the racial problem is not present in Tanzania". Mr. G.P. Deshpande asked whether the African elite in Kenya did not know that British capital and influence were dominating the African economy. He expressed surprise at the African governments' pro-British and pro-white policies and feared return of Western investments in Africa. This had created a suspicion in the Indian settlers' mind whether the African governments were at all serious about their problem. Dr. N.S. Grewal said that a clash of economic interests was at the root of racial animosities.

Most speakers described the Indian Government's policy as correct but not clear and pragmatic. They also blamed British equivocation on the question of citizenship for the Indian settlers' difficulties.

The points that emerged from the Seminar were:

1. There is need for a comparative study of colonial policies in regard to emigration and immigration of peoples in colonies.
2. The process of integration in multi-racial, multi-cultural societies should be studied from three viewpoints:
  - (a) Whether external factors play any role or not. It was pointed out that the British Immigration Act had created more problems for Asians in Kenya and for the Kenya Government. This should have been essentially a British problem.
  - (b) A negative racialist approach such as that of the South African Government may as well bring about integration of Africans and Indians at several levels but, on the whole, that kind of integration should have to be consolidated in the future phase of the South African peoples' struggle against apartheid.
  - (c) Political approaches or ideologies may also play an important role in the process of integration. In this connection it is worthwhile to note the differences in the political systems of Tanzania, which is committed to socialism, and those of Kenya and Uganda which are 'Africanizing capitalism'.

3. It seems that the ideal type of integration has been achieved by Singapore and Mauritius, but how far they can serve as a model for other societies in Asia and Africa remains a problem to be studied.
4. During the Seminar discussions, two points of view emerged again and again: first, that the problem of Indians overseas should be dealt with separately, without India getting involved in it and, second, that India can or should get involved. What is needed is perhaps to analyse these problems from country to country and see in what countries they can be resolved within the framework of India's general foreign policy.
5. The need was urgently felt for a reorganisation of India's foreign missions. Perhaps this would be possible only when we study this aspect more carefully and spell out the kind of revamping we want.
6. On South Africa, the categorical stand of India was reiterated. "We are there with the African majority in Southern Africa fighting against racialism and colonialism." However, if possible and whenever necessary, we shall do more for achieving the dignity of man everywhere in any part of the world.

#### Seminar's Findings

Dr. Anirudha Gupta, Coordinator of the Seminar, reviewing the discussions in an article in the *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, observed that the immediate aim of the Seminar was to find out whether the problems posed by Indian settlers abroad fell within the broad framework of India's foreign policy and if so, what India could do to resolve such problems. The consensus in the Seminar was in favour of treating the problem as part of India's general foreign policy. But on the question of means to secure the desired end there were various opinions. One extreme view held that wherever there was an Indian with a problem that should be treated as India's problem. In his inaugural speech, the Chief Justice, Mr. M. Hidayatullah, also said: "For us, an Indian is an Indian wherever he be provided he wishes to throw in his lot with us." He added that the people of Indian origin must have a status conferred in terms of citizenship so that they might come under Indian protection.

This view was challenged by others who argued that by extending an "umbrella of protection" to Indians abroad, India might create more problems for them in their host countries.

Both these viewpoints, however, took note of the fact that there could not be a simple solution to the problem of the people of Indian origin abroad as it differed from country to country and was conditioned by peculiar historical and socio-economic factors. For instance, it was pointed out that the ideal type of integration had been achieved by the multi-racial and multi-cultural societies of Singapore and Mauritius. How far they could serve as models for other societies in Asia and Africa remained a problem to be studied.

#### External Factors

As most of the post-colonial societies faced the task of reorganizing inherited socio-economic structures, it was repeatedly pointed out that



Indians were facing only the problem of readjustment and not expulsion. If this was conceded then the problem should be studied from the point of view of a continuing process of integration, in which two factors played an important role. First, the external factor as, for instance, the British Immigration Act of 1968 which created new complications for Asians in Kenya and for the Kenya Government. Could India's involvement in Kenya be considered an external factor? In this connection, an African Indian said : "Please forget us so that we can adjust ourselves to the new situation".

The general view, however, was that whatever inhibitions India might suffer as far as interference was concerned, from the point of view of both domestic and foreign policy it was equally hard to keep neutral in the face of an exodus of Indians from Kenya. In this connection, a useful suggestion was made by a foreign participant that those Asians having British passports who wanted to come to India should be extended all help by the Government of India to return and resettle here. As regards their material assets, it was suggested that India could either advance a loan to the East African government to be realized later from the Indians, or that some sort of arrangement should be arrived at with the British Government on the same lines as the latter had adopted in the case of the assets of British settlers in Kenya at the time of independence.

The second factor which was stressed in the Seminar was that political approaches or ideologies of the new nations might also play an influential role in the process of integration. In this connection it was worthwhile to note the differences in the political systems of Tanzania, which was committed to building socialism, and those of Kenya and Uganda which were, as a participant said, "Africanizing capitalism". Perhaps the differences in the systems of these countries also explained why Indian settlers in Tanzania did not face such racial tensions as existed in Kenya and Uganda. The Kenya situation had become more complicated because of the comparatively larger number of Indian non-citizens and also because of the very perceptible presence of British influence. In East Africa, one did often get the impression that British diplomats or settlers encouraged racial feelings among Africans against the Indians.

In this connection a reorganisation of India's foreign missions was repeatedly urged by various participants. The Tanzanian delegate pointed out that Indian diplomats spent most of their time in "inter-dining and inter-wining" with rich Indian settlers, which neither helped the poorer section of Indians nor made them fully informed about African realities.

In his valedictory speech at the conclusion of the Seminar Mr. Asoka Mehta struck the right note. He said that in such countries where Indians constituted a sizable proportion of the population (such as Mauritius or Fiji) or in countries where societies were multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-lingual, the problem of Indians as a separate community did not exist.

In Fiji, however, the people of Indian origin constituted nearly half the total population and the constitution which did not give most of them the right to enfranchisement must be changed. The fundamental right of "one man, one vote" cannot be denied to any people.

Mr. Mehta said that he had no desire to judge Britain, but it was clearly Britain's responsibility to provide protection to those of Asian origin in African and Asian countries who held British passports. He, however, felt that there was a general consensus over the matter of granting citizenship which might perhaps be followed by the African governments.

Mr. Mehta called for a modification of the Indian Government's policy regarding the stateless citizens of Indian origin in the new countries. He said that those Indians who became stateless and wanted to migrate to India should be given citizenship rights on humanitarian grounds. There was nothing more degrading to the dignity of a human being than statelessness which made him a frustrated, forlorn, and homeless person not wanted by any country.

The Seminar highlighted a number of problems and studied in full length their many implications. However, some questions still remained unanswered such as, What is that which makes an Indian feel an Indian in a foreign country? What is the connection between India's total image and the future of the people of Indian origin abroad? If there is any connection, what can India do to convert what has so long been a liability into an asset?

#### People of Indian Origin in Various Countries

<i>Name of the Country</i>	<i>Total Population</i>	<i>Asians or Indians</i>	<i>Percentage of the total</i>
Burma	24,229,000 (1964)	—	—
Ceylon	10,624,507 (July 1963)	1,032,000	12
Fiji	469,934 (1965)	235,338	50
Guyana	635,743 (1964)	319,000	50
Kenya	9,643,000 (1960)	188,000	1.9
Malaysia	9,070,974 (1965)	871,949	9.5
Mauritius	751,400	592,750*	67.2
Singapore	1,008,000 (1966)	153,700	8
Tanzania	— (1962)	92,100	—
Trinidad and Tobago	827,957 (1960)	301,946	36.5
Uganda	7,189,600 (1963)	82,100	1.1
South Africa	15,982,644 (1960)	477,125	3

\*The figure includes both Hindus: 373,150 (50.9 per cent) and Muslims: 119,600 (16.3 per cent).

## **Flow of News between India and Africa during Times of "Crisis"\***

H. S. ESWARA

**T**HERE is a greater need for international cooperation and understanding today than ever before. An adequate and meaningful flow of information among different nations is one of the important means of promoting harmonious international relations. There is need for exchange of information on scientific and technological innovations between the more developed and less developed nations and also a need for flow of information on the various developmental programmes among the developing nations themselves. Therefore, the pattern of the international news flow and the factors governing it require a careful study.

Previous studies have revealed a predictable pattern in the flow of information in the world. Wilbur Schramm, a leading authority on international communication, contends:

The currents of information in the world today are nearly as predictable as the currents of air that we call the winds. Frequently, an event or a series of events disrupts the information flow as a storm disrupts the meteorological chart. But underneath these disruptions are repetitive patterns as regular as trade winds.<sup>1</sup>

In essence, the pattern that the previous researches have found may be summed up as follows: If the nations are arranged on the basis of their political-economic development, the pattern of news flow is "vertical" rather than "horizontal". In other words, a large proportion of news flows from the economically more developed to the economically less developed nations. Not only is the flow in the reverse direction lacking, but there is very little news flow among the less developed countries themselves.

Although the theme of the present study falls within the general domain of what Schramm calls "disruptions", a brief review of studies reflecting the underlying "patterns" may be desirable for purposes of comparison. In an extensive project undertaken jointly by the University of Paris and Stanford University<sup>2</sup>, the flow of information among 13 nations on five continents, including both highly developed and developing countries, was studied. From each of these nations three daily newspapers were selected for analysis. Among them were: (1) a "prestige" newspaper, such as *The New York Times*; (2) a large circulation "popular" newspaper like

*New York Daily News*; and (3) a "provincial" newspaper like the *Des Moines Register*. Each of the papers was studied for the same month in the spring of 1961. The space devoted to news events from various foreign countries was recorded, and also the handling of news events of general importance. The results indicate that the amount of space devoted in all the newspapers under study to the 'big four' powers—the USA, the UK, the USSR, and France—is extremely high to the virtual neglect of all other countries.

In another study, Hachten<sup>3</sup> examined by content analysis the foreign news flow as found in the daily press of six less developed nations in Africa and Latin America, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Equador, Honduras, and Argentina. For control purposes, newspapers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany were also analysed. The findings indicated that 45% of the foreign news in five American papers came from the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and France. It was also found that practically no news appeared from 43 countries with a population of over a million. The same was true of three Latin American newspapers.

Markham<sup>4</sup> made a comparative analysis of 30 days of foreign news in seven United States and seven South American daily newspapers. For comparison purposes, a similar analysis of foreign news in *The New York Times* was also made. The amount of space devoted to each world area in the newspapers of the countries sampled was measured. The news was classified according to its nature, and the sources were identified. The findings indicate that the South American papers published about double the daily volume of foreign news published by the United States newspapers. The significant point of this study is that a large part (about 50 column inches) of the daily foreign news reported in the average South American paper was devoted to news about and from the United States. On the other hand, the average United States newspaper devoted only one-twentieth of the space to news of South America that the South American paper devotes to the United States.

Abu-Lughod<sup>5</sup>, in a comparative content analysis of the Arab Press, observed that Arab newspapers in general devote a higher percentage of their overall space to the coverage of foreign news than do comparable newspapers in America and Europe. International events which in one way or another involve the big powers receive a disproportionate share of attention in the Arabic press. In the light of the findings, Abu-Lughod pointed out that "the major criteria of news coverage in the Arabic press appear to be three: (1) the *objective* power status of a country in the world community determines, to a large extent, how well its events and involvements will be covered in the Arabic press; (2) the *subjective* orientation of a particular country modifies to some extent its foreign coverage; and (3) geographic proximity differently sensitizes the press to regional events."<sup>6</sup>

The following reasons have been offered for the existing pattern of international news flow:

1. The five big news agencies in the world are located in the four highly developed countries—the Associated Press and United Press

International in the United States of America, Reuters in the United Kingdom, Tass in the USSR and AFP in France.

2. The ownership of long-distance telecommunication facilities is in a relatively few hands.

3. The distribution of power and wealth among nations being unequal, nations with great power and more wealth decide the destiny of others through their policies and actions, and consequently receive far greater attention than the less developed nations.

4. A lack of reader background, i.e., as Earl Johnson, Vice-President and Editor of the United Press International, puts it : "To attract readers an editor must publish news that will strike something at least vaguely connected with what the reader already knows. Much news from Latin America is useful but not interesting, important but dull because there is this gap between the fact and the reader—a lack of reader background. An event that may get headlines all over South America, where people have enough background to understand the new fact, will get squeezed to death in North American papers."<sup>7</sup> This is an important observation, and is specially so in the developing nations where there is lack of skill in interpretative reporting.

5. Selective coverage to attract special interest groups. Discussing the disproportionate coverage of the West in the Arab Press, Abulughod points out that "low literacy rates in the Middle East make newspaper readers a more select group than elsewhere. Since this group has been educated, on the whole in the Western tradition, the press provides with news to meet their conditioned needs."<sup>8</sup>

The foregoing review of research on international news flow suggests the existing patterns of such news flow during the normal course of events. It is both interesting and important to do research on the pattern of news flow during times of "crisis". Although the less developed nations do not make news during regular periods, it is to be expected that they break into news when they undergo some "crisis". Such an hypothesis has been suggested by Hachten in his contention that "the news flow from less developed nations is closely related to the occurrence of conflict and/or catastrophe."<sup>9</sup> Elaborating the hypothesis Hachten says that "a nation on the lower end of the scale of national development would usually break into the world news flow only when there was some kind of political violence or natural catastrophe within that nation."<sup>10</sup> A similar thesis is reflected in John Hohenberg's address to the 15th Assembly of the International Press Institute. Hohenberg blamed the poor coverage of Asian news upon what he termed "closed minds" and said that there is reluctance to break with the "tradition" that big news consisted of war, revolution, rioting, murder and disaster.<sup>11</sup> This tendency of "crisis coverage" found in the case of Asia is true of other developing nations as well.

The present study seeks to examine the hypothesis of crisis coverage by analysing the news flow between African nations and India for a period of about two weeks during January 1966.

The study included three African countries—Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa—and India. The period of two weeks chosen for analysis was marked by such news events in Nigeria and India as showed that these countries were under political crisis. A sample of the news events which took place in these countries during the period of study included the deaths in the Lagos riots; the Army revolt and coup d'état in Nigeria and the murder of the Nigerian Prime Minister and other high officials, the signing of the Tashkent declaration by Indian Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan, Prime Minister Shastri's death in Tashkent and his cremation in New Delhi, the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as India's new Prime Minister, and the Rhodesian crisis in Africa. During this period, Kenya and South Africa, the other two countries included in the study, were undergoing a "normal" life, although somewhat disturbed by the Rhodesian crisis. These two countries serve as controls against which the news coverage of the two countries under crisis will be compared and evaluated.

Specifically, the hypothesis may be stated as follows:

1. The countries under crisis (Nigeria and India) receive greater attention than the countries undergoing a "normal" life (Kenya and South Africa) in the mass media coverage of foreign news ("crisis coverage" hypothesis).

Two additional hypotheses are advanced to be tested in the course of this study:

2. Nigerian news receives greater attention in the press of Kenya and South Africa than in the press of India ("physical proximity and cultural similarity" hypothesis).

3. Indian news receives greater attention in the press of Kenya than in the press of Nigeria or South Africa ("special interest groups" hypothesis).

### Procedures

Four English language dailies—one each from India, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa—were selected for the study. The newspapers selected were: *The Statesman*, from Calcutta, India (established in 1875, current circulation 125,901);<sup>12</sup> *West African Pilot* from Yaba, Nigeria (established in 1937, current circulation 40,000); *East African Standard* from Nairobi, Kenya (established in 1902, current circulation 30,000); and *The Cape Times* from Cape Town, South Africa (established in 1876, current circulation 66,260). These four papers represent what might be called large circulation "popular" papers in their respective countries. In other words, they represent the best of the press available in these countries—any generalization about the press as a whole in these countries is unwarranted.

The analysis procedure consisted of counting the number of items and measuring their length in column inches. This procedure was followed with all the news items in a given newspaper considered "foreign" to the country where the particular paper was published. In addition to a total

measure of foreign news in a given newspaper, measures of news about the other countries forming part of the present study were also recorded. For example, in analysing *The Statesman*, the total number of "foreign news" items and number of news items on Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa—the other three countries included in the study—were worked out along with the length of these news items in column inches. Similar measures were obtained for the other three newspapers as well.

At this point reference may be made to a methodological problem. The problem relates to the question: What makes a news item "foreign" in a given newspaper? For example, is the Commonwealth meeting in Lagos "home news" for the Nigerian press, or the death of Prime Minister Shastri in Tashkent "foreign news" for the Indian press? The answer is "yes" if we simply adhere to the criterion that anything originating anywhere other than the country of publication of a particular newspaper is "foreign news" in that paper. If we strictly adhere to this criterion, then it is possible to achieve an objective measurement of foreign news. However, such an objective measurement has to be sacrificed in favour of presenting a picture nearer to reality. An example may clarify the issue involved here.

Most of the news about the Tashkent agreement and Shastri's death were reported in Indian newspapers with Tashkent datelines, and by following a strict criterion based on the place of origin of news, all these news stories must be treated as foreign news in the Indian press. If this is so, Indian newspapers reported a far greater amount of foreign news than any of the newspapers we have analysed. But as a matter of fact the high ratio of foreign news in the Indian press during the period under study could very well have been a reflection of the artifact of our measurement criterion which includes in the category of foreign news all those salient news stories appearing under Tashkent datelines. In an effort to overcome such flaws, at times a subjective and often arbitrary criterion was adopted in the course of our analysis. Whenever there was any doubt, the decision was based on a combination of three considerations: (1) the country of the origin of news, (2) the saliency of the news item to the country where the newspaper is published, and (3) the personalities and the issues involved in the news stories.

### **Findings**

In interpreting the findings, it is best to keep in mind the limitations of the study and treat the figures as only tentative. First, the papers we have included for analysis do not represent accurately the press system in the respective countries—we have chosen the English language press which represents the "prestige" press. Second, the period chosen for analysis is what we call the "crisis" period, and our study does not include a "non-crisis" period with which we can compare our findings. This leaves us with the inevitable choice of comparing countries under "crisis" with those countries which did not undergo a comparable "crisis" during the period of our study.

The findings relevant to the "crisis coverage" hypothesis are presented in Table 1. Compare the amount of space devoted to the countries under

the "crisis" situation and those under the "normal" situation. On an average, the countries under a crisis (India and Nigeria) jointly account for 11.2% of all foreign news items in the three other newspapers, than their own as contrasted with the joint contribution of those countries that were under no crisis (Kenya and South Africa), which is only 3.8%. Similarly, India and Nigeria jointly occupy about one-fifth of all space devoted to

TABLE 1

*Number and length of news items about countries under "crisis" vs. "no crisis" (Figures indicate the percentage of all "foreign news" in the papers under study)*

<i>Measures</i>	<i>Countries Under Crisis (India and Nigeria)</i>	<i>Countries Under "No Crisis" (Kenya and South Africa)</i>
Number of news items	11.2	3.8
Number of column inches	19.4	3.0

foreign news (i.e., 19.4%) which may be contrasted with the 3.0% space devoted to Kenya and South Africa. This may be interpreted to mean an unequivocal support to the contention that a developing nation breaks into the world news flow only during times of crisis. In other words, the findings clearly support the "crisis coverage" hypothesis that the news flow in developing nations is a function of the crisis or catastrophe occurring in those nations.

"The physical proximity and cultural similarity" hypothesis contends that Nigeria, being physically nearer and culturally similar to the African nations of Kenya and South Africa than to a remote and distant India, will receive a better coverage of its news in the press of Kenya and South Africa than in the press of India. To examine this hypothesis, we may turn to the findings reported in Tables 2 and 3. Although the differences are not of any great magnitude, they are in the predicted direction. The Indian newspaper devoted only 3.7% of all foreign new items to Nigeria

TABLE 2

*Number of news items about India, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa in the newspapers under study (Figures indicate the percentage of all "foreign news" in the papers under study)*

<i>Newspapers</i>	<i>News About :</i>			
	<i>India</i>	<i>Nigeria</i>	<i>Kenya</i>	<i>South Africa</i>
<i>The Statesman, India</i>	—	3.7	1.6	0.5
<i>West African Pilot, Nigeria</i>	3.9	—	2.4	4.7
<i>East African Standard, Kenya</i>	10.3	4.6	—	1.7
<i>The Cape Times, South Africa</i>	5.2	6.0	0.8	—



which may be contrasted with 4.6% in the press of Kenya and 6.0% in the press of South Africa. Similarly, in terms of the amount of space devoted, Nigeria received only 7.3% of all space devoted to foreign news in the Indian press against 9.6% in the press of Kenya and

TABLE 3

*Length of news items about India, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa in the newspapers under study (Figures indicate the percentage of all "foreign news" in the papers under study)*

Newspapers	News About :			
	India	Nigeria	Kenya	South Africa
<i>The Statesman, India</i>	—	7.3	1.2	0.2
<i>West African Pilot, Nigeria</i>	9.0	—	2.6	3.2
<i>East African Standard, Kenya</i>	14.5	9.6	—	1.2
<i>The Cape Times, South Africa</i>	7.6	10.1	0.5	—

10.1% in the press of South Africa. Although these results tend to be in the direction predicted by the "physical proximity and cultural similarity" hypothesis, the differences are so small that too much emphasis on them is unwarranted. Therefore, the hypothesis guided by the physical proximity and cultural similarity needs to be substantiated by further investigations.

The "special interest groups" hypothesis predicts a better coverage of Indian news in the press of Kenya than in the press of Nigeria or South Africa. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that one of the largest groups of mass media consumers in Kenya is the Indian population in that country, and naturally the press provides Indian news to meet their special interests. The findings presented in Tables 2 and 3 seem to support this contention. Compare the amount of space and number of news items about India in the press of Kenya with those in the press of Nigeria and South Africa. The press of Kenya devoted 10.3% of all foreign news to Indian affairs as against 3.9% in the Nigerian press and 5.2% in the South African press. Likewise, 14.5% of the total space devoted to foreign news in the press of Kenya concerned India whereas this figure dropped to 9.0% in the press of Nigeria and to 7.6% in the press of South Africa. However, different explanations may be offered to the above findings to those in terms of "special interest groups". The lesser attention given to Indian news events in the press of Nigeria and South Africa may be due to factors other than the lack of a sizable Indian population in these countries. It is possible that Nigeria itself was undergoing so much of upheaval that the press generally ignored what was happening in India. On the other hand, the cold relations between South Africa and India may have been the reason for the relatively low attention given to Indian news events in the South African press.

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### Conclusions

Certain limitations of the study and the possible alternative explanations that may be offered to some findings do not, however, undermine the importance of the hypotheses suggested in this paper. The limited evidence that has been gathered in this study offers tentative support for the validity of the three hypotheses—the “crisis coverage” hypothesis, the “physical proximity and cultural similarity” hypothesis, and the “special interest groups” hypothesis—and suggests that these hypotheses may prove valuable in accounting for the observed “patterns” in the flow of international information.

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\* The paper was prepared when the author was attending a seminar on “International Communication” at the University of Wisconsin in 1966-67. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor William A. Hachten of the School of Journalism for his valuable suggestions in conducting this project.

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# **The Army in Africa**

MATHIAS FINAGNON OKE

**I**T is not the purpose of this study to cover all the problems related to defence in Africa but rather to examine the political role and influence of the army in African States.

The army in all the newly created African States appeared as an obvious symbol of supreme authority, in both the internal and external domains. African States before they were independent rarely had an armed force. Autonomous States and Protectorates in certain cases did have armies but these were invariably, in some way or other, controlled by the Metropolitan powers who were responsible for their defence.

Independence led immediately, whether one desired it or not, to the creation of an army. Whether this army was purely symbolic, composed of a few dozens or a few hundred of men or whether it was a real military force, was of little consequence to the political plan. Its creation was taken as an acknowledgement of independence as was the membership of the United Nations.

## **Origin and Structure of These Armies**

Some armies had a colonial origin, others were almost entirely national. In the majority of the countries the armies bore the imprint of the colonial period. They were thus different in their structure according to the colonial power which ruled them—French, English or Belgian.

Thus France created special units for Africa (*“les troupes coloniales”*) but they were an integral part of the French Army. As a contrast, the British system depended on local units recruited from the ranks of a colonial territory and paid for through the budget of that colony. There was an old English tradition going back to the times when private colonial companies had their own defence forces as, for example, in India and Kenya. In all the African territories under British rule, units were recruited and formed locally, with the exception of officers, and paid from the local budget. They were essentially meant to help the colonial power maintain order throughout the colonial territory.

One finds, however, in these two types of “colonial” armies a common feature in their employment by French and Great Britain. These forces were utilised to maintain order in other territories as well as those in which they were originally recruited and organised. For example, the battalion of Nigeria was employed in 1906-1908 to crush the great revolt of Ashanti in the Central Gold Coast (Ghana).

African forces, it is well known, were also used in the wars in which the great colonial powers were involved on the African continent as well as abroad. Thus the original forces of the Gold Coast were employed in the struggle against Germany in Tanganyika in 1918. During the 1914-18 war black troops were used in Europe. Again, during World War II, the employment of black troops by France and Britain extended from the heights of the Lecterc Column in Equatorial Africa up to Konfra on the one side and the Mediterranean and up to Burma on the other.

But this did not occur without giving rise to some grave political and psychological problems.

In the first place the employment of African troops was made to appear—though hardly convincing—as a feature peculiar to colonization. The Africans, it was made out, were capable of serving only as soldiers, volunteers and cheap mercenaries while they were denied the obligation of full military service which is considered a political right in a modern State. The criticism against mercenaries was vindicated as so often they were forced by their social position, need for employment or administrative pressures to give proof of their voluntary enlistment.

Secondly, the employment of African troops outside the country of their origin, specially in the case of 'colonial' wars, posed another problem. It often produced a contagious effect and the suppression of national revolts by these Africans led them to raise, in their own turn, the question of their own destiny. This became particularly apparent in the case of the Algerians who, for example, fought in Indo-China before 1954 and to a lesser degree the Africans who were recruited to fight in Algeria after 1954.

#### **Present Structure of African Armies**

In order to have a more precise idea of the structure of African armies it is necessary to understand, first of all, their numerical importance. For this purpose a statistical table is given below which indicates two contrasting features.

#### **AFRICAN ARMIES**

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Total Armed Forces</i>	<i>Total Police &amp; Security Forces</i>	<i>BUDGET military in million \$</i>	<i>Technical Assistance</i>
Algeria	12,000,000	100,000	10,000	100	France, USSR, UAR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia
Basutoland	660,000	40,000	550	—	United Kingdom
Bechuanaland	337,000	—	500	—	United Kingdom
Burundi	2,250,000	—	850	12	Belgium
Cameroun	4,500,000	800	5,000	16	France, USA

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Total Armed Forces</i>	<i>Total Police &amp; Security Forces</i>	<i>BUDGET military in million \$</i>	<i>Technical Assistance</i>
Central African Republic	1,250,000	2,000 (50 Aviat)	1,450	2.105	France, Israel
Congo (Brazzaville)	1,000,000	500	500	3.7	France, UN
Congo (Leopoldville)	15,000,000	800	15,000	10	Belgium, UN, US, Israel (anticipated), Canada, Nigeria, Italy
Ivory Coast	3,500,000	30,000	2,200	8.7	France, Israel, US
Dahomey	2,250,000	4,000	2,000	1.1	France, US, Israel
Ethiopia	20,000,000	1,000	30,000	17.9	US, Sweden, Norway, India, Israel, UK, (1947-51)
Gabon	500,000	34,000	500	3.1	France
Gambia	315,000	600	4,000	—	UK
Ghana	7,000,000	2,700	9,000	35	UK, USSR, Yugoslavia, Israel, Pakistan, Canada, India, US, Australia.
Guinea	3,000,000	9,000 (1,000 Aviat)	3,300	5.8	New Zealand, USSR, West Germany
Upper Volta	5,000,000	4,800	1,335	2.8	France, US, Israel
Kenya	7,300,000	1,000	11,500	8.4	UK
Liberia	1,400,000	2,500	700	2.4	US
Libya	1,200,000	3,580	11,000	14	US, UK, Italy, Turkey, West Germany
Madagascar	6,000,000	2,600 (900 Aviat)	5,900	9	France, West Germany
Malawi	2,750,000	1,500	5,900	1.1	UK
Mali	4,500,000	3,100	1,250	8.7	France, USSR, UK
Morocco	12,500,000	35,000 (1,000 Aviat)	24,300	93	France, Spain, USSR, US
Mauritania	800,000	500	400	0.4	France, US
Niger	3,000,000	12,000	1,500	3.4	France, US
Nigeria	40,000,000	8,000	24,000	33.6	UK, West Germany, US, India, Canada, Pakistan, Ethiopia
Uganda	8,500,000	2,000	5,500	4.1	UK, Israel
UAR	27,000,000	120,000	150,000	32.0	USSR, UK, US
Rhodesia	3,200,000	4,300	35,000*	16.2	

Countries	Population	Total		BUDGET	
		Total Armed Forces	Police & Security Forces	military in million \$	Technical Assistance
Rwanda	2,700,000	900	650	1.3	Belgium
Senegal	3,500,000	27,700	4,000	11	France, US
Sierra Leone	2,500,000	20,000	2,000	2.2	UK, Nigeria
Somalia	2,500,000	7,000†	4,800	3.9	Italy, USSR, UAR, UK
Sudan	12,500,000	11,000	10,000	21.5	UK, West Germany, USSR, UAR, Yugoslavia
Republic of South Africa	16,000,000	26,500	35,000	294	UK, US, Canada, France, Switzerland, West Germany
Swaziland	267,000	—	370	—	UK
Tanzania	10,000,000	2,000	5,000	7.2	UK, Israel, Algeria
Tchad	2,730,000	400	1,950	1.5	France
Togo	1,500,000	1,000	300	0.5	France
Tunisia	4,000,000	20,000	4,600	11.4	France, US, Sweden, UK
Zambia	2,500,000	2,250	4,000	7	UK
†European : Active		2,000	African : Active		4,000
		Reserve 2,1000			Reserve 75,000

\*Somalia intends to bring the total strength of its army to 20,000 men and increase the importance of aviation (*Jeune Afrique*, Tunis).

This Table has been taken from the Essay on African Problems and drawn from different journals.

The table brings out, firstly, a contrast between those States which can be described as peaceful and those which may not be described so. In the first category fall those where no grave internal political problems exist; the second comprise those who have experienced such troubles in the past or those who are experiencing them at present. The fact that Algeria owed her independence to a prolonged military struggle explains to a large extent the importance of the Algerian army estimated to consist of 100,000 men. Neither is it surprising that in Cameroun, which has been experiencing grave internal trouble now for some years due to the subversive activities of the "Union des Populations Camerounaises" (UPC) and the revolt of the Bamilekes, the strength of the security forces has mounted to nearly 7,500 men and that a quarter of the budget of the Federal Republic of Cameroun is devoted to the upkeep of the security forces.

Another example of a country which has been facing serious internal troubles is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) which has an army of about 30,000 men, not to mention the white mercenaries. There is also the Federation of Nigeria which is today torn by internal strife. The

events in both these countries are still fresh and too close to permit a serious analysis.

External difficulties can also explain the importance of some armies, notably the 30,000 strong army of Ethiopia which is used not merely to maintain internal law and order but also to protect the frontiers especially against incursions from Somalia.

As against this, several states have small armies—1,000 men in Kenya, 2,000 in Tanzania, 2,800 in the Central African Republic, about 4,000 in Dahomey plus 2,000 men of the police.

Another contrast is among countries which are considered expansionist. A striking comparison is provided by Ghana and Nigeria. Their population, in relation to each other, is 1 to 8 or 1 to 9 respectively. In 1962 both the States had armed forces equal to each other's—approximately 8,000 men. It is obvious that if the armed forces of Ghana became proportionately 8 to 10 times more than Nigeria's this could be attributed perhaps to internal troubles but equally to some political claims vis-a-vis its neighbours, notably Togo.

The structure itself is the second aspect which varies according to resources, the desire for prestige etc. of different countries. Generally, the armies of these countries from the military point of view and defence are armies in a symbolic sense. They only consist of ground forces composed of a few hundred or, if need be, a couple of thousands of men. But motivated more by prestige and less by practical internal necessities an air force has to some extent been developed in these countries. The emphasis is more on transport planes than on military planes in the real sense. Nevertheless some States do possess about a dozen fighter planes (Ghana) or a full-fledged air force (UAR or the States of North Africa). There exist also in some cases naval units, certainly not large. Then the Federal Republic of Cameroun possesses six communication planes, four patrol ships of 100 tons and a gun-boat; Ivory Coast a torpedo boat and a patrol ship. As against this Togo, Dahomey and Tanzania hardly possess a navy worth the name.

### **External Support**

External support, always considerable,<sup>1</sup> manifests itself in different ways. There is, firstly, direct assistance from a foreign power. There are defence agreements by which African States are generally linked to their former colonial rulers or which, in some cases, tie up some African States to non-colonial powers (see table). Generally these defence agreements reveal a conflict between military needs and political principles and with the exception of the UAR the incapacity of most African States to face the slightest external aggression is evident when one takes into consideration the length of their frontiers and the weakness of their armed forces.

There is also the financial implication involved in these agreements for external aid for the maintenance of an army whether for the purpose of actual employment or for law and order, which can prove to be a drain on the resources of most African governments. Finally, there is a

contradiction in the need for an army and the fundamental political principle which demands that national sovereignty must be safeguarded, and cannot countenance the presence of foreign bases on African soil.<sup>2</sup>

### **Political Role of the Army in Africa**

The political role of the army is apparent in several ways—one sees the army as an instrument of realising national unity, of maintaining internal order, repulsing external threats, but one also finds the army intervening and assuming the role of the arbitrator in political struggles when it does not assume power itself.

#### **(a) Army an Instrument of National Unification**

The army by virtue of its hierarchical set-up and its strength based on discipline, it is believed, provides to some extent the requisite atmosphere for creating national unification which governments attempt to achieve by different methods. This is, however, only partially true and tends at times to be an oversimplification, for there are countries where divisive tribal elements have raised their heads within the army itself. Such was the case, for instance, in Congo (Kinshasa) in 1960, in Guinea after independence, in Togo in 1963 and in Sudan after the coup d'état in 1958. On the other hand, there are two striking examples of the army playing a unifying role in Algeria and Ghana.

The composition of the Algerian National Army, which included Arabs and Berbers, during the struggle against France helped in the process of integration and enabled the Algerians to resist successfully all attempts by France to drive a wedge between the two. In Ghana, again, it is well known that Dr. Nkrumah faced a great deal of opposition from the strong tribal-based society in Ashanti and former Togo under British rule. The fact that Nkrumah was able to build up an army which absorbed different ethnic groups was certainly one of the factors which enabled him not only to establish gradually his supremacy over the tribal chiefs of Ashanti but to integrate this region into Ghana.

But, as stated earlier, and Congo (Kinshasa) furnishes an appropriate example of it, there have been occasions when ethnic divisions and fissiparous tendencies developed within the army itself. The bloody events in the Congo soon after independence actually had their origin in the conflict between the Congolese Army and the local population of what was then known as the Leopoldville region (now Kinshasa). The Congolese troops and militia in this region were generally from the north and north-east of the country and did not belong to the same tribe as the people of the Leopoldville region. The situation later changed and several other complicating factors were introduced in addition to the purely tribal animosity. However, by and large it can be stated that in Africa the role of the army in the process of national unification has been negligible owing to its past traditions, structure and orientation.<sup>3</sup>

#### **(b) The Army and Defence**

The role of the army in defence and in maintaining internal order



does not differ much from what it is in other parts of the world. Yet there are some significant distinguishing factors.

The army has proved that it is capable of being an effective guardian of frontiers as the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia has shown. The Somali claim to recapture all territories—whether in Ethiopia, Kenya or on the Somalia French coast where people of Somali origin live—has so far been successfully rebuffed by the Ethiopian army which considers these attacks a flagrant violation of its national sovereignty.

But still the question of defence of frontiers specially in the context of external aid poses problems due to the heavy costs involved in maintaining an unduly large army in the vast continent of Africa.

The problem has to some extent been resolved by the decision emanating from the birth of the OAU in 1963 and the political guarantees inscribed into its Charter to preserve existing frontiers. The Charter explicitly proclaims that "these frontiers are intangible", and that "each State undertakes to respect the frontiers of others."<sup>4</sup> African countries, it has been found, are inclined more and more to turn to the OAU whenever border conflicts occur in an attempt to reconcile their differences. The Moroccan and Algerian dispute is a case in point as also the conflict between Dahomey and Niger over the Isle of Lette which was amicably settled by the Conseil de l'Entente.

### **(c) The Army and Internal Order**

As regards the army's role in maintaining internal order this is nothing new to Africa. Here the national armies have inherited the traditions and powers of the former colonial armed forces, who for nearly 50 years were employed to crush revolts and disorders.<sup>5</sup> The difference is that while earlier these revolts were directed against the colonial powers, today they are directed against a particular political or ethnic group in power. Typical of such revolts is that of the Bamilekes in the Cameroun under the leadership of the UPC.

The African army has, in fact, been increasingly utilised against political adversaries. When, for example, the Federation of Mali, created in 1959 by Senegal and the ex-French Soudan, was threatened with a split and extinction in August 1960 the question rose who would utilise the armed forces against its opponent? Would it be the Soudanaises under the leadership of M. Modibo Keita, then President of the Federation of Mali, or would it be M. Mamadou Dia, at that time Prime Minister of Senegal and Vice-President of the Federation?

It posed a political, administrative and constitutional problem. For, while M. Modibo Keita was President of the Federation, M. Mamadou Dia was both Vice-President and Minister of National Defence. Thus when President Keita issued orders to the armed forces to arrest some Senegalese leaders including M. Mamadou Dia, they did not obey as they were directly under the authority of the latter. Instead, they carried out the instructions issued by him to put President Keita under house arrest.

There are innumerable other cases which reveal that the African armed forces have intervened more often in the political life of the country than in other countries<sup>6</sup> and there are cases where the army's direct intervention goes beyond the normal constitutional limits of political power. And the fact that the military leaders have an organised force at their disposal superior to the ill-defined and not firmly established social and political institutions tempts them to play a political role. While partly they are goaded by personal ambitions, they are often, it would be true to say, forced into a situation where recourse to the army, with its well-organised structure and stability, appears the only alternative for maintaining public order and unity.

Togoland furnishes a good example of the first. The assassination of President Olympio in January 1963 by a group of non-commissioned officers was no doubt an indication of the army's contempt for vesting political power in anybody other than itself. But deeper down, their suspicion of President Olympio was rooted in regionalism. Composed largely of tribes from North Togo, the army had the feeling that the leaders, particularly President Olympio, who came from the South, were not responsive to the idea of developing their region. Once, however, Olympio was assassinated the army was totally at a loss to find a political solution to the situation created by it. There was a complete political void with the collapse of the Olympio regime, but the army was unable to retain power as it was not prepared for it. Hence the appeal made on its behalf to two opposition leaders in exile—President Grunitzky and Vice-President Meatchi—designations which they were to acquire a few months later.<sup>7</sup> In January 1967, however, the same armed forces, composed still exclusively of Northerners, decided to overthrow the two leaders whom they had themselves installed but who by now had become opponents.

In the neighbouring country of Dahomey, a political crisis occurred barely ten months after the Togo coup of 1963 in which the army played a decisive role. Social unrest, in addition to political difficulties, led President Maga to reshuffle his cabinet. The army came to his help in quelling the riots which had spread to all parts of the country, but more especially in Cotonou, the capital. In recognition of this service and anxious to retain the army's support, President Maga nominated Colonel Soglo, Chief of Army Staff, as Vice-President.<sup>8</sup> But as disorder erupted again a few days later Colonel Soglo was induced to replace President Maga and to constitute a Provisional Government over which he presided. He took into his cabinet leaders representing the three regions of Dahomey—President Maga from the North, M. Apithy from the South-East, M. Ahomadegbe from the Central province. This could have been called, rightly so, a National Government as it represented the major political trends and ethnic groups of the country. However, it turned out to be a transitional government which did not last long as finally President Maga was forced to leave the political scene and was replaced provisionally<sup>9</sup> by a coalition of his two opponents—M. Apithy, who became President of the Republic, and M. Ahomadegbe, Vice-President and head of the Government.

The intervention here of the army thus to some extent helped to suppress the disturbances which were threatening to become increasingly

more violent, especially in Cotonou, and on the other hand it contributed to the transition of power from one political group to its opponents. Colonel Soglo, it is true, could have, had he wished, continued to remain in power for at least some time. But he acted as he did because he believed, as he has stated elsewhere<sup>10</sup>, "that the role of the army is not to intervene in politics normally or for a prolonged period, that if extraordinary circumstances led it to take an exceptionally active part in the political life, this should be confined to as limited a time as possible and only in so far it is absolutely necessary for it to. Consequently, the moment the circumstance justifying intervention disappears the army should return to the barracks and place itself at the service of the political group which has assumed power meanwhile".

These forms of intervention, though not frequent earlier, have become more so since 1965 and particularly noteworthy are those which have occurred in Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Ghana, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Upper Volta and Togo. But while intervention has been limited to keeping alive institutions, national consciousness and the government, in some cases the intervention of the army has resulted in it assuming total power. The most outstanding among such cases is to be found in Egypt and Congo (Kinshasa).

Nasser's assumption of power is well known and since he was elected President in 1956 certain changes may have affected the ruling group or the institutional forms but by and large the political life of the country has continued to be dominated by the small nucleus of armymen who were from the beginning integrated into the main organs of the Egyptian revolution. Around Nasser this small military group has remained the driving force whether it be under the name of the Revolutionary Command Council or under the name of the Presidential Council established in 1962 consisting of 12 members, six of whom belonged to the former Revolutionary Command Council. The Free Officers' Movement forms the next circle and they in turn are surrounded by approximately 500 officers from whom the new leaders are recruited generally and who form the most reliable supporters of "Rais" Nasser.

The intervention of the army in Congo (Kinshasa) is even more pronounced. Divided into many ethnic and political groups, the Congo, when it was declared independent on June 30, 1960, came under the rule of politicians holding widely differing views and belonging to political parties diametrically opposed to each other. No agreement or understanding was possible among them.

The problem of the Congo was thus basically one of conflicting ethnic groups over whom were imposed different political orientations; whether under the Government of Adoula, or in the secession of M. Tshombe or M. Soumialo, the struggle remained essentially a tribal one. The national identity which one vainly attempted to search for became subservient to tribalism<sup>11</sup>. To put an end to the deteriorating situation General Mobutu wrested power in November 1965. The military authority dissolved all parties and parliament and assumed absolute power, constitutional, legislative and executive.

Thus Congo fell in line with the countries already cited above—Ghana headed by General Ankrah, Upper Volta by General Lamizana, the Central African Republic by General Bokassa, Algeria by Colonel Boumedienne and Nigeria by Maj-Gen Gowan.

From all these instances it may be possible to conclude that the army, despite its known weaknesses, does play a notable role in Africa. On occasions it is a unifying factor, a pacifying element, on others it is an eventual source of trouble and revolution. The army has not ceased, nor probably will in the years to come, to create problems for African political leaders. It is certain that as long as Africa does not have an extensive political base and structure an organised force such as the army represents (whether in providing its own leadership or supporting a particular politician) will remain a powerful means of action which it would be difficult to ignore and whose intervention will perhaps be decisive.

*translated by*  
**SHANTI SADIQ ALI**

#### References

1. For the English-speaking territories see BELL, "Military Assistance to Independent African States", Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1964.
2. It is on this principle that some States demanded the removal of French military bases from their territories or have violently opposed the attitude of some French armies (Dahomey and Upper Volta).
3. To the extent national or civic service is organised the process of unification has been found to have been facilitated.
4. Law—63-15, JORD Special No. 4 of June 25, 1963, article 3 para 3.
5. One of the famous revolts was the Rif war which from 1922 to 1924 cost the lives of thousands of Spaniards and as many Frenchmen not to mention the Moroccans themselves whose loss was perhaps the greatest.
6. The wave of military coups d'etats in the young African States since 1963 confirms this.
7. DEZALAY: "Coups in Togo and Congo in 1963", Seminar IEP 1964, 65.
8. E. TERRAY: "Revolutions in Congo and Dahomey". *Revue française de Science politique*, Oct. 1964.
9. After the coup the army came into power. The second Republic of Dahomey was established on January 5, 1964, after a referendum had approved the constitution, but another on December 22, 1965, led General Soglo to seize power again. He was however overthrown in his turn on December 17, 1967, following still another coup. Seven months later, the army appealed to Dr. Zinson, whom it nominated President of the Republic, and confirmed by a referendum on July 28, 1968.
10. See "Aube Nouvelle"—October-December 1963 and January 1964.
11. F.M. "Survival of Tribes or Problem of Nationalism in Black Africa" in "Etudes Dahomeens" No. 12, Tome 1, page 57.

## The Political Theme in South and West African Novels

JOHN F. POVEY

**"I'M** dead off politics." "Oh yes, but they blow in under the door."— Nadine Gordimer.

Belles Lettres, in their etiolated sense, have little place at present in the African continent. All writers demonstrate a commitment to the societies in which they live. Sometimes they attempt to record the past; the tribal, pastoral heritage, on other occasions they focus their attention on the present—commercial urbanized. Always their concern is social as well as personal. Because of their belief in the social significance of a writer many manage to make political statements, overt or implied. It is this political reaction that has interested me in my reading of recent novels in English from Africa.

It is usual now to divide Africa by the boundary of the Zambesi, the river which, at the moment, separates independent black African states from those territories still controlled by white settlers. It is assumed that these regions can only be seen as antitheses, the diametric opposition of freedom and oppression. From this judgement it would appear there could be no area of mutual concern for writers. One might ask what comparisons could be made between the manner in which the novelists of independent countries respond to their own African national governments and the attitudes that must be taken by those writing under a hated and alien regime. It may seem impossible to bring such disparate attitudes within the confines of a single essay. The contrast is less extreme than might be imagined. The novelists of West Africa have not celebrated their independence with unqualified and fulsome praise. They have looked very shrewdly and critically at the political problems it has brought. I hope to suggest that writers of both these groups make similar assumptions about the type of society that all Africans desire. Their criticism is always aimed at those people and forces who stand in the way of the fulfilment of their hopeful social ideals, and these ideals are not only pan-African, but universal.

The political theme of South African writing is protest. "The whole way we live becomes a political gesture above everything else", observes Nadine Gordimer. There can be no other subject for the sensitive writer. This inevitable singleness of purpose cannot have a desirable effect on the development of South African writing. Such exclusive concern makes, regrettably enough, for some monotony. From a literary standpoint something more is needed than the demonstration that your sentiments are

with the right side. For some readers these books have something in common with the left-wing writing of the thirties. Where political sentiments are so admirable literary standards seem irrelevant. The desire of world opinion to condemn South African racial policy has made critics dangerously ready to accept much recent ephemera at its political value. I doubt if any novel, however brilliantly written, could gain a publisher in England or the States if it was written upon the assumption that there was anything positive to be said for the present government of South Africa. There may not be, of course, but that is not quite the point. South African writing is being judged by its topic.

There is a distinction in South African protest writing between the white and black novelists. (European and non-European is the curious government terminology.) I doubt whether you would often be mistaken in deciding which group wrote a certain book though both write in English which, as Guy Butler remarked, is "the language of dissent" in South Africa. Writers of both races start with the same premise, a similar non-racial ideal, but a white writer, however indignant, can write with just a shade of more detachment. Irony is a possible mode. After all, there cannot be quite the same physical conviction when you don't live in a location, you don't carry a pass or search for the non-European counter of the Post Office. For the African the protest is less intellectual and more openly political. They describe the violence of arrogant policemen, the conditions of labour in the compounds of farms and mines. We see at the receiving end what happens when dispassionate government edicts are translated into a world of "Slegs vir Blankes" (Whites only).

To the European the shame that needs protesting is the emotional deprivation; that colour precludes the possibility of being human. This is made clear in the religious sentimentality of Alan Paton and the firm denunciation of Dan Jacobsen. What is so revealing is the number of times "love" is made part of their titles: *Cry the Beloved Country*, *The Occasion for Loving*, *The Evidence of Love*.

In that latter novel Dan Jacobsen insists that in South Africa now the evidence of love is to be arrested. He may mean this to apply more widely, though in the story it is marital love that brings the hero to jail. Kenneth is light skinned but technically "coloured". He marries a white South African girl in London. They could stay on, but they choose to return even though their act is only a gesture with a foregone conclusion. The confrontation comes before he even sets foot in the country. When the immigration officials come aboard the liner at Cape Town and see the term "coloured" on his passport at first they are merely amused. He has a white wife, clearly there has been some typographical error, idiotic but correctable. Then they realize that Kenneth is not only coloured but that they cannot prevent him from entering his own country. Once ashore however the Immorality Act can take effect. For the sin of being in the same hotel together the penalty is prison. More shocking than the epileptic violence of the hotel manager, more horrible even than the law that condemns, is the response of the sympathetic witnesses. Hearing of the sentence—six months with hard labour and twelve strokes of the cane—their

own lawyer remarks, "Could have been worse. The judge is a good stick at heart." Such attitudes mirror the moral degradation of this society.

Nadine Gordimer is just as explicit, but her technique is different, more subtle. No one writing today has a sharper ear for the characterizing conversation. She simply allows her characters to speak and out of their own mouths they stand condemned. Not one would have any realization of the judgment that follows when an outsider hears their natural words. To the Africans these people react in a variety of ways, all of which expose how deeply the corruption of this society warps the individual spirit. Many can't imagine Africans as humans at all. "You know, I can't imagine it—I mean a black man next to me at table talking to me like anyone else. The idea of touching their hands... Her hand came out in the imaginary experiment and hesitated, wavered back". Some offer snide praise fed on superiority. "The Africans were an absolutely marvellous audience. Do you know they actually picked up points that white audiences missed." Some appear almost burlesque. "How long do you think this wood will last, eh? That's no good at all that small stuff. Makulu, makulu. Plenty big logs." Some are just openly vicious. "You can't bring Kaffirs into my building," she screamed, "sitting there like this is a bloody location backyard."

Let no one who has not been in the Republic imagine these are caricatures. Nadine Gordimer has hooked living, wriggling specimens of the breed. In a sense, however, the political protest is oblique because these writers concentrate on the human beings whose ethos the government edicts support. They say only by implication that the government is bad. Perhaps they rather say people in this society are made bad. The society as described predicates the need for social change.

The Negro protest writing is often a product of exiled writers such as Lewis Nkosi who has the choice between jail and London. Denis Brutus must be debating similar alternatives at the moment. The title of his last collection of poems tells all: *Sirens, Knuckles and Boots*. This protest writing is not only more political than the European, but more autobiographical too. This may be partly because the thinly disguised autobiography is the most obvious way to begin writing, but more because these men really have had the experience. Their commitment is not like that of the whites, an intellectual one from which they can withdraw after a change of heart or income. They are condemned by colour for life. A moving example of this kind of autobiography is Ezekiel Mphahlele's recapitulation of his childhood, *Down Second Avenue*.

The common tone can be seen best in the open anger of Alex La Guma, who, in some unexplained way, still manages to survive in Cape Town with Richard Rive. Such men know the score very well. When one remarks of a passing white woman, "I don't give a damn for the bastard white arse." The answer comes quickly, "That's politics. Cut out the politics." La Guma's *A Walk in the Night* (published in Nigeria by Mbari) catches exactly the vitriolic tone that European writers avoid. The hero, on the way home, is stopped by the police. He doesn't look at them. "It was only the brave or the very stupid who dared look straight into the law's

eye, to challenge them or question that authority...." The significance of the following dialogue is the distinction between public words and private feeling; between surface submission and personal vindictiveness.

Yes (you mucking boer)

Yes what?

Yes, baas (you mucking bastard boer)

Deep down inside him the feeling of rage, frustration and violence swelled like a boil knotted with pain.

The image of the festering boil has ominous implications for South Africa's future.

In a quieter but equally personal tone, Peter Abrahams records the problems of living as *Mine Boy*. Xuma, strong and innocent, comes from the country to seek work. He discovers a world of tough mine bosses of Johannesburg location slums and police persecution. Abrahams makes a determined attempt to suggest the need for a utopian world in which a person is seen first as a man only then as black or white. During a strike, Chris, Xuma's boss, makes a deliberate racial sacrifice when he chooses to join the black workers. But even this may not be an adequate gesture. There is a wealth of sadness in an earlier conversation between Xuma and Chris's sympathetic girl friend. "Chris wants to be your friend." "He is white," Xuma said. The smile faded from her face, there was sadness in her eyes. "And so you cannot be friends?" she said. The question is merely rhetorical. The answer is so clearly "no". The character who remains in my own memory is the girl teacher with bitterness etching into her soul. Her education in exposing the world had opened her eyes, not to opportunity, but to the immense area she will be denied in her life; the regions restricted by race, not ability. One notes the agonizing appraisal of colour. "Inside down there is something wrong. And it is because I want the things of the white people. Inside I am not black and I do not want to be a black person."

The emotion of this writing suggests what might have been the attitude of Africans in other countries, had the development of their writing preceded their political progress. You can see something of this protest mood from Kenya in James Ngugi's novel about the Mau Mau, *Weep Not, Child*. His hero answers the question, "Don't you believe in anything?" with a vehement "No, nothing, except revenge, the return of lands." Even in this novel, however, the writer's attitude is retrospective, almost historical. But in West Africa, independence was granted without any real revolutionary activity. The British could afford to be generous, for the tsetse fly and the malarial mosquito had seen to it that there would be no settler problem. The writing in English from West Africa began in the fifties when, if independence had not been granted technically, there was no expectation that national agitation would add much to the speed of the British departure. It is conceivable that a Nigerian writing in the thirties might have sounded his opposition to the occupying colonial authority.



There are hints of this mood in the historical reconstructions of Chinua Achebe's first and third novels, *Things Fall Apart* and *Arrow of God*. Writers concentrating on more recent times give little attention to past deprivations, except for the occasional bitter memory of missionary education. Their themes concern the problem of reconciling Africa and the West; the whole impact of European and American know-how on tribal allegiance and a conservative tradition.

I can find little evidence of a honeymoon during which time the writers expressed their delight at the fact that they were now governed by their own national officials. When the Nigerians began writing, their political theme was invariably critical. I found two brief moments of approval in Ekwensi. There is the adulatory description of the funeral of the great patriot in *People of the City* and there is the idealized portrait of the Prime Minister in *Beautiful Feathers*. These moments are rare. Nzekwu put it, "I don't play politics. It is a dirty game. I shall not be your tool in the mean job of dragging the names of properly constituted authority in the mud." A curious version of political activity! Even passion cannot overlook the stigma of political association. The hero's rival is hardly a threat. "He is only a little troublesome politician. He doesn't stand a chance with any literate girl in town." One notes the surprising connection between literacy and the rejection of politicians.

I should stress that the attack on the politicians is not revolutionary. It is not in any way directed at a specific government, as in South Africa, though conceivably such an intention might develop in Ghana, for example. Whereas the South African writer can reasonably argue that a change in government might make conditions better, the Nigerian writer does not see such a solution. Their criticism is not against a party, but directed deeply into the social and political fabric of the country. It is not a government that is condemned, but the spirit that controls local politics: the bribes, the corruption, the violence, the greed.

Cyprian Ekwensi creates the archetype of the base, venial politician with Uncle Taiwo in *Jagua Nana*. This corrupt party leader is one of the most powerfully conceived characters in African fiction. He has a monstrous liveliness. Vulgar, greedy, sensual, gross, he demands allegiance by his personal strength. When this fails there are other ways of campaigning:

When Uncle Taiwo acknowledged the cheers...he opened his bag and coming down among the people scattered handfuls of ten shilling notes like rice grains on a bride.

His system and motives are not complex. "Is party money, I give dem de money lik dat, so them kin taste what we goin' to do for them if they vote us into power."

In *Beautiful Feathers* there is a similar figure, the rabble rouser Jacob, "who could convert three votes to a thousand for a consideration." For him a political demonstration only supplies the opportunity to loot and rape. Jacob is a mean jackal of a man; he has none of Uncle Taiwo's shabby grandeur. But both characters show the rapacious figures who stand at the fringe of local politics.

In *Beautiful Feathers* there is another political caricature worthy of Evelyn Waugh at his old-time best. This is the figure of the Minister of Consolation. He is a comic exaggeration of the dozens of new ministers who strut at international conferences.

The Minister of Consolation showed his teeth in a manner which the mirror had told him was most flattering. The photographer prepared and began focussing the camera. The minister manoeuvred the reporter till he was farther from the camera...

Only gradually the dangerous power that lies behind his false bonhomie is exposed.

This egocentric figure is constantly surrounded by a group of toadying leeches. He gives them all a handout and there is a significant political assertion contained in the humour of the following repartee.

"Thank you sir. Next election you will go in by the power of our vote." "By the power of God," corrected another man breaking into the room.

There were now twenty of them waving envelopes addressed to the minister.

"It is God who is above everything." "Just so. Next time you will go in by the power of God and our vote."

What price democracy here?

The hero of this novel, Wilson, is meant to be the honest politician, but he is so ineffectual that he is easily overshadowed. When he refuses a bribe there is a wealth of scorn in the millionaire's sneering, "And I thought you were serious."

One meets another demagogue in T. M. Aluko's *One Man, One Machet*. Benjamin Benjamin is a grandiose, picturesque figure, dishonest, ill-educated but impressively verbose to the credulous. As with Uncle Taiwo we almost overlook the political vice under so much jaunty life. The other politicians see the danger.

There is one thing that worries me about the Benjamin in our midst... ordinary people cannot easily distinguish the half educated and the spiv from the honest individuals like ourselves.

Aluko is exactly right, of course, but somehow we are not absolutely convinced of it in the novel. The preaching of his pasteboard heroes does not carry much conviction when the villains have such cheerful dynamism. (Didn't Milton once have a similar problem?) Aluko's heroes are of inadequate substance to become the basis for a morality, even a just one.

There is one other character I must mention because I cannot sort out the manifold ironies that Achebe creates. His own attitude to the politician Sam Okoli in *No Longer at Ease* seems mildly approving. Sam is both able and successful. But how is one to take the following speech?

I used to have a Nigerian as my assistant but he was an idiot. His head was swollen like a soldier's because he went to Ibadan University. Now I have a white man who went to Oxford and he says sir to me. Our people have a long way to go.

To say 'sir' to sharp politicians like Sam, presumably. Whose side is Achebe on?

It is not easy to draw together the political attitudes of the writers of these two countries, but some generalization is possible. The writers of South and West Africa are all committed—sometimes perhaps almost unconsciously and only in that they describe the society that they know. In Africa even description can be a political comment. This attitude towards the part a writer plays in his country will certainly also be true of writing from other nations as that develops. There are few ivory towers in Africa. The contrasts are obvious. There is a great difference between having no vote and being bamboozled out of using your vote. It is not the same to be merely exploited as to be deliberately persecuted. In one case there are cruel policies, in the other only cruel individuals. South Africa represents the effectiveness of a bad system, West Africa the ineffective administration of a good one. Such division accounts for the difference of tone. The West African can use humour and satire; his world can be the mode of high comedy. For the South Africans there is too much bitterness, too much humiliation for them to afford the luxury of the comic. For them the scene is one of explosive tragedy.

But if the writers live in such different worlds, they join across the continent to insist that certain human and humane qualities are the irreducible necessities of any society. The only question that a writer must ask of any government is how well its organization allows the freedom for individual honour and fulfilment. These beliefs are fundamental. The nature of their denial in the two countries is utterly contrasted, but would the future conditions which all these writers desire be so very different? I think not. This is where literature approaches the universal beyond the national. The fact that both these countries have spokesmen for a single humane ideal is the most hopeful political sign in a continent where the news seem to read as a series of universally depressing oppressions.

## DOCUMENTATION

### **Fifth Summit Meet of East and Central African Heads of State**

The East and Central African Summit conference in Lusaka may be considered a landmark on the path of African unity. The decisions taken at the conference reflected greater unanimity among the participants than at similar meetings held before. The 24-point manifesto showed that an overwhelming majority of the participants were committed to the total liberation of Southern Africa. We publish below the texts of the joint communique issued at the end of the conference, the manifesto and the inaugural speech of President Kaunda.

**T**HE Fifth Summit Conference of Heads of State and Governments of East and Central African States met in Lusaka from 14th to the 16th April under the chairmanship of His Excellency President Kenneth Kaunda, of the Republic of Zambia.

The Conference was attended by all the fourteen member-states, namely: Republic of Burundi, His Excellency President Michel Micombero; Central African Republic, Hon. Marrice Gouandjia, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Republic of Chad, Dr. Jacques Baroum, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Hon. N. Mondjo, Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Hon. Justin Bomboko, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Co-operation and External Trade; Ethiopia, His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie I; the Republic of Kenya, Hon. Daniel Arap-Moi, Vice President; the Republic of Malawi, Hon. A.M. Nyasulu, Minister of State for Regional and National Development; the Republic of Rwanda, H.E. Anastase Makuza, Minister of National Education; the Republic of Somalia, Hon. Haju Farah Ali Omer, Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Republic of Sudan, His Excellency President Ismail El Azhari; the United Republic of Tanzania, His Excellency President Julius K. Nyerere; Republic of Uganda, His Excellency President Milton Obote; Republic of Zambia, His Excellency President Kenneth Kaunda.

The joint communique said the Summit Conference, after examining and studying the recommendations of the Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Dar es Salaam in February this year approved these recommendations. The recommendations covered political and economic matters.

The Conference having noted with grave concern the further worsening situation in Rhodesia and in particular taking serious note of the British Government position with regard to its terms for a final settlement of the Rhodesian crisis, that is, their preparedness to have a settlement with the rebels on a minority basis, rejected the 'Fearless' proposals and affirmed NIBMAR as the only basis of an honourable settlement.

The Conference does not accept any settlement on Rhodesia short of complete independence based on majority rule, and, therefore:

- (i) rejects the 'Fearless' proposals as being incompatible with NIBMAR;

- (ii) urges the British Government to withdraw the 'Fearless' proposals;
- (iii) re-affirms NIMBAR as the only basis for any acceptable settlement.

The Conference unreservedly condemns the savage acts of the illegal regime in carrying out executions of African nationalist leaders and freedom fighters, and holds the British Government wholly responsible for the life and security of the Africans under the present illegal regime. The Conference, therefore, calls on the British Government to take immediate measures to protect the lives, and safeguard the security of Africans in Rhodesia.

On territories under Portuguese domination, the Summit Conference reviewed the position and considered in particular the role of Liberation Movements and paid special tribute to their heroic efforts. The conference pledged to increase both moral and material support to the Liberation Movements and to collaborate fully with the OAU co-ordinating committee for the liberation of Africa.

The Conference reiterated its unreserved condemnation of racial discrimination and apartheid, and spurned any form of dialogue with minority regimes in Southern Africa, since these regimes reject the principle of human equality.

The Conference issued a manifesto on Southern Africa.

The Conference also agreed on specific measures further to explore regional capacities for promoting greater cooperation and consolidating all aspects of economic activity in the region. Particular emphasis was placed on devising, where necessary, appropriate machinery for fostering regional cooperation in agriculture, industry and energy, transport and communications, trade and human resources, and as far as possible to use existing organs within the region.

The Conference noted that foreign intervention had further complicated the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, and it expressed its views to His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I, Chairman of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria, for his consideration, wishing the Committee complete success.

His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I explained to the Conference the situation prevailing in Equatorial Guinea, and the Conference thanked His Imperial Majesty for his efforts.

The Conference realised the necessity of rendering Guinea urgent aid and noted the offers which some States had already made in this regard. The Conference asked the Secretary General of the OAU to co-ordinate this technical and economic assistance.

The Conference discussed the Middle East Crisis and :

- (1) Reaffirmed their support for the stand already taken by the OAU

in their support for the Security Council resolution of 22nd November, 1967;

- (2) They urged that the terms of this resolution should be implemented without delay.

The Conference also exchanged information on a number of other matters of common concern.

The Conference noted with satisfaction the progress which had attended successive sessions, and their growing importance as a means of continually improving good neighbourliness and of attaining the ultimate goal of African Unity.

The Conference expressed their deep gratitude to His Excellency President Kenneth Kaunda and through him to the Government and the people of the Republic of Zambia for the warm and brotherly hospitality shown to the Heads of State and Governments and to the members of their delegations during their brief but useful stay in Zambia. The Conference also expressed their appreciation for the efficient manner in which the Secretariat serviced the Conference.

At the close of the Conference, the Heads of State and Governments agreed unanimously that the next conference be held in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan, in January, 1970.

#### **Manifesto on Southern Africa**

The following is the manifesto on Southern Africa agreed during the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African Heads of State.

1. When the purpose and the basis of States' international policies are misunderstood, there is introduced into the world a new and unnecessary disharmony, disagreements, conflicts of interest, or different assessments of human priorities, which provoke an excess of tension in the world and disastrously divide mankind at a time when united action is necessary to control modern technology and put it to the service of man. It is for this reason that, discovering widespread misapprehension of our attitudes and purposes in relation to Southern Africa, we the leaders of East and Central African States meeting at Lusaka, 16th April 1969, have agreed to issue this Manifesto.

2. By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, or political organisation.

3. On the basis of these beliefs we do not accept that any one group within a society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens. We recognise that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognise that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals, without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

4. None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organisation which would ensure a reasonable standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

5. If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

6. The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the Union of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination. This is not a matter of failure in the implementation of accepted human principles. The effective Administrations in all these territories are not struggling towards these difficult goals. They are fighting the principles; they are deliberately organising their societies so to try to destroy the hold of these principles in the minds of men. It is for this reason that we believe the rest of the world must be interested. For the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

7. Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to this principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those

countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.

8. Our stand towards Southern Africa thus involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination. We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins; and would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin. We are not talking racialism when we reject the colonialism and apartheid policies now operating in those areas; we are demanding an opportunity for all the people of these States, working together as equal individual citizens, to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.

9. As an aftermath of the present policies it is likely that different groups within these societies will be self-conscious and fearful. The initial political and economic organisations may well take account of these fears and this group self-consciousness. But how this is to be done must be a matter exclusively for the people of the country concerned, working together. No other nation will have a right to interfere in such affairs. All that the rest of the world has a right to demand is just what we are now asserting—that the arrangements within any State which wishes to be accepted into the community of nations must be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity and equality.

10. To talk of the liberation of Africa is thus to say two things. First, that the peoples in the territories still under colonial rule shall be free to determine for themselves their own institutions of self-government. Secondly, that the individuals in Southern Africa shall be freed from an environment poisoned by the propaganda of racialism, and given an opportunity to be men—not white men, brown men, yellow men, or black men.

11. Thus the liberation of Africa for which we are struggling does not mean a reverse racialism. Nor is it in an aspect of African Imperialism. As far as we are concerned the present boundaries of the State of Southern Africa are the boundaries of what will be free and independent African States. There is no question of our seeking or accepting any alterations to our own boundaries at the expense of those future free African nations.

12. On the objective of liberation as thus defined, we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve it without physical violence. We should prefer to negotiate rather (than) destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa,



we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors. This is why the signatory states participate in the movement for the liberation of Africa under the aegis of the Organisation of African Unity. However, the obstacle to change is not the same in all the countries of Southern Africa, and it follows therefore that the possibility of continuing the struggle through peaceful means varies from one country to another.

13. In Mozambique and Angola, and in so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe. The only thing which could convert a part of Africa into a constituent unit in a union which also includes a European State would be the freely expressed will of the people of that part of Africa. There is no such popular will in the Portuguese colonies. On the contrary, in the absence of any opportunity to negotiate a road to freedom, the peoples of all three territories have taken up arms against the colonial power. They have done this despite the heavy odds against them, and despite the great suffering they know to be involved.

14. Portugal, as a European State, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. However, in our context, the effect of this is that Portugal is enabled to use her resources to pursue the most heinous war and degradation of man in Africa. The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola, and the so-called Portuguese Guinea is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but it is also diametrically opposed to the politics, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The people of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in communism or capitalism; they are interested in their freedom. They are demanding an acceptance of the principles of independence on the basis of majority rule, and for many years they called for discussions on this issue. Only when their demand for talks was continually ignored did they begin to fight. Even now, if Portugal should change her policy and accept the principle of self-determination, we would urge the Liberation Movements to desist from their armed struggle and to cooperate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power from Portugal to the peoples of the African territories.

15. The fact that many Portuguese citizens have immigrated into these African countries does not affect this issue. Future immigration policy will be a matter for the independent Governments when these are established. In the meantime, we would urge the Liberation Movements to reiterate their statements that all those Portuguese people who have made their homes in Mozambique, Angola or Portuguese Guinea, and who are willing to give their future loyalty to these States, will be accepted as citizens. And an independent Mozambique, Angola, or Portuguese Guinea may choose to be as friendly with Portugal as Brazil is. That would be the choice of a free people.

16. In Rhodesia the situation is different in so far as the metropolitan power has acknowledged the colonial status of the territory. Unfortunately, however, it has failed to take adequate measures to reassert its authority against the minority which has seized power with the declared intention of maintaining white domination. The matter cannot rest there. Rhodesia, like the rest of Africa, must be free, and its independence must be on the basis of majority rule. If the colonial power is unwilling or unable to effect such transfer of power to the people, then the people themselves will have no alternative but to capture it as and when they can. And Africa has no alternative but to support them. The question which remains in Rhodesia is therefore whether Britain will reassert her authority in Rhodesia and then negotiate the peaceful progress to majority rule before independence. In so far as Britain is willing to make this second commitment, Africa will cooperate in her attempts to reassert her authority. This is the method of progress which we would prefer; it could involve less suffering for all the peoples of Rhodesia, both black and white. But until there is some firm evidence that Britain accepts the principle of independence on the basis of majority rule, and is prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to make it a reality, then Africa has no choice but to support the struggle for the people's freedom by whatever means are open.

17. Just as a settlement of the Rhodesian problem with a minimum of violence is a British responsibility, so a settlement in South-West Africa with a minimum of violence is a United Nations responsibility. By every canon of international law, and by every precedent, South-West Africa should by now have been a sovereign, independent State with a Government based on majority rule. South-West Africa was a German colony until 1919, just as Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi, Togoland, and Cameroon were German colonies. It was a matter of European politics that when the Mandatory system was established after Germany had been defeated, the administration of South-West Africa was given to the white minority Government of South Africa, while the other ex-German colonies in Africa were put into the hands of the British, Belgian, or French Governments. After the Second World War every mandated territory except South-West Africa was converted into a Trusteeship Territory and has subsequently gained independence. South Africa, on the other hand, has persistently refused to honour even the international obligation it accepted in 1919, and has increasingly applied to South-West Africa the inhuman doctrines and organisation of apartheid.

18. The United Nations General Assembly has ruled against this action and in 1966 terminated the Mandate under which South Africa had a legal basis for its occupation and domination of South-West Africa. The General Assembly declared that the territory is now the direct responsibility of the United Nations and set up an ad hoc Committee to recommend practical means by which South-West Africa would be administered, and the people enabled to exercise self determination and to achieve independence.

19. Nothing could be clearer than this decision—which no permanent member of the Security Council voted against. Yet, since that time no effective measures have been taken to enforce it. South-West Africa

remains in the clutches of the most ruthless minority Government in Africa. Its people continue to be oppressed and those who advocate even peaceful progress to independence continue to be persecuted. The world has an obligation to use its strength to enforce the decision which all the countries cooperated in making. If they do this there is hope that the change can be effected without great violence. If they fail, then sooner or later the people of South-West Africa will take the law into their own hands. The people have been patient beyond belief, but one day their patience will be exhausted. Africa at least will then be unable to deny their call for help.

20. *The Union of South Africa* is itself an independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. It is more highly developed and richer than any other nation in Africa. On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa. Yet the purpose of law is people and we assert that the actions of the South African Government are such that the rest of the world has a responsibility to take some action in defence of humanity.

21. There is one thing about South African oppression which distinguishes it from other oppressive regimes. The apartheid policy adopted by Government, and supported to a greater or lesser extent by almost all its white citizens, is based on a rejection of man's humanity. A position, privilege or the experience of oppression in the South African society depends on the one thing which it is beyond the power of any man to change. It depends upon a man's colour, his parentage and his ancestors. If you are black you cannot escape this categorisation; nor can you escape it if you are white. If you are a black millionaire and a brilliant political scientist, you are still subject to the pass laws and still excluded from political activity. If you are white, even protests against the system and an attempt to reject segregation will lead you only to the segregation, and the comparative comfort of a white jail. Beliefs, abilities, and behaviour are all irrelevant. The whole system of government and society in South Africa is based on the denial of human equality. And the system is maintained by ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population—and, thus, inevitably of all.

22. These things are known and are regularly condemned in the Councils of the United Nations and elsewhere. But it appears that to many countries international law takes precedence over humanity; therefore no action follows the words. Yet even if international law is held to exclude active assistance to the South African opponents of apartheid, it does not demand that the comfort and support of human and commercial intercourse should be given to a government which rejects the manhood of most humanity. South Africa should be excluded from United Nations Agencies, and even from the United Nations itself. It should be ostracised by the world community. It should be isolated from world trade patterns and left to be self-sufficient if it can. The South African Government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of mankind's unity and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. And certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.

23. The signatories to this Manifesto assert that the validity of the principles of human equality and dignity extend to the Union of South Africa just as they extend to the colonial territories of Southern Africa. Before a basis for peaceful development can be established in this continent, these principles must be acknowledged by every nation, and in every State there must be a deliberate attempt to implement them.

24. We affirm our commitment to these principles of human equality and human dignity, and to the doctrines of self-determination and non-racialism. We shall work for their extension within our own nations and throughout the continent of Africa.

#### **Inaugural Address**

The following is the inaugural address of Dr. Kenneth Kaunda at the summit conference:

Your Imperial Majesty,

Your Excellencies,

Let me first of all express my great pleasure and that of the Government and the people of Zambia at having such a distinguished gathering of African leaders and statesmen in our Republic. It is for us a historic event. We feel deeply honoured to have you with us. We very happily and sincerely welcome you all and wish you a very happy and enjoyable stay in our country.

I must hasten to add that Zambia is probably the least endowed among Eastern and Central African countries with facilities for relaxation after a hard day's work ; however, I can still ask you to feel free and very much at home.

We last met in Dar es Salaam 11 months ago. These months have been very eventful.

On the debit side the tragic war between Nigeria and Biafra continues with unabated fury, unequalled in severity to anything this continent has ever known ever since the slave trade. Wars of liberation in Southern Africa continue with no sign of hope that the forces of freedom will break through the high dykes of racialism and minority rule.

Still on the debit side the Middle East crisis which envelopes part of Africa still remains unresolved. It is a threat to the peace of Africa, first, because it affects part of this Continent; secondly, because it is a matter of international peace and security for which we in Africa share concern and responsibility through the United Nations and, in general, as members of the international community.

There are many problems which have plagued the world in its various regions such as the war of attrition in Vietnam for which Africa feels genuine and deep concern. I do not need to stress that here.

Finally, Mother Africa has gone through another period of painful growth full of stresses and strains in her various constituent parts.

However, on the credit side of this balance sheet we find that the story is one of progress :—

—Progress towards greater understanding and cooperation among neighbours—a phenomenon which we gathered here represent,—progress towards unity for which African States have continued to work untiringly,—progress towards building a strong economic and social base, a sound infrastructure for the attainment of African unity, a unity of interests, a feeling of community and a common destiny.

The meetings in Nairobi, Kinshasa, Kampala, Dar es Salaam and now Lusaka form one unfolding success story. Consequently, our presence in Lusaka during these few days creates the hope that our efforts to seek unity, peace, security and development for and in Africa will continue. For the creation of greater understanding and cooperation among Eastern and Central African neighbours guarantees the successful growth of common interests and a spirit of unity among these neighbours.

The Sudan and Uganda, Kenya and Somalia, Ethiopia and Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, Uganda and Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda and Burundi, among others, all represent real progress in their various efforts and successes to create a better framework for understanding and cooperation in the solution of their outstanding problems on the road to unity.

I think we have made impressive efforts to inspire confidence in the future of this region and Africa as a whole. The contribution of His Imperial Majesty to the peace, security and unity of Africa requires special mention and we pay tribute to him.

We cannot pretend that there are no problems. Problems there are and they will continue to be with us but I regard these as pitfalls within a wider story of success. They are pitfalls in a continuing drama of progress which is a familiar phenomenon in any life which is growing. We are a life which is growing and we shall have our brightest days and darkest hours.

The most important thing now is that for three years the East and Central African region has engaged in genuine and concentrated efforts to create better conditions and better framework for understanding, cooperation and coordination for unity and progress among the Eastern and Central African countries represented here as well as in the whole Continent. There can be no better road at the moment than that which has good neighbourliness and cooperation as a starting point and foundation.

To this extent the progress we have made is plausible. Communications between member States of this region are improving. Telephone and telegraph communications are either under way, or nearing completion, if not completed. International airline communications are better than they

ever were ; road and rail connections are being forged; shipping lines ply the coastal areas of member States with access to the sea.

With all this multi-dimensional development the 1970s should see the establishment of a network of new arteries of communications and the improvement of the present ones which together must nourish the growth of greater cooperation and coordination in development. This is a challenge for us all. This is the one ambition which we all share and must devote our energies to give effect to our determination.

Now, we have before us the recommendations made by our Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Dar es Salaam in February last. They cover political and economic fields. They are aimed at furthering the aims and objectives of all of us here. I am sure the Conference would wish me to pay our tribute to the Foreign Ministers for their efforts.

In the past meetings we have developed the procedure of having no formal agenda, no restrictions in our discussions. Informality and frankness have marked our deliberations. This approach has paid off very well and I would not wish to depart from it.

However, in the light of the wide field covered by the discussions and recommendations made in Lusaka by the Foreign Ministers in 1967 and by the Kampala and Dar es Salaam Summits in December 1967 and May 1968 respectively and the recommendations before us at this fifth Summit I think that sufficient ground has been opened for this Conference to consider.

I would only add by way of emphasis that the real problem is one of effective implementation of the recommendations so far considered where feasibility studies have been completed with satisfaction. I cannot avoid feeling a sense of urgency in the implementation of the proposals affecting economic development and social improvement in our area as this is a vital factor for the progress which we so desire in East and Central Africa.

I wish to make a brief reference to the UNCTAD Conference held in 1968 in India. The results of the Conference do not hold as much hope as we, the developing countries, had expected. We are not belittling the efforts which were made but we are underlining one key factor *i.e.* the importance of self-reliance within our own individual States as well as in the region as a whole. Indeed, the purpose of this Conference would be well served if we were able to implement the various recommendations on telecommunications, on transportation, trade, economic planning and so forth. This would in a way meet one of the points already made by the Pearson Commission on International Development Aid, namely, that while finances may be made available to us we must remember that we are the primary force behind our own development and we must be responsible for giving effective direction to this development. We are aware of this responsibility and hence our emphasis on economic and technical co-operation among ourselves.

In this connection we welcome the organisation among West African countries in their effort to stimulate economic and technical cooperation to harmonise development in their own region.

The Conference will, no doubt, consider political problems in Africa, the most urgent among them being the fratricidal war which has plagued Nigeria and Biafra for the last two years. We all deeply regret this tragedy as a setback to Africa's development.

At this time I know the Conference would wish me to express the hope that the OAU Consultative Committee due to meet in Monrovia later this week will bring an end to this war and restore peace and a spirit of brotherhood. We wish the Chairman of the Committee, His Imperial Majesty, success and God's guidance in this noble task. We pray that wisdom and love for mankind and peace may shed a beam of brightness upon the leaders of the warring parties so that hope for peace and security may filter through to the victims of war and starvation.

The Southern African situation remains critical. It is a time bomb. The developments which have occurred have only added to our anxiety.

In Rhodesia, Mr. Wilson has moved since November 1965 from the 1961 Constitution to the Tiger and from the Tiger to the Fearless proposals, each worse than the previous one—and still calling the result an "honourable settlement".

It must be said that history has recorded not the British Government's inability to solve the problem but their utter refusal, despite the consequences, to discharge their obligation towards the four million people in Rhodesia. These millions were not a party to the Tiger or the Fearless proposals.

To entrust the so-called six principles to diehard minority racists is to place confidence in a people who by their repeated repressive acts against the majority have shown utter disregard for fair play and justice.

On the question of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea there can be no excuse for the Portuguese Government not to grant independence. We in Africa have amply displayed the dynamic forces of development unleashed after independence. Independence had paid not only the colonised but also the colonisers in trade and investment.

Behind the thinking of the Portuguese Government may be the fear for the security and future welfare of their nationals whose lives have become so wedded to life in colonial territories. We do not need to give assurances to the Portuguese Government about security and future of their nationals in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea.

However, if any assurance is needed we will only refer to the lessons drawn from the excellent conduct of the African independent countries towards their minorities, once their rulers. Nowhere in independent Africa has a nationalist Government taken vengeance and victimised its minority groups. No where in Africa has an African Government driven or even threatened to drive a racial minority into the sea. On the contrary, African Governments, despite a history replete with hardship and oppression by these racial minorities, have, after their accession to power, displayed the most humane qualities; they have immediately striven to create con-

ditions which ensure full and equal justice, equal opportunities for all without distinction.

The Portuguese Government should also find assurance from the stories which we hear of the conduct of freedom fighters towards the Portuguese nationals who have fallen under their control.

So far as we know, Portuguese nationals in areas under the control of freedom fighters have been treated as humans. This is an indication of the human and humanist outlook even under the most difficult and tempting conditions for freedom fighters. It is an indication of the preparedness of the freedom fighters to assume full responsibility for the future of these Portuguese nationals.

Nothing demonstrates the humanness of the African people, their patience and consideration for human beings than their treatment of minorities after independence. This must be regarded as a proud record and a source of our strength. It is also a demonstration of the determination of independent Africa to work for a non-racial world society. For international cooperation will remain an academic exercise unless both the minorities and the majorities realise that the cooperation of each group with the other is vital to the success of the whole international society.

We welcome the recent Security Council resolution on NAMIBIA and would appeal most earnestly particularly to France and Britain to join hands with the rest of the members of the Security Council to help build an effective moral force on world scale against the defiance of South Africa. Unless we are united against the forces of injustice and oppression, I am afraid we will only allow these forces to be united against the efforts of men of goodwill to the detriment of peace and security which we seek to protect and further.

As for South Africa herself, her future is not in apartheid but in helping to foster a world community of free peoples cooperating in their endeavours to develop what nature has provided for them and sharing equitably in responsibility and in the fruits of their labour.

Apartheid is a concept whose methods are outrageous, oppressive and self-contradictory and whose end is self-destruction.

Our meetings are always practical. That we are able to meet in adjacent to hostile minority regimes is a mark of progress. It is a milestone on the road to complete liberation of this Continent.

Your Imperial Majesty, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, among the problems which this Conference will wish to consider are these which I have outlined. It is my sincere hope that our deliberations will add yet to our capacity individually as nations and collectively as members of this region to contribute more effectively to economic development and social improvement and above all to the movement for African Unity.



# Quarterly Chronicle

VANITA SABIKI

## INDIA AND AFRICA

### **Conference of Indian Ambassadors in West Asia and North Africa:**

Thirteen Indian envoys to West Asia and North Africa assembled in Delhi recently for an exhaustive survey of the political and economic situation in their respective areas. In conference from May 23 to 27, Indian diplomats in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, the UAR, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan and Turkey reviewed India's policies in these countries and generally agreed to effect a new orientation in the light of the growing interest in the development of mutual trade and economic relations. A series of concrete proposals for closer economic, trade, technological and cultural relations between India and the WANA (West Asian and North African) countries were formulated. The envoys were advised to give top priority to fostering such contacts and presenting an image of an industrially developing country which could play an important role in the development of the countries to which they were accredited. The Ministry of External Affairs Economic Division, it was agreed, would in future deal with all matters relating to economic and industrial contacts by coordinating the activities of the concerned ministries. Towards this purpose, it was recommended that export houses and show-rooms be opened in different countries and that the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry send a delegation to these regions to convey a comprehensive idea of the industrial progress made in India. It was also decided that India should participate in the forthcoming trade fairs at Teheran and Algeria.

India's trade with the WANA countries was closely surveyed. India's total exports, consisting mainly of non-traditional items like engineering goods, iron and steel, chemicals and allied products, to the West Asian region, it was noted, increased from Rs. 42 crores in 1966-67 to Rs. 49 crores in 1967-68 and reached a total of Rs. 58 crores in the first nine months (April-December) of 1968-69. India's total exports to and imports from the region as a whole in 1968-69 were balanced. Similarly, the conference noted that India's trade with the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan and the UAR had increased from Rs. 51.2 crores in 1964-65 to Rs. 87.8 crores in 1966-67. It remained at the same level through 1967-68 and stood at Rs. 83.14 crores in the first nine months of 1968-69. In these areas, however, India continued to have an adverse balance of trade because of the decline in the exports of tea and cotton cloth to the UAR. In view of this sizable trade and the necessity of securing export promotion and rectification of imbalances, the conference recommended the establishment of warehouses in ports along the African coasts as also the Mediterranean. It was suggested that shipping services should expand their communication line to the WANA region and that an overland land route be opened.

The attitude of the Super Powers to West Asia and North Africa was the main topic of discussion in the political analysis. The West Asian conflict, the relationship of the US and the Western nations with Israel, the activities of the

Western oil cartels and the possible consequences of the British withdrawal of troops from the Arab region were discussed. Noting that the countries of the region were increasingly opposed to continued Western control, in some cases over their economies and politics and were trying to find alternative sources for their development among the developing nations, the conference stressed the possibility of India playing a vital role in the area. India could actively help by providing technical know-how and assistance to these countries, several of which were at a lower technological level. The envoys identified major points of short and long term national interest and once again urged development of trade and commercial contacts.

The conference also decided on opening new diplomatic missions in a number of countries, including Libya and the Persian Gulf territories. Several other proposals for cooperation in the cultural, educational and technical training fields were agreed upon (*Patriot*, May 27 and 29).

Commending the idea of convening a conference of Indian heads of missions in each region and that too a homogeneous Arab area, the *National Herald*, in an editorial on May 29, said it would "be useful for our men on the spot to be in personal touch collectively with the sources of foreign policy from time to time; they too with free exchange of views can make a contribution to policy-making. Recalling the existence of traditional close cooperation between India and the Arab countries since ancient times, the editorial added, "Against this background it should not be difficult for the Indian heads of missions to go back and articulate policies clearly and sturdily from Morocco to Kabul". Further, keeping in mind the basic issue of Arab nationalism the newspaper advised that India "should establish close diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with them. Economic and cultural ties underlie diplomatic ties and India has reached a stage of development when she can have joint economic ventures in as many countries as possible. For those in this country who expect Israel to be India's true friend it is worth putting the question whether it is wise to lose so many friends for the sake of this one friend which has committed aggression so many times and is refusing to withdraw it."

**Government Policy on Peoples of Indian Origin Reiterated :** In the Rajya Sabha on February 20, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, stated that India would place no restrictions on peoples of Indian origin in Africa returning to India under the existing citizenship regulations. Answering questions on the orders issued by several African countries dispossessing Indians of their trade and property rights, Mr. Dinesh Singh explained that India could not take any action to help these peoples beyond what could be done on "humanitarian grounds". Appealing to these peoples to make adjustments with the new situation in African countries, the Minister maintained that it was only a question of Indians integrating themselves with the peoples of the countries in which they lived. Matters should not be complicated by giving false hopes to the displaced persons. If India was to become a "self-appointed" guardian of all the people of Indian origin everywhere in the world, it would only disturb them in the countries in which they lived, he said.

**Khadilkar to Visit East Africa :** Mr. R.K. Khadilkar, Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, recently left on a goodwill tour of East Africa and Europe. He will visit Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia and Italy, Rumania and the German Democratic Republic.

**Trade Agreement with Algeria :** An agreement was recently signed between India and Algeria to strengthen the economic ties existing between the two

countries. Under the agreement Algeria will supply fertilisers and rock phosphates, a small quantity of olive oil, non-ferrous metals and cork. India will export textiles, manufactured goods and machinery, including pipes and cranes and construction machinery. In addition, India will supply coffee, tea, tobacco and jute goods. The total volume of trade after the signing of the agreement will be Rs. 7.5 crores a year against Rs. 3.7 million in 1965-66. Improved trade relations between the two countries, it is hoped, will rectify the prevailing trade imbalance.

**Trade Protocol with the UAR :** In New Delhi on March 19, a trade protocol was signed between India and the UAR for collaboration in the field of agricultural development. The protocol, an outcome of talks between the Government of India and a UAR agricultural delegation led by the Minister for Land Reclamation, Mohammed Bakr Ahmed, provided for the setting up of a joint advisory committee of experts and officials which will meet once a year, alternatively at New Delhi and Cairo, to review and formulate specific programmes.

**Indian Plan for Uganda Mill Approved :** An Indian industrialist's proposal to establish a jute bag manufacturing project has been approved by the Uganda Government. The project, costing £1 million, will be set up in partnership with the Uganda Development Corporation. It is expected to produce over a million jute bags needed for Uganda's coffee crop and a further quantity of jute sacking for packing cotton bales.

**Indian Ambassador Presents Credentials to President Mobutu:** Speaking on the occasion of the presentation of credentials on March 12 by India's new Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mr. Surendra Singh Alirajpur, President Joseph Mobutu recalled India's contribution to the evolution of the idea of the 'Third World' of nations. "Faithful to the ideas of Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru", he said, "India has responded to the ardent desire of the nations of the 'Third World' which are looking for a just solution to the problem of the deterioration of exchange terms and just remunerations for raw materials." Referring to UNCTAD II, the Congolese President said: "As in the case of the Bandung Conference, the results achieved at New Delhi have not lived up to the hopes of disinherited humanity. But this meeting has opened up a dialogue between the affluent countries and the under-developed world which will help to serve as a basis of new thinking on the necessity of establishing machinery for a more fair system of international exchange".

President Mobutu recalled India's "already solid and old friendship" with the Congo and said this was "based on the identity of our destiny, on common ideals and on the firm conviction that cooperation between the under-developed states is the foundation of a real and lasting peace." The President also spoke of India's contribution in bringing about "national unity and internal stability in the Congo which was seriously threatened in the early days of our independence".

**Gandhi Commemorative Stamps :** The Governments of the UAR and Mauritius announced the release of special Mahatma Gandhi commemorative stamps on October 2. The UAR stamps—2½ million are to be printed—will be trilingual with letters in Arabic, Hindi and English. The Mauritius stamps will show Gandhiji as a law student, as a stretcher bearer in the Zulu War, as a Satyagrahi and as the father of the Indian nation.

**Help to be Extended to UAR Industry :** Mr. K.L. Nanjappa, Indian Develop-

ment Commissioner for Small Scale Industries, on his return from Cairo after talks with UAR authorities, said in New Delhi on April 8 that the UAR would immediately import equipment to the tune of Rs. 2 crores for setting up two industrial estates. One of the estates is designed to be an ancillary unit for automobile parts. It was hoped, the Commissioner said, that the new unit would enable the increase of indigenous car components from 60 per cent to 95 per cent. Indian collaboration was also sought for setting up units for making bicycles, sewing machines, electric house service meters, water meters, electric fans and diesel engines in the small-scale sector. Also, the UAR Government had requested that a team of Indian economists make techno-economic surveys and suggest possibilities of industrial expansion.

**Wagons to be Supplied to Sudan :** The Sudan Government recently placed an order with an Indian firm for the supply of 120 covered goods wagons at a cost of Rs. 75 lakhs. This is the first order from the Sudan for the supply of wagons—Belgium is the traditional supplier. India, it may be recalled, undertook last year a turnkey project for laying a power supply line linking Khartoum with some important industrial regions of the country.

**Wool Exports to Africa Rise :** India's exports of wool and woollen fabrics have increased considerably in recent years from Rs. 23.3 lakhs in 1966-67 to Rs. 67.4 lakhs in 1967-68. This increase was chiefly due to the increased intake by the woollen hosiery industry. Another interesting and significant trend is the increased purchase of woollen fabrics by African countries. From a bare export figure of a few thousand rupees in 1966-67, last year's exports rose to Rs. 26.4 lakhs. This has been largely due to the recently increased exports of carpets, blankets and druggets.

**African Rail Official's Visit :** A delegation of senior railway officials from Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Zambia paid a six-week visit to industrial and engineering installations in the country. The delegation surveyed railway and industrial establishments in India.

**Kenyan Diplomatic Representation in India :** In April, the Kenya Government announced the opening of a diplomatic mission in India. Since then Kenya's first High Commissioner to India, Mr. Lee Pins Odera, has taken up his new assignment. It may be mentioned that Mr. Odera graduated from the Delhi University some years ago.

In Nairobi, the new Indian High Commissioner, Mr. Avtar Singh, presented his credentials to President Jomo Kenyatta on March 12.

**Anniversary of Israeli Aggression :** At a press conference on June 4, on the eve of the second anniversary of the Israeli aggression (June 5, 1967) the UAR Ambassador to India in a statement said that "we are not ready to surrender any part of our territories to the forces of aggression. The maximum limit has been given in our consent to the Security Council resolution. We take this opportunity to convey, through you, the deep appreciation and thanks of the UAR Government and people for the sustained support of the Indian Government and people—on various levels—to the Arab legitimate stand and the Palestinian resistance".

## **ORGANISATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY**

**OAU Council of Ministers Meets in Addis Ababa :** The OAU Council of Ministers held a meeting in Addis Ababa in February. A "hard-line" resolution on apartheid and colonialism adopted on February 22 expressed the Council's "worry over the deteriorating situation in territories under racist and colonial domination". The resolution called on OAU Member-States to take the necessary steps to aid the "armed struggle" in Africa to free territories still under foreign domination. South Africa's apartheid was unanimously condemned. The Council denounced the British proposals for a settlement on Rhodesia presented abroad the Fearless. No negotiations could be held with the illegal Rhodesian regime, and the resolution added that the only means of settlement was the use of armed force. The Conference also adopted a statement reaffirming support to the Middle East Resolution of the Algiers OAU Summit of September 1968.

## **ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN AFRICA**

**ECA's Ninth Session at Addis Ababa:** The UN's Economic Commission for Africa met in conference at Addis Ababa in February. Attended by delegates from all the 41 Member-States, including the three newly admitted associates, France, Britain and Spain, as well as delegates from UN affiliated organizations and observers from other countries, the Conference adopted several resolutions. The Member-States recommended the establishment of an ECA Ministerial Conference empowered to consider matters of policy and priorities of programmes and activities of the ECA, including inter-African and international economic policy. A ministerial conference will be held every two years to study economic and financial affairs, planning and development of the Member-States. The resolution also called for the establishment of a technical committee of experts and an executive committee. Effective cooperation between the ECA and the OAU in the economic and social spheres was advised through another resolution. A third resolution called for a revision of the functions, and a review of the structures and organizations of the ECA Secretariat, including its sub-regional offices, to make such groupings more realistic. On this resolution the Conference recommended the establishment and implementation of a long-range programme of Africanisation. It was considered "absolutely necessary" that Member-Governments should make available qualified personnel to the ECA who could be appointed to responsible and policy-making posts.

A fourth resolution adopted assessed the work of the Commission in the past ten years and urged Member-States to encourage a spirit of self-reliance. It requested the ECA to advise and assist Member-Governments in drawing up realistic plans for specific targets of growth. (*Daily Nation*, February 12).

**ECA Organizes Technical Assistance Seminar :** The Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in collaboration with the Office of Technical Cooperation organized a Technical Assistance Seminar in Addis Ababa early in April. Attended by representatives from 12 English-speaking African countries (Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, UAR and the East African Community) and specialised agencies of the UN, the Seminar studied the techniques and procedures of UN technical assistance. Earlier the Executive Secretary of the ECA, Mr. Robert Gardiner, said at its inaugural session: "We in the ECA attach

particular importance to this Seminar because we are convinced that African governments are not getting all the benefits they should derive from the UN assistance programme... We believe that a better understanding of techniques and procedures should enable member-states to arrange their priorities in order to be able to extend direct assistance to the most critical areas." (*Ethiopian Herald* April 8)

**World Bank Commission Meetings in Abidjan and Kampala:** An International Development Commission of Inquiry, headed by the former Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Lester Pearson, met in Abidjan from March 18 to 20 and in Kampala from March 24 to 26. At Abidjan representatives from Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Mauritania, Mali and the Ivory Coast studied the various problems which countries of West and Central Africa would have to solve to make economic progress. International trade, the terms and volume of aid, private investment and technical assistance and relations between aid-giving and aid-receiving countries were analysed. At the meeting at Kampala, representatives of the ten African countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) agreed that solutions to their aid and development problems lay with them. Having noted that there was less international effort on development in Africa than in other parts of the world, the Conference hoped that the Commission would be able to get the developed and less developed countries to help the various development projects.

**FED Aid to African Countries:** The European Economic Community's Development Fund (FED) announced in February aid programmes totalling \$1,433,000 to Rwanda, Burundi and Togo. To Rwanda, FED has allocated a sum of \$366,000 to develop its electric power projects which include the construction of a hydro-electric plant at Mukungwa. Burundi, to be given \$307,000, will utilise the money to develop a tea plantation, a tea processing plant and a power station. The aid to Togo, totalling \$760,000, is to help finance a programme of agricultural development. Togo is also to receive a non-repayable aid of 280 million CFA francs for a road project.

**Afro-Asian Conference on Small Industries:** In Cairo, from March 24 to 27, the first Afro-Asian Conference on Small Industries met. Organized by the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, the Conference was attended by 34 African and Asian countries and 12 world organizations. The Conference dealt with the role of small industries in the economic development of African and Asian countries and adopted a number of recommendations for promotion of co-operation among the participant countries, increased exchange of experiences between the developing countries and the consolidation of economic and social development. An important recommendation put forth by the Conference was a definition of the industrial countries' responsibility towards the developing countries and the necessity for cooperation between the Afro-Asian countries to bridge the gap between them and the developed countries. A call was made to mobilise all resources of the Afro-Asian countries for the implementation of economic development plans and the achievement of a reasonable standard of living in the two continents. Members of the Conference observed that the Afro-Asian countries should take the initiative with regard to their economic development plans and that foreign aid should be the next step. The vital role of small industries in the process of economic development of these countries was noted and it was recommended

that attempts should be made to extend and mechanise them. It was also decided to hold an Afro-Asian Conference on the Development of Small Industries every two years.

## **UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA**

**Security Council Calls on South Africa to Withdraw from Southern West Africa :** In a resolution sponsored by Colombia, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Senegal and Zambia, the Security Council on March 20 called on South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia (South-West Africa). The resolution invited all States to exert their influence to effect this withdrawal and decided that "in the event of failure on the part of the Government of South Africa to comply... the Security Council will meet immediately to determine necessary steps or measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the UN."

**Resolution on Rhodesia Voted :** The UN Decolonisation Committee on March 26 voted a resolution calling on Britain to take immediate measures to "secure the release of all political prisoners" in Rhodesia. Submitted by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, India, Iraq, Iran, Mali, Syria, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, the resolution unanimously expressed "profound indignation at the trial and conviction of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and the continued detention, imprisonment and assassination of other nationalist leaders by the illegal racist minority regime". Concern was also voiced at the attempts by the "illegal regime to entrench, under the guise of a so-called new Constitution, its policies of separate racial development in Southern Rhodesia . . ." The resolution called upon Britain "to take immediate measures to secure the release of all political prisoners and to prevent the production of the so-called new Constitution."

## **AFRO-MALAGASY JOINT ORGANISATION**

**Heads of State Conference :** An Afro-Malagasy Joint Organisation (OCAM) Heads of State Conference was held in Kinshasa from January 27-30. Attended by 10 of the 14 OCAM Member-States, the Conference was boycotted by the Congo Republic and the Central African Republic because of their differences with the Congo (DR). The Conference, despite "contradictory interests and different situations" reached agreement on almost all points. The final communique stated that after an examination of the political situation in Africa, the Conference recommended various measures to bring about peace and friendship between Member-States. The communique also noted that the Congo (DR) and Rwanda refused to re-establish their relations ruptured in January 1968 after Rwanda refused to hand over to Kinshasa the interned Congo mercenaries.

The OCAM members agreed to create an African Cultural Institute to secure co-operation among them and called for closer relations between the OCAM's different specialist organizations and between African universities.

Among the economic subjects discussed was the attitude of the OCAM states, linked with the European Common Market, to the renewal of the Yaounde Convention. A statement issued urged that this be renewed before the expiry date of May 31. The delegates also considered that preferential tariffs on products

must be maintained and expressed agreement with the new common agricultural policy outlined by the Common Market countries.

The European Economic Community's decision to set up a third European Development Fund was welcomed, but Member-States considered this proposition insufficient and called for increased European aid. Finally, the delegates recommended co-ordination in the sphere of industrialisation and the institution of a system for guaranteeing private investments and facilitating procedures for international loans.

On January 30 President Diori of the Niger Republic announced that the two Congos, Chad and the Central African Republic had decided to normalise their relations in the fields of economy, culture, and communications. This conciliation, the President reported, was the outcome of continued negotiations at the Kinshasa Conference.

**Mauritius Admitted as Member of OCAM:** On February 4, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius, announced that his country had joined the OCAM. He expressed the hope that the Member-States of the OCAM would help Mauritius adjust its economy to their's and promote co-operation in the economic, social and cultural spheres.

**Africanisation Conference :** A Conference on Africanisation and the promotion of African companies, sponsored by the Afro-Malagasy Joint Organization (OCAM) and organized by the International Association for Development and Technical Aid, met in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, from April 15 to 18. Attended by all OCAM members (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo (DR), Congo Republic, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Upper Volta, Niger, Madagascar, Rwanda, Senegal, Chad and Togo) and representatives of the French Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs, the ILO, the World Bank, and the European Development Fund (FED), the Conference emphasized the importance of formulating a policy of Africanisation on a joint collection of principles agreed to by all OCAM States and professional associations. The participants also called on the OCAM President to appoint a commission to visit Member-States to examine the possibilities of professional training offered by existing centres.

## **EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA**

**Summit Conference in Lusaka :** The Heads of State and Governments of East and Central Africa met in conference at Lusaka from April 14 to 16 under the chairmanship of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (See "Documentation" for a detailed report of the Conference).

In an editorial on April 16 the *Nationalist* said that although the summit was essentially a good neighbourly get-together, it could not take any political decisions which were binding to anyone. "The summit should have reviewed the help which African liberation forces have been getting since the last summit in Dar-es-Salaam last year and, in particular, it should see if all members in the East and Central African states have fulfilled their obligations to the liberation movements. Furthermore, the summit should have reviewed the development of respective Member-States—politically, economically and socially".



The editorial also warned of the reactionary and neocolonialist attitudes of Malawian President Hastings Banda and Tsiranana of Malagasy "who shamelessly abandon and auction Africa at the top of their voices" and urged the summit to get away from petty nationalism. "The time has come", it concluded, "for East and Central Africa to advance and constitute itself into a revolutionary base for the salvation of Africa".

Commenting on the grouping of the East and Central African States, larger than the East African Community but smaller than the Afro-Malagasy Organization (OCAM) and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) the *Uganda Argus* (April 15) commended the operation of these meetings. They had worked without being in conflict with the other African organizations. "It is significant", it added, "that this grouping brings in both English-speaking and French-speaking States; in its own way it has been able to do a great deal to lower the barriers which the language division has created in Africa in the past .."

**Foreign Ministers Confer in Dar-es-Salaam :** A meeting of Foreign Ministers from the East and Central African sub-region was held in Dar-es-Salaam at the beginning of February. Representatives from Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo (DR), Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania attended. The Ministers presented progress reports, discussed in detail ways and means of strengthening economic co-operation and technical collaboration at a regional level and made specific recommendations to the Heads of State and Governments in the fields of industry, agriculture, transport and communication, energy, human resources and trade.

**UDEAC Finance Ministers Meet :** Finance Ministers of the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC), in conference in Libreville in March, prepared a reorganisation project for a regional grouping. Mr. Augustus Bouham, Gabonese Finance Minister, said the Ministers were determined "to spare no effort, to aid the Heads of State resolve the difficult problems posed by the development of this immense integrated economic area". According to the communique issued, a plan for industrialising the Member-States—Gabon, Cameroon, Congo Republic and the Central African Republic—will be submitted to the UDEAC Heads of State at their next summit meeting scheduled to be held in Libreville in December 1969.

## ETHIOPIA

**Public Safety and Welfare Order Decree :** Emperor Haile Selassie on April 5 promulgated the Public Safety and Welfare Order Decree as "public order, security and people's welfare were threatened in several parts of the empire by certain evilly disposed persons." Under the new law troublemakers can be arrested and detained for six months if found threatening order and public security. The Order also decreed that places suspected of being used by any association encouraging or aiding actions of violence or intimidation prejudicial to order and public security could be banned. The new Order is valid for six months.

**Students Sentenced :** Following a widespread student agitation in the country in March and April, which led to the arrest and detention of several thousand students, the Addis Ababa High Court on April 30 sentenced four university students and one secondary school teacher, charged with defamation and incitement to break law and public order, to five years' jail with hard labour—the maximum

penalty prescribed under the law. The Court ruled that all of them "acted as a gang organized to commit offences" and spread false rumours to "foment dissension and stir up acts of violence and general disturbances. The four students and the teacher authored and distributed pamphlets abusing and defaming constitutional authorities." The Court also said they had been working in close collaboration with foreign agents working against the country. No names were given by the Court but these foreign agents were understood to be three Russians and three Czechoslovaks who were recently deported from Ethiopia.

**Trade Agreement with Somalia :** The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a statement on March 31 announced the signing of a "most favoured nation" trade agreement with Somalia. Under the agreement, each country will provide the other, "on the basis of reciprocity and within the laws and regulations of each country, the most favoured nation treatment on all questions relating to customs duties, charges, importation, exportation, loading and unloading of goods, shipping, port harbour facilities and issue of import and export licences." (*Ethiopian Herald*, April 1).

## KENYA

**President Tsiranana's Visit :** In Nairobi on April 16, the Madagascar President had talks with President Kenyatta. Reporting an interview with President Tsiranana, the *Daily Nation* said the two leaders had cordial discussions. "I believe", President Tsiranana said, "that this meeting has helped to further and better relations between our two countries. We are interested in cultural, educational and economic development...When there is a better understanding only then will there be a better consolidation of the peace and unity of Africa." (*Daily Nation*, April 18).

**General Ankrah's Visit :** General J.A. Ankrah, Chairman of the National Liberation Council of Ghana, paid a state visit to Nairobi in February. A communique issued after his talks with President Jomo Kenyatta said they had agreed to promote trade between their countries, establish better communication links and make economic co-operation more meaningful. To further these aims, the communique said, the two leaders approved the exchange of students, sportsmen, traditional dancers, and experts in the fields of agriculture and tourism. In the communique President Kenyatta indicated his Government's intention of establishing a diplomatic mission in Ghana. Ghana already has a diplomatic mission in Nairobi.

On international affairs, the two leaders reaffirmed their full support to the OAU and the UN and stressed the need to strengthen these organizations so as to enable them to carry out their aims. The communique reiterated the two leaders' belief in NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule) in Rhodesia and felt that no equitable or lasting settlement could be effected without it. Both General Ankrah and President Jomo Kenyatta resolved to support all measures designed to rid Africa of foreign domination and advised self-determination under UN auspices for South-West Africa. (*Ghana Times*, February 19).

**Trade Licensing Act Reviewed :** The *East African Standard* on March 27 said Kenya's Trade Licensing Act was presently under review so that established companies might be granted licences for up to three years. The paper quoted the Minister for Finance and Industry, Mr. Kibaki, as having said : "To remedy the

shortcomings which have come up since the Act came into force, the Ministry is now thinking of revising the Act to ensure that established businesses run by non-citizens but which are unlikely to be Africanised should be granted licences for two to three years without being subjected to annual renewals. The Government is also considering introducing amendments to the Act to ensure that business men applying for licences for the new year have ample time to do so."

**Russians Expelled :** *The Standard* (Tanzania) reported on April 14 that a *Pravda* correspondent in East Africa had been served with a notice by the Minister of Home Affairs to leave Kenya. The First Secretary of the Russian Embassy, Mr. Victor Eliseev, was also reported to have been barred from living in Kenya. No reasons were given for the expulsions.

## SOMALIA

**Somali Youth League Returned with Majority :** The General Elections held on March 24 for the 124-seat Legislature returned the ruling Somali Youth League with a majority of 73 seats. The Socialist National Congress won 11 seats, the Somali African National Union six seats and the remaining seats were divided among 25 minor political parties, including two seats for the main Opposition party—the Popular Movement for Democratic Action.

**Telephone Link With Ethiopia :** Under the terms of a telecommunications agreement with Ethiopia drawn up in February, the first direct telephone link between the two countries was inaugurated on April 1. The line, between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, marks the first phase of the telecommunications agreement (*Ethiopian Herald*, April 2).

## TANZANIA

**Union Anniversary Celebrated :** The fifth anniversary of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was celebrated in Dar-es-Salaam on April 26. President Julius Nyerere took the salute at a mass parade held on the occasion. Speaking on the eve of the anniversary, the President said the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar "is being firmly cemented and will remain cemented for ever". The process of uniting the two parts of the Republic, he added, was going on "as well as any one would expect".

**World Bank Loan for Road Project :** In Washington on February 19, the World Bank and its affiliates—the International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation—announced a loan of £5,350,000 for the construction of the Iyayi-Morogoro section of the Tanzania-Zambia Highway. The World Bank group and Sweden are jointly contributing £10,700,000 towards the cost of construction of the road.

**South African National Congress Meets :** The African National Congress of South Africa held a seven-day Consultative Conference at Morogoro from April 25. The meeting, the second of its kind held in Tanzania, was attended by 60 members from African and overseas centres. Mr. George Magombe, Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, in his opening address urged the Congress members to close their ranks and eliminate all elements of disunity and

overcome ambitions and tribal discrimination among themselves. He also assured them that the OAU was fully committed to rendering every possible assistance to members of the Congress which would enable them to liquidate the oppressors in their country and elsewhere in Africa. He lauded the efforts of the African National Congress in the freedom struggle during the past year and said this was an encouraging sign for all Africa.

## UGANDA

**Pope Paul to Visit Kampala :** Pope Paul VI, during his first portifficial visit to Africa starting on July 31, is likely to visit Kampala to bless the altar of the Cathedral to be built at Nagugongo. The spot marks the martyrdom of 22 Christians burned alive during persecutions in 1885. While in Uganda, Pope Paul will also preside over the opening of the first inter-African Episcopal Conference to be attended by seven African cardinals.

**East and Central African Regional Students Seminar :** A meeting of representative students from East and Central Africa was held in Kampala early in April. The meeting pledged its complete support to all liberation movements in Africa and called on African nationalist governments who had failed to honour the OAU resolution to contribute to the liberation struggle. It also commended the efforts of other African countries which had contrlbuted liberally to the cause of liberation. (*Uganda Argus*, April 8).

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Coup Attempt Foiled :** Under the leadership of Lt.-Col. Banza the Minister for Public Health, a coup was recently planned to oust President Bokassa. The attempt, which sought to overthrow the government with military assistance, was foiled as loyal officers reported the matter to the President. On April 12, after a trial by the Permanent Military Tribunal Lt. Col. Banza was shot.

## CHAD

**Presidential Mandate Ends :** Mr. Tombalbaye's seven-year presidential mandate ended on April 22. At a press conference held on the occasion, the President announced that under Article 7 of the Chad Constitution the electoral college would be summoned within 60 days. Commenting on this statement, *Marches Tropicaux* said that since the National Assembly was the only constitutional electoral college a constitutional problem would arise. The Assembly was dissolved on December 31 at the end of its five-year legislative term.

## CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC)

**President Mobutu's Visit to European Countries :** President Joseph Mobutu paid an official visit to European countries—Greece, Germany (FR) and France—from March 14 to 27. In Athens. President Mobutu held talks with Greek Foreign Ministry officials on improving economic relations between the two countries. A communique issued at the end of his eight-day visit to Germany on March 28 stressed that both sides had expressed their desire to increase cooperation between them. The Federal Government also indicated its desire to increase "the dialogue with African countries and widen its cooperation with them in all fields in order to contribute more effectively to the establishment of a true and lasting peace

in the world". In Paris, after talks with General de Gaulle, President Mobutu at a press conference on March 27 stated that relations between France and the Congo were bound to improve because they were the largest French-speaking countries on the continent. World problems and economic policies were discussed during the talks.

## MALAWI

**President Tsiranana's Visit :** The Madagascar President during an eight-day official visit to Malawi had discussions with President Hastings Banda on various world issues. A joint communique issued at the end of his visit on April 16 said the talks in which the leaders in particular discussed the problems of Eastern and Southern Africa took place in a cordial atmosphere. The two Presidents reaffirmed their identical views on the necessity of promoting realistic policies based on justice and equity and emphasized that only through examples of persuasion and liberalism could the struggle against racism be effectively pursued. Towards this purpose they recognized the necessity of mutual understanding and co-operation and expressed the need to exchange visiting missions at all levels and to intensify cooperation in trade, commerce and tourism.

Commenting on President Tsiranana's visit, the *Times of Zambia* said "all that could be said for Presidents Banda and Tsiranana was that they have been well and truly hypnotised by Pretoria and Salisbury". "How can anyone in his right mind", the editorial added, "be honest, sincere or religious about a policy as vile as apartheid? And as for not denouncing the racists, we can visualize the day when their propaganda machine will have worked so well that Dr. Banda will be drawing up his own apartheid policy for Malawi." (*Times of Zambia*, April 12).

## MAURITIUS

**Split in Coalition Government :** The *Standard* (Tanzania) in a report on March 12 said that four members of the Independent Forward Bloc had been dismissed by the Coalition Government on March 10. "The break-up of the coalition", the paper explained, "centred on a dispute over arrangements with the Social Democratic Party, the second largest party in the Legislative Assembly, for holding municipal elections."

The Independent Forward Bloc consists mainly of Hindus and has 11 members in the 70-member Legislative Assembly. The Labour Party had 29 seats and the Moslem Committee of Action six. Of the rest 20 seats are held by the Social Democratic Party.

## ZAMBIA

**Emergency Extended :** Mr. Simon Kapwapwe, Zambian Vice-President, announced on April 24 the extension of the state of emergency for a further period of six months. The Vice-President said the security situation in the country had taken a sharp turn for the worse. The white minority regimes which shared borders with Zambia continued to pose a grave danger to Zambia's security.

**Referendum on Constitution :** In Ndola on April 10, the Minister for Rural Development, Mr. Kamanga, announced the holding of a referendum on May 20 which would enable a Zambianisation of the Constitution. The United National

Independence Party, he explained, could not at the moment pass any laws to this effect because the Constitution did not empower it.

**Agricultural Development Plan :** The Zambian Minister for Rural Development, Mr. Reuben Kamanga, recently revealed that a master plan for an agricultural revolution designed to relieve poverty in rural areas, double production and make the nation self-supporting in food was being finalised. The plan would not only boost agriculture but also narrow the gap between rural and urban workers. There is also a proposal to set up a marketing organisation to enable farmers even in the most remote parts of the country to sell their produce.

The Minister also indicated that plans were being worked out to transfer responsibility from the Government to the people. He said, "I have noticed that people working on Government agricultural projects regard themselves merely as employees. They must own their ventures, either as family groups or small co-operatives." To achieve this purpose, Mr. Kamanga said, secondary industries, such as tanneries and cereal processing plants, would be set up by the Rural Development Board. (*Times of Zambia*, February 20).

**Trade Route Ties with the South Severed :** The Ministry of Trade has put out a list of items, including agricultural and pastoral products, wines and spirits, tobaccos, fibres, yarns and textiles, metals, machinery and vehicles, drugs, chemicals and fertilisers, which would from now on be imported into Zambia through Dar-es-Salaam and not through Rhodesia. This is intended to sever the remaining trade route ties with countries to the South. (*Times of Zambia*, March 27).

**Zambia World's Third Largest Copper Producer :** Zambia was the world's third largest copper producer—after the US and the USSR—in 1968. Its production of 750,000 tons was 19,000 tons more than the previous year's. Sale proceeds in 1968 reached K532 million compared with K452 million the year before, while copper exports earned a record K518 million in foreign exchange and accounted for 95 per cent of the country's total exports. Britain was Zambia's biggest copper buyer for the year, followed by Japan, West Germany and Italy.

**Zambia to Cooperate with the East African Community :** A statement issued from the East African Community regional headquarters in Kampala stated that Zambia would be associated with the Community in three services—posts and telecommunications, harbours and research and social services. This step has been necessitated by the delay in arranging Zambia's full membership of the Community. Earlier, the Steering Committee of the East African Community, formed of representative officials from member states (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) and the Secretariat of the Community, met at Kampala on March 6 and 7 to consider matters arising from the applications of Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia and Burundi. The Kampala talks had advised further studies at technical level in these countries.

## WEST AFRICA

### CAMEROON

**President Ahidjo in Liberia :** President Ahidjo paid an official visit to Liberia from April 9 to 13. At the end of his talks with Liberian President William Tubman, the two leaders in a joint communique expressed their agreement on the

question of the total liberation of Africa and resolved to support, through the OAU, the liberation of Angola, Mozambique, South-West Africa, Portuguese Guinea and Rhodesia. They reiterated their repugnance of South Africa's apartheid policies and recorded their respect for the principles of the OAU and the UN Charter. On Nigeria, the joint communique stated that it was possible to bring about a peaceful and equitable solution of the crisis and resolved that they would "use their best endeavour . . . to resolve the *casus belli* and persevere for the restoration of peace." The two Presidents also discussed the development and stability of the continent and emphasized the importance of regional groupings.

## EQUATORIAL GUINEA

**Emergency Declared :** Early in March a state of emergency was declared in Equatorial Guinea following anti-Spanish disturbances. The *Nigerian Morning Post* declared on March 4 that Spain had sent two passenger ships, escorted by a frigate to evacuate Spaniards who desired to leave the country. Earlier President Francisco Macias had requested the UN to send 150 UN troops to keep the peace. Under the Independence Agreement signed in October 1960, Spanish troops had taken over the posts of Guinean guards, occupied telegraph and post offices and were patrolling the main towns when the incidents leading to the crisis took place. Spain's Permanent Representative at the UN said the trouble arose because the authorities would not allow the Spanish flag to be flown on the Spanish Chancery at Bata.

A coup d'etat was attempted on March 5 by Dr. Antanasio Ndonga, Foreign Minister. Dr. Ndonga was reported to have gone to Bata, the capital of Rio Muni, to stop President Macias from making inflammatory statements. When President Macias refused to do so, Dr. Ndonga rallied forces, blew up the Bata radio station and attacked the Government House where the President was staying. However, forces loyal to the President counter-attacked and Ndonga was reported to have been killed.

*Le Monde* in an editorial on the crisis said that like the Congo disaster in 1960, this was due to "tribal rivalries, personal conflicts, continuation of Spanish colonists' economic interests, the ill-will of some administrator from the colonial power, and national susceptibilities all the stronger for being newer." On the immediate cause *Le Monde* commented that probably Senor Macias had tried to stave off unrest in the poorer territory of Rio Muni, where there had been resentment over the greater wealth and power of the Fernando Po people, by stirring up anti-Spanish feelings.

**Spanish Evacuation Completed :** In a statement to the Security Council on April 8, Secretary General U Thant reported that the evacuation of Spanish forces and nationals from Equatorial Guinea had been completed. Apart from the military forces, the UN Secretary-General said, 1,200 Spaniards were evacuated by sea and 3,809 by air. Only about 600 Spanish nationals, mainly planters and owners of forestry concerns, stayed on voluntarily. These were mainly on the Island of Fernando Po.

## GHANA

**National Liberation Council Chairman Resigns :** The National Liberation Council announced the resignation of General Ankrah on April 2. In a statement,

the Council said : "Information has been received that certain persons have been collecting monies from various companies, particularly expatriate firms, for building up political funds . . . for the purpose of conducting research into General Ankrah's prospects for the presidency at the forthcoming elections".

The National Liberation Council has since reshuffled its membership. The former Commissioner for Finance, Brigadier A.A. Afrifa, has been appointed chairman of the Council.

The *Pioneer* (Kumasi) on April 8 commented that "the sudden resignation of Lt. Gen. J.A. Ankrah from both the chairmanship and membership of the NLC . . . was a shocking incident to Ghanaians and our well-wishers. Comments already made here and in Ghana, and elsewhere abroad, underscore the widespread feeling of shock and disappointment being nursed by both national and international observers. We consider that some aspects of the matter call for legal action, and that in the face of the NLC decree, which prohibits any indulgence in partisan politics in this country, the Attorney General's Department will train its unerring scrutiny upon all the facts and handle them accordingly."

The National Union of Ghana Students urged an enquiry into the events leading to General Ankrah's resignation. In a statement issued on April 11 the students called for an investigation into the activities of the firms which were alleged to be involved in the corruption that led to the resignation.

The Ghana Trade Union Congress also demanded a full enquiry into the facts of General Ankrah's resignation and expressed the view that any change in the composition of the NLC would be "meaningless" if not accompanied by a better "spiritual, moral and physical" life for the people. During General Ankrah's leadership, the Congress alleged, the Government had stood by the employers even when "naked injustice was being perpetrated against the workers". They now demanded that the selfish interest of leaders should not be allowed to have an edge over their responsibilities of office.

**Decree Bans Tribal or Religious Biased Political Parties :** A Government decree on April 28 prohibited the formation of any political party with a tribal or religious bias. Following up the decree issued in February, which disqualified 152 people from holding public office, the new decree prohibited several categories of people from being founding members of a political party or holding office in it. These include all who at any time after July 1960 were members of the Central Committee of the Convention People's Party, Secretary-General of the party, Ministers of State, Special Advisers to the President, Regional or District Commissioners and others holding specified jobs. According to the new decree before a party could be registered a list of its first 54 members has to be approved by the Electoral Commissioner. Further, at least three of the founding members must be resident in Ghana and no more than six of the founding members should belong to any one tribe.

**Russian Trawlers Released :** The National Liberation Council announced on March 3 the release of the two Russian trawlers and their crew detained in Takoradi harbour since October 1968 for violating Ghana's territorial waters. The two captains of the fishing vessels were however released only on March 19 after they had made their statements before the Amissah Commission which is investi-



gating charges of subversion against the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Air Marshal Otu.

**Border Agreement :** After a meeting of the Joint Border Commission on April 14, Ghana and Togo agreed to exchange information about subversive elements, prohibited immigrants and bush and footpaths used for smuggling. Both Governments also agreed to operate a patrol along their entire common frontier in a drive to eliminate smuggling. (*Nationalist*, April 4).

## GUINEA

**Assassination Plot Foiled :** In a communique issued on March 12, the Guinea Revolutionary Tribunal revealed that its investigations into the motives of the counter-revolutionaries arrested in the town of Labe on February 26 had established that the movement in which they were involved "had direct links with French imperialism in active collaboration with African governments." It added that French mercenaries with Africans in their charge were stationed in neighbouring countries. These "enemies of Guinean Revolution" aimed at liquidating Guinean leaders and there had been several attempts at subversion. (*Nationalist*, March 15).

Later reports from Conakry indicated that the two principal instigators, now under arrest, were the Secretary of State in charge of Rural Economy, M. Fodeba Keita, and the Assistant Chief of Staff of the People's Army and Secretary of State in charge of Civic Service, Colonel Kaman Diaby. They along with mutinous troops and local officials at Labe, 180 miles north-east of Conakry, had planned a coup d'etat. The plot included the assassination of President Toure and seizure of power. The plans for the overthrow of President Sekou Toure began in November 1968 since which time there had been a "climate of subversion" in the military camp in the region bordering Senegal. Commandos had been trained for the plot and arms distributed to soldiers who would have been assisted by 400 mercenaries being trained in the Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal. Reports also revealed that apart from links with these countries, Colonel Diaby maintained contacts with France to facilitate the coup attempt.

**Development Aid from USSR :** A Guinean delegation which visited Moscow for negotiations on economic and technical cooperation concluded an agreement with the USSR Government. The agreement, signed late in April, included cooperation in the construction of hydro-electric units and development of fisheries.

**Solidarity Conference Meets in Conakry :** The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the All-African Trade Unions Federation (AATUF) sponsored a Consultative Conference for Trade Union Solidarity at Conakry from March 18 to 21. In his inaugural address, President Sekou Toure attacked imperialist policies and called for "a world revolutionary conference to denounce imperialist machinations". A joint statement issued later called on "all the workers of the world to unite to step up the struggle against imperialism and colonialism" and recommended that a world conference of trade unions should be convened "to work out steps for the liberation of African countries still under colonial and racist domination".

## IVORY COAST

**West German President's Visit :** Dr. Heinrich Leubke, President of West Germany, paid a State visit to the Ivory Coast from February 5 to 10. A com-

munique issued at the end of his visit said the two sides agreed on the need for more cooperation in agricultural development and tourism. During the visit, Mr. Gerhard Eppler, the Minister for Economic Cooperation, signed a financial agreement for a new West German loan of 840 million CFA francs to the Ivory Coast for construction of a new harbour at San Pedro. The West German Government had last year extended a 25 million mark loan for the same project.

**Electricity Generating Unit Inaugurated :** An electricity generating station at Vridi was officially inaugurated on February 17. With a power generating capacity of 32 MW, it is the largest thermal unit in French-speaking Black Africa. The Vridi generator is the first of a series of power projects designed to increase the Ivory Coast's productive capacity. In 1970, another unit at Vridi of 32MW would be put into production. The dam at Kossou will further increase the country's power capacity.

## NIGERIA

**OAU Consultative Committee Meets in Monrovia :** The OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria met in Monrovia on April 17. Opened by President William Tubman, the meeting was attended by President Tubman (Liberia), Emperor Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), President Ahidjo (Cameroon), President Mobutu (Congo DR), President Diori (Niger) and the Deputy Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Mr. I.K.W. Harlley, who led the Ghanaian delegation. Nigeria was represented by a six-man team headed by the Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing, Mr. Fermi Okunnu, while Justice Sir Louis Mbanefo attended on behalf of Biafra.

After deliberating for three days, the Committee adjourned on April 20 without resolving the deadlock in the war between Nigeria and Biafra. A statement issued on April 20 proposed that "the two parties to the civil war accept, in the supreme interests of Africa, a united Nigeria, which ensures all forms of security to all citizens" and advised that "within the context of this agreement, the two parties accept an immediate cessation of the fighting, and the opening without delay of peace negotiations". The Consultative Committee also offered "its good offices in order to facilitate these negotiations".

The Committee statement further "noted with satisfaction that the Federal Government of Nigeria accepted the proposals", but the "representative of Colonel Ojukwu did not accept them". To the leaders of the secession and all its supporters, an appeal was extended "to accept and implement the declaration so that reconciliation, peace and unity may be restored in Nigeria". (*West Africa*, April 24).

Commenting on the failure of the Monrovia meeting, Mr. Diallo Telli, Secretary-General of the OAU Consultative Committee, expressed the view that the Committee's statement constituted "the minimum conditions" for peace and contained concessions for both the Federal Government and the Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu. Mr. Telli added: "For the first time we made it a point to put responsibilities where they lay" and even though responsibility was placed on the Biafrans, the Committee had made a special effort not to take sides.

**International Observers' Report :** On March 11, the International Observer Team in Nigeria issued a report covering the period January 14-March 6. Signed by representatives from Canada, Sweden, Poland and the UK the report

was drafted after the team had visited all the war zones, other parts of the country and had discussions with senior Government and military officials in Lagos.

The report confirmed that troops of the Nigerian Army had continued to adhere to the instructions in their code of conduct and that malnutrition problems in the war zones were being rapidly brought under control. Plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction and care of property, the observers noted, were well under way in the areas visited by the observers. The Federal Military Government had also undertaken to improve conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps. The report commended this progress but pointed out that such steps were also necessary in Port Harcourt and in parts of the Rivers State.

About the Biafran allegations of indiscriminate bombing by the Nigerian Air Force of civilian territory, the observers said they could not reach any conclusion on the matter. They however noted the determination of the Federal Military Government to avoid the bombing of non-military targets.

**Prime Minister Wilson in Nigeria :** The British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, paid a six-day official visit to Nigeria beginning March 27. In Nigeria, the British Premier had talks with General Gowon and visited areas ravaged by the war and refugee camps and hospital clinics. Though no dramatic peace initiative was taken by Mr. Wilson on the Nigerian crisis, General Gowon commented that the talks were "very frank and very fruitful". The Nigerian Head of State described Mr. Wilson as "honest, frank, straightforward, very witty and intelligent". Mr. Wilson himself explained that the British Government would not interfere in a matter well within the competence of Nigeria. The British people, he said, would do everything they could to mitigate the sufferings of the Nigerian people.

**Biafra Recognised by Haiti :** The Government of the Republic of Haiti announced its recognition of Biafra on March 24. The same day, the Haitian newspaper *Panorama* reported that the recognition was based on Haiti's foreign policy—the sovereignty of a people and of a government to be free to choose their administration". President Duvalier stated that the recognition "is part of my Government's policy of participating in the defence of states and of oppressed countries. Over and above the humanitarian aspects, it aims at a return to a just and lasting peace between Nigeria and Biafra, a peace that could lead to economic progress which could guarantee the welfare of the population."

## MALI

**Captain Diakite Visits France :** Captain Yoro Diakite, on March 18 became the first Head of the Malian Government to be received in audience by General de Gaulle since its independence in 1960. "The audience", Captain Diakite later stated, "gives hope for closer ties of cooperation between the two countries".

**Reintegration with Franc Zone :** M. Louis Negre, Minister of Finance, announced in March that his country intended to reintegrate itself with the franc zone "in spite of present difficulties". Mali, he said, would remain faithful to the financial agreements with France concluded in 1968 according to which the reintegration of the Malian franc with the French franc would be effected. He explained that the "radicalisation" of the Malian regime under Modibo Keita, which had destroyed confidence among traders and peasants and led to increased smuggling,

practices, had made convertibility difficult. Since the investment loans granted by France were insufficient, France had agreed to delay repayment of the loans and increase its investments in Mali.

## MAURITANIA

**President Tubman's Visit :** Liberian President Tubman and his wife paid an official six-day visit to Mauritania during which a convention of cooperation was signed between the two countries. In a joint communique issued on March 6, Presidents Tubman and Moktar Ould Daddah "renewed their total support for liberation movements" in order to "accelerate the independence of African territories still under colonial domination". Support was extended to the UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East and the two leaders hoped that the current Paris peace talks on Vietnam would lead to a settlement of the crisis. They also praised the efforts of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria to restore peace and unity in the country.

Commenting on the agreement, *Agence France Presse* said it would enable the countries to cooperate more freely than in the past. Travel between Liberia and Mauritania would be easier, while a cultural agreement provided for an exchange of students and grants. Under a commercial agreement, Mauritania would export meat to Liberia in return for timber. A Mauritanian trade delegation would visit Monrovia to draw up a complete list of products which the two countries could profitably sell to each other.

## SENEGAL

**Student Strike Intensified :** Students of the University of Dakar and secondary schools continued their strike throughout April. Launched on March 28 to press their demand for the readmission of 25 students expelled from the University for riotous behaviour, the students in a resolution published on April 14 by the Dakar Students Union stated that the Senegalese Government had refused to take into account "the clearly expressed position".

The Senegalese authorities had wanted courses to be resumed prior to any discussion on the expelled students. President Senghor, in a message to the nation on April 3, said that the unrest in the schools and universities should be seen as an attempt at subversion directed from abroad. No one should despair of Senegalese youth since the present troubles were simply "the Negro-African version of the European crisis", providing evidence that every African country would experience the same phenomenon. A later decision by the Government to withhold grants from all students absent from schools and colleges on April 21 had no effect and the strike became total on April 26. Following new instructions from the Students Union all 1,240 Senegalese students and 1,240 foreign students went on strike.

To check this increasing unrest the Government promulgated on April 22 a series of emergency laws. The three draft laws adopted by the National Assembly provide for the state of emergency to be applied by the President and a limitation of individual liberty, for a state of siege applicable by presidential decree allowing the transfer of civil administration (including policing functions) to military authorities, and for the right to intern those whose activities constituted a danger to public security. This latter legislation also empowered the authorities to transfer or suspend suspect civil servants and requisition people, goods and services.

In an editorial on April 16, *Le Monde*, commenting on the prevailing bad relations between the Government and the students, advised "a series of basic reforms ... possibly affecting other sectors than that of education". In another commentary on May 5, *Le Monde* maintained the necessity for "thorough reforms" as much in institutions as in economic and social policy.

## SIERRA LEONE

**Emergency Lifted :** Dr. Siaka Stevens announced early in March that Parliament had unanimously revoked the state of emergency which had been declared throughout the country on November 22. 32 army and police officers who had been under arrest since the overthrow of the military Government in 1963 were released from prison on March 11.

## NORTH AFRICA

### ALGERIA

**Plotters Sentenced :** Early in April, after a two-week trial, 56 people accused of plotting against the Government were sentenced by the Revolutionary Court in Oran. Death sentences were passed on M. Belkacem Krim and two other leaders of the movement, M. Tamasout Belkacem and M. Slimane Amirat. The former two were tried *in absentia*. Nine others were sentenced to life imprisonment and about 20 given sentences of between one and 20 years imprisonment.

There is no appeal against the sentences passed by the Revolutionary Court other than reprieve.

Commenting on the trial, M. Denis Langlois, a French lawyer of the International Federation of Human Rights, described the death sentence passed on M. Slimane Amirat as having "nothing to do with justice". M. Langlois, who had been refused permission to attend the trial, said, "This is simply a political tactic for ridding the regime of an opponent."

**African Labour Ministers meet :** The 8th Conference of African Labour Ministers was held in Algeria from March 10 to 15. Attended by delegations from 32 African countries, representatives of trade union organizations and liberation movements, the ILO and the Secretary-General of the OAU, Mr. Diallo Telli, the Conference studied the possibilities of extending co-operation among African countries and African labour.

During the Conference the two main African trade union movements, the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) and the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC), decided to work towards a merger and called for an All-African Workers' Union Congress in Dakar in 1970. A preparatory committee, it was agreed, would meet in Algiers in July to draw up statutes for the grouping to be known as the Pan-African Union. The two African trade union delegations considered that "in the present stage of evolution of African countries, seriously compromised by under-development, a united front of workers in a single dynamic trade union organization is a positive factor for rapid economic and social development in Africa" and described the new union as "independent, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist."

The Conference declared its support for the struggles of the Palestinian and Vietnamese peoples and for African countries "under colonial domination". The Ministers said the Governments of Lisbon, Salisbury and Pretoria in the south and Israel in the north were an "immediate and serious danger to the security of the African continent" and urged the non-political organs of the UN to "cooperate with the liberation movements under colonial domination".

Other resolutions called for the creation of an inter-African technical assistance scheme, exchange of information between member countries on social legislation, the necessity to harmonise labour legislation and the development of trade-union unity in the continent.

**President Podgorny's Visit:** Mr. Nicholas Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, paid a six-day official visit to Algeria late in March. Talks were held between Presidents Podgorny and Boumedienne on the Middle East situation and the development of Russo-Algerian co-operation. The Middle East crisis, "caused by Israeli aggression towards Arab countries", Mr. Podgorny said, was a great danger to world peace and the world demanded stoppage of this aggression, immediate evacuation by Israeli forces of occupied Arab territories and cessation of Israel's military provocations.

The visit, *Le Monde* commented, marked the conclusion of a long series of negotiations through which the USSR had been seeking to establish privileged relations with Algeria. These relations however, *Le Monde* stated, were not confined to the economic sphere. Moscow was interested in Algeria in political terms both as an Arab and a Mediterranean country. The USSR, it continued, was of the view that no other power (such as the US) should gain a foothold there. Friendship with Algeria, as with Syria and the UAR, was thus an integral part of Soviet policy in the Mediterranean, providing a counter-balance to the "threat to peace and security" represented by the American Sixth Fleet. (*Le Monde*, March 28).

**Statement on Rhodesia:** In a statement issued on June 2, the spokesman of the Algerian Ministry of External Affairs said that Algeria "views with grave concern" the dangerous decision of the illegal Salisbury regime to submit a new Constitution to referendum." The Constitution sought to sanctify definitively apartheid, racial discrimination as well as Zimbabwe's domination by a European minority and thus exclude all possibilities of independence or the establishment of an African majority government. More convinced than ever before of the utter ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and of the compelling need for the use of force to crush the rebellious regime of Ian Smith, Algeria, once again, holds Great Britain squarely responsible for the deterioration of the Rhodesian situation. In the face of this new affront to Africa and to the conscience of mankind, Algeria takes the view that Africa, relying, above all, on itself, is duty bound to do everything in its power to bring down the illegal regime in Salisbury and to ensure the victory of the just cause of the people of Zimbabwe. It is also incumbent on the Security Council to exercise, in the face of this new and serious threat to peace, its responsibilities by taking more effective measures as is in point of fact stipulated by the UN Charter."

## LIBYA

**Military Agreement with Britain:** Under a new agreement signed in Tripoli on April 21, Britain has undertaken to supply Libya with modern arms, including heavy tanks, anti-aircraft guns and artillery.

## MOROCCO

**President Podgorny's Visit :** The President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Nicholas. Podgorny, paid an official visit to Morocco in April for talks with King Hasan II. A joint statement issued in Rabat on April 7 stated that the two leaders discussed the present state of Soviet-Moroccan relations, prospects of improving them and international politics.

On bilateral relations, both parties expressed their satisfaction with the "positive results of cooperation" (the beginning of the work on the dam and the hydro-electric plant in Ouarzazate and the hydro-electric centre at Jerada) since King Hasan's visit to Moscow in October 1966. Economic cooperation had increased. The development of trade was viewed as particularly satisfactory. In July 1968, the USSR and Morocco signed their first long-term trade agreement by which trade was to be doubled and brought to a total value of \$40 million in five years. The Soviet delegation also expressed a wish to contribute to Morocco's development plans. It was agreed that an inter-governmental mission be established to examine development of cooperation and implementation of joint agreements. It should meet twice a year.

In international affairs particular attention was given to the Middle East question. Both leaders condemned Israel's refusal to withdraw from occupied Arab territories and agreed that the worsening of the situation constituted a serious threat to world peace. A solution, they suggested, should be found in accordance with the UN resolutions taking account of the legitimate interests of the Arab peoples.

## TUNISIA

**Treaty of Cooperation with Senegal :** Tunisia and Senegal ratified a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two countries on March 18. They also expressed their determination to work together to secure elimination of colonialism and promotion of co-operation in the technical, scientific and social fields.

**Shah of Iran's Visit :** Talks were held in April between President Bourguiba and the Shah of Iran during the latter's state visit to Tunisia. A joint communique issued at the end of the Shah's visit stated that the two leaders had expressed their wish to develop relations and trade between Tunisia and Iran. Emphasis was placed on the necessity of strengthening ties between Islamic states and on economic and cultural cooperation as a factor "for the protection of peace and friendship between peoples in accordance with the lofty principles of Islam." They also expressed alarm at the deteriorating situation in the Middle East. While they respected the wish of Palestinians to recover their legitimate rights, they maintained that "the occupation by force of part of the territories of several Arab states constitutes a flagrant violation of international laws, and a serious threat to security in the region and to world peace." The only just solution to them was a settlement in accordance with the UN resolutions.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

**New Peace Plan for the Middle East :** King Hussein of Jordan, during a recent visit to the United States, put forth in Washington a new peace plan for the Middle East. The plan included end of belligerency; respect for the sovereignty,

territorial integrity and independence of all states in the area; recognition of the right of all to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries; freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal; guarantee of the inviolability of all States in the area through whatever means necessary, including the establishment of demilitarised zones; and, finally, a just settlement of the refugee problem. In his speech announcing the plan, King Hussein proclaimed the readiness of the Arab States to establish peace on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 1967 and requested that "Israel should withdraw from all the occupied territories and implement all the provisions of the Security Council resolution". Support was extended to the four-power talks among the US, France, the USSR and Britain, convened to achieve a settlement of the Middle East crisis.

**UN Reports Ceasefire Ineffective :** UN Secretary-General U Thant in a special report issued on April 21 said the Security Council's ceasefire call "has become almost totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector". Almost daily clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces occurred throughout April. The Secretary-General's report added that a wide range of weapons were used, including rockets, tank-fire and heavy artillery and despite attempts of the military observers to secure a quick end to the firing, the area continued to be in a "virtual state of active war".

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

**Reorganization in FRELIMO :** In a communique issued in Dar-es-Salaam on April 25, the Central Committee of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) announced the formation of a three-member Council of the Presidency. The Council of the Presidency, formed by the election of Mr. Uria Simango, formerly Acting President, Mr. Marceline Dos Santos, Secretary of the Political Department and a member of the Central Committee, and Mr. Samora Michael, Chief Commander of the FRELIMO Military Forces, would replace the President. It would assume the functions given to the Presidency in the Statute of FRELIMO and would perform collectively the functions attributed to the Presidency within the Central Committee, the Political Military Committee and other FRELIMO organs. (*The Standard*, Tanzania, April 26).

### LESOTHO

**UNDP Undertakes Feasibility Study :** The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) announced that it had approved a sum of \$1.6 million for a feasibility study of Lesotho's projected dam across the Orange River in the mountainous Oxtow Region. This will be the final stage of reconnaissance before work starts on the dam.

### RHODESIA

**Referendum Proposed :** A Government statement early in April announced the publication of a Referendum Bill enabling a referendum of Rhodesian A and B-roll voters to be held on either a British agreement or a constitution devised in Rhodesia. The statement issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs explained that there was no question of a British agreement and a Rhodesian constitution being alternatives in the referendum. "The Bill will allow for one of these alternatives to



be put to the electorate, and details of the Government's proposals for a new constitution will be published in a White Paper before the referendum takes place." The referendum, however, did not rule out further negotiations with the British Government. Provision would be made to test public opinion on the desirability of Rhodesia becoming a Republic. (*Rhodesian Herald*, April 3).

## SOUTH AFRICA

**"Coloured" Elections from September :** Mr. S.L. Muller, Minister for the Interior, in a statement issued late in March said that elections for the special assembly of "coloureds", to be known as the Representative Council, would be held on September 24. More than 600,000 "coloureds" would be eligible to vote in the elections which fall within the framework of the Government's "separate development" policy. The Representative Council, to be composed of 40 elected members, and 20 nominated members, would soon be followed by the disappearance of coloured representation in the South African Parliament at Cape Town, Mr. Muller said. Until now, the interests of the "coloured" community had been looked after by four European deputies.

**Prison Sentences for "Terrorists" :** The South African Supreme Court in a decree published on March 26 passed prison sentences ranging from five to 20 years on 11 Africans who were found guilty of plotting against the State. The accused had been charged with taking part in a plot, directed from abroad and aimed at overthrowing the present Pretoria regime by terrorism and violence, sabotage and guerilla warfare. The plot, covering a seven-year period, was believed to be communist-inspired and the accused were said to have taken orders from a communist revolutionary headquarters in Rivonia controlled by Mr. Mandela. The prosecution also charged that the accused had received training in the Soviet Union, China, Algeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Zambia and had passed through transit camps in Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania. This training had helped them establish a network of contacts in South Africa for future operations, the Supreme Court stated.

**Robert Sobukwe Released :** The South African Government, through its Minister of Justice, Mr. Pelser, announced on April 23 the release of the former Pan-African Congress leader, Mr. Robert Sobukwe. Freed after six years' detention on Robben Island, Mr. Sobukwe was first imprisoned for three years in 1960 for incitement to rebellion. After this term, he was detained at Robben Island under the General Laws Amendment Act, which empowered the Minister of Justice to detain persons whose release could endanger the internal security of the State.

## SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

**South African Parliament Approves Bill:** The South African Parliament approved a South-West Africa Bill. Effective from April 1, the Bill gives the Government legal power to proceed with the proposed readjustment of the administrative and financial relationship between South Africa and South-West Africa, which would bring the white part of the territory closer to South Africa. Commenting on the Bill, *the Star* said that it would "reduce the status of South-West Africa to little more than that of a province". "This will be done", the paper added, "in the face of considerable international pressure to maintain the status quo in South-West Africa and in spite of vigorous opposition from the United Party..."

## SWAZILAND

**Scheme to Sell Bulk Power to South Africa :** A R100 million scheme to sell bulk power to South Africa from 1979 to 1985 is presently under study. A feasibility study of two-grade coal deposits in Swaziland and their use in the thermal power stations to export about 1,000 MW a year to South Africa is under way. This would be more than the output of the Caborra Bassa Scheme in Mozambique.

## PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

**Portuguese Prime Minister's Tour :** The Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr. Caetano, went on a tour of the Portuguese African territories—Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea—in April. This was the first time that a Portuguese Prime Minister visited the country's overseas provinces though Portuguese Presidents had toured these areas. Dr. Caetano was accompanied by the Minister of Overseas Territories, Prof. da Salva Cunha, and the Secretary of State for Information, Dr. Moreira Baptista.

In Lisbon, before his departure Dr. Caetano stressed that Portugal in Africa sought to develop the land and "give dignity" to the people. "We are a single people, we form a single nation, we have a single Government . . . What we are seeking in Africa is nothing more than advancement of the countries and the dignity of their peoples", he said. Similar assurances were given by the Premier in Bissao, Portuguese Guinea; Luanda, Angola, and Lourenco Marques in Mozambique.

*The Times*, London, on April 15 commented that there seemed to be more than one reason for Dr. Caetano's visit. With elections due this year and the fact that several elements had been fighting the Portuguese authorities in these regions for the past eight years, the visit was meant to reassure the populations that their struggles and sacrifices were being taken into account.

*Tass* expressed the view that the Portuguese were now feverishly looking for a way out of the deep crisis in which Portugal had landed itself as a result of its policy of preserving its African possessions at any cost. "Never before", *Tass* commented, "have the disastrous results of this policy affected the position of the working people in Portugal as strongly as today. This has fully confirmed the conclusion about the chronic inability of a weak and backward country to bear an excessive burden of military expenditure now accounting for almost half of its budget".

To *the Standard* (Tanzania) the main aim of Dr. Caetano's visit was to "show the flag" in the three countries and to reaffirm the pledge he gave when he came to power that he would not neglect for a moment the defence of Portugal's "overseas provinces".

**Independence Plan for Portuguese Guinea:** President Leopold Senghor of Senegal has put forward a plan for the independence of Portuguese Guinea and the creation of a "Portuguese-African" nation with the possible participation of Brazil. Advising "self-determination, independence by stages followed by a Luso-African nation", President Senghor said he had always supported the principles of self-determination and independence but recognized the futility of violence. The war must end in Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique and substituted by co-operation, he added. (*West Africa*, March 12).

## Gandhi the Revolutionary

J. B. KRIPALANI

*This is the third in a series of four articles on Gandhiji which we are publishing to mark the Gandhi Centenary Year which began on October 2 last year. The first article, published in Vol. VIII, No. 3, dealt with his role in South Africa and the second, published in Vol. VIII, No. 4, with the historic phenomenon which he brought about in the political, economic and social life of the country.—Ed.*

MEN and women who come in contact with a revolutionary are valued principally in so far as they further the objects of the revolution. Otherwise they touch the revolutionary but slightly. He has no personal or sentimental ties. It is not high standing or superior intellect that gains his confidence but loyalty and devotion to the cause. This point too is illustrated in religious history. There were many able, learned and even sincere people in Palestine, when Christ preached his doctrine; but his disciples came even from the humblest and the least intellectual strata of society—sinners, publicans, prostitutes, tax gatherers, fishermen and the rest. These had the virtues of constancy and loyalty to a far greater degree than those who were considered their superiors and betters. One who has the right faith, however inferior he may otherwise be, is saved, because he is free from the greatest sin of denial of the right doctrine, on which depends his relation with the one and only true God. This was the creed of Mohamed's revolutionary innovation in society. He thought that it was the one most urgently needed at the time. The Islamic prophet put the oneness of God above everything else. Even today pious Muslims would consider a person damned, however good he may otherwise be, if he did not believe in the doctrine of oneness of God. Both Christian missionaries and Muslim divines were sincerely anxious to convert Gandhiji to their respective faiths, even though they would have admitted him to be a better and juster man than themselves—as if, good as Gandhi was, he was not good enough unless he subscribed to some of their theological views. With them, not straight conduct but the rightness of doctrine was of paramount importance. All this may be the exaggerated zeal of the followers of a fanatical faith. But in some form or other a revolutionary's preferences are guided by his mission. All other standards of conduct are subordinate to loyalty to the cause.

### Promote the Cause

The revolutionary likewise values men only as they hold to the right doctrines and are useful to the cause. If they are not, he has no need for them. This trait too is present in Gandhiji, though in a very modified form, owing to his belief in truth, non-violence and purity of means.

He could not hate a man or injure him for any cause. His religion was the moral law. "The reforms required", he wrote in 1926, "are more from within than from without. A perfect constitution super-imposed upon a rotten internal condition will be like a white sepulchre". Therefore, the moral individual, apart from the views he held, the doctrines he believed, the ritual he followed, was for him the religious man. With all this he preferred those who were most helpful to his cause. He had no personal relations. He deprecated intimate and sentimental connections. Love for him was a collective and not an individual tie—love of the poor, love of humanity. Many men and specially women came to be attached to him, attracted by his personal charm and greatness. He accepted their love and attachment only to utilize them for the revolution. Such people were often not interested in politics but he managed to make them instruments in that sphere and suffer privations and march to jail as they would never have done if left to themselves. Psycho-analysed, such persons underwent all this suffering for his sake and not for the country's cause. They may have explained their actions to themselves and others as impelled by patriotism and love of the country, but the real motive was to please their master and win his good opinion. It is therefore no wonder that, after his death some personally attached patriots can't function in the political field. The incentive, the personality of Gandhiji, being absent, they revert to their non-political natures, or if they yet by circumstances are in the political field, they play a very subordinate and passive part. No political initiative can be expected from them.

This is, however, by the way. The main point is that men and women were valued by Gandhiji, apart from their character, only in so far as they were useful for his cause. Gandhiji used his wife too for his revolutionary purpose. Kasturba, left to herself, would never have adopted his social, economic and political views. In her case he sometimes admitted that he was guilty of violence in enforcing his views. He brought up his children and utilised them for the same purpose, in spite of the protest of some of them. Ultimately, they left the political field for activities more normal and congenial to their natures. His friendships were also of a similar nature. The Ali Brothers were at one time his "blood brothers". As soon as they ceased to be useful for his purpose they dropped out of his circle. In this case the indifference was mutual for they too had a purpose of their own which Gandhi, they thought, no longer served. Many came under his influence, worked with him for a time and were his trusted comrades; but in a few years, they were to be found nowhere near him.

#### **He Could Be Ruthless**

This trait of the revolutionary is again brought out in his treatment of objects of art. Boycott of foreign cloth was necessary for his mission. In pursuance of his policy he advised the nation to burn foreign cloth. This sacrificial fire consumed many artistic fabrics. Even costly pieces woven in gold and silver shared the same fate. No amount of protests from saner, non-revolutionary friends and admirers was of any avail. The burning of material goods was symbolical of his burning zeal for Swaraj. Friends pointed out that his zeal smacked of violence, but to no purpose. He said all the costly and artistic fabrics were tainted goods. I am sure if

by any logic the destruction of the Taj Mahal had been necessary for the triumph of his cause, a bonfire would have been made even of that monument of love and beauty. This was nothing unusual in Gandhiji, the revolutionary. "Nations have progressed", he wrote in 1922, "both by evolution and revolution. The one is as necessary as the other. Death, which is an eternal verity, is revolution as birth and after is slow and steady evolution. Death is as necessary for man's growth as life itself. God is the greatest Revolutionist the world has ever known or will know. He sends deluges. He sends storms where a moment ago there was calm. He levels down mountains which He builds with exquisite care and infinite patience".

Such acts have been done by those possessed with an idea of serving a cause. How many fanatical puritans of different faiths, in history, have not destroyed temples, churches, artistic statues of gods and goddesses and mutilated them in the service of the ideal! Gandhiji was saved from such vandalism by the restraint of non-violence under which he worked. If an idea is to be followed with all the devotion, fervour and fanaticism of a revolutionary, it is a great relief and advantage to humanity that the restraint of non-violence be put upon it. This, mercifully, Gandhiji's unbounded faith in the moral law put upon him. "The spiritual weapon of self-purification," he said, "intangible as it seems, is the most potent means of revolutionising one's environment and loosening external shackles. It works subtly and invisibly; it is an intense process though it might often seem a weary and long-drawn process; it is the straightest way to liberation, the surest and quickest and no effort can be too great for it".

Non-violence works for tolerance, patience and self-suffering in the service of an idea. All these virtues Gandhiji possessed in abundance. Within the restrictions imposed by these, his cause for him was supreme, and in its service he could be non-violently ruthless. Had he not had that over-mastering faith in non-violence, who knows he might have, with his zeal and passion for the cause, been one of the great revolutionary scourges of mankind.

When he was collecting funds for his schemes, if a poor man gave him his last pice and starved himself to death, Gandhiji would write at column of praise for such supreme sacrifice, oblivious of the fact that money might be misspent by a misguided volunteer in his army. It was sometimes painfully interesting to watch Gandhiji, in his efforts to collect funds for his cause, inducing little children to part with their gold and silver trinkets. The poor kids knew not what it was for which they were parting with bright and shining bits of precious metal. These trinkets could not possibly make much difference to the cause. But the gifts deprived the little ones of some joy. But when did a prophet care for the joy of life even of the little ones? Gandhiji would have argued that they had compensatory joy derived from the performance of a patriotic act! Maybe, who knows? There is no yardstick to measure revolutionary zeal and the conduct based upon it.

### **True Revolutionary**

To conclude, then, Gandhiji, apart from his moral and spiritual greatness, was a social and political revolutionary of insight and judgment. As

such he assessed the situation in India correctly when he entered the political field in 1919. He tackled the situation, as a revolutionary would, by direct action, even though the action was non-violent. Practical non-violence was more suited to the situation than any other method for an unarmed people fighting against a powerful foreign Government with a modern army of occupation. Gandhiji, like a good revolutionary, had a social philosophy and a plan which he had outlined earlier in South Africa in his book "Hind Swaraj". Like a good revolutionary, Gandhiji, in various ways, brought into the struggle and his constructive schemes the mass of the population. He had also the revolutionary's sense of urgency coupled with the virtue of patient waiting for long periods till a suitable opportunity presented itself. Again, like a good revolutionary he had his hand upon the pulse of the people. He knew their heart-beats. He took advantage of every rise in their political tempo. He knew when to give battle, when to retreat and when to lie low, what challenge to accept and which to ignore. He valued men and women, apart from his moral preferences, from the viewpoint of the central theme of his life, the Indian revolution.

I have not in the preceding discussions laid any stress upon the moral qualities of non-violence and truth which he preached and practised and in the light of which he carried on his revolutionary activities. It is far from me to suggest that the insistence upon these moral qualities did not greatly help and affect the revolution. The point that I want to emphasise is that if Gandhiji had not been a social revolutionary, all his moral qualities would not have affected the political situation in India and brought about national freedom. In India then, and even today, there are moral giants whose spiritual stature is in no way inferior to Gandhiji's. Yet they are unable to affect the Indian political and social scene. This scene today is none too happy. It does need radical readjustments. But whenever this comes it must come from a social revolutionary and not from a mere moralist or a saint. It is useless to look in that direction, as our Socialist friends did a little while ago—calling upon saints, philosophers and scholars to come to their aid.

This does not mean that great saints, sages and reformers are not revolutionaries. But their kingdom is not of this world. They are primarily concerned with the salvation of the individual. Their effect on social, economic and political life is indirect. As a matter of fact, they generally leave social, economic and political questions severely alone. They hold that, even under crippling external and organisational conditions, the spirit of man can soar in regions of freedom and emancipation. Gandhiji, on the other hand, held that for the common man's moral and spiritual advance, wise and suitable external arrangements of organised life are as necessary as a healthy body. He was not working merely for the spiritually chosen. He was working to raise the mass of mankind to a higher moral level to live the good life, which they could do only in a just and equitable external organisation of society. He held that moral virtue did not exist in a vacuum but entered into all social, economic and political situations. The social organisation must therefore be informed and reformed to reflect the moral law. Man is born, lives and dies in society. That society, like the human body itself, must be made an appropriate temple of God.

It is neglected at the peril of higher life for the average individual. Buddha, after he had attained enlightenment (nirvana), wished that he be born again and again till the last man was redeemed. Gandhiji in another way and from another angle wanted to bring the possibility of the moral life within the reach of every ordinary man and woman engaged in their everyday work, performing the citizen's duty in society arranged and organised on an equalitarian and democratic basis.

Those who make of Gandhiji merely a moral reformer, a saint and a Mahatma, miss the central point of his teaching and life. Truth and non-violence as supreme moral virtues are nothing new in the world's history. They have been preached by Christ, Buddha and other prophets and reformers, old and new. What is novel is their application to group life and to the need of a political revolution. If this central point of Gandhiji is missed, his mission fails. It will survive merely as a brilliant and unique episode in Indian and world history.

## **Tribal Welfare in India**

N. K. BOSE

THE total number of Scheduled Tribes in India happens to be in the neighbourhood of 30 million in a population which is now well over 500 million. The way in which they make their living ranges widely from hunting and fishing, as among the Andamanese, to shifting cultivation, which is practised extensively in NEFA and the Kashi and Jaintia Hills in Assam, Nagaland, some portions of Manipur, and Tripura. In the middle belt of India, as well as in Bihar, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, the majority of tribal communities have taken to agriculture of one kind or another. Their main dependence is on cultivation; yet a larger proportion among them do not own land than among the rest of India's peasant population.

During centuries of contact with the Hindus, who were organized into castes, a substantial fraction of the indigenous population who retired into the forests and hills also became deeply influenced, perhaps indirectly, by their Hindu neighbours. Sometimes farmers and artisans from the more fertile plains came and settled down in small colonies among the tribal peoples; sometimes small numbers of the latter lived surrounded by plainsmen, and slowly adapted themselves to the economy practised by the more prosperous peasantry from the plains.

Thus, for instance, the Mundas in Chotanagpur had in their company weavers and blacksmiths from the plains whom they treated as subordinates. The Birhors of the same area, however, adapted themselves in a different way altogether to the peasant folk who lived nearby. The Birhors live in small migratory lands. During some months of the year, they collect the bark of wild creepers, convert it into well-finished ropes, and barter them for either paddy or millets with the neighbouring peasantry. Of late, as the jungles of Chotanagpur are becoming depleted of their carnivores, the Birhors have begun to rear goats in the scrub jungle where they live, and sell them for cash in the neighbouring markets.

Among the Gonds of Madhya Pradesh or Andhra Pradesh, or the Santals of Orissa and Bengal, a large number have taken to cultivation with the plough; and many of the farmers have even lost their original language and have begun to regard themselves as 'Raj Gonds', 'the Kingly Gonds' who are indistinguishable from other peasant castes who live beside them.

The following table based on the Census of India, 1961, indicates how the Scheduled Tribes recorded themselves on the basis of their religion:



**TABLE 1**  
**Classification of Scheduled Tribes by Religion**

<i>Total Population of India</i>	<i>Scheduled Tribes</i>	<i>Hindu</i>	<i>Tribal Religion</i>
439,072,582	29,879,249 (6.80%)	26,710,428 (89.39%)	1,251,706 (4.19%)
<i>Buddhist</i>	<i>Muslim</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Others</i>
100,593 (0.34%)	61,233 (0.21%)	1,653,570 (5.53%)	101,719 (0.34%)

With the advent of Independence, and even before, another kind of contact has been taking place between the tribal communities and others which is sharply distinguishable from the slow small-scale infiltration which took place in former times. With the building of roads, and the large-scale introduction of motor transport, the confrontation of the isolated tribal communities and the rest of India has now begun on a massive scale. It also takes place very quickly when we compare it with what happened in earlier times. In the past, that is before Independence, large numbers of labourers belonging to tribal communities like the Santals, Mundas, Oraons or Kharias were taken to the tea plantations of Assam or North Bengal. And so were also large bands of Oriya peasant folk in former times. But the confrontation today between a modernized economy and the more ancient one is on a very massive scale. For instance, when a steel plant is established in Rourkela in Orissa, or a mine is opened up in Bailadila in the southern part of the same State, the factory has to be put into operation quickly. Many of the peasant communities, both tribal and non-tribal, are dislocated from their homes, given compensation in money, and cast adrift to seek their fortune as best they can. Quite a few among them find it difficult to adapt themselves rapidly to the kind of labour which is demanded in a modern industrial establishment. Perhaps, if adequate arrangements were made for their rehabilitation, if suitable training were given to the younger generation in the skills required in a modern industry, they could have adjusted themselves to the new life in a better way than they have.

But in the hurry to set the industries going, this task of rehabilitation has often been neglected. Labourers in large numbers have been drafted from Andhra Pradesh, or Bihar, or Punjab. And the situation thus created has led to a feeling among the local displaced tribal population that 'outsiders' have been systematically invading their land and taking away bread from their mouths.

It is not our purpose to suggest that this is the only thing which has happened, or that no members of the tribal community have succeeded in adapting themselves favourably to the new way of life. Some, of course, have done so. But, at the same time, we have also to remember that in spite of nearly two centuries of influence of a capitalistic modernized

productive organization, in India today only four per cent of the total working force is engaged in large-scale industries, while six per cent are in small-scale household industries, of either the ancient type based on caste, or otherwise. So that when 90 per cent of the working force of India is still bound down to agriculture in one shape or another, the competition for employment in the industrial sector is bound to be keen and harsh indeed. If, therefore, a factory has to be set up and quickly run, the influx from the landless labourers from various parts of India becomes so acute that neither the factory owners nor the Government have very much time to think about the rehabilitation of the communities which are displaced by the growth of industries.

This is a sorry state of affairs, but need not be regarded as inevitable. With great wisdom, the makers of the Constitution of India decided to look specially after the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes as well as of the Scheduled Castes of India, who altogether form 21 per cent of the country's entire population.

One of the measures which was adopted was to help in the creation of a new leadership from among the Scheduled communities themselves. This was to be by the reservation of seats in the State Legislatures as well as in Parliament. It was also decided that, in all governmental employment, a certain proportion of vacancies would be reserved for the Scheduled communities. This figure is five per cent for Scheduled Tribes and 12½ per cent for Scheduled Castes in posts and services under the Government of India. But it has been the experience of the Government that even after 21 years of Independence, the proportion in the different services remains at a very low level.

TABLE 2

Representation of Scheduled Tribes in various grades of services  
under the Government of India

Year	Class I			Class II		
	Total No.	ST	%	Total No.	ST	%
1957	6,233	6	0.10	14,455	56	0.32
1961	12,254	26	0.21	23,295	157	0.67
1966	20,379	106	0.52	30,001	80	0.27
	Class III			Class IV		
	Total No.	ST	%	Total No.	ST	%
1957	642,651	3,990	0.62	759,570	18,497	2.44
1961	897,633	8,289	0.92	933,754	29,232	3.13
1966	1,117,754	12,356	1.10	1,176,826	40,113	3.41

The leaders of the Scheduled Tribes, as well as of the Scheduled Castes in Parliament are naturally very dissatisfied with the slow progress, and demand that the proper percentage should be attained as quickly as possible.

Let us, therefore, look at the causes which underlie the slow progress. On looking up the records of the Social Welfare Department, one discovers that a large part of the expenditure on tribal welfare is utilized for the promotion of education. Expenses have gone up many times in the course of the three Five-Year Plans as will be evident from the following table :

TABLE 3

Category	1st Plan	2nd Plan	Rupees in crores 3rd Plan
Sch. Castes	5.46	18.28	31.81
Sch. Tribes	5.52	8.85	14.39

Similarly, when we consider the post-matric scholarships awarded to the Scheduled Tribes in different years, we find that there has been a substantial increase in numbers as well as in expense.

TABLE 4

**Progress of Post-Matric Scholarships Granted to Scheduled Tribes**

	No. of Scholarships	Amount in rupees
1948-49	84	45,986
1953-54	1,587	818,538
1958-59	4,821	2,076,206
1963-64	11,836	5,027,741
1966-67	17,650	8,382,866

The increase has been substantial. Yet it is a fact that the proportion of educated youth who have been absorbed in different grades of services has shown no marked increase whatsoever. What can be the reason for this? And what should be the remedy for this kind of shortage?

Let us look at the figures of one particular State, namely, Orissa, which has a high percentage of tribal population.

In Orissa, the Scheduled Tribes constitute 24.07 per cent and the Scheduled Castes 15.75 per cent of the total population. In the annual High School examination held in 1966, it was however found that out of a total of 23,745 students only 631 (2.7%) belonged to the Scheduled Tribes and 731 (3.1%) belonged to the Scheduled Castes. Out of 12,284 students that came out successful, 309 belonged to the Scheduled Tribes and 305 to the Scheduled Castes. The percentage of success works out to be 48.9 for Scheduled Tribes and 41.7 for Scheduled Castes against an overall percentage of 51.7.\*

\* Quoted from *Appeal for Fund for the Educational and Economic Uplift of the Adivasis, Harijans and other Weaker Sections* published by the D. A. V. College Trust and Management Society, New Delhi-55.

It is clear from a study of this case that the total supply of educated youth is very low indeed. And as long as this is not raised substantially by an extension of primary and secondary education on a massive scale, the percentage of people in services will obviously remain far below the reservation fixed for them.

This is therefore one aspect of the problems facing the tribal communities. The other lies in the economic sphere. In the whole of India, the total percentage of Scheduled Tribes in 196 was 6.80. But among cultivators their percentage was 11.59. That is, a large population of the Scheduled Tribes is still tied to agriculture, and not to other forms of occupations.

Their agriculture is, again, subject to severe limitations. It has been the widespread experience of anthropologists and social workers that lands belonging to the tribal folk have often been taken over by non-tribal people on one pretext or another. Even the British Government was aware of this; and, during their days, they enacted several laws like the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act which were designed to prevent the alienation of land from the indigenous to migrant populations. In Free India more Acts have been passed, as in Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere. Yet, on local enquiry, it appears that almost everywhere a considerable amount of land has passed under the control of traders and money-lenders in spite of these Acts.

Quite lately, there was an occasion for the writer to investigate the cause of the failure of the Act in preserving the rights of the tribal peasantry over their own land. It soon became apparent in Andhra Pradesh, for instance, that although the laws preventing alienation had been passed several years ago, yet the procedure or rules by means of which the land could be restored had not yet been laid down by the State Government in question.

This is indeed a strange predicament in which the poor tribal peasantry finds itself. Firstly, they are poor and neglected, and hardly any organization makes them its special concern to bring about an agricultural improvement among them. Secondly, those who become educated from among the tribal people seek avenues of employment in occupations other than agriculture. Thirdly with the growing interest in better seeds, and the use of fertilizers coupled with the use of tractors and the like, agriculture, in some parts of the country, is becoming more and more a skilled job, and a gentleman-farmer's occupation, with which the tribal peasant, in his present state of lack of education and organization, can hardly compete. Fourthly, just because the tribal peasant is low down in his economic resources, and also unaware of the rights which have accrued to him through the Constitution, he is unable to take advantage of even the laws which should operate in his favour. And it is the belief of the writer that the State Governments are not as keen on promoting the rights of the poor peasantry as they are in advancing the interests of the more vocal, unemployed sections among the urban folk.

On account of all these separate causes, both the economic and the

educational interests of the tribal people have been left uncared for. Yet, as the Constitution has been framed, and many favourable laws have been passed by the States in respect of land alienation, and for the purpose of writing off long-standing debts, it proves beyond any shadow of doubt whatsoever that the intention to enfranchise the tribal people from all forms of bondage is undoubtedly there. But intention alone does not carry us far. It is only when we launch upon a bold and massive action in order to give effective shape to our intentions that our efforts can be called genuine.

And it is at this level of education and organization through numerous voluntary associations that the statutory provisions regarding tribal welfare can really be given effect to.

## **Activities of the Council**

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

The Council, in association with the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, organised a Seminar on "Indians Abroad—Asia and Africa" at Azad Bhavan from April 7 to 11. A number of Indian and foreign experts and scholars took part in the Seminar which discussed the problem in almost 16 countries. A brief report of the proceedings of the Seminar appears elsewhere in this issue.

The following members played host to the delegates at lunches and dinners: Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, Dr. Gopal Singh, General Secretary, the Maharani of Patiala, Mr. Manuabhai Shah, Dr. Anirudha Gupta, and Dr. N.S. Grewal.

The Council expresses its gratitude to Mr. Harish Mahindra, the Maharani of Patiala, the Mysore Government and Mr. Sohan Lal for offering accommodation to the delegates.

### **Mr. Asoka Mehta on World Tour**

The President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, left on a foreign tour which will take him, among other countries, to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Algeria.

Mr. K. Jagat Singh, Minister of Health of the Government of Mauritius, met the President of the Council and exchanged views with him on subjects of mutual interest to India and Mauritius. Mr. Asoka Mehta presented him with a set of books.

### **Award of Scholarships**

Miss Vanita Sabiki, a member of the Indian Council for Africa who has been compiling the feature "Quarterly Chronicle", was awarded a doctorate for her thesis on "United Nations and Racial Discrimination with Special Reference to the Peoples of Indian Origin in South Africa". She will soon leave for Dakar University on a scholarship sponsored by the Council. Before proceeding to Dakar, she will spend some time in West Germany to collect material for the Council.

### **Annual General Meeting**

The Annual General Meeting of the Indian Council for Africa which

was scheduled to be held on May 4, 1969, was postponed due to the death of the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain.

**Documents Received**

The Council expresses its deep appreciation to the Embassy of the Congo for its donation of very valuable documents which have been listed in "Publications Received".

**Gift of Books**

The Council has despatched 85 sets of books to African countries for presentation to schools on Gandhi's birthday on October 2.

## Book Reviews

### **Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism**

By Reginald H. Greene and Ann Seidman, Penguin Books, 1968.

### **Economic Integration in Africa**

By Peter Robson, Allen and Unwin, 1968.

It seems there can be two approaches to any problem at any given time: the pious and the pragmatic. There is no need to be cynical about the former. Piety has to be tempered and sharpened by pragmatism; pragmatism derives its sense of direction or purpose from piety. Pan-Africanism seems to have reached a stage where pragmatism tends to play a dominant role. This is as well since it merely underscores the continuing reality or relevance of Pan-Africanism; it even affirms that Pan-Africanism is no political mumbo jumbo.

The two books under review deal with the question from the economic angle. When economists analyse these issues one is always tempted to take the view that at some time or other their science must have been dismal! Not for them the colourful imagery of the political scientist or the sociologist. They seem to fall back on the Greek wisdom that "things beautiful are as difficult as they are rare".

The authors of the first book do not share the "dismalist" ethos of economists. They were in the vanguard of African unity and in all their writing we may sense a purposive or revolutionary zeal. An earlier version of the book was presented under the title *The Economics of African Political Unity* as a background paper at the Cairo Heads of State Conference of the Organisation of African Unity in July 1964. It has been expanded further after a good deal of discussion with many other economists and research scholars. We have a massively documented book analysing the various faces of the African economy. The authors analyse with ease and clarity the economic forces—which are legacies of colonialism—afflicting them. In their arguments they draw inspiration from recent developments in economic growth and international trade theories. Often they show a rare insight into complex economic variables. But when we lay the book aside, we are not wholly satisfied. Their approach borders on the pious and their analysis is teleological. They succeed in portraying the postulates or pre-conditions necessary for making Pan-Africanism work. (Part III of the book develops the need for continental planning, for planning sectoral growth, for market unification and for fiscal and monetary unification.) The authors fail to indicate how this unification or harmonisation is to be achieved. Recent history of Africa is littered with wasted efforts towards integration even at regional levels. The pulls of local fears, demands or



even patriotism have proved insurmountable and political leaders are attempting to resolve these claims in the context of overall or regional unity. There is no need to fight shy of these complications on the ground that they would be accused of appeasing "tribal" elements. The road to the European Common Market was not as straight or asphalted as it is made out now; behind the ECM is the whole lot of nasty compromises, assurances and 'protections'. It is in dealing with these recalcitrant elements that Green and Seidman fail totally. At times their failure in this regard reduces the book to something like economic pamphleteering for African unity.

Where Greene and Seidman fail, Prof. Peter Robson excels. His book, *Economic Integration in Africa*, is a model of academic writing at its best. Prof. Robson has travelled widely in Africa and has been working in the Department of Economics at University College, Nairobi. He has a clear sweep over theoretical developments in regard to economic growth and integration. He has a command over economic data concerning Africa and the forces which have to be reckoned with should economic integration succeed in Africa. Coldly empirical in approach, he hesitates to force any generalisation; but where he has to, he does so convincingly and without rancour. This is all the more a virtue since many of his conclusions should be unpalatable to uncritical Pan-Africanists.

Prof. Robson attempts in an early chapter to recapitulate the elements of the classical theory of customs union. He finds that the classical static theoretical assumptions are not valid in dealing with the problems of integration of less developed economies. He then gathers the components of a model which is a combination of the theory of economic growth in the context of customs union or economic integration. This happy marriage between economic integration and economic growth is as novel as it is invaluable in dealing with the less developed economies. Prof. Robson draws heavily on the formulations of Johnson, Cooper and Massell. Though he does not claim any originality for his contribution, what he has performed is a *tour de force*. As he sums up at one stage "...the case for regional integration in Africa, as in most other less developed areas, rests squarely on the proposition that, by specialisation within a region, it may enable these objectives to be achieved more effectively. At the present stage of economic development of most African countries, industrialisation must rest on the basis of import substitution. The small scale of most national markets renders this as an expensive process beyond a point which is soon reached. Because integration makes possible specialisation on the lines of comparative advantage within the union, and also the exploitation of economies of scale, gains are possible as compared with the situation which would be reached if instead each country tried to achieve a given expansion of industry separately. Except in the unlikely special case in which the countries have identical economic structures and there are no economies of scale, integration can make possible a potential increase of real income to the region. Regional integration makes the frame of reference of import substitution the regional, rather than the national, market; it should therefore increase the potential rate of growth of manufactured output for any level of protection. In this way it should contribute to economic growth directly and indirectly." (page 39). Except those who

would dispute the role of industries in economic growth no one can disagree with this balanced statement.

After a survey of theoretical developments Prof. Robson proceeds to describe the economic setting and problems of integration in Africa. He analyses the basic features of African economies. His description of the impact of colonialism on the economies is not new or original. But where he cores is in marshalling impressive data made as nearly as possible up-to-date. With this background he attempts to derive the possible gains on account of integration. His own conclusion is somewhat modest in that he feels "that in terms of rates of growth this gain (i.e. as a result of integration) may be expressed as an increase of about 0.5 per cent on the forecasted annual growth of GDP that would otherwise be expected, that is, the rate of growth would be 4.5 per cent instead of 4 per cent." "This would be useful, but hardly a dramatic gain." (page 93).

The fundamental issue, as Prof. Robson sees it, is to arrive at a policy of investment for the area. This policy must have sufficient safeguards in regard to costs and benefits. Integration succeeds or fails to the extent there is such a sound investment policy. There are the effects of 'polarisation' (i.e. tendency to localise investments in particular areas for such reasons as the availability of natural resources, existence of infrastructure, etc) and these may be offset by 'spread' or 'trickle' effects. (Spread or trickle effects are those factors which may make for investment in other areas as a result of concentration of investment in particular areas.) If in the grouping there are centres making heavily for 'polarisation' then the chances are that, in the context of a free union of independent states and in the background of the claims of the local citizens for projects in their areas, the union cannot be stable. The Rhodesian Federation had to be dissolved for this reason alone. For the same reason it is very doubtful whether a union comprising South Africa and BSL (Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Lesotho) would work. Though Prof. Robson confines his analysis to pure economics, one can easily see that in all these matters there can be no solution derived purely on the basis of economics. Politics and economics intermesh and the decisions of the leaders of African states have to rest on one and lean heavily on the other. Where and how they strike a compromise is the test of their leadership. As Prof. Robson sums up the problem: "Time alone will reveal the future of economic integration in Africa, but, as has proved to be the case with political grouping, time may not be on its side. But even if far-reaching schemes for regional economic integration may not at present be widely negotiable, important economic gains may still be derived from the initiation of more limited forms of cooperation for the joint promotion of selected regional projects, or even from the establishment of preferential groupings falling short of a common market. These beginnings may subsequently provide the foundation for more intimate and profitable cooperation later. To achieve and maintain even these more limited forms of cooperation, however, will certainly pose a formidable challenge to African leaders." Prof. Robson is no Cassandra. At the present stage of African development one can learn more from Robson than Greene and Seidman.

One minor slip may be pointed out. On page 44 when analysing

'polarisation' and 'spread' effects it has been stated that a further discussion on the operation of these factors will be undertaken in Chapter 3, Section 7. This has not been done. Presumably the reference is to Chapter 4, Section 7. Even here the discussion centres on the specific case of the East African Union and on whether Tanzania would gain by remaining in the Union or by opting out of it.

K. SUBRAMANIAN

**War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression**

Edited by Morton Fried, Marvin Harris and Robert Murphy. The Natural History Press, 1968, Garden City, New York, pp. 262+XXII, Price \$6.95.

AN anthropologist's view of armed conflict and aggression evokes strange emotions. What could an anthropologist whose usual preoccupation has been to study primitives in remote savage societies have to say on war. Though it may seem somewhat far-fetched, it does seem that anthropologists have a lot to say on war.

A group of anthropologists organised a symposium in Washington, D.C., on 30 November 1967. The first paper, read by Frank Livingstone, attracted considerable controversy. He maintained that war has few, if any, serious genetic consequences for the human species. According to him, the use of LSD among college students "has probably caused more mutations and effected future generations more than all the atomic explosions thus far." (page 5). Further, the number of young men killed in automobile accidents in a year was greater than all American deaths in the Vietnam war till September 1967.

The thesis was vehemently criticised. It was pointed out that casualties in a war comprised not only those directly killed and wounded but also those who suffered disease, starvation, or other consequences of social disarrangement due to war. It was further suggested that Livingstone had failed to visualize a future in which nuclear warfare might play a more devastating role.

This line of thought was picked up by Ralph Holloway in his paper on human aggression. Holloway stressed the significance of the evolution of the human brain as a basis for increasing its potential ability to find the means for the resolution of conflicts other than military combat. Yet he recognised the paradox that warfare, far from withering away, seems empirically to be increasing. Thus as man's brain has helped him in dealing with his fellowmen more sympathetically, it has also increased his efficiency in tackling others in a hostile manner.

Alexander Alland, Jr., made a bold and brilliant assessment of the biological effects of war in Vietnam, and distinguished between the "natural" war-induced development of epidemics and the potentials for "artificial epidemics induced through bacteriological warfare." He laid the blame on the United States for the potential consequences that may

affect a large segment of the Vietnam population. Benjamin Paul, who supported Alland, noted the nature and extent of the damage caused by American planes : "More than a million gallons of chemicals over more than half a million acres of land defoliated a thousand square miles of Vietnam and ruined 70 thousand acres of rice." (page 79). He cited expert evidence on the effects of this war on children, the elderly and pregnant and lactating women.

Part V of the book contains an interesting paper on the effects of war on social structure by Napoleon Chagnon. The psychological dimensions of the war were ably brought out by Anthony Wallace. He emphasised the sanctioned use of deadly force by trained and coordinated teams supported by a significant portion of the remaining population.

But it is Margaret Mead's "Alternatives to War" at the end which is refreshingly different from the other essays. Her definition of war included all forms of warfare in which defined groups engaged in purposeful, organised and socially sanctioned combat involving killing each other. She regards warfare as a cultural artifact, a social invention. Hitherto peaceful co-existence was inconceivable between two or more organised religious systems. It is no more so. Dr Mead makes a forceful plea for ignoring systematic clash and offers possibilities of new models for a world order. In the process she dismisses worn-out models of world government, world federation, etc. She lays down positive requirements for the new model, which include prevention of major wars, provision for distribution of the essentials of life among all peoples, decentralization of power, preservation of cultural identities, and internationalisation of individual loyalties.

RAHMATULLAH KHAN

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**TO OUR READERS**

As the compiler of "A Selected Bibliography on Africa" is on leave, we regret we have had to drop the feature from this issue. —Ed.

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(O.N.R.D.)

**Congo (Kinshasa)**

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
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### **To Our Readers**

There will be no separate supplement to AFRICA QUARTERLY this year. Instead, we have enlarged the current issue of the Journal to twice its normal size. The next issue will be a special number on "Italy and Africa".

—Ed.

## Gandhi and his South African Journal "Indian Opinion"

B. PACHAI

*This is the last of four articles on Gandhi to mark the Gandhi Centenary Year.* —Ed.

IN 1884, when Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was only fifteen years old, a famous African leader and journalist in the Eastern Province of South Africa started the publication of a newspaper entitled *Imvo Zabantsundu*. The founder was John Tengo Jabavu. The location was Kingwilliamstown. The English title was *Native Opinion*. This newspaper became the first non-European paper in South Africa under African direction. Jabavu's paper played an important part in Cape politics, especially in its stand on the issues of land and labour concerning the African people in the 1890s.

Twenty years later, M.K. Gandhi was instrumental in starting an Indian newspaper in South Africa. Like Jabavu's before him, Gandhi's paper, entitled *Indian Opinion*, became embroiled in the politics of the times. In Jabavu's case, a political opponent, the Rev. Walter Rubusana, who later became the first and only African to be elected to the Cape Provincial Council, started a rival paper named *Izwi la Bantu*. Similarly, in Gandhi's case a political opponent, P.S. Aiyar, started a rival paper called *African Chronicle*.

These developments indicate the beginnings of incipient nationalism among the non-white communities of South Africa. They threw up the first batch of leaders in twentieth century politics in these communities. They indicate, too, political organization, progress and motivation. The use of the press as a political weapon is an index of advancement towards political maturity.

This article concerns itself with one of these papers, that is, *Indian Opinion*; it traces how and why it was started, its failures and successes. In doing so, it deals with a large part of the Gandhian era in South Africa: an era which has become topical in this Gandhi centenary commemoration year.<sup>1</sup>

*Indian Opinion* was established on 4 June, 1903, almost a decade after Gandhi first came to South Africa to practise law. It was printed by the International Printing Press, the first Indian owned press in South Africa. The press was owned by a former Bombay school-teacher, Madanjit Vyavaharik, who was one of the trio whose names are associated

with the founding of *Indian Opinion*. The second was a journalist from Bombay named M.H. Nazar, the paper's first editor. The third was Gandhi himself, the real power behind the paper. To ensure the continuance of the venture, Gandhi undertook to finance it to a limit of £75 a month, to write regular features, to assist in editing, to offer legal advice and to assist in policy-making. Indeed, to keep the paper solvent during the first year of its existence he advanced £2,000 to meet the running expenses.<sup>2</sup>

Gandhi's main objective for the paper was that it should serve as a mouthpiece for the British Indians living in South Africa and as a bridge to draw the Indian and European communities together so that areas of friction could be reduced. He felt that if understanding could be fostered conflict might be minimised. In all this his expectations were high even though his own experiences in South Africa from the time of his arrival there were not too pleasant. Since 1893 he had seen a progressive deterioration in the political climate in which the South African Indians found themselves: there was in force in Natal the Immigration Restriction Act, the Dealers' Licences Act, the £3 tax on ex-indentured Indians if they elected to remain in Natal. It was Natal which had been responsible for importing indentured labour to South Africa. It was here that Indians were and are concentrated. Naturally, the problems of this part of the country were more keenly felt. No wonder, then, that Indians first organized themselves politically in Natal with the formation of the Natal Indian Congress in 1894 and followed this up with the founding of *Indian Opinion*. But these ventures were due to Gandhi's qualities of leadership. The Congress without Gandhi was rudderless; Gandhi without *Indian Opinion* did not have an effective voice.

To advance the cause of Indians in South Africa, the paper had to appeal to the conscience of the governments in South Africa and outside as well as to sympathetic Europeans. This would have to be done in English. It had to appeal, too, to the conscience of Indians themselves in South Africa and India. For this it used the Gujarati, Tamil and Hindi languages for the first two years of its life but finally, because of expenses and support, dropped all but the English and Gujarati languages.<sup>3</sup>

In almost sixty years of its existence, the paper was edited by over a dozen persons but during Gandhi's stay in South Africa only four persons were officially connected with its editorship. They were M.H. Nazar (1903-1906); H. Kitchi (1906); H. S. L. Polak (1906-1916) and the Rev. J. J. Doke (Acting, 1913).<sup>4</sup> All but one of the editors were non-Indians in keeping with Gandhi's philosophy of choosing the right man rather than the right race. Of these, the most remarkable was H. S. L. Polak, the man who was editor of the journal longer than any other person except the Mahatma's son, Manilal Gandhi, who was editor from 1918 to 1956.

Polak was a sub-editor on the English paper *Transvaal Critic* in 1904 when he first met Gandhi. Their meeting and association resulted from the outbreak of bubonic plague in the Transvaal in the early months of 1904. The worst hit area was the city of Johannesburg where the death

toll up to 30 March, 1904, was 6 whites, 2 Africans and 47 Asiatics. Gandhi attributed the blame largely to negligence on the part of the municipality. "It was after the municipality became in Johannesburg the immediate landlord to every individual tenant," he wrote, "that the mischief of excessive crowding and insanitation arose bringing in their train the awful scourge."<sup>5</sup>

Gandhi wrote letter after letter in the Transvaal press on this subject and his persistence aroused Polak's curiosity and admiration. According to Gandhi's own testimony Polak, an English Jew, played a large part in stimulating Gandhi's love for country life and in fostering in the Western-trained barrister the dignity of labour. It was this development that led to Gandhi's establishment of the Phoenix Settlement, fourteen miles from Durban, as the countryside headquarters of *Indian Opinion* in 1904.<sup>6</sup> Two years later Polak gave up his Johannesburg job and joined the Gandhian establishment with headquarters at Phoenix. There was now no turning back. Polak gradually assumed the mantle of understudy to Gandhi, a position which led to his being sent by the South African Indians to India in 1909 as a one-man delegation to protest against the situation in South Africa which had led to the outbreak of passive resistance in 1907. He was now an attorney of the Supreme Court of the Transvaal, a profession he joined in order to assist Gandhi. He was also Assistant Secretary of the Transvaal British Indian Association, a body formed to champion the cause of British Indians in the Transvaal. Gandhi was its Secretary. It is clear, then, that Polak and Gandhi were comrades-in-arms, in the legal chambers, in the Transvaal British Indian Association and in *Indian Opinion*.

Whilst in India in 1909 Polak produced a book in two parts. The first was entitled *The Indians of South Africa*; the second *A Tragedy of Empire, The Treatment of British Indians in the Transvaal*.<sup>7</sup> In the foreword to his book, Polak evaluated the South African situation very much as Gandhi himself did, and in fact embodied partially in the series of letters he exchanged with General Smuts in 1914. "... the grievances of the Indians in the various South African Colonies are many, serious, and legitimate, and that in their attempt to procure a remedy, the Indians have succeeded in evoking expressions of opinion distinctly favourable to their case, from those who might reasonably be expected to be, if anything, hostile witnesses... the greater part of the sufferings borne by the South African Indians are due to the ignorance and carelessness of their European fellow-colonists. The latter are usually unaware of what is going on and what is being done in their name; they are ordinarily too much engrossed in material pursuits to have time to spare for the consideration of hardships, which, as a rule, they are unable to appreciate, not being themselves subject to the disabilities complained of."

Polak's words not only described succinctly the position obtaining in 1909 but they also hold true for the position obtaining sixty years later in spite of the considerable headway made during the first half of the twentieth century in political organization, representation and agitation among all sections of the South African population. In its own way, *Indian Opinion* played an important part in this development. The fact

that its editor, Polak, was a delegate of the Transvaal British Indian Association to India in 1909 and again in 1911 and to England in 1911 and 1913, in addition to being a leader of the Indian community, is a fair reflection of its role in South African and international politics.

To recount the role of *Indian Opinion* in South African politics during the Gandhian period in South Africa is in effect to trace all that happened to the Indian community between 1903 and 1914. This has been done elsewhere.<sup>8</sup> Certain aspects will be selected for treatment here in order to highlight some of the lesser known facts.

First about the plague which broke out in the Transvaal in 1904. Gandhi attributed the main blame for this, as we have seen, to the Johannesburg Town Council.<sup>9</sup> The Council denied the charges vehemently.<sup>10</sup> Gandhi sallied forth into the denials the following day and countered them point by point.<sup>11</sup> Having got the Council to admit its responsibility and to discharge its obligations, he looked to the columns of *Indian Opinion* to remind his countrymen of their obligations; an editorial headed "A Lesson from the Plague" stated :

"The French have a name for the artistic, the English for personal bravery, the Germans for hardheartedness, the Russians for frugality, the colonists in South Africa for gold hunger; similarly, the Indians in South Africa have rightly or wrongly got the evil reputation of being unsanitary and ignorant of the first principles of hygiene."

That being the case he exhorted the South African Indians to pay serious attention to questions of sanitation and hygiene so that the stigma could be permanently eradicated.<sup>12</sup>

Again, when passive resistance against the immigration and registration laws of the Transvaal began in 1907, *Indian Opinion* appealed to its readers to undertake the task of disseminating information about the issues involved among those who were uninformed or illiterate.<sup>13</sup> In a later editorial the paper made the following plea : "Let the people then strive earnestly to educate themselves. Ignorance is the greatest enemy. It binds, it disfigures, it distorts. And in a body of people fighting for rights, it is a positive weakness to their fighting capacity".<sup>14</sup>

In this respect the journal not only prodded the aggrieved community into action, but also called for improvements within the community. And it stirred officialdom into taking steps in certain directions. A perusal of the files on Indian immigration in the Colonial Secretary's Office, Natal, reveals the variety of the journal's activities on behalf of the community : for example, it complained of the quality of rice rations issued in the Elandslaagte Collieries in Natal to indentured miners<sup>15</sup> ; it complained against the detention and allocation of indentured labourers and against their treatment in the mines;<sup>16</sup> unfair persecution, withholding of licences from Indian traders and a host of other matters. The two leading lights of the journal were also deemed to be leaders of the Indian community ; they were practising barristers, too. They made representations, filled memoranda, appeared in court, went overseas as leaders of delegations,

wrote books and took an active part in the passive resistance struggle, including the indignity of serving prison sentences. But if Gandhi, Polak and others, including the political bodies, the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal British Indian Association, received almost unanimous support from the Indian community in the early years, what happened between 1913 and 1914 is quite another story.

This period saw a heightening of the crisis. It saw the introduction of the Immigrants Regulation Act which in effect advocated a closed-door policy, a policy which both Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Member of the Viceroy's Council who visited South Africa in 1912 at the invitation of Gandhi, and Gandhi himself, supported as a *quid pro quo* for the improvement of the lot of those Indians who were already in South Africa. There was no question after the introduction of the Immigration Act of 1913 that India's millions would spill over into South Africa. It saw, too, the passing of the Searle judgment which pronounced all monogamous marriages contracted by Indians according to non-Christian rites to be polygamous marriages and therefore not recognized in law. This latter issue led to serious consequences. It made Gandhi draw Indian women into the arena of resistance. When this happened, it was a small step towards involving ex-indentured immigrants. These persons were now free from the obligation of indentured labour but they were subject to an obnoxious £3 tax as the price for staying on in South Africa after giving at least ten years of their working lives in that country. The abolition of the £3 tax became the cry of the resistance movement.

These issues were the very ones on which the Indian community became divided. Gandhi lost the support of the Natal Indian Congress, a body he had been instrumental in founding and which he had served for many years as secretary. He formed the Natal Indian Association as a political platform. To add to his chagrin at this time, a rival Indian paper took up the cudgels against him. This was *African Chronicle*, edited by P.S. Aiyar. The paper set its tone and defined its stand in the following editorial excerpt: "We have been fooled long enough by the wisdom of this great 'South African Indian patriot' and we hope and trust that our countrymen will no longer subject themselves to be victimized by his reputed wisdom."<sup>17</sup> *African Chronicle* held the view that "by an insensate and short-sighted policy, Mr. Gandhi and his friends have brought the Indian community to the verge of ruin."<sup>18</sup>

Gandhi's "friends" were singled out to be L. W. Titch, Herman Kallen-Bach and H. S. L. Polak, all Europeans.<sup>19</sup> To Gandhi's credit, he defended his friends stoutly and continued to work with them. He had found their "purity, talents, ability and ideals" unimpeachable.

This opposition bedevilled Gandhi for the rest of his days in South Africa. *African Chronicle* intensified its campaign of discrediting Gandhi and *Indian Opinion*. What was worse, and perhaps the unkindest cut of all, was that Gandhi was impeached at a mass meeting held in Johannesburg on 15 July, 1914, five days before he sailed for ever from the shores of South Africa: his leadership was repudiated; he was charged by his former friends with having misappropriated £1,200 for running *Indian*.



*Opinion* and with having accepted a settlement which was detrimental to Moslems on the score of non-recognition of polygamous marriages. This mass meeting ended in uproar. The first era in the Mahatma's political life ended on 20 July, 1914, when he left South Africa, disavowed and discredited in some quarters. Yet much was left behind and still remains. It was a forerunner to the tragedy of 30 January, 1948, when the second era ended. On the second occasion, as on the first, though disavowed and discredited in some quarters, there was much left behind.

In concluding this account of Gandhi and his journal in South Africa I wish to draw upon some observations made elsewhere over a decade ago:

"The files of *Indian Opinion* of the years 1903-1914 are a testimony to the journal's adherence to facts, dealt with as objectively as circumstances permitted, according to the editorial standards of the *Times* of London, as laid down by Gandhi himself. It lived through the turbulent period covered by this study carrying in its print and policy the spirit of moderation. It was moderation that led *Indian Opinion* to support voluntary re-registration in the Transvaal in 1908; it was the same attitude that lent support to the Gandhi-Gokhale 'closed-door' policy in 1912 in order that the permanent Indian population of South Africa might prosper in proportion to the curtailment of future Indian immigration to South Africa from India. It was moderation that caused the journal to support the Indian Relief Act of 1914, and it was in an atmosphere of compromise that the Smuts-Gandhi Agreement was conceived.

"Whether or not future events justified the spirit of moderation and compromise of Gandhi and his journal, one thing was indisputable: *Indian Opinion* had carved for itself a niche in South African affairs by its conception and advocacy of passive resistance as an instrument of protest, and by its service in focussing attention on the defects in the system of indenture in Natal. If after 'Mahatma Gandhi left the shores of South Africa, Pheonix was like the mythical bird turned into ashes,' the lesson of Gandhi and his journal of Passive Resistance lives on. Nor has South Africa heard or felt the last of it."<sup>20</sup>

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## **Socialism and Class Concept In African Development**

AHMED MOHIDDIN

TO the radical intellectual and the ideologue brought up in the Western intellectual tradition, the phenomenon of capitalist industrialism and the notion of 'class' are central to the understanding of socialism. What is asserted by this "socialist school of thought" is not just the fact that socialism is a child of European agrarian and industrial upheavals, and therefore a uniquely European phenomenon since these upheavals took place in that part of the globe before anywhere else; it is also dogmatically postulated that class struggle is an inevitable prerequisite for socialism. In other words, there can be no socialism without the appearance, in the first place, of classes.

In general, African socialist thinkers have rejected both the proposition that socialism is essentially an offspring of European capitalist industrialism, and the notion that socialism is based on class struggle. This paper examines the African socialist's attitude to class in the mainstream of socialist thought, but our discussion will be within the context of African development generally.

Before we proceed, let us first look at socialism itself. What, then, is socialism?

When President Nyerere was recently asked by a student at the University College, Makerere, to define socialism, the "Mwalimu" paused and admitted his inability to define it.<sup>1</sup> He said it was a difficult proposition, but he could, he hastened to add, define a socialist or what socialists believed in, and this he proceeded to do at great length. Part of the difficulty in defining socialism, as is indeed the case with defining democracy, is that in so doing one is likely to embarrass or even antagonise some people unnecessarily.

Most independent African leaders have not as yet settled their choice of socio-economic and political systems for their respective countries. The majority of African states have simply continued with the systems inherited from the colonial regimes. There are however some African states—and Uganda is one of them—that are now in the process of defining their own institutions. While speaking to the students at Makerere, Nyerere was an official guest of the Uganda Government, having come to the country to witness the consecration of the shrine of the Uganda Martyrs by His Holiness the Pope. Some months earlier, the President

of Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote, had made a statement to the effect that Uganda was contemplating a "move to the left". This pronouncement from the President of the ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), was generally interpreted as meaning some form of socialism. When Nyerere was asked to define socialism, Uganda had still not committed herself to a definition of the precise "move to the left". Hence the Mwalimu's understandable difficulty. But Nyerere's discreet hesitation in defining socialism while in Uganda, and Uganda's conspicuous and seemingly deliberate refusal to commit herself hastily to definitions are typical manifestations of contradictions in modern post-independence Africa.

There are some clear indications that Uganda does indeed wish to make the "move to the left"; but there are also equally conspicuous symptoms that the general leadership is not in unison with regard to the precise definition of a move. Some believe that the move has in fact already been made; others are disturbed by the very thought of any movement to the left, while others are eagerly awaiting marching orders, complaining that the move to the left is long overdue.

But these internal contradictions are explainable. As a result of successive British colonial policies, particularly in their attempts to introduce capitalism into Uganda through the former Kingdom of Buganda, Ugandan society at independence was an odd mixture of feudalism, capitalism and aspiring republican socialism. Although the Obote Revolution<sup>2</sup> which reached its climax in 1966 with the overthrow of the feudal regimes and the complicated and archaic political systems, went a long way in destroying some of these difficulties, the situation is not quite free of contradictions. A conservative breed of people, the British usually—and understandably, bearing in mind their imperialist disposition—build for the future solidly. Thus, most of the Uganda elites are not temperamentally predisposed towards any national movement which is likely to affect their personal fortunes, as *any* move to the left is bound to. And these contradictions are restricted primarily to the leadership level. The masses, who comprise more than 95% of the population, are most likely to be behind any move to the left. Hence the persistence of contradictions which only a Presidential or Party directive can remove.

Yet, superimposed on these internal contradictions are the possible demonstration effects of Tanzania's experimentation with Ujamaa Na Kujitegemea<sup>3</sup> and Kenya's own brand of Africanised capitalism euphemistically entitled "African Socialism"<sup>4</sup> and Zambia's recent dramatic move to nationalise her vital natural resources, the copper mines. These might all influence Uganda's policy makers. In these circumstances, it is therefore rather difficult to imagine Uganda either not making a move at all, or making a move to the right; it is also equally understandable why Nyerere was shy of defining socialism at Makerere when asked by the Uganda student, although he has done precisely this elsewhere several times.<sup>5</sup> It is important that Uganda should come to grips with her own definite problems.

What is socialism? Socialism refers to a form of society in which natural resources and economic activities are consciously controlled and

organised for the benefit of the community as a whole. In a typical socialist society, the basic means of production are owned by the community and economic activities are usually planned and co-ordinated by a central authority responsible to the community. Thus socialism is opposed to a capitalist system in which the means of production are owned by private individuals and are utilised for their personal profits.

The late Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford University, Professor G.D.H. Cole, defines socialism thus :

... a form of society in which men and women are not divided into opposing economic classes, but live together under conditions of approximate social and economic equality, using in common the means that lie to their hands of promoting social welfare ... a social system in which no one is so much richer or poorer than his neighbours as to be unable to mix with them on equal terms, the common ownership and use of all the vital instruments of production, and an obligation upon all citizens to serve one another according to their capacities in promoting the common well-being . . .<sup>6</sup>

It is because of the community-orientation and emphasis on human equality that socialism has that African socialists have claimed their societies were basically socialist before the coming of the colonial and trading invaders to Africa. What is asserted here is not the outward forms of socialism, but the basic principles of socialism which are universal. And since these principles were an inherent part of the traditional African society, there is no need for the African to go through capitalism and industrialisation in order to arrive at socialism. This does not imply that the African must go back to his nostalgic past. It merely means that insofar as socialism is concerned, contemporary African society has an advantage in that the basic values and structures underlying a *modern* socialist system are already present. What is needed is to adapt these basically traditional systems to serve modern needs. Africa could, if necessary steps are taken, avoid the social and economic convulsions experienced by Europeans in their transition to socialism. The objective is the same—socialism: but the means must of necessity differ in Africa simply because Africa is not Europe, Asia or America.

"Our road to socialism", writes Nkrumah, must be a road designed and charted in accordance with the conditions of Ghana and the historical and social conditions and circumstances of Africa as a whole. We do not therefore seek to copy the methods by which other countries have achieved socialism within their own states. Indeed, the path to socialism followed by many countries has not been worked out in accordance with a preconceived plan.<sup>7</sup>

Nyerere argues in a similar vein. The fundamental principles of socialism and the basic purpose of socialism are universal. "A useful definition of the basic assumption and purpose of socialism is not only possible, it is also essential",<sup>8</sup> he asserts. The basic purpose of socialism is the well-being of all men, and the basic assumption is the acceptance of human equality. Yet in order to achieve these goals, it is not inevitable that all societies must adopt the same approach. He argues that in a

society like Tanzania's where capitalism did not have strong roots, where the system was confined mainly to the colonial invaders and to a negligible number of Africans, it would be silly for one to insist that Tanzania could not become a socialist society if it was not presaged by capitalism. What is important in an African society like Tanzania is not the theoretically postulated stages which such a society must go through before it attains socialism, but what empirically necessary measures are to be taken to ensure that this particular society will achieve and retain socialism. And these can be ascertained by a clear understanding of the objective conditions of that society, and not by speculative excursions into the realm of dogma.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, Nyerere argues that capitalism could precede socialism only if it could be demonstrated that it is *only* capitalism which could solve the problems of production, exchange and distribution. As he put it :

It is certainly true that capitalism can lead to the high output of goods and services—no socialist would dispute that. But there is very little evidence to support the contention that only through capitalism can a satisfactory level of production be attained ; indeed there is an increasing amount of evidence with which to refuse such a statement.<sup>10</sup>

Nyerere's basic contention, therefore, is that the traditional African society does provide the basis for socialism, certainly in Tanzania. What is needed is the adaptation of this essentially traditional base to a modern nation state.

Thus the stress is always on the *essence* of socialism and not on its outward forms or on a particular means of achieving it. Africa does not have to go through the stages of capitalist industrialisation simply because these stages are *not necessary* for Africa, or for any other non-Western non-industrialised country for that matter. The last 60 years have witnessed such a tremendous technological advancement that it is now possible for young African countries to organise their societies and utilise their natural resources for the benefit of the community as a whole, to a degree unimaginable even to Karl Marx. Moreover, during the same period, a number of socialist systems have come into being that have to a very large extent been able to solve their problems of economic production and social organisation to a degree that one could not overlook—certainly in the developing countries. Africans can therefore draw from the experiences of these established socialist systems in order to create their own modern socialist systems based on their own traditions. What is asserted is not so much an Africanisation of socialism, as an *African approach to socialism*. As Nyerere put it to his Egyptian academic audience in Cairo in 1967 :

It is not possible for a country which moves to socialism from a highly developed capitalist economy to follow the same path as one which starts from a backward peasant economy. Nor is it likely that two backward countries moving towards socialism will follow exactly the same path if one starts from a feudal base and another from traditional communalism. Each state must move in a direction which is appropriate to its starting point.<sup>11</sup>

Indeed, African socialists go further and assert that socialism and democracy, as social systems, are indigenous to Africa and are not therefore alien to the African. There is no need to preach either socialism or democracy to Africa. Nyerere's assertion here is typical of this school of thought :

Socialism like democracy is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare.<sup>12</sup>

By reducing socialism—and democracy—to the function of an attitude of mind, what Nyerere is claiming is that, as a social system, socialism is not to be attributed to any geographical area or to a particular breed of people. What is important is the attitude the individuals in that system have towards one another and towards property.

But the Mwalimu is saying more than this. By stressing the universality of the essentials of socialism, as we have already observed, and by putting the emphasis on the *attitude of mind* as a crucial index distinguishing a socialist from a non-socialist system, Nyerere is also denying the centrality of class in the complex of a socialist system. In a piece entitled *Ujamaa—The Basis Of African Socialism*, written in 1962, Nyerere rejects the notion that the class struggle is the basis of socialism in Africa. He accepts the proposition that it was the two European revolutions—the Agrarian and the Industrial—which precipitated the class struggle which ultimately led to socialism in Europe. But to accept this is merely to admit the peculiar circumstances which presaged socialism in Europe. African societies have not, at the point of his writing, had those experiences, and yet they were basically socialist. In his own words :

... Brought up in tribal socialism, I must say I find this contradiction (class struggle) quite intolerable. It gives capitalism a philosophical status which capitalism neither claims nor deserves... This glorification of capitalism by the doctrinaire European socialists, I repeat, I find intolerable.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, in his rejection of the centrality of class in socialism and his obvious impatience with "doctrinaire European socialists", Nyerere was in a significant, though perhaps aggressive, way asserting the African's right to speak for himself and for his society. For what he was in effect saying is this : that in so far as he—Nyerere, an African—is concerned, African society is socialist and yet this does not appear to him to be a consequence of any class contradictions or revolutions. In so far as socialism in Africa is concerned, European class analysis is irrelevant. There are no classes in Africa, says Nyerere. And to substantiate his position, he resorts to linguistic evidence:

I doubt if the equivalent of the word 'class' exists in any indigenous African language ; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it, and the idea of class or caste was non-existent in African society.<sup>14</sup>

Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea reflects the same attitude towards the centrality of class in the evolution of socialism. He argues that we must examine the totality of African society as it is now, and should not be deluded by the developments in other parts of society which might be different because of their contact with outside corrupting influences. This is how he puts it :

Africa is essentially 'communucratic'. Collective life and social solidarity give her habits a humanistic foundation which many people may envy. It is also because of those human qualities that an African cannot imagine organising his life outside that of his group—family, village or clan. The voice of African people is not individualistic. On the contrary in spheres contaminated by the mentality of the colonised, who has not observed the progress of personal egoism? Who has not heard the exponents of the theory of art for the sake of art, poetry for the sake of poetry, the theory of each one for himself?<sup>15</sup>

Thus, according to Sekou Toure also, African society has in its own traditions those principles which are generally associated with socialism. In fact Toure, like the Mwalimu, has gone further in his denial of the centrality of class in socialism, in so far as Africa is concerned. Not only does he reject the notion of class antagonism as a necessary prerequisite for socialism, but also the very existence and the possibility of such a phenomenon in Africa. "The class struggle here is impossible, for there are no classes, but only social strata. The fundamental basis of our society is the family and the village community".<sup>16</sup>

In rejecting the assertion that socialism is of European origin and therefore an alien import into Africa, for which one can be either grateful or feel threatened, depending on one's views, African socialists are not thereby rejecting socialism thus conceived because of its European origin alone. Rather, they are emphasising the essentials of socialism as a system which can be found anywhere on this planet. It is not a matter of nationalising socialism and making it African. It is merely to assert that socialism is a way of life and as such has no particular geographical or ethnographical origins. They reject the claim that socialism is a European phenomenon which could, given the right combination of circumstances, be imported into any country by any sort of people; and they also reject the imputed essential components of socialism, namely, classes and the inevitable antagonism arising from such a situation.

What do we mean by class? To avoid unnecessary ideological confusions and for the purpose of our discussion, we may approach the definition of class in one of the following ways.

In the first place, there is the familiar Marxist definition of class in terms of relation to the basic means of production, exchange and distribution in a given society. Thus the capitalists, or the bourgeoisie, are those who own these basic means of production; and the proletariat, or the workers, are those who possess none of these things except their own natural labour power which they offer for hire to the capitalists.



Secondly, class as a concept can be used as a general categorisation of individuals on the basis of stipulated criteria, for example, education, income, place of residence, occupation, and so on. These criteria might not on their own have any significance when related to each other, but are here used simply to single out individuals on the basis of these criteria, in order, for example, to demonstrate a hypothesis, say, the behaviour of a given people in a given society.

Finally, class is also used as a label signifying the political roles of individuals. There are thus the rulers and the ruled. The rulers may not necessarily be those owning the basic means of production or those who are wealthy. It may be that at the point of assuming the role of ruler, the individual is not wealthy at all. He might even be poor. Though it is possible that as time passes the individual might acquire wealth by virtue of his being a ruler. And this is virtually the position with regard to almost all wealthy people in the emergent countries in Africa and elsewhere. Political power there has inexorably led—except for the insignificant virtuous few—to economic power for those wielding it, and for their friends and relatives.

But could it not be argued also that social differentiation, whether on the basis of economic function or political role, is an inherent factor in society? That by definition society embraces a community larger than the family, and for this entity to maintain itself there must be some form of division of labour within the society? And if division of labour is essential for the very survival of society, let alone its prosperity, and if classes are based on this fundamental social fact, why then do African socialists protest vehemently against something which is in many ways undeniable?

Part of the answer to the question is connected not with the rejection of class as such but, as we have already noted, with the association of class with socialism, that socialism is a class-based phenomenon; consequently no country can have socialism without first going through capitalist industrialisation. And with this rejection goes, as already noted, the claim that socialism itself is uniquely European.

There are also other reasons based on the genuine, though naive, belief that African societies were in fact basically classless and that classes in Africa are an alien phenomenon introduced by the colonial and trading powers. This, as already mentioned, was the position held by Nyerere in his earlier work, *Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism*.

But that was Nyerere, the African nationalist, philosophising and lamenting on the fading old order. Yet it did not take him long to appreciate the realities of the traditional society, the consequences of the alien impact, and their implications to one determined to build socialism. The traditional African society was *in fact stratified*, and did contain internal contradictions. As Nkrumah once put it: "Colonialism deserves to be blamed for many evils in Africa, but surely it was not preceded by an African Golden Age or paradise".<sup>17</sup>

There were classes in traditional African society. The fact that they did not assume the same acute arrogance, hostility and cruelty towards each

other as in industrialised Europe was simply a question of opportunity. Should opportunities for class formation occur, as is likely once modernisation in African states gets seriously under way, and in the absence of any positive public measures to counter such formations, social stratification will take place in Africa. Indeed, it is the prospect of the emergence of an African bourgeoisie and proletariat that disturbs Nyerere immensely.

That even the present Tanzanian society is still precariously in the grips of feudalism and incipient capitalism is admitted by the Arusha Declaration :

Tanzania is a nation of peasants and workers, but it is not yet a socialist society. It still contains elements of feudalism and capitalism —with their temptations. These feudalistic and capitalistic features of our society could spread and entrench themselves.<sup>18</sup>

The seriousness with which Nyerere views this nascent class formation and the danger it poses for a Tanzania determined to build Ujamaa is indicated by the following observation on rural development :

Yet the present trend is away from the extended family production and social unity, and towards the development of a class system in the rural areas. It is this kind of development which would be inconsistent with the growth of a socialist Tanzania in which all citizens could be assured of human dignity and equality, and in which all were able to have a decent and constantly improving life for themselves and their children.<sup>19</sup>

The same fear of class formation was expressed by Thiam, the former Minister of Planning and Development in the Senegal Government, when he wrote :

However, the non-existence of such a class in our countries does not mean it would be impossible for it to come into existence. Unless we exercise caution we may find emerging a bourgeois class of political-administrative origin, which could give rise to the problem of class struggle. Also we might find in our countries that we have to deal with national bourgeoisies as appendages of international capital.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, although African socialists reject class as irrelevant to the evolution of socialism in Africa, none the less they do not also reject class as a concept *necessary* to the understanding and implementation of *modern* socialism to the modern African nation-state. Indeed, it is because of the acceptance of the importance of class in the implementation of modern socialism that such conditions as those stipulated for leadership in the Arusha Declaration assume their true significance. A political leader in Tanzania must be either a worker or a peasant. He must not have more than one source of income, although if he wishes he may have more than one job. Finally, he must believe in and practise socialism.<sup>21</sup>

Although African socialists *now* accept the importance of class in their own societies, yet, colonial African experience has shown that these

class formations need not necessarily be determined by their actual relation to means of production, distribution and exchange. In a colonial situation, there are other criteria the possession of which endows the owner with power over other people. It could be the colour of skin, or the style of life associated with a particular pigmentation. As Frantz Fanon explains :

When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence ; you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich.<sup>22</sup>

Thus in a colonial situation, whose legacy is still with the independent African countries, the criteria of belonging to a class—and the power associated with such a position—are not simply economics or education, but the right colour of skin, the right sort of education, and the appropriate style of life. And it is for this reason partly that a black millionaire is still considered a rare phenomenon. Not merely because Africans, or black people in general, are considered poor ; for in terms of absolute numbers, there are more white or 'near-white' people who are poor than there are black. It is rather the very idea of wealth being associated with pigmentation. It is thus 'normal' for a white American to be a millionaire or just rich ; but not so for the blacks, even in such an egalitarian society as the United States. Indeed, any outstanding achievement by the black man in any conceivable field is considered exceptional to the extent that a highly reputable Negro magazine, *Ebony*, regularly devotes a two-page feature publicising these remarkable achievements by these people.

The point being made here, lest it be forgotten or lost, is that in a colonial situation—and most independent African countries are still in this state, certainly psychologically and economically—one's class and the power which goes with it (or the lack of power) is still largely determined by pigmentation. And within these fading colour lines, there are also evolving class formations along the classical European pattern.<sup>23</sup>

African socialists have also extended the notion of exploitation beyond the simple Marxist criterion of class relations based on the basic means of production. They argue that exploitation in the sense of one person or a group of people living on the proceeds of the work of another person or group is a phenomenon which does not require capitalist industrialisation to exist. It prevails wherever there are people with power to exploit others. And this power is not necessarily related to the possession of economic wealth.

There has been exploitation in Africa from time immemorial and this has been carried out sometimes by people who could not be described as economically wealthy. Women have been and continue to be exploited by men ; wives exploited by husbands ; senior wives exploiting the young ones in a polygamous society ; one tribe exploiting another ; and in modern times, one region—the wealthy or the more politically important—exploiting another ; the urban exploiting the rural ; intellectuals exploiting the masses of peasants. Hence the criteria for exploitation in African society—traditional or modern—are numerous. One does not have to be a 'worker' or

'proletariat' to be exploited. Nor does the exploiter have to be a 'capitalist' owning factories and such like things to live on the proceeds of someone else's work.

Finally, using exploitation in the sense already defined, African socialists regard the colonised world—the Third World—as one class, the exploited; while the former colonial rulers and those with whom they collaborated constitute the exploiting class. Nyerere explains:

...When you look at the international scene, you must admit that the world is still divided between the 'haves' and 'have nots'. This division is not a division between capitalists and communists; this is a division between the poor countries of the world and the rich countries of the world. I believe therefore that the poor countries of the world should be very careful not to allow themselves to be used as the 'tools' of the rich countries of the world...however much the rich countries may seek to fool them that they are on their side. And don't forget that the rich countries of the world today may be found on either side of the division between capitalist and socialist countries.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, as in the case of the notion of class—and of socialism—what African socialists have captured and retained in the notion of 'exploitation' is the *essence* of the phenomenon, and not its outward manifestation.

Could it therefore be argued that class in the sense of social differentiation of individuals on the basis of their roles in society is an inevitable aspect of society? As we have seen, in order for the society to maintain itself, let alone develop, it must function on the basis of some form of division of labour. Moreover, African societies are now modernising in earnest. Changes in these societies are now a matter of deliberate policy. Could it therefore be asserted that the more developed a society is, the more stratified it is likely to be, and the greater the significance class will assume in the complex of power structures in the society which is undergoing these changes? For the new African societies can neither avoid these changes, nor indeed can they afford not to have rapid and planned development. As Nyerere once put it: "All young countries have to be revolutionary if their policies are to survive. It is this which distinguishes them from the developed countries, and indeed from their own past".<sup>25</sup>

In this process of rapid and planned change, class formations are inevitable products. Qualified people are needed to perform the complicated tasks involved in nation building—engineers, doctors, teachers, town planners, administrators, lecturers, and skilled workers of various types.

Can we therefore conclude that if classes are inevitable consequences of development, i.e. development of necessity requires skilled personnel, and as African countries are determined to bring about changes in their societies, revolutionary or otherwise, that these classes are indeed *necessary for development itself*? To put it another way, can Africans really avoid having elites, and indeed avoid being led by these very elites? For this is what the statement and the logic of development implies.

The spectre of class still haunts African socialists, even men like Nyerere, Nkrumah and Toure, who at one time expressed optimistic views

about their own societies. But is class an evil thing? Or does it depend on the context and the values attached to class?

In the colonial situation, classes were disruptive for two reasons. In the first place, they were carriers of alien values and hence their role was disfunctional; in the second place, the whole class structure threatened the viability of the traditional African society. What makes classes evil in contemporary African society is not the fact that their existence symbolises, as it were, the fragmentation of society; it is rather the supercilious and arrogant attitudes the "educated classes" adopt towards the rest of the society. The assumption by these educated elites that they are a different breed, and should be treated as such, from the rest of humanity.

If classes are a reality in Africa, what has been the 'socialists' reaction to them? There is a typically socialist strategy to the problem of class formation, but it is a part of a larger, more comprehensive approach to the problems of African development. This involves taking into account the realities of African society, its contradictions, and the kind of problems which are likely to occur in the modernisation processes. As already discussed, class formations are inevitable; more so in a society undergoing rapid changes. Hence what ought to and must be done is to mitigate the effects on society of these classes through radicalisation of education, and by putting the emphasis on human rather than on material development. If the 'educated' are socialised to be *useful* members of their own society, and if development is that of the people themselves rather than that of their natural physical resources, then some of these problems of class can be mitigated. The educated will then be an integral part of the community, and not apart from it and merely living on its proceeds. Tanzania is experimenting with this approach.<sup>26</sup>

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## Renewal of the Yaounde Convention

ROBERTO ALIBONI

NEGOTIATIONS for the renewal of the association between the EEC and the eighteen African countries, including Madagascar, grouped under the initials SAMA, which came into force on June 1, 1964, and expired at the end of the five-year period on May 31, 1969, began only on December 19, 1968. By the terms of the convention governing the relations between the associate countries, negotiations should have started one year before the date of expiry, *i.e.*, in June 1968, but considerable delay was caused by the fact that the EEC was not sufficiently prepared to tackle the subject. It is the aim of this article to examine, in the light of the association's achievements, the questions which have come in for most discussion during the negotiations for the renewal of the Yaounde Convention.\*

### Financial Co-operation Problems

The Yaounde Convention covers two of the more important elements in development aid policies : commercial cooperation and technical and financial cooperation. Beginning with the latter, it can be said that taken as a whole the balance of technical-financial cooperation is clearly positive. The EDF (European Development Fund), which has a total of 666 million dollars at its disposal, had paid out, as of December 31, 1968, a little more than 533 million, thus achieving a rate of about 120 million per annum. As of the same date, the EIB (European Investments Bank), with a total of \$64 million at its disposal, had paid out 33 million in loans granted to SAMA countries in ten investment operations. This rate of outlay is higher than the rate achieved in the previous period of association, which ran from 1958 to 1962.

The EDF has also greatly improved its loans compared with the past procedure. While previously the only technique of financing used was that of non-repayable subsidies, the Fund now uses loans, short-term advances and payment of contributions for lowering the interest on loans granted by the EIB as well. Besides the loans the EDF can grant, which qualify as genuine soft loans owing to the conditions attached to them, the EIB makes up the range of intervention methods with its grants of loans on market conditions, where these conditions exist. Just as methods of giving aid have increased, so have the situations to which they are applied. Previously the EDF could only intervene in projects concerning economic

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\*This article was written before the renewal of the Yaounde Convention for another five years.—Ed.

and social infrastructure, its policy being a repetition of the old financial instruments of the franc area. Now it can also finance productive projects of general interest or normal profit-making projects, as well as technical cooperation programmes whether or not connected with these projects. Furthermore, a good third of the outlay is earmarked for financing programmes to help production and diversify economies and cultures.

The new opportunities and new instruments for financial cooperation have not however been enough to achieve two objectives in which Africans fervently believe: industrialization and coordination of projects at a regional level. These two aims are emphasized in all three of the resolutions on technical and financial cooperation approved by the Council—the highest institutional organ of the association—in 1966, 1967 and 1968.

The question of turning European aid to SAMA countries into regional channels came up right at the beginning of the association, on two levels: the level of regional cooperation within the associated area, and the level of cooperation between certain associated countries and other non-associated African countries. I shall deal with the second question later, when I take up the political problems posed by the association, but here I must say something about cooperation between SAMA members. Despite the Council's solemn declarations on the subject of regional cooperation for investments and despite the doctrines expounded by figures of importance in Africa and Europe, progress in this field has been almost nil. According to information from the EEC Commission, regional projects in May 1968 accounted for less than 37 million dollars which represent about 8% of the EDF's total commitments in SAMA countries for the same period. Nevertheless there are doubts about the criteria used in deciding whether or not a particular programme comes under the heading of regional cooperation. One can hardly say that a road linking two cities in different countries is a regional cooperation project. The content of such cooperation is too obvious not to be fortuitous. There are, however, good examples of cooperation, and those mentioned by the Commission include the Figuil (Cameroon) cement works and the Fort Archambault (Chad) textile factory, both of these products being tied to precise agreements between Chad and Cameroon which are designed to set up suitable markets for the production of the two factories. However, operations of this scope make up much less than 8% of the EDF's total commitments.

Finally, we should note that Commission officials and their African counterparts—or rather those who are responsible for the daily management of financial cooperation—are somewhat sceptical about the usefulness of aiming at regional integration. This scepticism is at its strongest on forms of integration based on investments, while opposition to integration in the form of customs unions or free trade areas is less strong. There is much to be criticised in this point of view since in conditions such as we have today in Africa the removal of customs obstacles is no help in creating trade which in any case does not exist; and we are still left with the problem of cooperating on investments in order to give life to effective trade tendencies. Nevertheless the EDF's policy of financial cooperation in this field is marked by scant liking for regional cooperation and a clear preference for cooperation on trade rather than on projects.



The other objective the EDF has fallen short of is the trend towards industrialization. When the African member nations began negotiations for the renewal of the convention, they put great emphasis on the need for future EEC-SAMA cooperation to push hard in the direction of industrialization. First of all, it must be realized that the association's institutions can do little by themselves. The decisive push towards industrialization must come from a massive influx of private investment in SAMA territories. The association has so far adopted a passive attitude to this question, limiting itself to establishing the right of firms in the member countries to set themselves up in the territory of other members and to ensuring limited freedom of circulation for capital. What is needed now is for the association to make a positive contribution by setting up, at European expense, a multinational guarantee system for private investment in SAMA countries.

Even though this move would create the conditions for a larger contribution from the private sector, the problem still remains of the forms which intervention by the EDF and the EIB should assume with a view to increasing industrialization. The most recent EDF balance-sheet shows industrialization at a mere 1.3%, while the EIB has devoted itself entirely to industrialization projects. It is probable that the structure of the EDF, modelled as it is on the organs of financial cooperation of the colonial era, is not very suitable for financing a process of industrial growth. At present credit operations stem from the EIB, both as regards the loans it makes out of its own resources and as regards the so-called special condition loans which are drawn on EDF funds but managed by the EIB. The EIB has recently made it known that, in its opinion, it should hold the reins of the process of industrialization of SAMA countries by setting up a special credit section which would make use of diversified and appropriate financing techniques. The choice between the EDF and the EIB as the prime mover of the process of industrialization will to a large extent determine whether financial cooperation is to be given a new lease of life in its methods and objectives or whether it is to remain anchored in its old habits.

### **Basic Products Problems**

Basic products, and in particular tropical agricultural products, are, in the association, the beneficiaries of a complex subsidy policy which includes both financial and commercial measures. From the trade point of view, these products benefit from tariff preferences in the EEC market, except for a tariff quota for bananas in favour of Germany (which virtually allows the Germans to get their supplies elsewhere) and the permission granted to the Benelux countries to import green coffee from third countries at a reduced tariff. In any case these preferences, which were lowered in 1964 and again at the end of the Kennedy Round, are not a very great advantage.

From the financial point of view, eleven countries which were formerly among France's colonial possessions benefit from a regressive subsidy on the prices of their products. This subsidy was in fact determined within the terms of the countries' economic plans, in agreement with and under the control of the EEC. It is flanked by another kind of financial aid—aid to production—designed to modify production structures as price subsidies

decrease. The whole policy is crowned by a third type of aid—aid to diversification—which by transforming the structure of the economy itself should be decisive in making beneficiary countries competitive. Apart from the eleven countries mentioned above, the remaining seven also benefit from this aid to diversification. The policy at present followed for basic products in the EEC-SAMA association is substantially an attempt to push production structures towards greater competitiveness, making compensatory finances available in the meantime.

It is now clear, however, that five years is too short a period for such an operation to come to fruition. The Africans are now asking for marketing organizations to be set up guaranteeing prices and outlets for all their products, together with a fund, independent of the EDF, which would finance profit losses due to deterioration in trade ratios. Obviously neither preferences nor financial compensations are regarded as sufficient by the Africans. Nevertheless this request of theirs is a long way from having any probability of being accepted. What will in fact be discussed is how to bring the problem of the SAMA countries' basic products on to a world level by drawing up world agreements for each product. The Yaounde negotiators had already thought of doing away with the privilege system and the uncompetitiveness which many of the SAMA countries had inherited from the franc area. This was why it was decided to make the aid designed to subsidize regressive prices. Since this regressivity has left the problem unsolved, the EEC must recognize that to find a solution satisfactory to themselves, to the SAMA countries and to other countries they will have to go outside the association and conclude world agreements for each product. For the immediate future the EEC must take care not to set up structures which are more complicated than those existing at present, but to limit itself to making compensatory funds available until such time as the necessary agreements for each product come into force.

#### **Preferences for Manufactured and Semi-manufactured Goods**

Another question on which the problems of the EEC-SAMA association and those of world trade intersect concerns the granting of non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences by developed countries to less developed countries. At the moment the EEC grants immunity to SAMA products and enjoys preferences for its products in SAMA countries. The Yaounde preferential system is therefore at odds with the system slowly being negotiated through UNCTAD—for two reasons. It does in fact discriminate against other developing countries and it is based on reciprocity between the EEC and SAMA. While in point of fact one can be excused for ignoring the SAMA countries' trade in manufactured goods with the EEC, it is less excusable to ignore the effect of the preferences which the EEC enjoys. On this point it is interesting to observe that in the period 1958-66 the annual growth rate of EEC exports to Congo Kinshasa, Rwanda and Burundi (three of the four SAMA countries which in fact have not granted preferences to the EEC) is actually negative (-1.5%), while the rate of exports to the rest of the SAMA countries is 5.7%.

The EEC, however, has drawn up a plan for a system of non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences. It will be submitted to the OECD,

where it will be discussed together with the plans of other developed countries, and will then be submitted to UNCTAD, where a definitive agreement should be reached.

The EEC system seems to involve the internal immunity of fixed quotas, product by product. The quota would be fixed by taking the value of imports coming from beneficiary countries in a given year plus 5% of the value of imports of the same product from the other countries. Finally, special mention is made of certain responsive products imports of which would be automatically blocked when the quota is reached. Immunity for cotton textiles would be granted only to countries taking part in the long-term agreement. Preferences for jute textiles and products would be subordinate to the settling of a minimum sale price by exporting countries. Since this system is based on quotas, it will come up against opposition from the U.S. authorities who prefer a system guaranteed by non-automatic escape clauses.

Special problems also arise from the EEC's position on the treatment reserved for processed agricultural products. The EEC protects these products by means of a fixed duty on the processing and a variable levy on the raw materials. The greatest concession the EEC could make in terms of its agricultural policy would be to do away with the fixed duty. Even in this it will be going against the United States and the United Kingdom. However it is worth recalling that the SAMA member nations have not received greater advantages in this field.

Apart from the reactions that this plan will provoke in developed and less developed countries, it is a fact that it does not explicitly face up to the two basic questions. Even if they find a loop-hole in the idea of "least developed countries" so that the SAMA countries (which in fact are among the least developed countries) will benefit from favourable treatment, it is not clear what will happen to the SAMA countries' preferences in case of an agreement on a non-discriminatory preferential system. Nor is it clear what will become of the reverse preferences if an agreement is reached on a non-reciprocal preferential system. The EEC will be able to reply to these questions during negotiations for the renewal of the association. Or the negotiations will have to wait until an agreement is reached at UNCTAD level between developing and less developed countries. Much will depend on the African show of force at the negotiations.

### **The Yaounde Convention and Developing Countries**

The preferential system of the Yaounde Convention is a kind of jigsaw puzzle. It has great political importance since it has a decisive influence on the EEC's trade policy towards developing countries. In particular it turns it into a policy of discrimination. At the same time it has had almost no positive effect from the economic point of view, particularly for the African countries which should have been its real beneficiaries. As a preferential area it has completely failed to create the diversions of trade which it was quite right to expect from it. Thus trade with Latin America has gone up faster than EEC-SAMA trade. On the other hand, although the EEC has kept its predominant position as supplier of the SAMA countries, it has not had much benefit from the reverse preferences. In fact in the

period 1958-66, while its export growth rate was 4.3%, the rate in all developed countries put together was 5.1% and the U.S. rate was 13.4%.

Faced with these results many people are wondering if it makes sense to go on with an association which does nothing but create complications in international policy and hinder the EEC on questions such as the drawing up of worldwide agreements per product and the elaboration of a general system of preferences for the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods of the developing countries. Even though it is at least partially valid to object that the meagre results achieved would have been catastrophic without a preferential system, one can still ask if it would be possible to reconcile the interests of the SAMA countries with the EEC's searching for a more balanced and comprehensive policy towards developing countries. The obstinacy with which the EEC pursues a policy of development aid the results of which are not even satisfactory leads one to think that the EEC's real targets are political objectives unconnected with this policy. There is no doubt that the renewal of the Yaounde Convention could be an opportunity for the EEC to clarify and strengthen its development aid policy.

Besides, the EEC-SAMA association gives rise to important doubts as regards the African continent as well. The association has not helped the process of regional integration between the SAMA countries and the non-member countries. The present convention contains regulations which plead the most-favoured-nation clause on behalf of the EEC and thus hinder an approach to non-member countries. Even if the next convention removes these doubts, as seems likely, it is a fact that the very existence of the association has worked against integration with non-member countries. The association has set up an integrated system of its own which tends to strengthen itself from within and to act like a centrifugal force on other African countries. The chance to reverse this movement has been lost. Since the EEC made no move to harmonize its association with the SAMA countries with its association with Nigeria and the East African Community, the result was that Nigeria has already repudiated its agreement, which is now useless, while East Africa looks on, armed with nothing more than a limited trade agreement. If there was ever a chance for the EEC, in spite of all the defects of its association policies, to act as a unifying force in Africa, it has now been lost, and it is this result which is already weighing heavily on the outcome, whatever it may be, of the negotiations for the renewal of the Yaounde Convention.

## **The Monsoon Culture: Contacts with Africa across Indian Ocean prior to 1500\***

OLOF G. TANDBERG

*"The ships which sail over the Southern Sea...are as large as houses. When their sails are set they resemble billowing clouds in the sky..."*  
—Chinese hand-manuscript, Chin Chu-fei, 1168 AD.

AMONG the last regions of Africa subjected to European colonization was the interior of East Africa. Before that occurred, *Anzia* and *Zanj*, as the shores of East Africa are actually called, had long been parts of a multi-racial culture in which the Indian Ocean was the connecting factor. This early monsoon culture is today known only through fragments and shreds. Here we will only sketch an outline of the origin, flowering and fall of a remarkable trade culture.

### **Early Immigration and Trade Contacts with the Coast of Anzia**

More and more geographers and geologists nowadays accept the theory about *Gandwanaland*, that is, that a supposedly connected continent existed in the southern hemisphere during the latter part of the Paleozoic era. Fossil animals, plants and common morphological characteristics support the theory that once India, Africa, Australia, Latin America, the Falkland Islands and the Antarctic were one unit.

Various theories have been put forward concerning the original home and movements of the human being. As early as 1899, for example, an English researcher stated that the human being probably reached Africa via Asia during the time when he still was in the collecting stage and followed the tracks of the animals which moved early to Africa from Asia. Present-day scientists think that the origin of the human being can probably be located in East Africa, but that the great majority of the forefathers of Africa's non-negroid population reached the continent via Arabia during an early period—a pluvial period with more favourable climatic conditions than we now have. Such discoveries as prehistorical dwellings in Kenya and Tanzania support this working hypothesis, since similar non-negroid remains have been found along the Nile Valley and on the Arabian coast.

The *Rig Veda*, the oldest of the four *Vedas*, gives in its 1,028 hymns remarkable information about the early Indian culture. The word *Veda*

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\*A chapter from "Brown Man's Africa—The Role of Indians in the Economic Development of India", by Olof G. Tandberg, Secretary-General of the Swedish National Commission for UNESCO.

means "knowledge" or "holy knowledge." Like the Old Testament, the *Vedas* cover a tremendous span, with a multitude of works of very different natures and from widely spread periods of time. The *Rig Veda* is written in Sanskrit and includes formulas for sacrifices, ritual rules, theological speculations and early narratives. It is still disputed as to how far back in time the oldest hymns of the *Rig Veda* go; the German religious historian, Helmuth von Glasenapp, who devoted all his life to research on the religions of India, thought that they were from a period between 1500 and 1000 BC, presupposing an older tradition. Here in archaic form are allegorical intimations concerning maritime contacts, navigation and early trade along the shores of the Indian Ocean and also about emigration along these coasts. Speaking of Varuna, the guardian of fire who seems to be the prototype of the god of the Iranians, Ahura Mazda, the Great Wise One, the *Rig Veda* states :

"...Varuna had full knowledge of the ocean and of its ways upon which ships sail. He knew well the different sails and winds which are necessary for navigating...Under Veda's time, merchants, seized by greed, travelled by ship to foreign countries. They travelled everywhere for the sake of sordid gain and sailed every part of the ocean..."

It is interesting to note the epithets given to these tradesmen. Always in the early Sanskrit collections they are mentioned in a derogatory way. They were unpopular for their greed among the Indian population of that time. This, doubtless, is one of the reasons for the early emigration—dissatisfaction with social conditions. This thoroughly black picture has certain political overtones. Probably herein lies the seed of the later damnation of sailors by the Brahmans.

Theories about an earlier Indian emigration to Africa have been presented at length (but the sources not checked) by a number of Indian researchers who have concentrated, among other things, on the mythological deity, Yama, and his feats. Since parts of the results of this research have been used as propaganda for Indian neo-nationalism, it is difficult to distinguish between wishful thinking and reality.

It should, however, be pointed out that Yama is mentioned in the *Rig Veda* as "king, pioneer, pathfinder and the god of settlers" and that he left India with those faithful to him to settle down on a high plateau. Whether this could refer to the highland area of East Africa has been discussed, among others, by the geographer, C. Raymond, who pointed out that the myth might have a basis of reality. We know that inner tensions and oppression of certain elements in the population led to an open civil war. After the defeat at Kurukshetra, Yadu's fifty-six tribes are supposed to have emigrated. As early as 1799, the original Sanskrit documents were translated and commented upon by the great Indologist, Sir William Jones. He reported intimations that the source of the Nile was a mighty lake—Lake Victoria. But that the explorer Speke should have used a map based on Hindu documents several thousand years old is, however, purely wishful thinking which is still being cultivated with a certain amount of energy by uncritical Indian scientists.

On the other hand, researchers in place-names have shown material

which proves that Indians had early acquaintance with various parts of the East African coast and islands such as Zanzibar. Special studies have shown that Swahili, the trade language of East Africa, is similar to Arabic and Gujarati and that at least 300 basic words have pure Sanskrit roots.

Ethnographers in comparative studies have shown mythological and religious parallels between the niolithic Nands in East Africa and the sun cult which exists in Arabic and Indian countries.

The facts are still too limited for us to draw any tenable conclusions. What we can say is that there were indisputably continuous cultural contacts between East Africa and India at a very early stage in the history of mankind and that this cultural contact came about apparently by land through the Arabian peninsula as well as by sea with the aid of monsoon winds.

### **Early Trade**

Gold, ivory, leopard hides and slaves were the early desirable goods which drove Arabs, Indians and Chinese sailors to the African monsoon coast. Early settlements of a more or less permanent nature were surely made along the coasts. Trade journeys from these stations to the interior of the country were made long before the birth of Christ.

This expansion of trade is connected with an early period of Indian greatness when an extensive maritime empire had been built up with trade contacts covering large parts of the southern hemisphere, from Japan and Borneo in the east to Madagascar and the monsoon coast in the west, with even some contacts with South American Indian culture.

This trade empire was in close contact with the Arabs and the Chinese. Knowledge of navigation, winds and geography in the various areas around the Indian Ocean seems to have been extensive. We know that there were commercial exchanges between China and East Africa in the eighth century BC. Chinese maritime maps of this period show the monsoon winds and show Malindi in East Africa as a trading station between Zanzibar and the inland, here called the coast of Anzia.

During the latter part of the Han dynasty (25-220 AD) this Chinese trade contact was further developed, presaging a continuous development of nautical science which led to the rather primitive early ships, such as the junks, being gradually superseded by multi-masted warships and trading vessels which, equipped with compasses, axial rudders and watertight compartments, sailed the Indian Ocean. During the 1400s, we know that there were more than twice expeditions to the coast of Anzia. There is every reason to mention that a unique Greek document speaks about trade contacts before that, 1,900 years ago. It is "Periplus on the Eritrean Sea." It is an antique market report on shipping, trade, imports and exports with countries around the Indian Ocean. The name of the author is not known, but "periplus" means "pilotage papers," and the document is proof of the Greeks' interest in new markets. As early as 510 BC, the Greek pilot, Scylax, from Karyanda, had sailed from the Red Sea to the Indus. Two hundred years later, the pilot of Alexander the Great, Nearchos, reports the same journey and mentions the extensive non-European trade

contacts. It was then not particularly remarkable that some of the rich Greek trading houses in prosperous Alexandria decided to collect information about the African monsoon coast and its transmaritime trade contacts. This information seems to have been kept in the greatest secrecy, just as the scientists of the Doge later kept secret their reports on Venetian trade relations with the Black Sea or the Hanseatic League its reports on early penetration of the Slavic market in central and eastern Europe.

The pilotage report, "Periplus on the Eritrean Sea," begins in Mussel Bay in the interior of the Red Sea on the Egyptian side, to which the author had arrived by one of the regular camel caravans which then connected the Bay with Cairo and the Nile. When the report was written, ships from Gujarat and other Indian kingdoms were still being tolerated, to be sure, but demands had been made which in reality turned the Red Sea into an Arabian lake, closed to direct Indian shipping. Customs duties had been imposed on spices, cloth and precious stones from India. The Arabs controlled all exports going through to Egypt and the Mediterranean. Aden, at the mouth of the Red Sea, had grown into an important re-loading station and was the end station for oriental trading vessels westward. At the same time, the Arabs had begun to penetrate the countries to the south and east.

The author of "Periplus" travelled along the coast by daily laps, often going ashore and describing the places and the various import and export goods thoroughly. He travelled along the Arabian peninsula to India and described the connecting trade routes inland from the harbour cities. The author left the Bay "at the proper time," the beginning of July, so as to reach the Indian Ocean with the "favourable winds." With the monsoon winds he reached East Africa, the coast of Anzia, and mentioned the existence of Indian-Arabian trading stations. The word for commerce, *duka*, by the way, was mentioned for the first time in a European document. When the careful Greek visited the trading city of Malao (nowadays Berbera in Somaliland, 10°25' N, 45°5' E), he noted that the city was a caravan centre for traffic with the interior and added :

"From this place is exported myrrh, some virak, the harder type of cinnamon, duaca, Indian copal and mekir, which is imported into Arabia ; in addition, slaves, although more rarely..."

*Duaka* or *duka* is here mentioned with the meaning of "incense," a meaning which is still accepted in certain harbours along the Indian Ocean, for example, in Dar-es-Salaam and Aden, even after its present meaning, "to trade" or "a place where one carries on commerce," has, through the Swahili language, come to dominate the entire East African language area.

The author of "Periplus" accompanied the trading vessels along the East African coast and reached the end station, the southernmost trading post, two or three days' sailing time from the islands (probably Pemba and Zanzibar), the "absolute farthest point on the continent which spreads out to the right" from the Red Sea :

"A two days' sail to the south lies the last trading station on the continent (Africa), namely, Rhapta. This place was named for the seamed



boats about which I have already written ; and at this place are large quantities of ivory and tortoise shell..."

A look at the map explains why Rhapta was the southernmost trading post. The monsoon winds grow weaker and weaker the farther south one comes from Zanzibar, at the same time as the southerly coastal current makes it difficult for sailing vessels to get back north, a situation which is closer to Madagascar. This was also the southernmost boundary of the Indian and Arabian penetration along the east coast of Africa. Of course, this did not prevent, for example, the Indonesians, in connection with their colonialization of Madagascar, from penetrating the present Portuguese East Africa and Natal in South Africa. Knowledge of the coastal conditions south of Rhapta was diffuse—as late as the Middle Ages, Arabian seamen maintained that Madagascar continued far to the east from Africa and was connected with Java or Sumatra in some way, as shown by Indonesian cultural contacts.

The report in "Periplus" of trade exchanges between India and the eastern coast of Africa is long and impressive. There seem to have been Indian goods all along the coast, and the natives especially coveted Indian cloth and high-grade iron products.

The Indian export goods also included rice, ghee, sesame-seed oil and "honey from a special form of reed called sacchari."

This would seem to be the earliest European mention of sugarcane. Ghee is treated as Indian water buffalo butter which, after boiling for ten hours and cooling, is put into leather sacks which are then sewn up. In this way the fat could be transported long distances without becoming rancid. Ghee, which is still used by Indian merchants in East Africa, may be considered an early oriental means of preservation which made possible provisioning for the long sea journeys.

According to "Periplus," the Indian voyagers took back with them hides, ivory, slaves, gold, powdered rhinoceros horn (then as now much sought after in India as an aphrodisiac), some palm oil and a great deal of tortoise shell.

How extensive the transportation of slaves was is impossible to determine exactly, but Negro slaves are mentioned in Chinese writings from 300 AD. That the trade was extensive (although it never reached the European 20-million level of the 18th and 19th centuries) is proved by reports on African slave riots in Bengal during the 1400s.

The ruler of Baghdad, Abul Abbas, had, to be sure, black soldiers in his army when he moved eastward in 749 AD and conquered the people of Iran. The synonym, "black ivory," for slaves was apparently known by Indian merchants who traded along the coasts as early as the time of "Periplus".

#### **Swahili-Asian Culture before the European Colonization**

There is no known proof of cultural development along the East African coast, either written or archaeological, from the fourth through the

ninth centuries AD. Historians of Africa see this as a proof that it was first then that the Negroid settlement of the coast took place; Bantus from the south expanded northward and westward because of the increasing pressures of population. This development and the wanderings of the Bantus, Niloits and Hamites in the interior of Africa are beyond the scope of this study, but we should avoid making any categorical statements until the discoveries of the prehistorical terrace cultivation in Kenya, Tanzania and certain parts of Ethiopia have been more thoroughly analysed.

On the other hand, what we can say with certainty is that the centuries after the descriptions of "Periplus" were marked by a continued Arabic penetration southwards. This movement of Arabic interests had commercial, not religious, causes, which is shown by the fact that the Coptic Christians in Axumitic Abyssinia were permitted to live in peace and their pilgrims allowed to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem by the thousands, even after *jihad*, the holy war, was declared against the Roman Christianity along the Mediterranean. This tolerance seems to have meant that Hindu shipping from "Ariaca and Barygaza" (that is, the present Gujarat province on India's northwest coast, including Kutch and Kathiawar) was permitted to continue along the monsoon coast, despite their non-Muslim faith.

Together with Dr. Freeman-Grenville, Father Gervase Mathew recently completed an archaeological survey along the African monsoon coast from Somali in the north to Portuguese East Africa in the south. Mathew shows that the coastal area is edged with fragments of old trading cities, even to a greater extent than one might suppose from reading works by Arabians subsequent to the author of "Periplus," such as el-Aby Idrisi and Ibn Batuta, with their lofty descriptions of the glory of the trading cities during the 12th through the 16th centuries. The destruction through sacking and unfavourable weather conditions which followed rapidly upon that period has, to be sure, wiped away many important clues, but in a couple of cases completely deserted cities have been discovered which, to quote Mathew, "are as well preserved as Pompeii. This is true of Au Garvin in Somaliland, somewhat to the north of Mecca, and Kua on the island of Mafia off the coast of Tanganyika."

According to archaeologists, the oldest ruined city yet discovered is the trading station on the island of Kati of Tanzania, where the settlement consisted of "small rectangular houses of carefully polished stone, grouped around a citadel whose walls still rise to a height of almost six meters." This settlement is from pre-Mohammedan times, and its building style may have been of either Arabic or Indian origin.

It is in the vicinity of Kati that the already well-known ruined island of Kilwa and the above-mentioned so rich Mafia lie. Kua is more than 28 acres in area, and it includes a large palace, 30 stone houses, three graveyards and seven mosques, probably of Shiite origin. Discoveries in this area included coins from Persia and Mesopotamia, Chinese porcelain of the Sung and Ming dynasties, amber, crystal and precious stones and pierced pearls from India. The three graveyards are proof of an early non-African settlement.

Other ruined cities are located close to harbour cities which are still active, such as Mombasa and Mogadishu, while most of them, such as Gedi

in Kenya and the one near Port Durnford in former British Somaliland, are buried in thick jungles or sand in areas that are now deserted. The search is still going on for such once admittedly great trade centres as the southernmost outpost mentioned in "Periplus," Raphta, but the scattered discoveries give together the contours of an interesting chapter in trading history which was interrupted abruptly with the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century.

With regard to Islam, the Arabian penetration seems to have continued more purposefully than before. During the 10th century, well organized small Arabian kingdoms, about the size of the Viking kingdoms of Scandinavia, began growing up along the coast of Somalia and southward, thus to the south of Christian Abyssinia (which, however, did not get involved in a religiously based conflict with them until the beginning of the 15th century). The basis of these small Arabian states was trade, and their trading routes reached deep into Nilotic Sudan, perhaps even to the interior of present-day Kenya and Uganda.

The Indians carried on trade as long as the small harbours fortified by the Arabs gave them protection and seem, just as in later eras, to have equipped Arabian expeditions to find new trade routes or expand the already existing ones. These orientals seem to have mixed with the original population, and gradually there arose the Swahili language, which is now spoken all over East Africa and in parts of Congo and Central Africa.

The size of these trading stations varied greatly, but as early as before the 11th century there were eight rather large trading cities, all but two of them located on islands off the mainland itself, easy to defend against attempted invasions from the mainland—or from the sea.

The number of cities or coastal settlements then increased rapidly, and an English report lists more than 60 archaeological finds along the monsoon coast. During the 13th and 14th centuries, the coastal settlements seem to have expanded in both number and size. This would seem to be due to the fact that that was a period of relative political stability in this and most areas around the Indian Ocean since Islam had expanded several hundred years earlier and had secured its power.

Many Indians were converted to the new religion but, just as the Coptic Christians in Abyssinia were tolerated, old Hindu families also seem to have continued to run their trading houses and develop trade between the western and southern parts of India and the East African coast. In his "Nuzhat el-Musta" (The Pleasures of Travelling), which was published in the 1150s, Idrisi emphasized that the Arabians were seldom prominent economists but that the Indians had important positions as intermediaries and financiers.

The Indians, for the most part, seem to have been Hindus converted to Islam. In the beginning of the 14th century, the great Arabian geographer, Ibn Batuta, described a visit to Kilwa. He characterized the city as "one of the most beautiful and most tastefully built cities that exist, cut in stone. With regard to its inhabitants, he said that besides the Arabians and the Indians, "the majority of these are Zanj, black as coal in skin, with deep tattooings in their faces."

Architecture was highly developed. Near Kilwa, Mathew found the remains of 13th century, beautifully worked "rifled semi-cupolas resting on rifled pilasters and artistically vaulted chambers with drum-like ceiling filled with hundreds of circular perforations."

Many of the chroniclers of this period wrote in Arabic, but such documents as the Pate and Mombasa chronicles were written in Swahili with Arabic letters. Mathew, who names the Swahili poem, *Al Inkishafi* (18th century), the best that the coastal culture has produced, pointed out that, along with Arabs and Indians, there were free African noblemen of a high class. According to this poem, there were a multitude of small states along the coast, each with strong national feelings and united around religious symbols of royalty such as an elephant tusk or a large drum.

Alongside these small Swahili kingdoms, certain harbour cities seem to have expanded into large cities for storing staple goods, in the same way as the free Hanseatic cities did around the Baltic Sea. Excavations in Kenya show that the means of payment seems mainly to have been kauri snails, the medieval predecessor to the Indian rupee. According to Methow, there were, in addition to kauri snails, three kinds of coins, and Kilwa is even supposed to have had its own mint. Just as the Hanseatic cities had a noticeable German element while the most of the population was made up of natives of the country, the cultural element in these larger East African coastal cities was predominantly Islamic, with obvious African Swahili elements.

A Chinese author in the 15th century visited Mogadishu, then such a lively harbour city, and spoke of stately stone buildings "four or five stories high" and of the women with "yellow paint covering their shaved heads, their ear-lobes adorned with large plates and silver rings around their necks." What was it then that made possible this rich city flourishing along the coast of East Africa? The interior of East Africa has still not been satisfactorily investigated archaeologically, although individual scientists, such as Dr. B. Leakey of Nairobi, have made tremendous contributions. We cannot yet archaeologically confirm any contact between the unique culture that flourishes in Uganda and the cultures around the great lakes, Victoria, Nyasa and Edward. Not a single pearl from Asia seems to have found its way up there. This naturally does not preclude that some contact took place, and, just as the Venetian merchants under the Doge were secretive about the construction of the mirror and about where they had assembled their riches, about their trade routes and their commercial contacts, the same thing may have been true in East Africa in the epoch before the arrival of the Portuguese.

Probably certain Swahili tribes functioned as intermediaries between the merchants of the coastal cities and the interior. How this commercial exchange took place still remains to be investigated. To be sure, traces of the old trading routes disappeared with the increase in the pressure of population and the cultivation of larger and larger areas, but Basil Davidson refers to remarkable terrace discoveries in East Africa—including slope terracing in southern Kenya and the highlands of Tanzania where geographic and climatic conditions made cultivation and settlement possible. These terraces have been found around lakes Eya

and Natron in the north and near present-day Iringa on the southern shores of lake Nyasa in the south. As in certain highland areas in Ethiopia, this terracing technique is still used for cultivation by some of the peoples who lived in the area at that time.

An interesting detail is the existence of constructed roads. They are as a rule three to four meters wide. The slopes seem to have been worked with tools. The longest of these roads which has so far been mapped connects the northern part of lake Nyasa in present-day Zambia with highland Tanzania and Kenya toward Arusha and Nairobi, a stretch of almost 900 kilometers and 300 to 500 kilometers from the coast. Discoveries of shorter stretches of road have been made in other parts of lake Nyasa. No trade routes down toward the coast, then, have yet been found, except routes from north to south down toward the former mining cities in Rhodesia. In connection with these routes, irrigation systems and wells, bored through limestone to a depth of twelve meters, have been discovered. The scientists, Oliver and Page, have presented the theory that in all of the interior of Africa as early as the Stone Age there were actually small African kingdoms of varying sizes, kingdoms which stretched from West Africa, across Central Africa and the interior of East Africa during the neo-Sudan period of civilization.

That there existed cultural forms with a high degree of development in the interior of Africa is shown by discoveries at Ishango on the high plateau near lake Edward, where an early culture from 6000 BC seems to have known the decimal system, the principle of multiplication and even prime numbers. With this information as a background, it does not sound impossible that there existed early African mining in Central Africa. Since this mining had direct connections with coastal trade, it should be touched on briefly here.

In Rhodesia, not far from the border to the Republic of South Africa, about thirty kilometers southeast of the city of Fort Victoria, is a collection of remarkable ruins called Big Zimbabwe. The ruins consist of two agglomerations of stones, the "Acropolis" and the "Temple." The "Acropolis" is a highly fortified fortress at the top of a cliff which gave strategic safety to the "Temple", which is the main building, lying further down in a slight valley. The ruins make a tremendous impression on the visitor. They are made of great blocks of granite, skilfully put together without the aid of mortar.

Ever since they were discovered in connection with the white penetration from the south and east, these remarkable ruins have been the subject of more or less fantastic speculations.

A German geologist who visited the area almost ninety years ago thought them to be a copy of King Solomon's temple on Mount Moriah, since the building in the valley below has similar features to the 10th century palace of the Queen of Sheba in Jerusalem.

The discovery aroused a global sensation, and a then almost unknown writer, Rider Haggard, made a fortune with his novel, "King

Solomon's Mines"—a well written thriller about uncivilized Africa and its diamond mines. When the area a few years later was invaded by British troops from South Africa, they found at Zimbabwe that the previous reports were not exaggerated.

The ruins in the deserted landscape were majestic—they were considered too well built to have been constructed by primitive Negroes. Closer investigation showed that the whole area was rich in archaeological finds, none of them, however, so magnificent as Big Zimbabwe, but most of them built in the same advanced way. Traces of an old mining culture were found, with thousands of abandoned mining shafts, some of them up to thirty meters deep. The area was enclosed and the mines worked again, but with modern methods. In this way, valuable finds also disappeared; the gold bars and art objects found were melted down and taken away during the first years of this century. Amateur archaeologists visited the place and succeeded in rescuing some objects for posterity. They thought they had found clear traces of Phoenician and Egyptian methods of construction. Others found similarities with the building methods of the Stone Age villages in Cornwall and drew rash parallels with the supposed Cornish kraal settlements.

In 1905, the first scientifically trained archaeologist, David Randall MacIver, arrived, and he proved that the buildings at Big Zimbabwe were not ancient but were built during the 14th and 15th centuries and that they were undoubtedly built by Africans—houses were still being built according to the same principles by the African residents of the area, who in some cases were also engaged in mining, using largely the same methods as were once used at Big Zimbabwe.

But MacIver's work was not taken seriously, and in 1929 the English archaeologist, Gertrude Thompson, arrived. After several years of work, she published her famous "The Zimbabwe Culture," which confirmed MacIver's statements, both with regard to the era and with regard to the builders. But representatives of the white landowners in South Africa and Rhodesia could not accept the idea that Africans had really built such an imposing structure, and many still do not believe it, in spite of the fact that the use of C-14 has largely confirmed MacIver's dating. (Certain parts of the stone wall were, however, constructed as early as the 7th century and others as late as the 18th century.)

Excavations are still going on in the area, and experts are still not completely in agreement about the discoveries at Big Zimbabwe, since there is a certain discrepancy in time between the mining operations and the construction of the stone buildings. It can be definitely said, however, that Big Zimbabwe is the centre of an ancient African mining culture, stretching from Katanga in the north to Transvaal in the south. More than 60,000 mines have been found in this large area, from which were taken, in addition to gold, copper and tin.

What transportation routes were used to get the gold to the coastal cities of East Africa is still a mystery, but that there were cultural contacts is shown by discoveries of datable Chinese porcelain and pearls from

Indonesia and India. Gertrude Thompson regretted that so much valuable material had been destroyed during the early 20th century gold rush, but she emphasized that "...trade contacts with India were undoubtedly very strong... Actually I would almost say that this was the primary stimulant which led to the development of this native Zimbabwe culture..."

During the 12th century, Chinese ships were, technically, fully capable of sailing the ocean, but it was not before the 15th century that Admiral Cheng Ho landed in East Africa. It was the third emperor of the Ming dynasty that had ordered a series of maritime expeditions to the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. Between 1405 and 1433, at least seven great fleets were equipped, fleets which sailed south and west of China. Of these, the fifth expedition reached the coast of East Africa in 1417-19 and the seventh in 1421-22.

They had with them on board a book about East Africa, taken from a work of 1226 by Chu Fan-chi, "Testimony about Foreign Peoples." Although finished in 1226, this book was largely based on older sources. It was written by a commissioner for foreign trade in Fukien and based on information received from seamen and foreign merchants. Among many other things, the book contains a great deal about the Zanj coast, East Africa. The inhabitants of the coast are of "kap-chi" (that is, Arabic) origin, and they belong to the Arabic religion. "They swathe themselves in blue cotton and wear shoes of red leather. Their daily bread consists of grain, of which they bake cakes, and the meat of sheep. The country has many villages and a number of wooded hills and terraced cliffs. And this part of the Zanj's country delivers elephant tusks, domestic gold, amber and yellow sandalwood". "Every year," wrote the author to Chu Fan-chi, "ships come from the Indian kingdom of Gudjurat and from the Arabian areas along the coast and trade with white cotton cloth, red cloth, porcelain and copper". Admiral Cheng Ho, who also personally visited the area, surely had a great deal to add to this, and we also know that he made several official reports to the Emperor of China. But about 1450 the country party at the Chinese court won a decisive victory over their opponents, those who supported the expeditions, and we know that all the available reports of the great Cheng Ho expedition were consciously destroyed, especially because they would not remain a dangerous enticement for Chinese seamen in later generations. Certain fragments were left, however, and one could surely find further material in the great archives in Peking. What is left is a few maps and Chinese maritime charts. The long parchment chart which Cheng Ho himself put together is very different from the charts of our day. I will confine myself to one of these charts, as preserved in Wu Pei Chih's folio volume, that is, notes on military preparation.

The charts have the form of cartograms, in which the coastline is drawn at the top as a horizon, with certain sea-marks, artistically drawn, and practical advice for sailors. The mouths of rivers, mountains, lakes and islands are drawn so that one sees them with a bird's-eye view from the sea. The scale varies according to the wishes of the cartographer; certain depths are given, proving that there must have been soundings taken, and it should be emphasized that these were not maps of an unknown coast. The place names are detailed. The central harbour of

Somaliland was then, as now, Mu-Ku-Tu-Shu, Mogadishiu, and farther down on the same chart roll, Man-Ba-Sa, that is, Mombasa, and a little farther Malinti, that is, Malindi. It also contains the names Zanj and Zanziber, Zanziber noted as a slave island and then with the Arabian word for slave. It should be added that Zanjistan, the country where the Zanj live, is the Chinese name for the coast of Tanzania of that time and that Zanj is a translation of the Arabian term for Negro, that is, Negro for sale. On the edge of the map, the great Admiral Cheng Ho himself wrote in 1431, immediately before the seventh expedition, the dates of his trips and that "we have travelled more than 100,000 *li* over endless waters and, out on the sea, have seen tremendous waves, lifting like mountains toward the sky, and have sighted barbaric countries, in the distance and hidden in the blue transparency of mists, while our sails, flying airily as clouds, day and night bore us further on our voyage."

This note marks the culmination of the Chinese ocean voyages. A special department had been set up to administer the construction of multi-masted Chinese vessels, but by the turn of the century, 1500, when the country party had won, all the large shipyards were closed, and it was considered a serious crime, punishable by death, to build vessels with more than two masts. Ocean-going junks were completely forbidden. In 1505 came an isolationist order that the coast guard was to destroy all ocean-going ships and arrest the sailors who were still in the area.

There has been much speculation as to why the Chinese suddenly made a volte-face, closed their shipyards, discharged their captains and destroyed their ships. Basil Davidson wrote in his book, "All Africa Rediscovered," that the reasons for this are to be found in the history of China and not in the history of Africa. It seems that the foremost reason lay in the rivalry at the court between its class of eunuchs, who had become more and more powerful as a result of the maritime discoveries, and a bureaucratic group who feared the eunuchs' power and looked down on ocean trade as something luxurious, uncomfortable, extravagant, in altogether too close contact with the barbarians. At any rate, it was the bureaucrats who won, but their triumph was a fateful one, for, just at the time they made their decrees and burnt their ships, European crews rounded the Cape of Good Hope and floated into the Indian Ocean.



## Prospects of Forming a Francophone Community

JEAN CLAUDE LUC

**D**ERIVED from the adjective Francophone, 'Francophonie' is a denotation for all those who happen to speak French. For some years now it has also been used to describe the awareness among French-speaking states of the linguistic and cultural community of which they form a part and the projects of organisation which have been formulated as a concrete expression of the existence of such a community and to give to the states which compose it a sense of solidarity.

It is in the latter sense that the term will be employed throughout this study which attempts to evaluate the prospects of a "Francophone community". Actually little has been achieved so far towards this end. The short history of Francophonie reveals that while it has been seething with ideas there has been a tendency to lose sight of the reality on the part of the states concerned. It is in the diversity of these countries that one must search for an explanation of the problems that have cropped up in executing the projects of a Francophone organisation. It is also a study of these situations and an examination of difficulties which militate in favour of a Francophonie which is essentially linguistic and cultural.

### Countries Widely Different

The French-speaking world comprises 31 countries where French is widespread among the population, whether it is the official language or the second major language used at times to the exclusion of all others. The status of French in these different countries provides mainly documentary interest and enables one to understand the threat posed by the extension of other languages. It is possible today to distinguish :

Countries where the French language constitutes the official and the only national language. This includes the French Republic—the metropole and, even though this is subject to correction in some cases, overseas territories and administrative departments. The Republic of Haiti could perhaps be included in the category as also Creole—a patois based on old French and enriched by many influences—which is spoken by the majority of the population;

Countries where French is the only official language but where several other languages exist: Belgian Congo, Congo-Kinshasa, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo;

Countries where French is the official language concurrently with one or more other languages—Canada, Cambodia, Laos, Tunisia, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Burundi and Ruanda; and

Countries where French is commonly used along with a national language—Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Lebanon, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam.

To complete this picture one may add New Hebrides (where out of 65,000 inhabitants 3,000 are French and French is among the three national languages), the former French territory of Pondicherry, where French remains one of the official languages, Louisiana in the U.S.A. where television programmes in French and schools of French language are to be found and, finally, the Valley of Aoste, an autonomous region of Italy, where 55 per cent of the people speak French.

Altogether this group represents nearly 215 million people. French thus appears to occupy an important place in the hierarchy of languages most widespread in the present world—800 million Anglophone, 220 million Spanish-speaking people, 300 million “Arabophone” and approximately 100 million people in Portuguese-speaking territories. However these figures should create no illusion as out of the 215 million persons scattered in the Francophone states, the actual number of persons speaking French hardly exceeds 80 million.

Nevertheless if one considers the international importance of the language, the large number of countries where it is used, and the economic and political power which these countries constitute, it is evident that French continues to occupy a privileged position. Could it constitute a strong enough link for a similar community organised for cultural, economic or even political goals of states as different as those which have been enumerated cursorily? To answer this question and evaluate the prospects of “Francophonie” it is necessary to grasp the existing divergencies between these countries in regard to economic planning and political goals.

### 1. Economic and Political Disparities

The problem of underdevelopment is the main hurdle among the Francophone countries. The following table shows the differences in revenues between the various countries.

		<i>Population in millions</i>	<i>Per capita income in dollars</i>
<b>Developed Countries</b>			
France	...	50	1,700
Canada (1)	...		
(Quebec, Ontario, Nouveau, Brunswick)		5.900	1,900
Belgium (1)	...	4	1,500
Luxemburg (1)	..	0.350	1,800
Switzerland (1)	...	1	2,150

**Developing Countries (2)****Africa**

Gabon	...	0.500	250
Mauritius	...	0.800	220
Ivory Coast	...	3.900	210
Algeria	...	12	200
Tunisia	...	4.500	200
Morocco	...	13.500	180
Senegal	...	3.500	170
Mauritania	...	1.100	150
Congo-Brazzaville	...	0.900	120
Cameroun	...	5.300	110
Togo	...	1.700	90
Madagascar	...	5.500	80
Guinea	...	3.500	75
Central African Republic	...	1.300	75
Niger	...	3.400	70
Tchad	...	3.500	65
Congo-Kinshasa	...	15.700	65
Dahomey	...	2.400	60
Mali	...	4.600	60
Upper Volta	...	4.900	50
Ruanda	...	3.100	50
Burundi	...	3.200	45

**Asia**

Lebanon	...	2.500	450
Cambodia	...	6.200	120
South Vietnam	...	16.200	110
North Vietnam	...	19	90
Laos	...	2.600	65

**America**

Haiti	...	4.500	70
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(1) Francophone populationally.

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As in all underdeveloped countries, the situation in the Francophone states of Africa or Asia is aggravated by overpopulation. The rate of population growth fluctuates in the Maghreb between 2% and 3% annually, in Mali it reaches 3.5% and in South-East Asia it rarely goes below 2.5%. Hardly sufficient to support a population increasing so rapidly, their meagre resources cannot be expected to fulfil the needs of development and necessitate dependence on foreign aid. Again, it is equally important that this

assistance be balanced, so as to avoid further loss of foreign exchange which these countries have already suffered in recent years. In 1960, for example, a ton of cocoa enabled the black African states to purchase 1.2 tons of cement and one ton of coffee provided them the means to import more than four tons of cast iron. Today the same quantity of cocoa enables the import of only 400 to 500 kgs of cement and for 1.5 tons of coffee the same quantity of iron as in 1960. Finally, the fragmentation of Francophone Africa constitutes another obstacle to the development of viable enterprises. It is difficult to conceive an industrial development plan for these countries, the internal market of each of which would equal the purchasing power of a large French city.

This particularly serious situation can hardly be expected to be remedied in the near future. This question continues to weigh heavily on the Francophone community and if the present trend is not reversed the disparity between the French-speaking states is likely to widen. Today the average per capita income is \$1,700 in France and \$65 in Tchad. In about 30 years it is expected to reach \$3,500 in the former and with great difficulty \$300 in the latter.

It would suffice to underline that all attempts to organise a French-speaking community would have to take into consideration the differences in the economic situation and it would be confronted with the problems of aid which the poorer countries would not fail to claim. But it is, at the same time, acknowledged that the French language can play a decisive role in the development of these countries. One of the basic problems of underdevelopment lies in the slow evolution of mental attitudes and the most effective help that could be rendered to lesser developed regions is to provide technically qualified men with a modern outlook. In other words what the developing states need most is technical assistance in order to train their cadres.

The vital role played by language in the field of education and mass communication is also acknowledged. One cannot therefore ignore the fact that the language chosen for the development of the young African mind happens to be a language adapted to a civilisation of a high intellectual standard. It is not to minimise African sensitivity or the rich artistic value of the works they have created if one asserts that it would be unwise for Africa to base its education on languages developed outside modern civilisation. It appears thus that while Francophonie would necessarily be confronted with problems of underdevelopment it could also facilitate solutions.

At the political level fresh differences appear. The French-speaking world today comprises regimes as different as those installed in Haiti by President Duvalier and the Swiss Confederation; Socialist countries like Guinea or Algeria mingle here with states which have introduced capitalist economies, such as Ivory Coast. Finally, federal states, ever anxious to maintain the balance between different ethnic groups, find themselves among linguistic minorities for whom the French language provides a means of safeguarding their originality and can be a unifying influence.

Generally speaking sovereign states are rarely inclined to support the

claims of these minorities. The unity of each state and the fear of large-scale fragmentation are the main preoccupations of African leaders. The attitude of some of them towards the Biafran problem is characteristic in this connection. Questioned on the Biafran question, M. Tsiranana, President of Malagasy, has said that he condemns all forms of secession. Mr. Hamani Diori, on his part, stated on October 19 last that "it is not a problem of Biafra but a problem of Nigeria" and underlined the need to preserve the unity of this country, indispensable, in his view, to maintain some equilibrium in Africa. This hostility to all forms of separatist tendencies on a linguistic basis certainly runs counter to the wishes of some Francophone national minorities. It explains, moreover, the attitude adopted by certain African leaders towards the question of Quebec. During the visit of M. Bourguiba to Canada in May 1968, after acknowledging to the Federal Government that Montreal was just a stopover in his journey, he declared, addressing himself to the French Canadians, that "they would benefit greatly by being fully assimilated into the larger Canadian community rather than being circumscribed within the confines of Quebec".

This political factor adds another divisive element to the economic differences to explain the divergencies in the foreign policies of Francophone states and, above all, their attitude to the attempts to form an organisation of the French-speaking world.

#### **Francophone States and "Francophonie"**

It was in November 1965 that President Bourguiba, during an official visit to Dakar, threw up, along with President Senghor, the idea of a Francophone Commonwealth. Throughout the year 1966 "Francophonie" figured in the agenda of the numerous meetings among heads of state. President Hamani Diori discussed it with Algerian and Moroccan leaders. President Senghor brought up the question with General de Gaulle as also responsible Canadians during his visit to the American continent in the month of September. During the same year plans for the organisation appeared to be materialising. In June, on the occasion of the conference of heads of state of the Organisation of African States and Malagasy (ICAM) at Tananarive President Senghor and Mr. Hamani Diori were given the responsibility of working out a plan for the Francophone community and submit it for consideration to all the states concerned. While 1965 and 1966 marked the beginning of "Francophonie", it was however towards the end of 1966 that the various Francophone states revealed their position on this question. More disposed towards France than the majority of the other Francophone states, the black African states played an important role in the development of "Francophonie". It was one of their heads of state who first of all extolled the complimentary roles of "Africanite" and Francite". The creation of OCAM in 1965 played such a vital role in uniting the former French colonies with the exception of Mali and Mauritania - besides Congo-Kinshasa and Ruanda—that a French journalist wrote on July 9, 1966, that "Francophonie" was "a desperate attempt on the part of OCAM to resist the trend of disengagement in France". The anxiety of many African states about the prospect of reallocation of French aid on the basis of the recommendation of the Jeannevey report is a factor which should not be ignored. It does not appear however that this was the

main reason for initiating the idea of a French community. The desire to draw closer to France, an awareness of the limitations of national languages employed here and there and, finally, the desire on the part of some for multilateral aid from other developed Francophone states, in addition to that from France, were some of the major reasons which prodded African leaders to be the prime movers of this idea.

In the Maghreb and in Lebanon the problem was regarded differently. Only Tunisia participated regularly and seriously in the attempts to organise "Francophonie". Among the other countries, the acceptance of Arab solidarity and memories of their recent struggles and efforts for "Arabisation" were not conducive to "Francophonie". While Lebanon did not express any hostility to the ideas of Presidents Senghor and Bourguiba, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania regarded it without enthusiasm. "Revolution Africaine"—the organ of FLN—echoing the governments' reservations, in its issue of July 5, 1966, declared that "this idea in the final analysis will serve only to reinforce one of the characteristics which undermines the OAU and encourage divisive elements". More recently the journal *Algerie Actualite* wrote that "Francophonie is a dangerous pretext" to cover up the neo-colonist character of their venture. Neither Mauritania nor Algeria attended the recent conference of countries, wholly or partially French-speaking, held at Niamey. Morocco, on its part, has shown little eagerness so far regarding an eventual Francophone community.

Subjected to the dual pressure of China and America the Francophone countries of the Far East have approached the idea of such an organisation in the context of neutrality which dominates their foreign policy. While agreeing to associate themselves with cultural exchanges, Cambodia and Laos had reservations which were reflected in the original definition of Prince Norodom Sihanouk in these terms: "Cambodia will never join a Francophone community, if ever one is created, for the sole and good reason that it has decided, by adopting a policy of strict neutrality, never to enter into any league or association of peoples whoever they be".

In Canada the attitudes were strikingly different where the Federal Government or the authorities in Quebec were concerned. At the beginning of 1967 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Canadian Government declared: "It goes without saying that 'Francophonie,' not excluding necessarily its economic aspects, should be essentially a large cultural enterprise. No one would wish to see its extension to the political field." Latterly a Canadian Minister acknowledged that "for us it (Francophonie) remains essentially a phenomenon of a cultural character".

In Quebec, 'Francophonie' evidently appears to mean something else. It has a political connotation to the extent that it acknowledges that there exist in Canada "two communities, two peoples, two nations"—to quote the Prime Minister of Quebec when he spoke at the Federal Provincial Conference in Ottawa last February.

The same trend is discernible in Belgium where linguistic clashes have been so serious in the last few years as to threaten the very unity of the country. The numerical decline of the Wallons and the lower priority accorded to French-speaking areas in the economic plan have exacerbated

the feelings of French-speaking Belgians. Several movements in defence of the Wallons and preservation of the French language have been organised, and in many parts of Belgium open confrontations between the Flemish and the Wallons occur frequently today. In the international sphere the government has associated itself with several meetings of Francophone states and does not seem to be hostile to the idea of some kind of solidarity among French-speaking states.

In Switzerland 20% of the population speaks French. In the French-speaking cantons of Geneva, Vaud, Neuchatel no problem exists regarding the continuance of French culture. But in the bilingual cantons of Freiburg, Valais and Berne, French is equally widespread and it is in these areas that a serious problem raises its head. The Jura Romand, where 120,000 people out of 140,000 speak French and belong to the Catholic faith, is a case in point. This Francophone minority was merged after the Vienna Congress into a larger Protestant canton and while officially it was declared bilingual the German language acquired an unquestioned advantage. Religious and linguistic grievances mounted with the creation of the Jura Assembly in 1948 and there was a demand for the separation of Jura from the canton of Berne to form the 23rd canton. Jura Romand reacted enthusiastically to the statement of General de Gaulle in Quebec in 1967. A way seems to have been found to resolve the problem on July 23 last with the setting up of a commission of experts nominated by the authorities in Berne to go into this question. The desire to preserve French culture however has not reached the point of secession among the Francophone Swiss, and the attempts to establish an organisation of the French-speaking world is regarded with considerable reservations.

As for France, she has approached the problem forcefully. It may be worthwhile to refer here to an official statement made on November 6, 1966, on the subject of 'Francophonie'. Speaking at the International Diplomatic Academy, M. de Broglie, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed "the sympathy, interest and association of France" while adding that "Francophonie must be approached with circumspection, empiricism and continuity". Significantly, during the intervening period which lasted nearly two months after the question of the organisation of a Francophone community, its headquarters and secretariat had all been raised with the French Government by the President of OCAM, the Minister could not give any clear indication of the possibility of such an organisation coming into being except to postpone it to some distant future. The differences over these proposals and the very forthright position adopted by M. de Broglie in favour of Francophonie after it has been divested of all governmental functions prompts one to conclude that the speech of November 6, 1966, reflected the opinion of the government rather than his own. On the same occasion M. de Broglie underlined that the initiative must continue to rest with foreigners. This has been the constant position of the French Government which has consistently refused to take the lead in a Francophone community. The President of the Republic has moreover never mentioned Francophonie in his public speeches and a question raised on the subject once at a press conference remained unanswered. It led him, on the contrary, to declare with regard to attempts to develop a community of French-speaking people that "the French language does not belong only

to France". Speaking at the Elysee, in July 1966, to the heads of state of OCAM, he underlined his interest in the earlier conference at Tananarive where it was accepted that "their political solidarity should be based on what is common, that is, the language and culture which is equally that of France". These reservations have not prevented the French Government from associating itself with the attempts to set up a Francophone community. It is, however, not possible yet to say precisely what is its policy or ulterior motive, if there is one, on this question.

The unfolding pattern of the prevailing situation—economic and political—and the varying attitudes of the states concerned from the beginning highlight the multiple forms which a Francophone community could take. If for some the desire to move closer to France or adopt a more assertive posture tends to give a political slant to the concept of Francophonie, for others a legitimate search for independence or the need for caution prompts them to envisage an organisation with a purely cultural goal. Finally, in the case of a majority of states concerned the problem of underdevelopment overrides all other considerations. Whether political, economic or cultural, Francophonie has yet to discover its goal.

## AMBIGUITY AND WEAKNESSES

### (1) Overriding Ambition

It is the awareness of linguistic and cultural solidarity, of the need to preserve a common heritage that gave birth to the concept of Francophonie. If among its progenitors, M. Bourguiba has played a determining role, the credit should go to President Senghor for being the "bard of Francite". In his "Eulogy of Francophonie" delivered at the University of Laval in Quebec in the autumn of 1966 President Senghor listed the merits of the French language which he said "provides, at the same time, clarity, richness, precision and nuance of thought". Aboveall, it is a way of thinking. More than that, it is the language, French civilisation, more precisely the pervading spirit of this civilisation found in French culture which I would call 'Francite'."

In all their speeches foreign statesmen have reverted to the need to preserve indigenous cultures. It is not in any way a new profession of allegiance when they say "We are no longer colonies, or junior partners who are reclaiming a part of our heritage. We are independent states, mature people who demand their part of the responsibility to strengthen the community by enlarging it".

The mutual enrichment which must result from contacts between different civilisations constitutes as a matter of fact the *raison d'être* of Francophonie. Praising this culture which has flowered from "a cross-breeding of Latin genius and the Celtic, the clarity of the Mediterranean and Alpine passions," M. Senghor underlines the advantages of cultural exchanges between countries. For black Africa it would bring out the affinity of Negro and Gallic art and reveal that "even if the Gauls are not



our ancestors no one can deny that they are our cousins". "This close relationship, despite striking differences, between African sensibilities and European culture is proof of the far-reaching possibilities which are inherent in the complementarity of Negritude and Francite." As for the Maghreb, President Senghor visualises, in Francophonie, a means of realising "the symbiosis of romantic Arab idealism and Roman vigour".

It is but natural that this awareness has resulted in efforts to set up an organisation in defence of a common cultural heritage. The progress from the call for linguistic and cultural solidarity to the proposition of a Francophone community has indeed been rather rapid. Whether it is the 'Francophone Commonwealth' of M. Bourguiba's conception or the form outlined originally by M. Senghor, it is apparent that the progenitors of these ideas have been in earnest.

Gradually, projects have been taking shape. Starting originally from a cultural plan they have progressed to the idea of multi-national economic and technical co-operation covering all French-speaking states. The projects proposed by President Hamani Diori to the Francophone states in September 1966 even included the nucleus of plans relating to matters of foreign policy. Thus, from its very inception, Francophonie has embarked on diverse paths. Some would wish it to remain a simple affirmation of cultural solidarity, others to limit it to co-operation between the developed and underdeveloped states, still others seem to regard it as a French union in a new form. This is to say that the ambition to realise certain projects, ambitions which clash over differences in situations and attitudes have hardly had the possibility of being realised so far. It is of interest to point out that the most advanced plan for a Francophone community was concluded in 1966 and since then there has hardly been any significant progress.

The institutional framework presented by OCAM envisaged an organisation made up of concentric circles of solidarity. Thus fields of co-operation among countries would diminish progressively while links would become more flexible as their distance grew from the centre, in this case from Francophonie (A) which unites France and the French-speaking states of black Africa and Madagascar to Francophonie (B) which includes all the countries in (A) plus Haiti, Lebanon, the Maghreb states and Indo-China and to Francophonie (C) where co-operation would include France, the developing countries listed in circles (A) and (B) and all other countries where French is a national language concurrently with one or more other languages. The aims of the organisation were rather ambitious at levels A and B where it was planned to develop cultural, economic and technical co-operation, set up well defined organs and make provision for ministerial conferences and meetings of heads of state and governments. It was also urged that Francophone states integrated in circle A should form a joint front in the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

1966 could thus be described as a period of euphoria. The strong criticism levelled at the prospect of a Francophone community in that year testifies to the apprehensions aroused at the idea of this new union coming into existence. By 1967 however other problems came to the fore.

The visit of General de Gaulle to Quebec in July 1967 was a turning

point in the development of Francophonie. It is not necessary to recall the attempts made by French Canadians to safeguard their identity. This struggle in the last few years has received much more open support from France than ever in the past. Since 1961 when at the initiative of the University of Montreal the Association of Francophone Universities (AUPELF) was set up its activities have extended to several other fields. In 1965 France and Quebec signed a protocol relating to cultural exchanges between the two countries. But it was after President de Gaulle's visit in 1967 that Quebec's relations with a Francophone community, should it be formed, drew attention. The participation of representatives from Quebec at ministerial conferences of Francophone states (see chronology in appendix) the creation of 'l' Office Franco-Quebecois de la Jeunesse"—comprising French-speaking youth—and the visit of M. Cardinal, Vice-President of the Quebec Council of Ministers, appeared to lend special significance to Canada's relations with France and the Francophone states.

This new orientation resulted in serious misgivings among some of the more zealous founders, if the guarded statements of the Tunisian head of state warning those who would like to give Francophonie a handle to political war is any indication. On December 30 last, President Bourguiba declared at the Congress of Francophone Youth held in Tunis that "action must be directed towards a cultural goal. The political quest must be abandoned. There is no need to make Francophonie the instrument of a political struggle. This would frighten those who were unwilling to become a weapon of war against some states and earn their hostility. One must have tact in dealing with others if one wishes to achieve results. The reservations which probably explain the reticence towards Quebec-French relations and Canada's desire for co-operation with Francophone states seem to have been shared by other heads of state as well. The short history of Francophonie is thus characterised by the emergence of different aims periodically. To these essentially cultural aspirations have been added the preoccupation with economic problems and political objectives which along with French-Quebec relations have assumed a new dimension. This plethora of ideas and the absence of a common doctrine have undoubtedly contributed to fundamental differences which exist between Francophone states. It explains, similarly, the pragmatic approach towards the organisation and the tardy development of its more ambitious projects.

## 2. Achievement : "Francophonie" a Myth or Reality ?

So far the institutional forms created to strengthen the base of Francophonie have been the result primarily of private initiative. At the governmental level, bilateral relations between Francophone states have led to some sort of a community in practice. In addition many other currents have existed. Sometimes cultural aspects have dominated, sometimes economic and political considerations have been added. But, generally speaking, till recently the Francophone states did not express their solidarity on a worldwide level ; rather it revolved around the existence of 'Francophonie' in practice.

It was not till the beginning of 1968 that the first conference of Francophone Ministers of Education was held. In response to an appeal at an earlier meeting of the OCAM heads of state, France and Quebec

sent their representatives to this conference held at Gabon in February 1968. It was the first time that Quebec was invited to an international conference and the precedence did not take place without some difficulties arising with the Federal Canadian Government (see chronology). The second conference of Education Ministers was held at Paris in April last year. But it was not till the Niamey conference which took place from February 17 to 20, 1969, that the question of the actual headquarters of Francophonie was raised. This conference, attended by almost 30 Francophone states, was important even though several countries like Algeria, Guinea, Mauritania and Switzerland were unrepresented. A striking feature was that the representatives of both the Federal Canadian Government and Quebec were able to "co-exist" without difficulty on the same platform and make their contribution to the ideas debated.

The aspirations of those who saw in Francophonie a means of developing multilateral co-operation seem to have been fulfilled at Niamey. Speaking at Bordeaux in October 1967 M. Senghor had expressed the hope that technical assistance could be provided at the level of Francophonie by establishing an international agency at Paris where the Francophone countries could indicate their potentialities and the assistance they required. The proposal was implemented with the creation of an agency for cultural and technical co-operation and formed the main item on the agenda at the Niamey conference. The project, which hardly deviates from the draft submitted to government delegations, appears rather ambitious. It envisages an institutional framework of six offices responsible for education, youth, sports, arts, information and co-operation in common programmes. Comprising about 20 officials and devoting a budget of 3,000 million old francs the agency should enable the development of multilateral co-operation among Francophone states and explains the enthusiasm with which the meeting was acclaimed. There is no doubt that African states can expect more technical assistance and that France on her part can through joint action with other developed Francophone states encourage increased assistance.

This is not to say however that all the problems have been solved. For while it has been provided, to start with, that France will finance 45% of the transactions, Quebec 20% and Belgium 10%, there is no reason to assume that these states will be in a position to make their contributions and that their past caution will give place to unreserved involvement.

Again, the aim of the agency does not seem to have been clearly defined. Must it proceed with investigations of the feasibility of plans and needs of states on the basis of research work of doubtful value? Or should it, on the contrary, concentrate on research which though selective would produce spectacular results? The resolution adopted at Niamey in any case offers at least the advantage of uniting Francophone countries in a common endeavour and enhances the prospects of the birth of an organisation. It would however be wrong to believe that Francophonie does not exist beyond the framework of the Community. The development of bilateral relations between the Francophone states and the existence of innumerable private bodies has given real content to the solidarity among French-speaking people.

In the course of the last few years relations between Canada and Belgium on the one hand and African Francophone states on the other are known to have widened. Canadian aid to Francophone countries increased between 1967 and 1968 from 12 to 22 million dollars. Today it exceeds the total aid given to English-speaking countries. Tunisia alone will receive \$10 million between 1969 and 1970. There is no doubt that this move underlines the desire of Ottawa to prevent Quebec alone from forging a link with the Francophone states. Questioned recently on the possibilities of rivalries likely to develop between France and Canada on the question of aid to African countries, M. Jean-Luc Pepin, Canadian Minister of Commerce and Industries, said: "One hopes for, in return, the sympathy of countries whom we assist and that they become sympathetic to what concerns us, for example, our conception of Francophonie . . . For us, this remains essentially a phenomenon of a cultural character".

Belgium, on its part, has developed a policy of co-operation specially with regard to Tunisia. Approximately 200 Belgians are imparting training under the technical assistance programme in education and agriculture, health and public services. Belgium has also been contributing to the industrial development of Tunisia in various fields and participating in the development of stock-farming and commercial cultivation.

Along with these bilateral exchanges more and more meetings are being organised by private bodies set up around Francophonie.

In the last two years innumerable associations have been added to those which already existed to strengthen the ties between French-speaking peoples. Some among them have very general aims, such as the Association de Solidarite Francophone—the Association of Francophone Solidarity—established in November 1966 and which endeavours to co-ordinate the activities of the various bodies revolving round Francophonie, to offer them a research bureau and common administrative services. This co-ordination as a matter of fact is indispensable in view of the innumerable associations in all sectors of activity. Similarly there are others like the 'Association des Jeunesses Francophones'—the Association of Francophone Youth—set up in May 1967, L'Association des Fonctions Publiques Partiellement ou Entierement de Langue Francaise (1967)—the Association of Public Offices—L'Association des Erivains de Langue Francaise (1968)—an association of writers, les "Jeunes Chambres Economiques Francaises—the Junior Chamber of Commerce which attaches particular importance to relations with Francophonie and could lead to an association of a Francophone Chamber of Commerce—L'Institut International de Droit d'expression Francaise 1964—a legal organisation, and L'Association des Universites Partiellement ou Entierement de Langue Francaise 1961—an association of universities.

At the parliamentary level a special reference needs to be made to "L'Association Internationale des Parliementaires de Langue Francaise", which was set up on May 18, 1967, and held its first general assembly last September at Versailles. Over and above the usual problems related to Francophonie—cultural exchanges and technical co-operation—the need to develop telecommunications through satellites has also been strongly urged.

Finally, there is a view that the French language must be prevented from being denigrated to serve merely as a utility language and a tool of technical co-operation. It was with this aim that the "Conseil Internationale de la Langue Francaise" (CILF) was established on September 12, 1967, at the initiative of "L'Haut Comite pour la Defense et l'Expansion de la Langue Francaise".\* The CILF aims at maintaining the quality and promote the expansion of French, to preserve its unity and to give it a universal dimension which its expansion requires.

It comprises 75 academic associates (linguists, grammarians, etc.) 26 French, 7 Belgian, 3 Swiss, 1 from Luxembourg, 8 from Quebec, 2 members from Canadian provinces other than Quebec, 1 from Haiti, 18 representing black Africa and Madagascar, 4 from the Arab world, 4 from Cambodia, Laos, Mauritius and Vietnam. These 75 members should represent Francophone countries which the Council regards with special interest. The publication of a glossary of the French language including modern terminology constitutes one of the foremost tasks of the CILF.

### **3. Future Prospects**

Participating in an open discussion through the columns of the daily *Le Monde* the former French Minister, M. de Broglie, wrote on November 5, 1967, that "it is necessary to state frankly that either Francophonie will ultimately become political, or it will cease to exist". Is there a possibility of this being translated into reality? Such an involvement does not seem to conform either to the interests of France or to the present policy of the government. It underestimates, moreover, the need for action based on a strictly linguistic and cultural plan.

#### **(a) Is a Clearly Defined Doctrine Desirable?**

It has been said that "this is an era when empires are broken up, not formed". For this very reason the French Government has been cautious about the idea of an organisation of Francophonie. Her refusal to assume the leadership of a new community is certainly in consonance with French public opinion, but it is primarily the result of a foreign policy based on a preference for bilateral relations and respect for the sovereignty of each state.

In France itself the idea of a Francophone community has found no response even in opposition circles. It has moreover aroused fears in a section of public opinion about the financial responsibilities which it will necessarily impose on France. These circles underline the contribution already being made by France towards the development of the Third World and its inability to increase it further. Other fiscal policy extremists see in Francophonie the manifestation of a narrow, outmoded nationalism. Reflecting this opinion a Parisian journalist wrote on April 3, 1968: "Having failed to dazzle our neighbours with our industrial power, or to frighten them with the force of our arms, we have discovered for ourselves

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\*The French High Commission for the Protection and Expansion of the French Language was set up under a decree on March 31, 1966, and inaugurated by the Prime Minister, M. Georges Pompidou, in June 1966.

a 'mission' which is to blind them with the radiance of our culture and since we have hardly anything to say, this little must be said in French. As for those who have nothing at all to say, it is enough to fill us with legitimate pride, if they say this 'nothing' in French. I am afraid that Francophonie will only be a confession of weakness and the consolation of a humiliated and angry chauvinism."

These criticisms do not always appear to be convincing. They in fact lose, in a large measure, their force in the context of the ample proof given by France of her own reservations in respect of Francophonie, and her manifest preference for bilateral relations to multilateral co-operation. Multilateral aid today represents only 4 to 5 per cent of French aid. France's objections to this type of assistance can always be raised within the framework of a Francophone organisation where she can play a leading role and ensure the effectiveness of the credits granted by her which is not always the case with world organisations which at present dispense multilateral aid.

But the ties with individual states provide France with other advantages. France leads in her contribution to the developing countries which represents 1.02 per cent of her national income against 0.57 per cent of the USA and the UK. It would hardly be realistic to expect her to give up this privileged position which it has with a large number of aid receiving countries. This preference for bilateral relations moreover forms the basis of the fundamental principles of the present French foreign policy. The importance accorded to the sovereignty of states over all other forms of community organisations and the supremacy of the nation over all ideological forms are the foundations of this policy.

Moreover there is no need to stress the suspicions that are likely to be aroused if France did not adhere to the above line of action or the accusations made that her foreign policy was being directed to the building up of a new empire—be it cultural. It would likewise be condemned if France should profit by it.

#### **(b) A Path which Compels a Peaceful Struggle in Defence of French**

It has already been stressed that Francophonie will be abandoned if the French language should cease to maintain its position in the world.

This appears less tenable than one would like to believe. In several foreign countries, for example, French is being revived for the past 15 years. Taught in 64 countries, it is compulsory in 21. It is an optional language chosen by a majority of students in 15 others and a second university language elsewhere. In Eastern European countries, Latin America and English-speaking Africa its expansion has been impressive.

In the Francophone states, on the other hand, the prospects of French seem less certain and it is even in danger of declining. In Europe the problem is not so serious. Despite the unequal growth in the population of the Wallons and the Flemish, 60% of the students receiving higher education continue to take their diplomas in French.

The Swiss have all along been traditionally favourable to the French language. In Italy, as also in the Netherlands, and in at least half of Germany it has become the major foreign language. Its expansion along with English—the principal concurrent language which is also the language of a big power against which Europe seeks to assert her independence—further brightens its prospects of becoming the language of a United Europe.

In America the situation is less favourable. The Francophone Canadians represent approximately 29% of the total population. These French provinces are economically weaker and their rapid urbanisation is not conducive to the development of the French language. Rather they find it more profitable to learn English in order to secure better employment. They are also allured by the American way of life and culture which is so dynamic and close to them.

The French language also faces a danger in Haiti where a dual rivalry emanates from the 'American-Haiti Institute' and the influence of Spain. Spain grants 300 scholarships each year whereas France is able to offer not more than 50.

In South-East Asia the rapid growth of American influence in South Vietnam has also brought to the fore the precarious position of French.

Finally, in Africa the position of French no longer seems to be as secure. An inquiry carried out in Senegal in 1966 revealed that out of 35,000 students interrogated only 2 out of 1,000 spoke French among themselves. In other cases it was found that 10% Africans and Malagachians understood French while only 1 to 2 in 1,000 'thought' in French.

However, the situation is not entirely hopeless when one considers that today there are 55,000 to 60,000 French teachers abroad as compared to 15,000-16,000 Americans and 6,000 British. This is at a time when the French authorities are formulating the 3rd Plan for Cultural Expansion and examining its deficiencies in three respects.

Investment credits have been sacrificed in favour of credits essential for the maintenance of teaching personnel and technical co-operation experts. Thus the 2nd Plan of Cultural Expansion reveals that contrary to the expectations that investment credits would rise by about 11.5 million to 30 million francs between 1964 and 1968 they actually reached only the 11 million mark in 1969 and 11 million is anticipated for 1969. It is clear that France should be alive to this problem and recruit personnel through institutions and build up a team of trainers rather than depute cadres directly to developing countries.

The need to rectify deficiencies in the field of broadcasting has also been highlighted. Radio broadcasts from France have only 42 hours daily frequencies, compared to 1,500 hours from the Voice of America, 1,100 hours from the USSR, 850 hours from China and 750 from Britain.

Attention has also been drawn to the need to boost exports of French publications which represent one-third of German or U.S. exports and one-

fourth of British. The accent moreover is on literary works rather than on scientific literature. Many French savants are forced today to publish their works in the English language. Is there a possibility of setting up a "Bureau of Books and Libraries" to encourage distribution of French books and subsidise scientific and technical works ?

A language must have the genius to adapt itself to changing times in order to survive. Francophonie, because of its nearness to different French languages and the increased resources it will place at the disposal of French, undisputably provides a chance of survival.

Beyond this analysis, the conclusions are not that of the observer. Francophonie will finally be what the respective states make of it, in particular France. The realisation of cultural and linguistic aims at present seems more desirable if one wishes to preserve a Francophone community. To attempt to strengthen the organisation of such a community by assigning it political objectives would certainly involve the risk of shattering it.

Winston Churchill has said : "The empires of tomorrow will be the empires of the mind". It rests with France to reveal her spirit without imposing an empire. It is equally a question of the will and means to do so. On it depends the future of the country. Because ultimately the cultures destined to spread shall be those which can respond to the problems of the 21st century. To be able to preserve one's language, the will to do so will not suffice. It would be necessary to have something to say also.—*Translated by Shanti Sadiq Ali.*

#### **Chronology of Attempts to Organise a Francophone Community**

July 1965 :	President Senghor raises the problem with General de Gaulle.
September 1965 :	First biennial of French language at Namur.
November 1965 :	President Bourguiba's visit to Dakar.
31 March 1966 :	High Commission for the Defence and Expansion of the French Language set up under the Prime Minister of France.
June 1966 :	Meeting of heads of state of OCAM at Tananarive.
	Presidents Senghor and Hamani Diori given the responsibility of outlining the plan to the leaders of the states concerned.
September 1966 :	President Hamani Diori places a scheme for an organisation of Francophonie before France and other interested states.



- End of September 1966 : M. Senghor's visit to Canada.
- 6 November 1966 : M. de Broglie, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, defines the position of France in an address to the International Diplomatic Academy.
- November 1966 : The Association of Francophone Solidarity set up at Paris.
- 5 May 1967 : The International Parliamentary Association of French Language (A.I.P.L.F.) established at Luxembourg.
- May 1967 : The Association of Francophone Youth set up.
- 23-27 July 1967 : Second biennial of the French language at Quebec.
- 22-23 January 1968 : Conference of OCAM at Niamey, proposal to set up an agency for cultural and technical co-operation.
- 5-10 February 1968 : Conference held at Libreville of Education Ministers of African countries, France and Quebec (invited for the first time to an international conference at ministerial level).
- 4 March 1968 : The Government of Ottawa asks its Ambassador accredited to the Government of Gabon not to present his credentials.
- 22-26 April 1968 : 2nd session of conference of Education Ministers at Paris. Mr. Cardinal, Minister of Education of Quebec, participates in it.
- May 1968 : Mr. Jules Leger, Ambassador of Canada to Paris, lodges a note of protest with the French Government. The Canadian Government issues a White Paper on Quebec's participation in international conferences.
- 29 July, 1968 : The protagonists of autonomy in Jura welcome the creation of a commission of experts charged with the responsibility of finding a solution to the Jura problem.
- 11 September 1968 : Radio Biafra : "Let us join Francophonie."

January 1969 :

Visit of Mr. Cardinal, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Quebec, to Paris. (France agrees to contribute to the University of Quebec. A committee to be set up to encourage French investments in Quebec, studies to be made for launching a Franco-Quebec telecommunication satellite.

17-20 February, 1969 :

Conference at Niamey. Resolution passed demanding states represented to create an agency of cultural and technical co-operation.

## **Tribalism, Politics and Eviction : A Study of an Abortive Resettlement Project in Ghana**

R. W. WYLLIE

THE Anlo are an Ewe-speaking people who inhabit the lagoon-studded coastal area of Ghana and Togo, between the mouth of the Volta river and Lome, the Togolese capital. They are among the most geographically mobile of West African peoples, Anlo migrant fishermen being found as far afield as Sierra Leone and Angola. Operating the beach seine net, these fishermen are organized in "companies" which form the nucleus of seasonal fishing settlements dotted along the West African coast. One such settlement was the village of Abakam, which was located midway between the towns of Cape Coast and Elmina, in territory occupied by the Fanti tribe of southern Ghana.

### **The Destruction of Abakam**

Early one morning in April, 1964, the people of Abakam were aroused by a police detachment from Cape Coast. They were ordered to remove all their belongings from their homes and warned to stand clear of the village, as it was to be burned down by workmen employed by the Cape Coast Municipal Council. By about 10 a.m. the villagers had crowded together, with their possessions, on the beach which lay across the highway skirting the village. From here they watched helplessly as municipal workmen poured kerosene on their homes and set them alight. Within a short space of time flames had engulfed almost the entire village, since most of the houses were made of bamboo and palm fronds and burned very rapidly. At the western end of the village, the flames began to damage the overhead telephone wires and the fire in this section had to be quickly doused.

By mid-day, Abakam had been destroyed, except for a few houses in that part of the village where the damage to the telephone wires had occurred. At this time the villagers began boarding "mammy-lorries", some bound for home in Anloland over 175 miles away, others heading for Anlo settlements along the coast near the towns of Winneba and Accra. Still others trudged on foot eastward to Cape Coast or westward to Elmina in search of lodgings. By evening, only one fire burned in Abakam and this was outside the charred home of the village headman. Stoically, he observed that "the captain must be the last to leave the ship." But he too was preparing to leave. There was no longer any reason for him to stay behind

for, as he put it : "Now we are dead." In one day, a village which had been in existence for forty-five years had been eliminated.

### **Tribalism and Politics**

Some four months previously I had begun fieldwork in Abakam. My interest in the village had been sparked by learning that it was the home of Anlo fishermen and I felt that it would be interesting to examine social relations between them and the host population. Among the local Fanti there circulated a wealth of blood-curdling stories about the Anlo strangers.<sup>1</sup> Since the village was situated only a few miles from the university in which I taught, many of these stories were known also to my colleagues, some of whom believed them to be true.

Not surprisingly, the Anlo of Abakam were well aware of the low esteem in which they were held by the host population. Nevertheless, I was hardly prepared for the way in which this fact was thrust upon my attention. In order to begin my work at Abakam, I sought the permission of the village headman. True to the democratic ideals of his people he called a meeting of the entire village to consider my request. At this meeting I was invited to explain the nature of the proposed research, after which there followed a lengthy period of discussion and questioning. When the meeting drew to a close the headman announced that I would be permitted to proceed with my investigation. He added that he was somewhat surprised that I had not seen fit to raise any questions about such matters as ritual murder, thieving, sorcery and the kidnapping of Fanti children. Not a little embarrassed, I replied that I had certainly heard stories about such things in connection with the Anlo, but had thought it impolite to introduce the subject on my first visit to the village. The headman was amused by this reply and assured me that his people would not have been offended had I asked them about such practices. The stories, he said, were the products of jealous and envious people and contained not a grain of truth. "Look around you," he invited, "and you will see no evidence to support such wicked lies."

At the time of its destruction, Abakam had a population of about 1,000 persons, most of whom were connected in one way or another with the activities of the six fishing companies which operated from the nearby beach. Although many villagers returned to their homes in Anloland at the close of the fishing season in April, Abakam had a larger proportion of permanent residents than most other Anlo settlements of this kind in Ghana. It was one of the earliest Anlo fishing settlements to be established outside Anloland and by 1960 some 20% of its population had been born in the locality.

Around 1918 the first Anlo migrant fishermen had come to the site of Abakam, attracted by its fine stretch of rock-free, sandy beach, by the lagoon only a few hundred yards behind the sea and by its proximity to Cape Coast and Elmina markets. As the first settlers were joined over the years by other Anlo, it became a seasonal camp for members and associates of Anlo-owned fishing companies. Local Fanti were sometimes employed by Anlo net-owners and before long a few Fanti-owned companies began operating from Abakam beach.

Gradually, the seasonal settlement assumed the character of a permanent fishing village. Some Anlo found employment in Cape Coast and Elmina between fishing seasons. Others rented plots of land from the Fanti to the north of the lagoon, on which they grew cassava and other crops. The Anlo women acquired a reputation locally as makers of *gari*, a very popular dish with the Fanti. A distillery was established in the village which produced *akpeteshie*—a crude spirit—for local consumption and for re-distillation in government-owned establishments. In one large hut corn-grinding machinery was installed and this was used not only by the women of Abakam but by those of surrounding villages as well. Two families in the village acquired lorries and entered the field of commercial transportation. In short, by 1964, Abakam's economy had diversified beyond the stage typical of a simple seasonal settlement. By this time Abakam was well on its way to becoming a relatively stable and durable village community.

Throughout its history, Abakam's internal affairs seem to have been managed fairly peacefully. Apart from occasional disputes between fishing companies over such matters as casting over each other's nets, relations within the village were generally good. The people of Abakam elected their own headman who, together with a council of net-owners and elders, drew up village by-laws and adjudicated in intra-village disputes. Relations with the Fanti, however, appear to have been strained and uneasy almost from the beginning. This was never marked at the level of the landlord-tenant relations obtaining between Fanti traditional authorities and Anlo net-owners, nor between Anlo users and Fanti owners of plots of land. Among Fanti townspeople, on the other hand, the Anlo were generally regarded with fear, suspicion and hostility. From childhood Fanti learned to view the Anlo as thieves, kidnappers, sorcerers and ritual murderers.

Despite the tension in An'lo-Fanti relations, there appears to have been only one important incident involving the two groups prior to the destruction of the village. This took place during the 1940's when a Fanti woman named Hagan formed a fishing company, under the supervision of her son, J.E. Hagan, which commenced fishing operations at Abakam beach without first consulting the Abakam headman. Hagan is said to have taken to view that, as a Fanti, he did not have to consult an Anlo before fishing from a Fanti beach. The Anlo, for their part, felt that some 20 years of fishing from this beach—a privilege for which they had to pay the Fanti—entitled them to some consideration. Other Fanti-owned companies had presented the Abakam headman with a bottle of *akpeteshie* as a means of establishing good relations prior to fishing. Hagan's actions were therefore regarded by the villagers as both a deliberate affront and a hostile act.

For a time relations between Hagan's company and the people of Abakam were very poor, marked by recurring disputes over fishing infringements. After two seasons, however, Hagan's company was disbanded (because they were very poor fishermen, say the Anlo) and J.E. Hagan became a shopkeeper in Cape Coast. Shortly afterwards, he became active in national politics, being a founder member of the United Gold Coast Convention, an early nationalist movement. A little later he was a founder member of

the Cape Coast branch of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. By 1963 he was well established as a leading member of the party, being Commissioner for the Central Region of Ghana, with his headquarters in Cape Coast.

It was in 1963 that Hagan, as Regional Commissioner, requested the Ministry of Social Welfare to embark upon a scheme to remove the residents of Abakam and resettle them at Bantama, on the outskirts of Elmina. The chief reason given by Hagan at this time was the unhygienic condition of the village. The Ministry of Social Welfare agreed to begin the project by constructing houses at Bantama. The headman and net-owners of Abakam supplied the unskilled labour for the project, while the Ministry of Social Welfare provided building materials, transportation and supervisory and craft personnel.

After about six weeks, the pattern of co-operation between the Ministry and the people of Abakam began to break down and within four months—that is, around the end of 1963—work on the project had come to a standstill. According to the residents of Abakam, the reasons for the failure of the project were as follows :

1. The Ministry of Social Welfare had run short of building supplies.
2. The lorry which had transported villagers to and from the resettlement area had broken down and no replacement for it had been made.
3. The villagers were not being paid for the work they had to do at Bantama.
4. Fishing activities were being seriously curtailed because of the demands for communal labour at Bantama.
5. The houses which were being built at Bantama were "too good for poor fishermen." They were not meant for the Anlo at all, but for the Fanti instead.
6. The beach at Bantama was very rocky and quite unsuitable for beach seine net fishing.

The project up to this point had been under the immediate control of the Chief Social Welfare Officer in Cape Coast. This official, when interviewed just prior to the destruction of Abakam, was extremely reluctant to discuss the project with me, although by this time it was out of his hands. He denied both that the Ministry had run short of building supplies for the project and that there had been a transportation failure. He pointed out that workers involved in communal labour were not paid wages, since they were the beneficiaries in the project. In this respect, he added, there was no doubt in his mind that the houses being built at Bantama were meant for the Anlo and not the Fanti. He did concede, however, that the beach at Bantama seemed unsuitable for the kind of fishing engaged in by the Anlo

and that fishing at Abakam beach might have been adversely affected by the demands for communal labour at the resettlement area. He frankly admitted that he was not happy about the project from the very beginning, since the villagers simply were not enthusiastic about being moved and resettled. When he realised that he could not carry the project through without the co-operation of the villagers, he recommended to his superiors that the project be abandoned. This recommendation was accepted by the Minister of Social Welfare. At this stage, however, the Regional Commissioner assumed personal responsibility for seeing the project through to completion. Although this made the Minister of Social Welfare "very cross", the Government of Ghana gave Hagan \$60,000 to complete the project. By the time Abakam was destroyed, six houses had been completed at Bantama, together with a half mile stretch of roadway.

In mid-March, 1964, the heads of households in Abakam were served with notices, signed by the Regional Commissioner, ordering them to remove "unauthorised dwellings" (i.e., all the houses in the village) before April 4, 1964. These notices cited a section of the Cape Coast municipal by-laws which stated that permission of the municipal council must be obtained before dwellings could be erected. This, of course, the villagers had neglected to do. The village headman then appealed to Hagan to allow the people time to bring their houses up to standards required by the municipal council, if necessary. This appeal was turned down and, according to the headman, Hagan then told him personally that the villagers could have until April 10 to comply with the original order.

It was with some surprise, therefore, that the villagers greeted the police on April 9. In their confusion and bewilderment on the day of the eviction, they were hard-pressed to find adequate explanations for the destruction of their homes. Many of the older residents felt that this represented the latest, and possibly final, stage of the feud which had developed when Hagan's fishing company had operated from Abakam beach. Others saw wider political considerations underlying the Regional Commissioner's actions, pointing to the fairly long history of tension and conflict between the Convention People's Party and the Ewe-speaking people as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Most, however, attributed Hagan's actions to a weak pandering to the fears and prejudices of his fellow-tribesmen, particularly the local Fanti fishermen. They suggested that the removal of the Anlo from Abakam would leave the field open to these local fishermen and would encourage similar evictions elsewhere in the region.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout, the Regional Commissioner refused to grant me an interview on the subject of Abakam and an understanding of his actions can be gained only from secondary and circumstantial sources. The Acting Town Clerk of Cape Coast at the time of Abakam's destruction had been in fairly continuous contact with the Regional Commissioner for some time prior to this event. He said that the official reason for the destruction of Abakam was the villagers' failure to comply with the notices served on them in mid-March. He felt that the Regional Commissioner's advocacy and determined support of the resettlement scheme was to be explained largely in political terms. The physical appearance of the village was poor and its location alongside one of the nation's major highways unfortunate.

The trouble with Abakam was that it was seen too often and too clearly by the many important visitors who travelled between the nation's capital and Takoradi, one of Ghana's two major seaports.

In order to lend some support to this explanation, the Acting Town Clerk went on to relate a story, which is a miniature tragi-comedy. It appears that when Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II visited Ghana in 1961, she travelled along the Accra-Takoradi highway, past the village of Abakam. Hagan, who rode in one of the accompanying V.I.P. cars, told the Acting Town Clerk how horrified he had been to see the Queen produce her camera and take some pictures of Abakam as she drove past. Hagan claimed that these were the first and only pictures taken by the Queen on her Ghanaian tour. This significant happening could mean only one thing—that Her Majesty had been so repelled by such a disgusting little village that she wished to record the scene for the benefit of friends and family back at the palace. After this incident, the Acting Town Clerk observed, Hagan was more firmly resolved than ever before that he must obliterate Abakam and its residents from the map of modern Ghana. When I related this story to the headman of Abakam, he was astonished. He remembered the Queen's visit very clearly, recalling how she smiled and waved to the villagers as she passed. But she did not, he insisted, take any pictures.

Another secondary source of information on the Regional Commissioner's thinking about Abakam was the government-controlled press. After the village had been destroyed, three separate and contradictory reports appeared in the two national daily newspapers. One report assured readers that the people of Abakam were safely established in a new township so that the government could develop the tourist potential of Abakam beach. Another explained that the villagers had been resettled so that the government could go ahead with a plan to build a palm oil factory on the site of Abakam. Still another, a classic in irony, informed the public that the villagers of Abakam had been resettled at Bantama after their village had been flooded by heavy rains. In no case did a report make reference to "unauthorised dwellings" or to the fact that the villagers were evicted and their homes burned to the ground.

Whatever Hagan's motives may have been, it seems quite clear that the official and quasi-official explanations for the eviction of the villagers and the destruction of their village were largely irrelevant. There were many "unauthorised dwellings" in Cape Coast town itself. In terms of public health and sanitation, Abakam was no worse than many parts of Cape Coast and the surrounding villages. And in the 22 months that Hagan remained as Regional Commissioner after the destruction of the village, no attempt was made to build a palm oil factory, nor to develop the tourist potential of Abakam beach.

### **The Anlo Stereotype and the Credibility Gap**

Some three weeks after the village was destroyed, interviews were conducted with a sample of 130 residents of Cape Coast and Elmina. These interviews were conducted in the streets of the two towns, by student interviewers who were instructed to interview a specified number of people



in various spheres of activity. The sample thus obtained cannot be regarded as representative of the population of these towns as a whole. The basic intent was to elicit views on the affair while it was still very fresh in people's minds. Furthermore, groups of people were interviewed who were thought to stand in some special relationship to the people of Abakam: fishermen because they were competitors of many of those who were evicted; petty traders because they were involved in commercial relations with the villagers; lorry- and taxi-drivers because they often carried the villagers as passengers on their vehicles; and schoolchildren because of the many stories we had heard about kidnapping.

One of the questions asked during the interviews was : "*Do you think that the destruction of Abakam was a good thing or a bad thing?*" The answers to this question are tabulated below, according to the age, sex, literacy level, employment status and occupation of the respondent :

Table I

*Simple Evaluation of the Destruction of Abakam, by Age, Sex, Literacy Level, Employment Status and Occupation of Respondent*

## Evaluation of the Destruction of Abakam

	Good Thing %	Bad Thing %	Don't Know %	Total %
<b>Age of Respondent</b>				
45 yrs. and over	48.0 (12)	40.0 (10)	12.0 (3)	100.0 (25)
25-44 yrs. of age	46.0 (17)	29.7 (11)	24.3 (9)	100.0 (37)
15-24 yrs. of age	88.0 (37)	7.2 (3)	4.8 (2)	100.0 (42)
0-14 yrs. of age	76.9 (20)	19.2 (5)	3.9 (1)	100.0 (26)
<b>Sex of Respondent</b>				
Male	71.4 (70)	20.4 (20)	8.2 (8)	100.0 (98)
Female	50.0 (16)	28.1 (9)	21.9 (7)	100.0 (32)
<b>Literacy of Respondent</b>				
Literate	56.3 (27)	22.9 (18)	20.8 (10)	100.0 (48)
Illiterate	72.0 (59)	21.9 (18)	6.1 (5)	100.0 (82)
<b>Employment Status of Respondent</b>				
Employed aged 15 yrs. and over	56.0 (42)	26.7 (20)	17.3 (13)	100.0 (75)
Unemployed aged 15 yrs. and over	80.0 (8)	10.0 (1)	10.0 (1)	100.0 (10)
At school, or under 15 yrs. of age	80.0 (36)	17.8 (8)	2.2 (1)	100.0 (45)
<b>Occupation of Respondent</b>				
Fishing	73.3 (22)	16.5 (5)	10.0 (3)	100.0 (30)
Trading	47.4 (9)	31.6 (6)	21.0 (4)	100.0 (19)
Transportation	42.1 (8)	36.9 (7)	21.0 (4)	100.0 (19)
Other	42.8 (3)	28.6 (2)	28.6 (2)	100.0 (7)

The most striking feature of Table 1 is, quite obviously, the very high overall anti-Anlo sentiment felt by our respondents, 83% of whom were Fanti. Apart from this, the table reveals a number of interesting variations. Younger people appear to be more strongly anti-Anlo than are their elders and this might suggest that anti-Anlo sentiment is unlikely to disappear quickly in the near future. On the other hand, this may simply reflect a greater credulity on the part of young people, which will diminish as they mature socially and psychologically. It may also reflect their sense of vulnerability in the midst of so many horrific tales of kidnapping. The fact that women appear to be somewhat less enthusiastic than men about the destruction of Abakam is probably best explained in terms of economic factors. Most women are petty traders and are involved in co-operative or reciprocal, rather than competitive, economic relations with the people of Abakam; most men, on the other hand, are fishermen and thus tend to see themselves as competitors of the men of Abakam. This line of reasoning would also seem to be supported when we compare the responses of people in different occupations. Traders and transportation workers are much less firm in their belief that the destruction of Abakam was a good thing than are fishermen. Like traders, lorry- and taxi-drivers are also involved in relations of economic co-operation with the villagers of Abakam. Literacy levels are to some extent related to occupation and since fishermen here have a generally low literacy rate, the strength of feeling of illiterates on the subject of Abakam is not surprising. As for the unemployed, their relations with the villagers of Abakam are unique. They are people who cannot even compete with the "strangers" in their locality and we can well imagine the frustration which might underlay their hostility toward the Anlo.

The quality of anti-Anlo sentiment becomes more clear in the answers given to the question: "Why do you think that the destruction of Abakam was a good thing?"

**Table 2**

*Reasons for Feeling that the Destruction of Abakam was a Good Thing*

Response	%
All Responses	100.0(99)
The villagers killed people	24.2(24)
The villagers used destructive magic	2.0(2)
The village was unhygienic	11.1(11)
The land was needed by the government	3.0(3)
The villagers disregarded authority	18.2(18)
The villagers were to be resettled	1.0(1)
The villagers constituted a traffic hazard	2.0(2)
The villagers were strangers	2.0(2)
The villagers had no right to be there anyway	1.0(1)
The villagers were feared	4.1(4)
The villagers were wicked	26.3(26)
Other responses	4.1(4)
Don't Know	1.0(1)

Here we see the broad outlines of the Anlo stereotype which has so much currency in the locality. Well over half of all reasons given concern the essentially wicked, destructive and anti-social character of the strangers as seen by the host population. Against a background of hostility such as this, one might marvel that the village of Abakam lasted as long as it did.

Our interviewees were also asked: "Why do you think Abakam was destroyed?" Their answers, which are shown in Table 3, provide a means of judging how far the official and quasi-official explanations of the event were accepted by local people:

Table 3

*Reasons Why Abakam was Destroyed*

Response	%
All Responses	100.0(149)
The villagers killed people	22.8(34)
The villagers were thieves	1.3(2)
The villagers used destructive magic	1.3(2)
The village was unhygienic	12.8(19)
The land was needed by the government	16.8(25)
The villagers were to be resettled	2.7(4)
The villagers constituted a traffic hazard	1.3(2)
The villagers disregarded authority	8.7(13)
The villagers were strangers	0.7(1)
The villagers had no right to be there anyway	2.0(3)
The villagers were feared	3.4(5)
The villagers were victimized	2.0(3)
The villagers were wicked	14.3(22)
Don't Know	9.4(14)

From the above table it would appear that the explanations of the event offered in the newspapers were no more convincing to the local Fanti than they were to the people of Abakam or to this writer. Some people did give reasons resembling the official and quasi-official ones mentioned earlier. Together, however, such reasons represent only a very small proportion of all explanations our respondents offered. Rightly or wrongly, most people interviewed believed that Abakam had been destroyed because its inhabitants were a thoroughly bad lot.

**Conclusions**

This has not been an exercise in "value-free" analytical sociology. Whether such a sociology has ever existed or can exist or should exist are questions which are presently the subject of heated debates and I do not wish to enter the lists in this paper. Suffice it to say that, as far as the subject-matter discussed here is concerned, it is humanly impossible to take a position of "ethical neutrality". While our lack of access to the Regional

Commissioner—who is perhaps the principal actor in the drama—makes it difficult to arrive at firm conclusions on the subject, some conclusions, firm or otherwise, need to be drawn. Here it seems reasonable to suggest that, on the basis of the information at our disposal, as well as his very refusal to grant an interview, the Regional Commissioner acted primarily as an agent of powerful tribal sentiments, reinforced possibly by political considerations and by a desire to pursue a personal or family feud. Evictions are never pleasant affairs and this one was perhaps more unpleasant than most.

Apart from this, the Abakam case might well be offered as a modern classic on how not to go about the business of community resettlement. The lessons here are so obvious that they require no further elaboration nor amplification. Perhaps the saddest part of all, however, is that these events took place, not in some white racist-dominated African country, but in the first of the new independent black African nations, whose leaders claim a fervent attachment to the socialist-humanist principles underlying traditional African communalism.

#### REFERENCES

1. Conversations with anthropologists, Albert De Surgy and David Butcher suggest that similar stories about the Anlo circulate in the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone.
2. This history would begin perhaps with the Pan-Ewe movement as it was during the 1950's and end with the coup of 1966, which was led by two Anlo Ewe, Kotoka and Harlley.
3. In recent years the governments of several West African countries have ordered the expulsion of Anlo fishermen in attempts to protect two interests of fishermen who are nationals of these countries.

## **Quarterly Chronicle (May-July)**

VANITA SABIKI

### **INDIA AND AFRICA**

**India-UAR-Yugoslavia Economic Co-operation :** A tripartite ministerial meeting among India, UAR and Yugoslavia on economic co-operation was held in Cairo in July. The Indian team was led by the Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, K. B. Lall, while the UAR and the Yugoslav delegations were led by the Ministers of Economy and Foreign Trade of the two countries, Hassan Abbas Zaki and Miran Mejak, respectively.

The meeting discussed proposals for economic co-operation among the three countries and of co-ordinating their industrial, economic, trade and customs policies under a trilateral agreement concluded among them in New Delhi in 1966. The leader of the Indian delegation pointed out that there had been some difficulties in implementing the agreement. While the developing process in Yugoslavia had gone ahead, the UAR had been faced with "an exceptional situation" and India's progress was interrupted by recession and drought, he said. However the results achieved since this pioneering experiment was started in 1966 dispelled speculation that there was only limited scope for co-operation among the developing countries.

Earlier, in New Delhi, in June, the official working group consisting of representatives from the three countries had recommended a few selective fields of co-operation. These included tractors, diesel engines and their components, TV picture tubes and glass bulbs, passenger cars, commercial vehicles, scooters, three-wheelers and auto-ancillaries, electrical equipment, ship ancillaries, and fertilisers. The working group also recommended that the three governments take suitable measures to modify their import rules, trade and customs regulations and payment procedures to enable these collaboration schemes to be implemented smoothly and efficiently. The group noted that while bilateral scientific and technical co-operation among the three countries had progressed satisfactorily, a good deal could be done in the field of utilisation of training facilities and expertise in productivity, management, planning, consultancy, market research, etc. available in these countries. It was also agreed that the three countries should keep one another informed of significant developments in the spheres of science and technology.

**Tunisian Foreign Minister Visits New Delhi :** Mr. Habib Bourguiba Jr., Foreign Minister of Tunisia, paid a four-day State visit to India from June 20. Talks were held between him and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, External Affairs Minister Dinesh Singh, Minister for Foreign Trade and Supply B.R. Bhagat, Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation Karan Singh and Minister for Industrial Development and Company Affairs Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed.

At his meeting with the Prime Minister, the two leaders discussed matters of mutual interest, the scope for greater economic links between the two countries and the West Asian crisis. With Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh the Tunisian Minister discussed the political aspect of the West Asian deadlock and the need for reopening the Suez Canal.

A joint communique issued at the end of the talks on June 24, and Mr Bourguiba's Press conference before his departure reflected a greater understanding between India and Tunisia in bilateral and international spheres. On West Asia the joint communique stressed that while a comprehensive solution should be found by implementing the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, "any delay in the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories was fraught with further dangerous possibilities". The two Foreign Ministers reiterated their full support for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian peoples, the Communique stated. At his Press conference, Mr Bourguiba welcomed the "four-power" plan, which now was limited to two, for resolving the West Asian deadlock, but felt that a peace established on the basis of the UN resolution would at best be a temporary palliative for the humiliated Palestinians. He hoped that the aggressive attitude arising from religion and race would be given up and Palestine made secular on the basis of mutual respect among the communities inhabiting it.

In the Joint Communique, the two Foreign Ministers recognised the continuing validity of the policy of non-alignment "which had made a positive contribution to the cause of peace, but the Tunisian Minister at his Press conference cautioned against convening a third non-aligned summit conference without preparing in advance an agreed agenda for a common plan of action.

The two Foreign Ministers also expressed solidarity with all countries and organisations struggling against the racist and colonial policies of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, and stated that "their policies, which are in direct contravention of the UN Charter, should be brought to a speedy end". Speaking on this issue at his Press conference, the Tunisian leader was extremely critical of the working of the OAU Liberation Committee, which, for the past six years, had taken no action though it continued to spend funds lavishly.

On bilateral relations, the Joint Communique said both sides expressed their keen interest in an increasing exchange of goods and products. Earlier the Tunisian delegation and Indian officials had agreed to examine the steps necessary to restore the level of trade between the two countries, which had been affected by the closure of the Suez Canal. Mr Bourguiba told newsmen that there would be an exchange of industrial and trade teams to explore the prospect of establishing joint ventures, particularly assembly plants for commercial vehicles and other allied industries.

During his visit, the Tunisian Foreign Minister signed a Cultural Pact. The agreement, signed by Union Education Minister V.K.R.V. Rao on behalf of India, seeks to strengthen Indo-Tunisian relations in the educational, scientific and cultural fields. There will be an exchange of teachers, research workers and students between the two countries. They would also make available to each other literary, artistic and scientific books, journals and films.

The Indian Education Minister accepted the invitation of Mr Bourguiba to visit Tunisia. It was also agreed that the Tunisian Education Minister would visit India to study its educational system.

**Mauritius Health Minister's Visit :** The Health Minister of Mauritius, Mr K. Jagat Singh, paid a three-day visit to India in the first week of May. He held talks with Government leaders and officials and others connected with Mauritius affairs. The visiting Minister sought Indian assistance for his country in the field of family planning and requested India to reserve some seats in its medical institutions for students from Mauritius. He also suggested that India set up an institute of Indian culture in his country. The institute, Mr Jagat Singh felt, would help the growing generation in Mauritius—the majority of whom were of Indian descent—in understanding its cultural background. Indian officials assured the Mauritius Minister of all necessary assistance and offered training facilities to medical personnel from Mauritius.

**UAR Health Minister's Visit :** UAR Health Minister Abdo Sallam recently paid a week's official visit to India. Talks were held with Mr K.K. Shah, Union Minister for Health and Family Planning, regarding the problems of family planning. Dr. Sallam indicated his country's plans to embark on an ambitious family planning programme in the near future. The UAR population, at present 30 million, was increasing at the rate of one million annually, he said. The Indian Government assured all co-operation and assistance to the UAR's health programmes.

**Dinesh Singh's Cairo Visit :** Union Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh arrived in Cairo on July 7 for a two-day visit. On his way to the United States for an official visit, the Foreign Minister held talks with UAR Foreign and Economic Ministry officials. The grave situation in the UAR, the possibility of increasing Indo-UAR co-operation, and the general West Asian situation figured in the discussions.

**AICC President Visits Cairo :** Mr. S. Nijalingappa, Congress President, visited Cairo in May. He was accompanied by the Party General Secretary, Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma, and held talks with President Nasser and other senior UAR Government officials.

**Sanjeeva Reddy's UAR Visit :** The former Speaker of India's Lok Sabha, Mr. Sanjeeva Reddy, paid a five-day visit to the UAR in the second week of June. In Cairo, he had talks with President Nasser on the latest developments in the Middle East, relations between India and the UAR, and also on proposals for a non-aligned summit meeting. Earlier, he held talks with his counterpart in the UAR, Mr. Habib Sukheri, on the recent political developments in the two countries.

**Khadilkar's African Tour :** At a Press conference in Poona on July 3, the Lok Sabha Deputy Speaker, Mr. R. K. Khadilkar, gave his impressions of his recent extensive tour of East African countries. African nations, he said, expected more positive Indian support for strengthening their hard-won freedom by reinforcing it economically. "They want industries and administrative and financial experts to help them in building up their economies and efficient infrastructures", he added.

The leaders of the liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea had suggested to him that there should be an independent centre in India to enlighten the Indian public about the activities of the liberation movements and also co-ordinate anti-colonial efforts. Apart from moral support material help was also required, "as their struggle is arduous and the nature of the colonial rule of the Portuguese Government quite different from that of the other colonial governments", he said,

Commenting on the reported anti-Indian feeling in Kenya, Mr. Khadilkar said

he believed that a certain amount of prejudice did exist in that country, but it was directed towards business circles. "Notwithstanding this, President Jomo Kenyatta, with whom I had an enlightened discussion, wants to remove the prejudice", he added.

**African Leaders' Tribute to Zakir Husain :** African leaders paid glowing tributes to the late President Zakir Husain whom they described as a noble son of India.

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, in his message of condolence, said Dr. Zakir Husain was "a man deeply touched by humanity". He showed his qualities of leadership in the bold and revolutionary agrarian reforms he inspired. In Tanzania President Julius Nyerere said : "Dr. Husain's election to the Presidential office in 1967 was the culmination of a long service to the people of his country. His wise counsel will be sadly missed."

President Nasser expressed sincere condolences at "this painful incident." President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya said both as an educationist and a devoted servant of the nation Dr. Husain served India with distinction. In Algiers, President Boumedienne commented that Dr. Husain belonged to a succession of Indian leaders who had done much for the cause of peace and progress. "Algeria still remembers with emotion this wise, modest and honest man who was inspired by the highest moral and humanitarian values". Messages of sympathy were also received from President Hastings Banda of Malawi who paid tributes to the untiring efforts of the Indian leader for world peace and the welfare of the Indian people. Others who sent messages included the Ghana National Liberation Council, and the Chairman of the Supreme Council of State of Sudan, Mr. Ismail el-Azhari.

**Trade Agreement with UAR Signed :** India signed a new trade agreement with UAR on August 5, which envisages a sizable increase in trade for the current year amounting to exchanges of the value of Rs 73 crores as against Rs. 50 crores in 1968. The agreement followed talks between a UAR trade delegation led by Mr. Ibrahim el-Desouki Imam, Director-General of the Ministry of Economic and Foreign Trade, and an Indian delegation headed by the Director of Foreign Trade, Mr S.K. Singh.

**Air Pact with UAR Ratified :** India and the UAR ratified an Air Services Agreement on July 4 in New Delhi. The exchange of instruments of ratification between Mr. Ashok Mitra, Secretary in the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation, and the UAR Ambassador, Mr. M. Amin Hilmy, was the result of an agreement signed earlier between the two countries in Cairo in February. The capacity and frequency of air services between the two countries will be subject to approval by the contracting parties under the new agreement.

**UAR Seeks Indian Assistance :** Union Minister for Industrial Development Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed informed the Lok Sabha in May that the UAR had sought India's assistance for setting up an ancillary Industrial Estate at Helwan, near Cairo, for the manufacture of motor parts and components for automobiles and bicycles, and also another Industrial Estate at Mansoura. The requests are under consideration.

**UAR University Rectors' Talks with Education Officials :** In New Delhi in June, Dr. Mohammad Mursi Ahmed, Rector, Cairo University, and Dr. Hasan



Ahmed Baghdadi, Rector, Alexandria University, held talks with officials of the Ministry of Education and called on the Vice-Chancellor of the Nehru University, Mr. G. Parthasarathy. They exchanged views on the educational set-ups of the UAR and India, the question of 'brain drain' which affected both the countries, and the possibility of co-operation in the production of text-books.

**STC to Set Up Textile Mill in UAR:** The State Trading Corporation of India will set up a textile mill in Alexandria during the current year under a contract valued at Rs. 4.7 crores for the supply of textile machinery concluded recently. The mill, with a capacity of 70,000 spindles, is part of a package deal. The STC is now negotiating a second contract with the UAR for the supply of textile machinery valued at Rs. 2.4 crores.

**New Trade Agreement with Sudan :** Early in July in Khartoum, India and the Sudan signed a new trade agreement for the year 1969-70, envisaging a trade exchange to the tune of £30 million (Rs. 54 crores). This represents a 50% increase in Indo-Sudanese trade which, during April-December 1968, was of the order of Rs. 29 crores both ways. The principal items of Indian exports to the Sudan are tea, cotton piecegoods, jute manufactures, railway equipment, machinery etc. Import from the Sudan is mainly of raw cotton.

Under the new agreement concluded by a four-member Indian delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. Ram Sewak Yadav, the State Trading Corporation will supply the Sudan with railway wagons and underframes worth Rs. 1 crore and jute goods of the value of Rs. 25 lakhs. The delegation also studied the possibilities of extended economic co-operation and joint ventures between the two countries.

**India Signs Pact with Ethiopia :** India and Ethiopia signed in Addis Ababa on June 2 an agreement for technical, economic and scientific co-operation. It provides for both the countries to "facilitate and promote all forms of technical, economic and scientific co-operation which they feel are useful to their respective countries".

**Aid to Ghana :** India is to train Ghanaian railway officers at the Indian Railway Schools at Poona and Secunderabad. This assurance was given to the General Manager of the Ghana Railways, Mr. G.K.B. Graft Johnson, when he visited India recently on a six-week observation-cum-study tour of Indian Railways. According to a Press release the Ghanaian official was impressed by the quality of rolling-stock produced by railway workshops in India and considered them as good as those produced in Europe and America.

**Nigerian Purchase of Indian Blades :** Nigeria's import of razor blades from India increased from Rs. 109,565 in April-December 1967 to Rs. 377,887 in the corresponding period of 1968. Nigeria was India's biggest customer of razor blades during the period.

**Somalia to Celebrate Gandhi Centenary :** The Somali Government is to organise an intensive programme for the Gandhi Centenary. Apart from lectures, seminars and talks on the life and teachings of Gandhi the Government is to issue a postage stamp of the value of 35 shillings on October 2 and also proposes to name a prominent road after the Indian leader.

**Gandhi Centenary Celebrations in Malawi:** Gandhi Centenary celebrations were held in Malawi under the exalted patronage of H. E. the President, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda. Africans, Europeans and Indians participated in the inauguration ceremony at which Mr. M. M. Khurana, Indian Ambassador, personally introduced the main speaker, His Worship the Mayor of Blantyre/Limbe, Mr. J. G. Kamwendo. The President sent his Minister of State, Mr. A. A. Muwalo, to read a personal message from him. The Malawi Broadcasting Corporation broadcast excerpts from this programme and held a special seminar on Gandhiji and his teachings. The seminar was held under the chairmanship of an African member of the University Staff, and the participants were a European missionary, an Indian Professor of History from the University of Malawi and Mr. Khurana.

**India's Second Submarine Docks at Matadi:** India's second submarine, *Kanderi*, and the submarine tender *Amba* docked recently at Matadi, Congo's port on the Atlantic seaboard. Congo President Joseph Mobutu paid a visit to the Indian naval vessels. In his address to the officers of the vessels, President Mobutu said the peoples of his country would never forget the part played by India in helping them to bring about internal stability and national unity to the Congo Republic.

**Indian Puppets Participate in Tunisian Festival:** A twelve-member troupe of the Bharatiya Kala Mandal, an institution famous for its puppet shows, participated in an International Folk Art Festival in Tunisia in July. The troupe also gave performances in various parts of the country.

**Nehru Award for Accra Student:** An architectural undergraduate student of Ghana was declared winner in an essay competition on Jawaharlal Nehru sponsored by the Indian Association of Accra and Kumasi. The student, Botwe, was awarded the Nehru Award for the year 1968-69. A set of books on Nehru was also presented to him.

**Diplomatic Changes and Appointments:** India's new Ambassador to Morocco, Mr. Gurbachan Singh, presented his credentials on April 30. He is concurrently assigned as India's Ambassador to Tunisia and presented his credentials to President Bourguiba in July. Mr. Inder Jeet Bahadur Singh, India's Ambassador-designate to the UAR, has concurrently been accredited as India's Ambassador to Libya with residence at Cairo.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced in June that Mr. K.L. Dalal, Consul-General in Saigon, had been appointed India's Ambassador to the Sudan.

The new Indian Ambassador to Ghana, Mr. A.S. Mehta, arrived in Accra on May 28.

Mr. Dileep Shankarrao Kamptekar, Director in the External Affairs Ministry, has been appointed India's High Commissioner to Mauritius.

In India, Mr. Yokosafati Engur, Ambassador to the USSR since 1964, took over as High Commissioner for Uganda.

## ORGANISATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

**OAU Celebrates Sixth Anniversary:** On the occasion of its sixth anniversary on May 25, the Secretary-General of the OAU, Mr. Diallo Telli, issued a new

appeal for "a united struggle to rid the continent of the Salisbury-Pretoria-Lisbon axis". The anniversary slogan, he said, was: "One free and united Africa, from Algiers to the Cape, from Dakar to Nairobi".

Statements of African governments and leaders condemned the Rhodesian constitutional proposals and reaffirmed support for the slogan of African liberation. In a nationwide radio and television address on the eve of Africa Day, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia said all independent African states were "duty bound to do all in their power to assist those Africans (freedom fighters) to achieve their independence and freedom. Africans under colonial and racist rule are fully aware that independence cannot and will not be attained by peaceful means. Force is the only language that colonial and racist regimes understand." To this end, the Emperor called upon the independent African states to render more assistance to African freedom fighters engaged in an "armed struggle" in Southern Africa. President Milton Obote of Uganda dismissed the statements of racist regimes, describing "enslaved" Africans as enjoying a higher standard of living than their independent brethren, as a mere smokescreen. The non-implementation of the UN resolutions for the liberation of South West Africa, the President said, was a reflection of the powerlessness of the permanent members of the Security Council who had allowed South Africa to flout UN decisions.

In an editorial comment, the *Kenya Daily Nation* on May 26 recalled the very trying period in the "short and rugged" history of the OAU which had seen the fall of five independent African governments and the takeover by the military in Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Nigeria, Ghana, and Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. It, however, believed that in spite of its failures, which tend to eclipse its successes with ease, the OAU is still the best centre for Africa's hope for unity and advancement. African unity has been rightly described as such an irresistible force that no independent African nation dare remain on its sidelines. The organisation is growing wiser and more realistic with age, and though situations have arisen to warrant radical treatment, not a single proposal has been made concerning a member's expulsion, and the Afro-Malagasy Joint Organisation (OCAM) and Monrovia groups continue to find more trust and brotherhood under its tutelage".

**Liberation Committee Holds 15th Session in Dakar:** The fifteenth session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU opened on July 15. Represented at the session were Algeria, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Uganda, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, and the UAR, representatives of the General Secretariat of the OAU and members of the national liberation movements. The Committee made a general survey of policy, defence allocations and administration. Military experts of the OAU studied reports given by the military commanders of most of the African liberation movements, reviewed the military situation within the movements and drew up plans for a new strategy and improved methods. The Executive Secretary of the Committee said that this would be submitted to the OAU Council of Ministers and, if adopted, would have a "very important effect".

The Liberation Committee also decided to propose to the OAU Council of Ministers that the Organisation withhold all support from the Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA), led by Mr. Holden Roberto, until it dropped its claim to represent the Angolan Provisional Government in Exile (GRAE). Instead, it advised that it increase aid to the rival Angolan liberation organisation—the Angola Peoples Liberation Front (MPLA)—which, it said, had carried out splendid social, political, health

and educational work in the liberated areas. These areas had been recently visited by the members of the OAU Military Commission composed of representatives of Algeria, Congo Republic, UAR, OAU Secretariat and other African observers. The Dakar session reiterated its confidence in the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) which, according to Magombe—the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee—was “the only serious movement struggling against the Portuguese troops in that country”.

**African Cultural Festival :** Saharan horsemen in traditional multi-coloured robes and African freedom fighters in khaki uniforms paraded through the streets of Algiers to mark the opening of the first Pan-African Cultural Festival. At the opening ceremony at the Palais des Nations, a seaside conference centre near Algiers, President Boumedienne referred to the festival as the greatest assembly of arts and letters ever held on the African continent. He said its purpose was to make the arts an instrument of social revolution.

The President is at present chairman of the OAU which sponsored the festival.

The OAU Secretary-General, Mr. Diallo Telli, said the festival would be decisive in the effort of “rehabilitation” that had been under way in all fields.

The first delegation leader to speak at the opening ceremony was the Nigerian Federal Information Commissioner, Chief Anthony Enahoro. Observers saw this fact as unofficially recognising and confirming the importance of Nigeria in the African family, and also the support given to Lagos in its civil war with Biafra by the majority of member states of the OAU.

—*East African Standard*, July 23.

**Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission Meets in Addis Ababa :** Representatives from 28 African states—Algeria, Berundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, UAR, UR Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia—participated in the first meeting of the new Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission of the OAU in Addis Ababa from June 30 to July 3. The delegates discussed the problems of education and teacher training at all levels in Africa ; prevention and control of contagious diseases ; nutrition problems ; teaching of applied science and utilisation of energy for development. The Commission was established following the recent reorganisation of the OAU structure merging together several specialised agencies.

**Co-operation Agreement Signed with UNHCR :** In Geneva, on June 13, the Secretary-General of the OAU and Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), signed an agreement providing for “close co-operation and regular consultations” between the two organisations on the problems of refugees in Africa. The main provisions of the agreement (consultation, reciprocal representation at meetings, exchange of information, documentation and technical co-operation) have already been applied over the last four years, was the outcome of a UN General Assembly resolution stressing the importance of promoting co-operation between the OAU and the UN. Several resolutions of the OAU conferences of the Heads of the State and Governments had also supported the idea.

## ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA

**FED Aid to African Countries:** The European Economic Community's Development Fund (FED) announced in May financial aid for new projects in overseas territories totalling \$26,900,000, of which \$15,400,000 is in the form of non-repayable donations and \$11,500,000 as special loans. The latest projects to be financed in Africa are the building of high-tension power lines in the Congo DR; a 70-Kilometer road in Gabon; the Nola River Project in Central African Republic; introduction of tea-growing in Rwanda; water-supply piping in Bamako, Mali; and an agriculture and stock-rearing training centre in Somalia.

In June FED allocated a further non-repayable aid of \$15 million for projects in Africa. This brings to a total of \$617,148,000 the money invested by the Fund since it started operations in 1964. Senegal is to receive \$7 million, as the fifth annual instalment of its production aid; Mali \$537,000 for tobacco growing; Niger for school administration \$640,000, the Fort Lamy Hospital in Chad \$243,000; agricultural studies and administration in Madagascar \$445,000; and handicrafts developments in Cameroon \$481,000.

A contract has also been concluded between the European Economic Community and the Cameroon Railway Company for the grant of a special loan of \$1.4 million. FED also approved aid of 115 million CFA francs to Chad for production and a non-repayable aid to Dahomey of 239.29 CFA francs.

**ECA's Executive Committee Meets in Addis Ababa:** The Executive Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) held a five-day meeting in Addis Ababa from July 1. The Committee adopted several measures intended to reorganise the Commission with the object of further "Africanising" it. It was agreed to decentralise the UN technical aid programme in Africa and it was proposed that the structure and composition of the sub-regional groups be revised to include "dependent" African territories—Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea and Namibia. The Committee suggested that Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius and Swaziland be considered a distinct sub-region.

Commenting on the ECA's report to its parent body—the UN Economic and Social Council—*West Africa* said the proposals arose out of disillusionment with the result of the UN efforts in the first Development Decade. It claimed that the theme of the report was the strengthening of the ECA so that it "concentrates more on action-oriented programmes . . . rather than being regarded merely as an "academic institution". The paper went on to say that this involves "a departure from the traditional approach of the UN system to the solution of the problems of developing Africa", including the suggested need for the motivation in development to be generated from within the continent itself, because Africa's own problems could best be tackled by Africans.

*West Africa*, July 12

**Yaounde Convention Renewed:** A new Convention of Association was agreed on between the six European Economic Community (EEC) countries and the 18 Associated African and Malagasy States (EAMA) at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxemburg on June 29. The new agreement, which will be signed, in Yaounde, will come into being as soon as it is ratified by the Parliaments of all the 24 countries concerned. African insistence on an early date so that

financial aid is spread over as short a period as possible, led to an agreement that the convention would expire by January 31, 1975, at the latest. European Development Fund (FED) aid over this period is to total \$900 million while the European Investment Bank will extend \$100 million by way of loans. France and West Germany will contribute \$298,500,000 each, while Italy will contribute \$140,600,000, Belgium and Holland \$80 million each, and Luxemburg \$2.4 million. Within the overall aid total the convention has provided for a special Disaster Fund to help those among the Eighteen hit by exceptionally severe falls in world prices for their exports. There would also be 50% advantage for African companies from the associates bidding for Community-financed projects and a stipulation that companies from two EEC countries must participate in projects of over \$5 million.

Commenting on the second "Yaounde Convention", *Le Monde* observed in an editorial that this is objectively less attractive to the African partners than the preceding one. Most of all they regret the absence of any effective mechanism to support the prices of raw materials. The lack of a stabilisation fund, it continued, will have a most serious effect in countries such as Senegal, Chad and Somali with a one-crop dependency.

*Le Monde*, June 30

**Negotiations for New Arusha Convention Completed:** Members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the three East African countries—Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania—completed negotiations for a new Association Treaty at Brussels on July 10. The treaty, to be signed at Arusha, Tanzania, in September and later ratified by the nine concerned countries, provides for duty-free entry into the Common Market for all East African goods, and grants Community quotas for three "sensitive" agricultural products—raw coffee, cloves, and preserved pineapples. The tariff-free coffee quota for the East Africans has been increased from 42,000 tons in 1968 to 56,000 tons a year under the new treaty. In return for these concessions the East Africans give to the Community modest "reverse preferences" on their own markets.

The agreement will have the same expiry date, January 31, 1975, as the Yaounde Convention between the European Economic Community and its French-speaking African associates concluded in June. The new Arusha Convention, as it is being called, replaces an earlier treaty which was signed at Arusha in July 1968 but never came into force, as four of the six European members never ratified it.

*Financial Times*, London, July 11

**Africa-West Germany Trade Increases :** Trade between West Germany and Africa rose by 12% in 1968 to more than 10,500 million DM. Goods worth 4,060 million DM were sold to Africa compared to 3,650 million DM in 1967. German imports of crude oil, particularly from Libya, rose to the unprecedented level of 6,880 million DM as against 5,770 million DM in the previous year.

Figures over the last ten years indicate that West Germany's imports from Africa have trebled, while its exports have doubled. Investments by private West German firms in Africa (excluding South Africa) totalled 730 million DM at the end of 1968, compared with a total 14,000 million DM for the entire world. Half of West German private investments in Africa are in the oil and mining industries.

## UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

**UN Decolonisation Committee Holds Meetings in Africa :** The United Nations Decolonisation Committee of 24 members held meetings in Africa from May 5 to 23. Sessions were organised in Kinshasa, Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam to collect evidence for the ultimate decolonisation of the non-self-governing peoples. In Kinshasa (Congo DR) the Committee was addressed by the leader of the Angola Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE), Mr. Holden Roberto, and leaders of the rival movements who explained their difficulties in their struggle against the Portuguese. Winding up the session, the Foreign Minister of the Congo DR, Mr Justin Bomboko, called upon the leaders of the liberation movements to form a united front. He emphasised that failures in this regard had contributed to the difficulties of the liberation movements.

In Lusaka, where the Committee met from May 10 to 17, it received petitions from the SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). SWAPO's petition pointed out the failure of the UN mission again to take over South West Africa and the creation of a Bantustan there. It said that a parliamentary bill had made Namibia virtually a fifth province of South Africa. The petition, as also of ZANU, charged the Western "imperialist" countries with supporting the racist regimes of Southern Africa, and with frustrating the efforts of the Afro-Asian members of the world body to take action in these areas. Also presented to the conference was an appeal by Mr. Paul Goman, representative of the Revolutionary Committee from Mozambique (COREMO). He called upon the UN to apply the General Assembly resolutions more efficiently. He also appealed to Portugal's allies to refrain from supplying arms to Portugal.

At its Dar-es-Salaam session, beginning from May 19, the Committee was apprised of the developing crisis created by Britain's failure in Rhodesia, the use of massive force by Portugal to perpetuate its domination of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, and the outright defiance of the UN by South Africa. The Secretary-General of the Liberation Committee of the OAU, Mr. Georges Magombe, who attended as an observer, condemned the U.S. and the U.K. for boycotting the African tour of the Committee. He said the fact that they "stayed away is just one indicator that they do not wish to relinquish their colonies". Certain proposals were made to the Committee at this meeting by Mr. Uria Simango, a member of the Presidential Council of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). An invitation to visit the liberated areas of Mozambique on a fact-finding mission was extended to the Committee. Other proposals put forward by Mr. Simango included one on the establishment of a special Mozambique Development and Aid Fund by the UN. Mr. Simango explained that this would enable FRELIMO to effect national reconstruction and development in the liberated areas.

*Compiled from Africa Research Bulletin, London.*

**Decolonisation Committee's Resolution on Portugal:** The UN Decolonisation Committee on June 24 adopted a resolution on Portugal which repeated its earlier call to all the states, particularly Portugal's military allies in the NATO, to stop military aid to Portugal. The resolution mentioned that the continuation of the aid "encourages that government to continue its repression of the African peoples in the territories under its domination". The Committee also reiterated its appeal to all the specialised agencies (like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund) to refrain from granting econo-

mic, financial or technical assistance to Portugal as long as it did not implement the General Assembly resolutions. It called upon the Security Council to take immediate steps to make its resolutions on the question mandatory.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 16 to 2 (USA and UK), with three abstentions (Italy, Ivory Coast and Norway); Sierra Leone and Ecuador were absent.

**Security Council Censures Portugal:** The Security Council on July 28 censured Portugal for its attack on a Zambian village near the Mozambique border earlier in the month and warned that any further incidents would be met with stronger action. The Council Resolution called on Portugal to "desist from violating the territorial integrity and from carrying out unprovoked raids against Zambia." The Portuguese Government was also asked to release and repatriate immediately all civilians from Zambia kidnapped from Angola and Mozambique and to return all properties unlawfully captured by the members of the Portuguese military forces from Zambian territory. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 11, with the U.S., UK, France and Spain abstaining.

**UNHCR Extends Assistance to Refugees:** The Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, in its programme for 1969, approved extensive allocations to rehabilitate refugees on the African continent. The programme allocated \$300,000 to the Central African Republic for the settlement of Sudanese refugees in M'Boki; \$876,000 to the Congo (DR) to rehabilitate Sudanese, Angolan and Zambian refugees; \$35,000 to Morocco for the settlement of a group of European refugees; to Senegal \$100,000 to strengthen its health and education services for individual assistance; to the Sudan \$820,000 for refugees from Ethiopia and Congo; \$235,000 to Tanzania for use for refugees from Mozambique and Rwanda; to Uganda \$523,000 for settlement programmes for Sudanese and Congolese refugees; and \$260,000 to Zambia to rehabilitate Angolan refugees.

*Daily Nation, May 23*

**ECOSOC Votes on Trade Union Rights:** On June 6, the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution on trade union rights in South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. It called on South Africa to establish accepted international standards pertaining to freedom of association; condemned it for infringing trade union rights and decided on a series of measures to ensure freedom for trade unions in Namibia. Britain was requested to check further infringement of trade union rights in Rhodesia and international trade union organisations were asked to support trade unionists in South Africa. The Council also requested the International Labour Organisation to prepare a report on trade union rights in the Portuguese colonies.

**UNESCO Help for African History:** African historians, meeting under the auspices of the UNESCO in Paris, decided on the preparation of a general history of Africa. Based on the interdisciplinary method, the book will include contributions from sociologists, anthropologists, archaeologists, linguists, religious specialists and economists, with special attention on the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. An international commission would select the authors. African countries have also agreed to contribute towards the cost of the book. To be written or originally in French and English, the book is likely to be translated into some African languages.



## NON-ALIGNED MEET IN BELGRADE

In Belgrade, a Consultative Conference of non-aligned countries was held from July 8 to 12. African countries (27 of them) constituted the majority of the participants. The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Mijta Ribicic, impressed upon the gathering that the influence of non-alignment had not diminished. He said that though there was no immediate threat to peace, pressures of all kinds were being exerted against the independence of the non-aligned countries, from both inside and outside the rival blocs.

A communique, released immediately after the conference on July 12, called upon all states committed to the policy of non-alignment (especially those which achieved independence after the Cairo Conference of 1964) and all member states of the OAU to participate in the future conferences of the non-aligned countries. The conference also pledged its support to the national liberation movements in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. It also voiced its unqualified support for the Palestinians struggling for liberation from colonialism and racialism. The conference renewed its opposition to the seizure of lands through war and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Arab territories occupied since June 4, 1967.

## EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

**East African Community Heads of State Meeting :** The East African Authority, the Governing Body of the East African Community, composed of Presidents Kenyatta of Kenya, Obote of Uganda, and Nyerere of Tanzania, met in Nairobi from May 9 to 11. In a communique it stated that from June 1 the East African Railways and the Harbours Corporation would be separated, the Railway having its headquarters in Nairobi and the Harbours Corporation in Dar-es-Salaam. The Authority also instructed the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation to complete its move from Nairobi to Kampala by the end of 1969. Amendment of part of the Treaty of East African Corporation led to an increase in the composition of the Communications Council, which will now have 12 members instead of the six at present.

The Nairobi meeting of the Authority was the fifth since the inauguration of the Community in December 1967 and the first in 1969.

*East African Standard*, May 12

**Equatorial African States Ministers' Meeting :** A ministerial meeting of the Equatorial African Heads of States Conference was convened in Libreville in June. Gabonese Minister of State for Agriculture Jean Marc Ekoh said that since its creation in 1959 the Conference was the only African organisation which had adapted itself to "all the circumstances attached to the evolution of the African continent's economic and political institutions". In a final communique the meeting, which groups Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Republic and Gabon, expressed its "unanimous desire for active co-operation within common organisations in the overriding interest of the people".

**Communications System Improved :** On May 28, President Kenyatta of Kenya laid the foundation-stone of Extelcoms House, the Nairobi headquarters of

the East African External Telecommunications Company to be built at a cost of £ 525,000. The new Extelcoms headquarters building will house the most modern communications equipment in the whole of Africa enabling a constant flow of data and swifter links with world centres. It will also help education through the setting up of television receivers linked through this local satellite system.

The Chairman of Extelcoms, Mr John Keto, revealed that the new station would also send and receive messages to and from satellite earth station being built in Rift Valley. The Company would beam messages from the station to a satellite in a stationary orbit above the Indian Ocean. For this purpose, 32 of the satellite's 1,200 channels would be leased—21 to Britain, 8 to India, and one each to West Pakistan, Hongkong and Nigeria. The Chairman also hoped that a second earth station in East Africa would be set up by 1975.

*Daily Nation*, May 29

**Eban Visits East African Countries :** Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban made an official visit to East Africa towards the end of June. He had talks with President Milton Obote of Uganda, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. At a Press conference in Kampala, Mr Eban called on African leaders to help bring peace to the Middle East. African leaders, he said, ought to emphasize that the very essence of sovereignty was the responsibility of every state for the settlement of conflicts in which it is involved.

*Uganda Argus*, June 28

## ETHIOPIA

**Emperor's Visit to the United States :** Emperor Haile Selassie paid a five-day official visit to the U.S. from July 7. Talks were held with President Nixon and the Secretary of State, Mr Rogers, on U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, mutual trade, and international affairs. A White House spokesman said later the President had expressed his support for Ethiopia's efforts in the field of security and economic progress and that he had appreciated Ethiopia's conciliatory moves in the Nigeria-Biafra war. A discussion of the Middle East situation and Ethiopia's recent rapprochement with Israel brought to the fore its possible role as an intermediary in the dispute between Israel and the Arabs.

**President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani's Visit :** President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani of the Yemen Arab Republic paid a five-day official visit to Ethiopia from June 24. A joint communique issued on June 30 said the two Heads of State, discussed the international situation and problems confronting Afro-Asian countries. They emphasised the need to encourage a settlement of the Middle East crisis in accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 1967.

**German Aid for Road Construction :** The Government of West Germany has advanced a loan of 87.4 Ethiopian dollars for the construction of the Dilla-Moyale road. The 400-kilometer road from Dilla, in Sidamo, to the Ethiopian-Kenyan border town of Moyale is part of the new Addis Ababa-Nairobi Highway.

## KENYA

**Tom Mboya Assassinated :** Mr Tom Mboya, Minister for Economic Planning and Development, was shot dead on July 5 by an unknown gunman in one of Nairobi's main shopping streets. The assassin shot him as he was leaving a pharmacy store

and then, reportedly, escaped in a car. Mr Mboya was immediately rushed to hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

A Luo, 38-year-old Mboya was one of Kenya's most able and brilliant leaders. He was an uncompromising nationalist and an avowed anti-tribalist. In a continent that has seen turmoil in the Congo, a dozen coups in the last five years, anti-Arab troubles in Zanzibar and anti-Negroid troubles in Southern Sudan, Mboya's sincere efforts to de-tribalise politics in Kenya were commendable. He and the late Argwings-Kodhek were two of the very few members of the Luo tribe who remained loyal to Mr Kenyatta and refused to join fellow tribesman Oginga-Odinga in the opposition. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), to which Mboya belonged, is dominated by the Bantu Kikuyu tribal group. Mr Mboya was one of the first eight Africans to be elected to the former Legislative Council in 1957 as member for Nairobi area and was returned as KANU member for Nairobi East in the general election of February 1961. In the 1963 general elections he was again returned as KANU member for Nairobi Central, becoming Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs when Kenya attained self-government on June 1 of that year. On becoming a Republic on December 12, 1964, Mr Mboya was appointed to head a newly constituted Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. He had also been Secretary-General of KANU from its inception in June 1960 until his death.

Tributes were paid to the African leader and many messages were received from all parts of the world. President Kenyatta described Mr Mboya as an uncompromising champion of Kenya's struggle for independence, and freedom of the African continent. He said Mr Mboya was "adamantly, ceaselessly, and courageously reinforcing the efforts of those who had started the struggle for the emancipation of his people in Kenya as well as our brothers throughout the continent of Africa. He was a mature political leader who never involved himself in petty parochial matters. The part he played in welding the Kenya nation is invaluable and will remain an inspiration to all of us. Rarely, in all my life, have I come across a man who was prepared to devote so much of his time and energy to the service of his nation and the welfare of mankind."

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in a message of condolence to Mrs. Pamela Mboya, expressed her grief, and said: "His untimely death is not only a loss to Kenya but to the Afro-Asian community. His significant role in the freedom struggle of his country will be a source of inspiration to future generations".

The U.S. President, Mr Nixon, in a statement said: "We deplore the senseless act of violence against an outstanding African leader who has contributed so greatly to the building of the Kenyan nation and to the solution of the problem of developing Africa". Australia's Prime Minister, Mr John Gorton, described Mr Mboya as a dynamic and dedicated leader of his people.

African Heads of State expressed the loss Mr Mboya's death had caused to the continent and deplored the violence involved in it. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia commented that "Kenya and Africa have lost a brilliant and dedicated son". To President Milton Obote the assassination "was an act that discounted the great achievement of the past and promise of the future". The Zambian President, Mr Kenneth Kaunda, regretted the day "when our brothers and sisters began to have recourse to an assassin's bullet in a continent which has always been famous for peace and love". He added that Africa's problem was a question of dedicated men willing to serve the continent and Mr Mboya's death had left a yawning gap in the field.

In Nairobi, the *Sunday Nation* in its editorial of July 6 headlined "The Horror and Shame" commented that the assassination "is a heinous black stain on Kenya's record for many many years to come. Thanks to Mboya himself, our economic progress has been one of the success stories of Africa. We are approaching an election which will give the people the absolute ultimate in democratic expression". The editorial, however, warned: "Yet somewhere we are weak if there are those who are prepared to resort to murderous means to alter the course of our society. We must search and find, for, if violence once seizes a hold on our way of life and its political processes, we are done for". On July 9, the *Daily Nation* warned against the obvious dangers of the deep feelings of anger, bitterness and grief which found expression in ancient tribal feelings. "We are", it said, "wise enough, experienced enough, to know just where this road takes us, or could take us. We have only to look around us for extreme examples of what is at the end of this road—Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria, Biafra".

The *Ghanaian Times* said that apart from the irreparable loss to Africa what was to be feared in Mboya's death was the dangerous trend which African politics seem to be following. Although it was premature to pin the motive, the nature of his death smacks of political manoeuvring. It also warned that Africa was entering a very dangerous year of political and social revolution with political assassinations that characterise a struggle to find the best form of governmental order for the continent.

*The Ghanaian Times*, July 7

*The Times*, London, ascribed to Mboya the qualities of a master tactician, "flexible, always ready to seize an opportunity, never permitting himself to be side-tracked. His skill in manoeuvring the white settlers of Kenya out of power was ruefully acknowledged even by themselves".

*The Times*, London, July 7.

Comments in the Indian press also unanimously condemned the violence involved in Mboya's assassination and indicated the loss to Africa. "The assassination", said the *National Herald*, "is the most shocking tragedy and the most ghastly event of a personal nature since the murder of Lumumba". Commending his high statesmanship and resourcefulness to rise above tribal and national loyalties, the paper said: "Mboya's career and sad end illustrate the tragedy of immaturity in politics, in which promise and performance count for nothing. African politics is tough and it may take some time for African peoples to emerge from tribalism to nationalism". The *Hindustan Times* in its editorial of July 8 paid glowing tributes to the youth and charm of Mboya. With his temperament for political longevity, the editorial expressed its surprise about his assassination. "The assassin has perhaps silenced a Luo contender for the seat of power, but the world will mourn with Kenya the passing of a most promising African leader". While finding it difficult to explain as to "what prompted the assassination of so controversial a person as Tom Mboya, the centre of many contentious feuds and disputes", the *Indian Express* on July 7 commented that his death would leave "an uncertain and uneasy void".

**Diplomats Expelled from Moscow:** The Kenya Government announced on May 4, the expulsion of its Second Secretary in the Moscow Embassy at 48 hours' notice. The move, the Government spokesman explained, had been expected after the expulsion of two Russians from Kenya in April. They were the First Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Nairobi and the *Pravda* correspondent in East Africa.

## SOMALIA

**New Government Formed :** Following the general election of March 24, which returned the ruling Somali Youth League with a majority, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Mohammed Haji Ebrahim Egal, formed a new Government on May 22.

On June 10, the Prime Minister submitted his Government's programme to the National Assembly. The programme emphasised the economic development of the country. He also dwelt on the issue of foreign policy and the problem of Somali territories. The main objective of the Government's policy on Somali territories under Kenya and Ethiopia, he said, was a solution of the problem. Though this could not bring about peace between the Somali Republic and her neighbours, it was necessary to secure from them the acceptance of the rights of Somali peoples in these territories to the exercise of their rights of self-determination. On the question of French Somaliland, Mr. Egal expressed the hope that the new French Government would implement the earlier understanding with the former President General de Gaulle.

The new programme was adopted after a confidence vote of 116 to 1 on June 19.

*Somali News*, June 13 and 20

**President Shermarke's Visit to the UAR :** The Somali President paid a two-day official visit to the United Arab Republic on July 10 and 11. In Cairo, he held talks with President Nasser following which a joint communique was issued on July 12. It said the two Presidents devoted an important part of their talks to considering the Middle East situation "which resulted from the Israeli aggression against the Arab countries". They believed that this danger threatened not only the security of the region but world peace. President Shermarke also reaffirmed his country's absolute support for the "just cause of the Arab states". The communique stated that both sides reaffirmed their faith in the OAU and expected continued support for the African peoples who were struggling for liberation from colonialism and racialism. In this context they strongly condemned the minority Governments in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. On the international situation, both the Presidents agreed that the policy of non-alignment had a vital role to play in easing international tension and providing the non-aligned peoples with the opportunity to reap the fruits of their efforts for development and advancement. Finally, President Nasser expressed satisfaction at Somali's new policy of relieving tension in the Horn of Africa and hoped that this would lead to permanent solution of the problems in the area.

**Ethiopian Delegation Discusses Border Security :** An Ethiopian delegation, led by the Minister of the Interior, held discussions with Somali officials in Mogadishu early in July to formulate ways of strengthening security between the two countries and setting up a machinery for settling mutual difficulties. The two countries agreed that they should take whatever measures were necessary to counter and reduce tensions at any time. They also agreed that in the event of any difficulty they would meet and resolve it mutually.

## TANZANIA

**TANU National Conference :** At its fourteenth National Conference, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) announced in Dar-es-Salaam on May 28 its Five-year Development Plan. Making the announcement, President Nyerere

said the Plan incorporated the five basic principles of the Arusha Declaration—social equality, Ujamaa, self-reliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration and expanded economic co-operation with neighbouring African states. It would, he said, effect major changes on the agricultural front and provide the guidelines for the implementation of socialism in Tanzania.

On June 7, at its closing session, President Nyerere called for a revolution. The historical task for Tanzania, he said, "is to make revolution here which, in the final analysis, means carrying out the African revolution". If the revolution in Tanzania succeeded, it would offer light to other African countries and "we Tanzanians would have fulfilled our duties to Africa".

*The Nationalist*, May 30 and June 9

At the conference, Mr. Nyerere and Mr. Kawawa were returned unopposed to their respective party posts of President and Vice-President. Mr. Nyerere has headed the Party since its founding in 1954, and Mr. Kawawa has been Vice-President since 1962. According to a new amendment to the TANU constitution all party leaders will hold office for five years instead of, as before, two years.

**TANU Calls for Abolition of Feudalism.** The Central Committee of the Tanganyika African National Union at its meeting at Hamdeni at the end of July resolved to call on the Government to enact a law to "wipe out all feudalistic legacies in Tanzania which allow for the existence of chiefs and sultans in the state of workers and peasants". Members stressed that the continuation of these "feudalistic" institutions were not compatible with the declared goals of Tanzania.

*The Nationalist*, July 30

**Rail Link with Zambia :** On June 13, President Nyerere stated that the construction of the 1,000-mile-long Tanzania-Zambia railway would be started in 1970. China, which is currently carrying out surveys, is to give £100 million for its construction.

*The Standard*, Tanzania, June 14

## UGANDA

**President Addresses International Students' Seminar :** At an International Students' Seminar at Makerere University College on June 9, President Obote emphasised the importance of nationalism and socialism. The guiding star in the Uganda freedom movement had been nationalism which was now being married to socialism.

**Bishops' Symposium at Gaba :** On July 28, the First All-African Bishops' Symposium was opened near Kampala. Attended by seven African Cardinals, 22 Archbishops and 10 Bishops representing 28 Catholic Episcopal Conferences throughout the continent, the symposium discussed the problems of missionary vocations, the urgent need for an official theology, the role of the Church in social and national development, relations between Bishops and mission institutes, African liturgy, ecumenism in Africa and contacts between French and English-speaking African states.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Ex-President to be Tried :** President Bokassa on June 23 called for the trial of the former President of the Central African Republic, Mr. Daoud Dacko, who was

overthrown on December 31, 1965. Mr. Dacko is to be tried on the charge that "he entered into relationship with certain powers in order to negotiate his release in return for control by these powers over CAR, thus casting into the balance national independence and economic progress".

## CHAD

**President Re-elected:** President Tombalbaye was re-elected President of Chad on June 15. The only candidate put forward by the single party, Chadian Progressive Party, President Tombalbaye secured 93% of the votes cast.

**President Tombalbaye's Visit:** President Tombalbaye paid an official visit to Cameroon during the first week of June. A meeting with President Ahidjo in Garna was followed by a communique which stated that bilateral co-operation in the field of trade and communication had been reinforced. The two Heads of State agreed to work together to strengthen co-operation and understanding in Central Africa,

## CONGO (DR)

**Congress of the Peoples Revolutionary Movement:** The second convention of the ruling Peoples Revolutionary Movement (MPR) opened in Kisangani on May 20. Presided over by President Mobutu, the convention was attended by Presidents Micombero of Burundi, Tombalbaye of Chad, Azhari of the Sudan, Obote of Uganda and Kaunda of Zambia. Also present were representatives from Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Tunisia.

*Agence France Presse* commented that through the convention President Mobutu "wanted to emphasize the nationwide and unitary character of the party. He also wants to give a boost to the economic revival of the Kisangani and Eastern provinces which were the worst hit during the calamities of 1960-1967". *Uganda Argus*, in its editorial of May 21, said the meeting was "an important occasion" symbolising the rebirth of politics in Congo which had been pushed to the background during the chaos following Congo's independence in 1960. It praised the role of the MPR since May 1967 and said the party "has a key role, and the Kisangani Convention is a sign of its confidence".

**Student Riots:** In Kinshasa on June 4, students of the Lovanium Catholic University organised a strike demanding bigger grants. The demonstration was banned and the entire route to the centre of the city cordoned off by armed forces. The students, however, refused to go back and police opened fire. Six students were killed and 12 wounded; two officers were reported missing and four soldiers seriously wounded; two police chiefs were taken to hospital badly burnt. Four hundred students were either arrested or held for questioning and the university was closed.

*Le Monde*, June 6

On June 12, at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Peoples Revolutionary Movement (MPR), General Mobutu announced a ban on all Congolese students'

organisations or associations. "Only the youth section of the MPR", he said, "will be competent to form a union to represent and defend the interest of Congolese peoples and students". The Political Bureau also decided that though the constitution allowed for two political parties, a second party was "superfluous" since the MPR was the expression of the "wish of the Congolese people to live in peace, concord, brotherhood and union".

*Le Monde*, June 14

**Regional Co-operation with Burundi and Rwanda :** In Bujumbura (Burundi) from June 10 to 12, a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Congo (DR), Rwanda and Burundi was held to consolidate relations among the three countries, to find solutions of their problems of development and to study possibilities of forming a regional grouping in accordance with the wishes of the OAU. Three commissions were formed, one under the responsibility of each of the participating countries : a Political and Juridical Commission (Congo), a Social and Cultural Commission (Rwanda) and an Economic, Financial and Technical Commission (Burundi). The conference proposed another meeting of the Foreign Ministers in October, preparatory to a meeting of the Heads of State to be held by the end of the year.

**Relations with USSR Improved :** The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Justin Bomboko, during a visit to Russia announced that "the Congo has decided to reopen friendly relations with the USSR." In turn, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, also made a statement : "To this end we are not considering ideological differences or differences in social systems. We are motivated by the wish for co-existence. We regard the Congo as playing an important role in Africa and we are ready to hold it to reaffirm its independence and unity". A joint communique issued in Moscow said that the two countries would explore ways of expanding their economic, trade and cultural links.

*Le Monde*, July 29

The relationship between the two countries have always been difficult. Broken off twice in 1960 and 1963 they were resumed in 1968.

**Collaboration with Japan :** A Congolese-Japanese joint enterprise to develop new copper resources in the Congo has been established in Lumumbashi. Called Societe de Developpement Industriel et Minier du Congo (Sodomico), it is to have 85% Japanese investment as against the Government's 15%. It is expected to start producing copper ore in October 1972. The ore will then be shipped to Japan for five Japanese non-ferrous metal firms which are investing in Sodomico.

**Japanese Firm to Lay New Railway :** *The Financial Times* (London) in a report on May 14 announced that a Japanese consulting firm, Pacific Consultants, had been commissioned to carry out feasibility tests for the laying of new railways across the Congo DR. They, along with a Belgian firm, would carry out detailed studies, and work out construction cost estimates, route location and geological studies.

## CONGO

**President Ngouabi's Visit to North Africa :** Major Marien Ngouabi, President of the Congo Republic, paid an official visit to Algeria and the United Arab Republic in May. In Algiers, at the end of his five-day visit, an official communique



issued on May 20 emphasized the "total identity of views between the two countries" on all international problems. President Ngouabi expressed his complete support for the Palestinian cause, North Vietnam and the African Liberation movements. President Boumedienne stated his country's readiness to extend co-operation with the Congo Republic and accepted an invitation to visit the country.

In Cairo, the Congolese President had discussions on the situation in Africa and on the Middle East crisis. He expressed his country's support for the struggle of the Arab people against "Israeli aggression" and the two sides pledged to stand by the cause of African liberation.

**Textile Factory Established :** The first textile factory in the country went into production recently after a two-year construction period. It has a capacity of four million metres of printed cloth and 150,000 undergarments per year.

## MALAWI

**Third Anniversary of the Republic Celebrated :** Early in July, Malawi held its Third Republic Anniversary celebrations. Speaking on the occasion, President Hastings Banda defended his country's relations with South Africa and Portugal. He said that denunciation was not the way to solve the problem of the black and the white. "I believe in dialogue between the black and the white. What is wrong with Vorster and Kamuzu meeting or Dr. Caetano and Kamuzu meeting?" He said black and white leaders might not agree but at least they could talk. This was why the Portuguese, White South Africans and White Rhodesians were welcome in Malawi.

The celebrations were attended by three Swaziland Cabinet Ministers, the Portuguese Governor of the Tete province in Mozambique, the President of the newly formed National Peoples' Union in Rhodesia and the leader of the African opposition in Rhodesia.

**Fishing Industry to be Expanded :** About £ 250,000 is to be spent on expanding Malawi's fishing industry. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) is to provide £ 153,720 ; the Danish Government £ 30,710 and the balance by the Malawi Government. The programme includes training of Malawians in the building, maintenance and operation of boats and engines, improved fishing techniques and the processing and marketing of fish.

## MAURITIUS

**Social Democratic Party Rejects Coalition :** The opposition Social Democratic Party on June 1 rejected the governing Labour Party's conditions for a coalition government. The main obstacle to this coalition, the Social Democratic Party explained, was the proposal to extend the life of the coalition by five years. The 70-member Assembly was elected in 1957, and, under the Constitution, the next elections are due to be held in 1972.

*Daily Nation, June 2*

**Prime Minister Visits Madagascar :** The Prime Minister of Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, made an official visit to Madagascar late in June. Talks

with President Tsiranana were followed by an "outright condemnation" of the recent Rhodesian referendum. The two Heads of State said the referendum "deliberately ignored the existence of millions of African men and women condemned to silence just because of the colour of their skin". They added that the two leaders had complete identity of views on international problems and on the development of political, economic and social links between their countries.

## ZAMBIA

**UNIP Wins Referendum :** President Kenneth Kaunda's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) won the national constitutional referendum held in June, polling more than half the electoral votes needed for approval of the proposals. These empower the Government to alter the entrenched clauses in the constitution by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. Under the Constitution agreed to with Britain in 1964, when Zambia became independent, the entrenched clauses of the Constitution could only be altered by an referendum. The Government said that its immediate aim was the problem of dealing with absentee foreign landlords who have left land underdeveloped, but who are at present protected by a clause on property rights.

**New Political Party Formed :** Former members of the banned United Party (UP) recently launched a new political organisation, the Zambia National Democratic Union (ZANDU). Led by a Lusaka farmer, Mr Judah Nkabita, who formerly belonged to the UP, the party called for "an acceptable democratic rule for the good of all safeguarding individual freedom of expression, association, movement and worship".

*The Standard, May 10*

**President Kaunda Tours West Africa :** President Kaunda in June toured West Africa. Starting from Lusaka on June 20, the President visited Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, Gabon, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast.

In Mauritania, after talks with President Ould Daddah, the two Heads of State issued a joint communique which indicated that each country would set up committees to study political, economic and social co-operation. They reaffirmed support for the liberation struggle in the Portuguese African territories and regions under colonial domination; condemned the Rhodesian "illegal regime" and described the recent referendum as valueless. "Only force could give the people of Zimbabwe their legitimate rights". On the question of the Middle East the two Heads of State denounced Israeli occupation of Arab territory and called on her to conform to the UN Security Council resolution of November 1967.

While in Guinea, President Kaunda met President Sekou Toure and the former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. The Zambian President supported Nkrumah and said that he regarded him as the legitimate President of Ghana. A joint communique at the end of the visit said that Zambia and Guinea would increase bilateral co-operation in the politics, economic matters and social and cultural affairs. To this end, the two leaders decided to increase "contacts and consultations" between the two countries. They also pledged to unite their efforts to build up the Organisation for African Unity.

In Libreville, Gabon, Presidents Kaunda and Bongo expressed an identity of views on the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. They indicated that they had no regret at

having recognised Biafra and that they believed that the present conflict could only be settled by negotiations and not through force of arms.

**Refugee Influx from Mozambique :** A Zambian Government announcement on June 19 indicated that about 900 refugees from Mozambique had entered the country. These refugees, the announcement said, had fled from the fighting between Portuguese troops and African guerillas. They were kept at the Nyimba camp, in the Eastern province. This brings the total number of refugees to 2,200

**New Tyre Factory Opened :** In Ndola, President Kaunda recently opened a new tyre factory. The factory will employ over 300 people and produce 90% of Zambia's requirements of tyres and tubes.

## WEST AFRICA

**Devaluation in Franc Zone :** Following France's 12.5% devaluation of July 9 the following 14 African states in the Franc Zone followed suit—Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon, Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Maurifania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Mali and Madagascar.

Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, the three North African countries linked with the zone, decided to maintain the parity of their currency. *Agence France Presse* commented that the devaluation will be felt in the North African countries in two ways: firstly, through the mass of money sent home each month by North African workers in France, and, secondly, because these nations have reserves in France.

*West Africa* commented that trade of the 14 is expected to be only slightly affected as France is still their largest trading partner. The French Finance Minister, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, however admitted that certain countries faced particular problems and said individual cases would be discussed when the franc zone Finance Ministers met in Paris on September 25 before the International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in Washington.

## CAMEROON

**Nurses' Training School Inaugurated :** In Bamenda on May 7, President Ahidjo inaugurated a training school for nurses.

The school, which has 50 seats, was built with aid from the European Development Fund.

## DAHOMEY

**Attempted Coup :** An attempted coup was reported from the capital, Cotonou, on July 23. In a communique the National Bureau for the Union and the Renewal of Dahomey reported that the conspirators had been surprised and arrested when they were about to commit the crime. Interrogation later led to the discovery of a conspiratorial network to disrupt the Army and the gendarmerie and seize the Head of the State.

## GHANA

**Draft Constitution Approved :** The Constituent Assembly after six months of discussion approved in July a Draft Constitution which would now go to the National Liberation Council (NLC) for consideration. After the NLC's approval the Constitution would be finally drafted and promulgated. This would be a major step in the direction of civilian rule in Ghana.

Analysing the Draft Constitution, *West Africa* commented that though earlier there was a possibility that the Constituent Assembly might have amended major sections of the proposals produced by the Constitution Commission, it had "in general approved them and the ideas behind them. And the ideas are the complete opposite of those animating Dr. Nkrumah's Republican constitution". It added : "Ghana is to have a constitution providing for a division of powers which places strong restraints on the Prime Minister and his Cabinet".

**Constitutional Proposals :** The Constituent Assembly decided on May 13 that any future Prime Minister or Minister of State or Ministerial Secretary would have to make a declaration in writing of his assets and liabilities to the President on his assumption of office. Later, on June 18, listing causes of disqualification of candidates to public office it provided that a Commission of Enquiry could judge a person to be incompetent to hold public office if, during that office, he "acquired assets unlawfully, defrauded the state, misused or abused his office or wilfully acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the state." Further, the Assembly also agreed that the Attorney-General should be a Minister of State and the principal legal adviser to the government. The National Assembly, it said, would consist of 140 active members.

*Ghanaian Times*, May 14 & June 20

**Air Marshal Otu Released :** Air Marshal Michael Otu, former Chief of Defence Staff, and his aide-de-camp, Lt. B.O. Kwapong, were released from house arrest on June 5. The Government withdrew its charge of alleged complicity in a subversive plot against two men after seven months' detention. Air Marshal Otu and Lt. Kwapong were arrested on November 28, 1968, and brought before the three-man Amissah Commission set up to investigate their involvement in the alleged plot.

## GUINEA

**Attempted Assassination :** A report from Conakry on June 27 stated that an attempt was made on the life of President Sekou Toure on June 24. The report said that while the people of Guinea were enthusiastically welcoming President Kaunda of Zambia, "an imperialist agent and traitor" rushed to President Toure's car. He was, however, overpowered by the President and lynched by the militant crowd on the spot.

**Army to be Reorganised :** President Toure announced early in June that the Guinean People's Army would be purged and reorganised. This had become necessary following the attempted military coup of March and would help eliminate from the army "elements whose presence was incompatible with Guinea's wish to radicalise its revolution".

## IVORY COAST

**Zambian President's Visit:** In the course of his tour of West Africa, President Kaunda paid a five-day official visit to the Ivory Coast from June 30. A joint communique issued after his talks with President Houphouët-Boigny stated that the two leaders had studied the relations between the two countries and reviewed major African and world problems in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding. The communique added that the two leaders had long discussions "concerning the fierce fratricidal war between Nigeria and Biafra." They said the peoples of their countries recognised Biafra as an independent and sovereign state. They reaffirmed "their conviction that this bloody conflict cannot be settled on the battlefield, but only through negotiations which should follow an unconditional ceasefire."

## MALI

**Frontier Demarcated :** A Mauritanian-Malian meeting was held in Bamako from June 1 to 3 to discuss the delineation of their common frontiers, the unspecified character of which constitutes a constant source of friction between the two countries. A joint communique issued after the talks indicated that means were found for the effective application of "the Treaty of Kayes".

**Relations with Guinea :** The Military Committee of the National Liberation (CMLN) issued early in July a statement denying the reported clashes between Malian and Guinean troops, "Our attitude towards our Guinean brothers has not changed", it said, and added "the insinuations and implications of Guinean leaders on Mali have done much to contribute to all kinds of speculations on the relations between the two states...In future, the quality of the ties of all kinds between the two peoples may not be affected by subjective considerations, and our interest is to preserve these ties from all vicissitudes".

*Dakar-Matin, July 4*

## NIGERIA

**Dispute with the International Red Cross :** Talks were held in July in Lagos between the Federal Nigerian Government and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr. Marshall Naville. A joint communique issued on July 13 after the talks stated that the Government would allow the ICRC to make "one emergency flight operation" to Biafra to take medicines to the Red Cross personnel there and to bring out others who had finished their contracts. Both sides agreed that "after discussions between the ICRC's technical experts" the date when Nigeria's Rehabilitation Commission would take over relief co-ordination work from the ICRC, as demanded by the Federal Government, would be determined. This transfer, the communique said, would be effected smoothly and without prejudicing the ICRC's continued performance of its traditional role of dispensing humanitarian services. Further, the ICRC, having noted the Federal Government's policy on relief flights to secessionist area, reaffirmed that the organisation would not enter Nigerian air space without the "authority and consent" of the Federal Government. The communique also said that Mr. Naville had urged the continuation of negotiations to find more effective and economic means to take

relief to the secessionist-held areas. The Federal Government in turn guaranteed the safety of the ICRC personnel in Federal areas and ICRC aircraft using agreed corridors.

*Nationlist*, July 13

The negotiations between the Federal Government and the ICRC followed a dispute between the two which had started early in June, when one of the relief planes was shot down by a Federal Nigerian fighter plane near Eket. The Federal Government in a statement issued on June 6 explained that this disaster would not have occurred if the ICRC had discontinued "night mercy flights in favour of daylight flights so that their identity could at no time be mistaken for Ojukwu's arms planes . . .". On June 14, the West African co-ordinator of the ICRC, Dr. Lindt, was declared persona-non-grata in Nigeria. Giving reasons for this action, the Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Arikpo, said Dr. Lindt had deeply involved himself in the politics of Nigeria contrary to the ethics and policies of his organisation. The Federal Government was now reviewing the position of the ICRC in the country as a whole.

Meanwhile in Geneva on June 18, the International Red Cross announced that Biafra had conditionally accepted daylight relief flights that would airlift medical and food supplies to Uli airport. This was the first time that Biafra had agreed to allow day flights. The day after, in a communique the International Red Cross expressed satisfaction at Biafra's decision and said that ways of getting the flights started would be studied as soon as possible with both sides.

The Federal Military Government which had meanwhile studied the arrangement for relief operations announced on June 30 strict new rules for all relief agencies operating within the country. To a gathering of representatives drawn from 20 relief organisations, the Federal Information Commissioner, Chief Enaharo, said: "Henceforth, only authorised relief operators who satisfy the Federal Government on the necessary details will be permitted to take relief supplies to the rebel-held territories". The ICRC was stripped of its functions as co-ordinator in helping victims of the war, and it was stated that from now on these functions would be taken over by the Nigerian National Rehabilitation Commission. All foreign governments and agencies aiding victims inside the Federal territory would have to work through the National Rehabilitation Commission. The latter would be strengthened and reorganised for its new task. The Nigerian Red Cross, which would be expected to play a more effective role, would also work under it, the Commissioner added.

**UN Appeal for Resumption of Relief Supplies:** On July 30, UN Secretary-General Thant appealed to Nigerian and Biafran authorities to allow resumption of relief supplies to war-stricken areas. Suspension of supplies would again plunge the population into "the dreaded cycle of starvation, disease and death". He said it had "long been recognised that the most satisfactory method for the distribution of supplies in the war-affected areas of Nigeria would be the establishment of land and river corridors, and urge both sides to give immediate consideration to the opening of such corridors." However, until such corridors became operative, he felt that "some arrangements must be made for the resumption of emergency flights, even if concessions are required from both the sides".

**Swedish Pilots Assisting Biafra:** A Swedish evening paper, *Expressen*, on May 26 revealed that Swedish pilots were fighting on the Biafran side in the

Nigeria-Biafra war. The paper reported that the operation, code-named "Biafra's Baby", was organised by a well-known Swedish aviator, Captain Carl Gustav von Rosen. Captain Rosen was a pilot employed by a Swedish commercial airlines company. He along with six other Swedes, equipped with five Pipe Cub aircraft, had undertaken the task of destroying the Nigerian Air Force (News agency reports, May 27 and 28).

On May 27, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander completely dissociated his government from the action of the private air force operating in Biafra under Captain Rosen. On May 28, the Swedish Embassy in Lagos delivered a note to this effect to the Federal Nigerian Government.

**UN Observers Report :** The Fifth Interim Report of the UN Special Representative to Nigeria was published in Lagos on May 16. Covering the period from January to April 1969, the report cleared the Nigerian army and air force personnel of the rebel allegations that they were not maintaining the code of conduct issued to them. It praised the army officers for maintaining good relations with civilians of all tribes and commended the efforts of the Federal Military Government in reopening schools and offices in most of the liberated areas. The report added that the Federal Military Government was making arrangements to house all prisoners of war in Lagos so that they could be well cared for.

**Italian Technicians Released :** Eighteen technicians of the Italian oil company AGIP, were released by Biafra on June 7 through the efforts of President Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Bongo of Gabon. These technicians were captured by Biafran soldiers early in May when they had crossed the river Niger into Nigerian territory and were sentenced to death for allegedly fighting alongside Federal troops. However, they were reprieved following international appeals.

**Colonel Ojukwu Promoted :** The Biafran Advisory Committee of Chiefs, Elders and the Consultative Assembly early in May conferred on Col. Ojukwu the rank and title of General of the Biafran Army. The leaders also reaffirmed their loyalty to and confidence in him and authorised him to continue prosecution of the war with all the vigour at his command.

**Inter-African Health Seminar at Lagos :** A week-long Health Seminar, attended by delegates from 19 African countries was held in Lagos in May under the auspices of the WHO and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) which is financing various programmes for eradication of diseases in the African continent. The seminar, attended by Anglophone and Francophone countries, recommended the setting up of an inter-country Co-ordination Committee on Communicable Diseases for West and Central Africa.

## SENEGAL

**Workers' Strike :** Throughout May, there were widespread workers' strikes in Senegal. The National Federation of Post Office Workers held a 48-hour token strike throughout the country to obtain an immediate review of their wage claims by a Government Commission. The National Union of Petroleum Workers and Employees of Senegal, an affiliate of the National Union of Workers of Senegal, called

a 72-hour strike from May 16. It was soon followed by a three-day token strike by the employees of the National Office of Co-operation and Assistance for Development on May 21. It aimed at securing reclassification of staff and grant of premiums and indemnities to the workers.

In June the bank employees of the country went on strike to secure a settlement of disputes on employers' contribution to medical expenses, old-age benefits, housing allowances and professional classification. A call by the National Union of Senegalese Workers for a 48-hour general strike was followed by the promulgation of a State of Emergency from June 11 to 23 through a Presidential Decree.

**University Residences Closed :** In Dakar on May 6 the Government announced the closure of all university residences and carried out their evacuation under the supervision of a large police contingent. The measure was taken following signs that the attitude of student strikers was hardening. The strikes launched on March 28 continued through April, and on May 5 students picketed faculty[doors. On May 4, the Rector of the University of Dakar issued a communique in which he stated that students who abstained from their courses from May 16 would not be allowed to take their examinations.

**UPS Recommends Constitutional Changes :** The National Council of the Progressive Union of Senegal (UPS), which met in Dakar from May 16-18, has recommended change of the present regime into a decentralised and rationalised Presidential regime with a Prime Minister in charge of Government activities. The conference proposed that the Prime Minister should be responsible to the Head of the State and National Assembly and act on the authority of the party,

*Le Monde, May 20*

## SIERRA LEONE

**Government Coalition Broken :** On June 10, the Sierra Leone People's Party broke away from the National Government to form an independent opposition party. The Sierra Leone People's Party headed the first post-independence government formed in 1961 under Sir Albert Margai. It was defeated in the 1967 elections by the All People's Congress under Mr. Siaka Stevens. A military coup overthrew the All People's Congress Government. When civilian rule was reintroduced in 1968, a coalition government led by Mr. Stevens was formed.

## NORTH AFRICA

### ALGERIA

**Conspirators Sentenced :** Five former army officers were condemned to death on July 23 for leading an armed rebellion against President Boumedienne's Government, in December 1967. Sentences were imposed by the Oran revolutionary court which had been hearing charges against 192 military men and civilians. Among those given death sentence was the former Chief of the Army General Staff, Col. Zbir.



The court also passed sentences ranging from 10 to 20 years jail on other officers, mainly juniors in the battalions which had taken part in the rebellion. Two former ministers in the National Liberation Front (FLN) were given suspended sentences of five years. Fifty others were awarded sentences of between three and five years.

*Le Monde*, July 25

**Frontiers Reopened :** The Algerian and Moroccan Governments have taken measures to facilitate passage across 1,500 kilometers of their frontiers which have had only one transit point at Oujda since the border dispute of October 1953. Now transit points at Saldia, Ahfir, Al Aricha and Figuig have been reopened and travellers in future would only require an identity card instead of a passport.

**Zhivkov's Visit :** The Bulgarian Prime Minister, Mr. Tudor Zhivkov, made an official visit to Algeria from June 23 to 28. He held talks with an Algerian delegation on the question of reinforcement and development of co-operative relations between the two countries and on international affairs. A joint communique issued after the visit said that an agreement had been concluded on co-operation in the fields of radio, navigation and TV, and on cultural exchanges in 1969-70.

**Mr. Tshombe's Death Reported :** On June 30, Radio Algiers reported the death of the former Prime Minister of the Congo DR, Mr. Tshombe, following a heart attack at his residence in the suburbs of Algiers. He had been a political refugee since his dismissal from the post of Prime Minister in October 1965 by President Joseph Kasavubu. He took refuge in Spain where he learnt of his death sentence given in absentia for high treason in March 1967. In July his plane was hijacked and flown to Algeria. Though extradition was sought by the Congolese Government, and the Algerian Supreme Court declared its verdict in favour of the move, President Boumedienne did not sign a decree which would have enforced the court's decision. Since then Mr. Tshombe had led a retired life in Algiers.

**New University :** Algeria recently announced the creation of a new university in Constantine. It will have three faculties : Law and Economic Sciences ; Science; Literature and Human Sciences. The Constantine University will be the third in the country ; the other two are in Algiers and Oran.

## MOROCCO

**Ifni Transferred :** Spain on June 30 announced the transfer of the region of Ifni to Morocco. Reporting the transfer, Radio Madrid said that the return of the territory emphasised once again the will of the two Heads of State, General Franco and King Hassan II, to strengthen the bonds of friendship which linked the two peoples.

Under the terms of the Transfer Treaty, signed on May 13, Spain would cede to Morocco all movable and immovable public property with the exception of the Consular Office, a school, a church, a cultural centre—the "Casa de Espana"—and five residential buildings belonging to Spanish officials. Spanish currency would be withdrawn and be replaced by the Moroccan currency.

## SUDAN

**Military Coup :** A leftist junta, backed by the military, overthrew the government of Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub in the Sudan on May 25 and set up a new

National Revolutionary Council. The Council under the chairmanship of Colonel Jafar Namirry, leader of the coup, assumed powers for the entire country. The military junta dissolved the Sudan's provisional constitution of 1964, the Presidential Council and the Constituent Assembly, and formed a Cabinet of 21 ministers led by Abu Bakr Awadullah. Awadullah, the only civilian in the Cabinet, is a former Chief Justice known for his left-wing views. He played a principal role in bringing down the military regime of General Ibrahim Abboud in 1964.

In a policy statement, Col. Namirry, who was promoted Major-General and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces shortly after the coup, stated that the army had taken over power because of the failure of the five-year-old regime of President Ismail el-Azhari to solve the country's economic problems, the trouble-torn Southern Sudan and the country's growing agricultural problems. He said "the people wanted a definite solution to the country's economic problems. They rejected the government of the past because of their failure to solve the Southern problem and smooth out the difficulties in the field of agriculture. The people want the Sudan to take its true place in the Arab world and the fight for Palestine. At home they want to fight imperialism and Zionist infiltration".

The new Prime Minister, Abu Bakr Awadullah, assured the people about the bona fides of the new National Revolutionary Council and promised to set the Sudan "on the road to freedom and socialism" based on its old traditions. He said that the new regime would tackle unemployment while maintaining freedom for national and foreign capital. The Prime Minister also assured a fair solution to the rebellion in Southern Sudan. Any form of interference, he stated, would be tantamount to a violation of international law and a blatant aggression against our country's sovereignty. He reiterated the new Government's Arab nationalism which would form a major plank of its foreign policy. "We are determined to regain the usurped Arab land".

**New Southern Policy Outlined:** The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Major-General Jafar Namirry, speaking in Khartoum on June 10 outlined the Government's new Southern policy. The four-point programme designed to effect a permanent solution of the problem envisages the continuation and widening of amnesty for the Southern opponents granted by the previous regime; an intensive social, economic and cultural programme for the South; the appointment of a Minister of Southern Affairs and the training of Southerners to take up positions of responsibility. In spite of the cultural differences between the North and the South, General Namirry said, unity could be achieved. To this end, he appealed to all the people in Southern Sudan, inside and outside the country, to participate in the implementation of the programme.

However, the Southern Sudanese leaders reacted sharply to the new proposals and asserted the independence of the region. Mourateny Pajokdit, the Vice-President of the "Sudan Azania", said in Kampala on June 13 that the move by the new Khartoum Government was "positively the last chance to reach a peaceful solution to the Southern Sudanese conflict". "If this failed", he warned, "the situation will be resolved at gunpoint" between the Anyanya (the military arm of the Azania) and the Sudanese Army. Also in Kampala, on June 16, G.M. Mayeni, the leader of the "Nile Provisional Government", said the Southerners would not be deceived or misled by "empty promises of autonomy". Rejecting the new offer, Mayeni claimed that the new Government was "Arab in aspiration and commitment", and such an orientation had reinforced the divergence of outlook between the Arab Sudan and the African Nile

State." He accused the new Sudan Government of being "hypocritical" and warned that the "Nile Provisional Government" was determined to follow the war through until complete independence for the Nile State was achieved.

**Organisations Dissolved :** The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) on June 16 announced the dissolution of all organisations found after the May 25 coup and banned the formation of any political body. In a statement the Council explained that the purpose of this measure was to protect the Revolution. Anyone forming a political body, regardless of its aims, would be punished.

**Awadullah's UAR Visit :** The new Sudanese Prime Minister, Awadullah, led a three-man delegation to the UAR in July. Talks were held with President Nasser in Cairo in which the necessity of consolidating the relations between the countries through bilateral meetings was emphasised. Awadullah also addressed the opening session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union on July 23. In his speech the Sudanese Prime Minister drew an analogy between the Sudanese Revolution of May 25 and the Egyptian Revolution of July 23. "We are committed, as you are, to the Arab Revolution through our objectives of freedom, socialism and union", he said.

**Goodwill Mission to East Africa :** A Ministerial goodwill mission visited Somali and Tanzania in June. In Dar-es-Salaam on June 29, after talks with President Nyerere, Dr. Mohammed Nur, leader of the delegation, explained the necessity of re-examining his country's foreign policy by paying more attention to the problems of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and the Arab world. Dr. Nur went on to say that "President Nyerere was relieved to know that ours was not a military coup but rather a people's uprising . . . The President was further relieved to know that our declared policy of regional autonomy, economic and social development of the South was genuine, and that only a truly socialist government is capable of taking such a correct decision". The Sudanese leader also expressed his government's keenness to learn from the experience of the socialist government of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and hoped that the goodwill mission would help establish permanent contacts between the two governments.

*Nationalist, June 30*

Another Sudanese delegation headed by the Minister of Social Government, Khalafallah Babakr, held talks in Cairo on June 18 with President Nasser. The object of the mission, Babakr said, was to affirm the fusion of the UAR and Sudanese revolutions, to strengthen the front lines, and to affirm the Sudan's liberation goals to President Nasser.

**Members of Political Parties Arrested :** On July 19, the Interior Minister Major Farouk Hamadalla announced "intensive arrests" of members of disbanded parties and political institutions. These included leaders of the disbanded Umma Party, the Islamic Charter Front, the Democratic Unionist Party, and other "counter-revolutionary" elements. An earlier announcement stated that 63 former politicians, including members of the dissolved Supreme Council, Ministers and leaders of the dissolved parties were detained.

**U.S. Diplomats Expelled :** The Sudanese Government announced in July the expulsion of certain American diplomats. The Prime Minister, Awadullah, said on July 20 that evidence had proved beyond doubt that the expelled diplomats had maintained close contacts with elements belonging to the counter-revolution.

**East Germany Recognised :** The Sudanese Cabinet on May 27 announced its recognition of the German Democratic Republic and exchange of envoys between the two countries. A statement issued in Khartoum stated that the decision had been taken "in appreciation of its just attitudes on all Arab questions, in particular the Israeli aggression against Arab Palestine".

**Dr. Werner Titel's Visit :** The Vice-Premier of East Germany, Dr. Werner Titel, visited the Sudan early in June. Talks were followed by a joint communique on June 7 which announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The two countries denounced the attempts by the Federal German Government to interfere in their internal affairs and condemned imperialist efforts to hinder the progress of socialist forces in various parts of the world by "constant aggression and provocation". Further, they expressed agreement on the necessity of ending Israeli aggression against the Arabs and on the right of self-determination for Palestinian Arabs.

**Refugee Problem Discussed in Addis Ababa :** A Sudanese Ministerial delegation led by the Minister of Immigration held talks with Ethiopian officials in Addis Ababa in July. The problem of political refugees which stood in the way of good relations between the two countries was discussed. It was agreed that a Joint Ministerial Committee would meet in Addis Ababa to consider all the problems between the two countries.

## TUNISIA

**Visit of King Olav V :** The King of Norway, Olav V, paid an official visit to Tunisia in the first week of May in response to an invitation from President Bourguiba made during the latter's visit to Norway in June 1963. A joint communique issued at the end of the royal visit reaffirmed the determination of the two parties "to further promote the relations between the two countries, particularly in the field of trade, and also through further efforts by Norway to help in the development of Tunisia". Discussions on the international situation, the communique added, led the two leaders to express "deep concern at the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the increasingly serious danger which it poses for international peace and security". They also expressed "their profound belief that reinforcement of international security and safeguard of peace in the world necessitates the respect of the rights of the peoples to self-determination, the sovereignty of states and equality between nations".

**Cultural Co-operation with USSR :** On May 27, the Governments of Tunisia and the USSR signed a programme for cultural exchanges for 1969-70. At the signing ceremony the Soviet representative, Lounjkov, said that cultural co-operation had always been "favourable to both countries" and opened a possibility of "further consolidation of political relations between Tunisia and the USSR". Tunisia and the USSR have had cultural relations covering the fields of education, science, culture, arts and sports since 1963.

**Agreement with France on Labour :** In June the Government concluded a new Labour Agreement with France. Under its terms, a French Commission for Immigration and Labour would be opened in Tunis and in future about 800 Tunisian workers would be recruited by French companies.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

**ASU Congress Meets :** The Arab Socialist Union met in conference from July 23 to 25. A statement was adopted and resolutions and recommendations made. The statement reviewed the political situation and restated Arab policies. It praised the UAR's military recovery—"a miracle by all material and moral criteria"—the steadfastness of the home front and the role of Palestine resistance. However, in its communique it warned : "Strengthening the Eastern front and establishment of co-ordination among the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian armies as well as effective co-ordination among these armies and the Western front (the Suez Canal) have become necessary and urgent following the escalation of military operations and the existing possibility of a general confrontation with the enemy".

A resolution adopted at the conference stressed the need to prepare the people for the demand of psychological warfare and suggested organisational measures to strengthen the home front. The Congress, through this resolution, also asserted that "the battle being fought by our masses is a battle for the accomplishment of two goals, the battle of liberation until victory is won by the Arab citizen, and the battle for shift to socialism so that the Arab citizen may achieve progress and secure a decent life".

**Diplomatic Recognition of GDR and the Vietnam Provisional Government :** The UAR extended diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic (on July 10) and to the Vietnam Provisional Government (July 12). Commenting on the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the GDR, the Egyptian newspaper, *Al Ahrām*, said : "It must be crystal clear that in recognising East Germany the Arabs are not taking sides over the German issue, but their stand is governed by the attitudes of other countries towards the Israeli-Arab conflict". The newspaper added that break in diplomatic relations with West Germany "stems only from her open alignment with Israel. But this situation will end as soon as the cause of the estrangement is removed".

The official recognition of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam resulted in the office of the Vietnamese Liberation Front in Cairo becoming a special political mission.

**Gromyko's Visit :** The USSR Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, paid a brief visit to the UAR in June. Talks were held with President Nasser on June 11 and 12 on the situation in the Middle East, following which a joint communique confirmed Arab-Soviet friendship. The communique also confirmed Arab and Soviet insistence on the enemy's complete withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967, as well as full implementation of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

**Nasser and Haile Selassie Discuss Middle East :** During a two-day visit to Cairo (June 14-15) Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia discussed with President Nasser the situation in the Middle East, relations between the two countries, consolidation of the OAU and its role in promoting African co-operation and peace.

**UAR and Syria Reassert Friendship :** A UAR delegation from the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) concluded a two-day visit to Syria on June 19. A joint communique issued after its visit stated that the Arab peoples must show their historical responsibilities in the battle for liberation and "pursue the solution which has no

alternative", namely, resumption of fighting on a large scale for the liberation of the Arabland.

## LIBYA

**Liquidation of Commercial Agencies :** The commercial agencies administration of the Ministry of Economy and Trade asked all non-Libyan commercial agents to liquidate their agencies not later than August 31. This decision will apply to all agencies and companies not totally owned by Libyans.

*Libyan News Agency, July 23*

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

**PAIGC Gains in Portuguese Guinea :** The Secretary-General of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), Amílcar Cabral, announced in Dakar (Senegal) on May 27 that during the first five months of 1969, 332 Portuguese troops died in clashes with PAIGC commandos. A number of Portuguese were wounded, camps overrun and planes destroyed. Cabral added that over the same period PAIGC had made 64 ambushes and 170 attacks against Portuguese forces. All these activities had helped the organisation to control more than two-thirds of the territory and 45% of the population, he said.

On June 12, during a visit to Tanzania, Cabral in an interview with the *Nationalist* said the year 1969 would see "more action on all fronts of our struggle inside the party than any other year". He added : "We have reinforced our positions and now we have mounted a general operation for intensified action against the enemy with the objective of pinning him down in the barracks where he is now no more safe...He is desperate and he is intensifying bombing in the liberated zones, but he can do no more since generally he is paralysed and isolated in every part of the country."

**Military Activities in Mozambique :** The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in a communique issued on June 3 claimed that it had killed more than 40 Portuguese troops in the Cabo Delgado Province between April and May. Thirty-eight Portuguese vehicles were destroyed.

The President of the Mozambique Liberation Committee (COREMO), Paul Gomané, in July claimed major successes for his organisation despite the sophisticated weapons of the Portuguese and other difficulties which they had to face. The successes, Gomané said, were largely due to the wide support the organization had from the people in the three provinces where freedom-fighters of COREMO were operating.

## RHODESIA

**New Constitutional Proposals Presented :** The Rhodesian Government, in a White Paper published on May 21, set out proposals for a new Constitution for Rhodesia closely following the draft plan issued by the Rhodesian Front Party in February. The main proposals envisaged complete segregation of the electorate,

with Europeans, Asians and coloured peoples on one voters' roll, and Africans, with wider franchise, on a separate roll. This would abolish the present common franchise and cross-voting between the upper and lower rolls. A National Parliament comprising a House of Assembly and a Senate would be set up. The House of Assembly, to be formed of 66 members, would have 50 members returned on the European roll and 16 from among Africans. Africans, the White Paper proposed, would eventually have parity with Europeans as their number would be increased at a time as their income-tax contributions rose. The Senate, consisting of ten Europeans elected by the European members of the House of Assembly, ten chiefs—elected by the Council of Chiefs—and three persons of any race appointed by the Head of the State, would, in addition to having the power to initiate legislation, take over the duties of the present Constitutional Council. On the question of land tenure, it was suggested that all lands be classified in the three different categories of European, African and National. The total area of the lands in the European and African areas would be equal and these land allocations would be entrenched.

The new constitution, the White Paper said, would "ensure that the government would be retained in responsible hands and will provide Africans with the right to play an increasing part in the Government of Rhodesia as they earn it by increasing contribution to the national exchequer. Moreover, the new Constitution will recognise the rights of the African Chiefs, as the leaders of their people, to take part in the counsels of the nation".

**Reaction to the New Proposals:** The constitutional proposals were widely criticised. The leader of the Centre Party, Bashford, said that the new scheme offered virtually no safeguards and that he "would not give the constitutional proposals a life of more than three years". To Mkudu, leader of the Rhodesian opposition and President of the United Peoples Party, the proposed Constitution was "totally unacceptable". Opportunity should be given, he said, to Rhodesia to "reach majority rule stage by evolution and not by revolution". *Rhodesia Herald*, in its editorial dated May 22, said that the White Paper simply projected "the existing white domination into the foreseeable future. Parity may never be reached by the yardstick of the tax method: there is no guarantee that a rising curve of African tax contributions will ever catch up with a rising curve of European contributions". The editorial warned that the proposed Constitution "will have a future only as long as Africans are not powerful to replace it—and when they are . . . this will be only possible through revolution, which, unfortunately, may not be peaceful".

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader, L. B. Chihota, defiantly stated that Ian Smith did neither intimidate nor scare the Zimbabweans, but rather drew nearer the replacement of the minority regime by the revolutionary peoples government. The apartheid-style Constitution, Chihota said, was a last desperate attempt by the settlers and their overlords in Whitehall to escape the inescapable destruction by the now politically conscious masses of Zimbabwe.

*The Standard*, Tanzania, May 23

All African countries, with the exception of South Africa, made identical condemnatory statements. The President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, said on May 23 that the proposals were not obviously acceptable "to Britain, to Africa and to the world community". He added that in Ian Smith's own words, they would "be the death-knell of the principle of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia". Sir Seretse also warned that the new Constitution, which envisages separate develop-

ment of races would increase the danger of a violent racial conflict, which cannot but involve neighbouring states",

*Star*, Johannesburg, May 24

The Organisation for African Unity (OAU), in a communique, said that the proposal created "a problem of survival" for the whole of Africa. African governments, "individually and collectively", should re-examine the Rhodesian situation and take the necessary steps to safeguard the "fundamental interests" of Africa. To this end, the communique called on all countries to sever relations with Rhodesia and impose sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, the two countries which were actively aiding Rhodesia. The OAU also called on the UN Security Council to immediately apply against Rhodesia the "provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter on steps to take in the interest of international peace and international security".

Commenting on Rhodesia's new constitutional programme, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated there was probably never a chance of settlement with Ian Smith. "A man who says initially that his proposal is a death-knell for majority rule...a man who is talking of hundreds of years of white domination" could not but have made any other agreement except one which would have been "a sell-out, a sell-out of the four million Africans and of peoples of other races", he added.

**Constitutional Proposals Accepted:** Following a referendum on the Rhodesian Front Party's constitutional proposals, the Salisbury Government announced on June 2 that the Rhodesian people had accepted the proposals by 54,724 votes to 20,776 and decided to become a Republic. On the latter issue the votes were 61,130 for and 14,327 against.

A spokesman of the British Foreign Office said on June 24: "Any declaration of a Republic on the wishes of the minority Rhodesian electorate will be as invalid as the illegal declaration of independence itself". Later, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart told the House of Commons that despite the fact that this vote has "pushed the 'Fearless' proposals off the table", it will remain Britain's policy "to work for an honourable settlement with Rhodesia, when there are people in power in that country who share our principles. Meanwhile, sanctions and international isolation of Rhodesia must continue". As a follow-up of the British policy, the Governor of Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibb's resignation was accepted, the British Residential Mission in Salisbury withdrawn and the Rhodesia House in London closed.

UN Secretary-General Thant in a statement issued in New York said the result, "though not unexpected, is a further and deplorable step in the wrong direction for Southern Rhodesia, for Africa and for the world". It was not only defiance of UN resolutions on the subject but in absolute conflict with the principles of the UN Charter.

In Africa itself, the referendum results were condemned. In Zambia, leaders called on Zimbabwe freedom fighters to intensify their struggle for freedom inside Rhodesia. The Secretary-General of the OAU, Diallo Telli, said that Britain seemed to have acted in concert with Rhodesia "in delivering up the African majority to white racist hatred". *The Star* of South Africa commented on June 21 that the strangest feature of the referendum was "the virtual ignoring of African opinion although Africans number 4,800,000 against 225,000 Europeans. In itself this is



unreal enough. But in Rhodesia it seems inexplicable since the primary reason why the Federation failed six short years ago was African opposition".

## SOUTH AFRICA

**New Security Legislation :** The Government of South Africa promulgated on June 30 the General Law Amendment Bill which virtually puts the Bureau of State Security beyond the scope of the law. Altering the wordings of the Official Secrets Act, the new legislation stated : "Anyone who has in his possession any information which relates to any military, police or security matter and who publishes it or directly or indirectly communicates it to any person in any manner or for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the Republic shall be guilty of an offence". A security matter is defined as "any matter relating to the security of the Republic" and includes "any matter dealt with by the Bureau for State Security" or relating to the relationship existing between any person and the said Bureau". Further the General Law Amendment Bill, through another clause, provided that in the instance of a trial a court could be prohibited by the Cabinet from testing the privileges and powers of either the police or the Bureau of State Security and even from hearing a citizen's defence.

**Foreign Minister Visits Portugal :** The South African Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, paid a three-day official visit to Portugal in June. Radio Johannesburg said on June 17 that Dr. Muller's visit would show the world that South Africa's links with Portugal were as strong under Dr. Caetano as they had been under Salazar. Both countries knew "where they were going and would not be distracted from their task by unwarranted criticism at the UN and elsewhere". Earlier, the South African Minister had stated that Portuguese and South African forces stood as a "bulwark" against the domination of the African continent by foreign powers.

**New Air Defence Weapons System Developed:** The South African Government announced on May 2 the development of a "Cactus" air defence weapon system against fast low-level air attacks. Making the announcement in Parliament, the Minister of Defence, Botha, said that the project, approved and partly financed by the French Government, would help secure "the most advanced and effective weapon of its kind in existence for the purpose of fulfilling the most difficult task of defence against fast low-level air attacks".

## SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

**Security Trial :** The Supreme Court at Windhoek on July 1 condemned eight Africans on charges of "terrorist conspiracy". The men were accused of having taken part in a plot which aimed at overthrowing the South-West African administration and replacing it by an African government led by the South African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). They were also said to have received guerilla training in Tanzania, Soviet Union and Egypt and were charged with having set up clandestine camps in South-West Africa as bases for guerilla warfare and for having smuggled weapons into the country.

*Nationalist, July 3*

At a meeting on July 3, the UN Decolonisation Committee adopted a consensus expressing serious concern over the trial. It called on the Security Council to consider urgently the steps necessary to make South Africa abide by previous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions cancelling South Africa's League of Nations mandate. The consensus, about which Britain, the U.S. and the Ivory Coast expressed their reservations, will be sent to the Security Council in view of what the Committee described as the "gravity of the situation".

## SWAZILAND

**Prince Dhlamini in East Africa :** The Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dhlamini, visited Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania from June 2 to 11. Expressions of friendship, brotherhood and adherence to principles of democracy were made. Prince Dhlamini also signed trade agreements with the three countries. The agreement with Uganda provides for reciprocal "most favoured nation" treatment in respect of matters relating to trade. The agreement states the countries will do everything possible to increase the volume of trade between them. With Kenya, Swaziland settled for the export of agricultural commodities as against import of industrial machinery. Prince Dhlamini expressed the hope that his country would have some of its traders receive training in Kenya.

## **Nationalization in Tanzania : Some Legal Aspects**

SUBHASH C. JAIN

**A**LMOST eighteen months after attaining independence in December 1961, Tanganyika embarked upon gradual nationalization and regulation of various sectors of its economy. A brief statement of the measures taken by it will be useful before undertaking an examination of their legal validity.

In June 1963, the Government announced the conclusion of negotiations for the transfer to it of sisal estates belonging to Ralli estates, a subsidiary of Ralli Brothers, on mutually agreeable terms.<sup>1</sup> Agreement in principle was also reached on the transfer to the Government of 50% shares in Dendira Tea Estates. The Dutch company, Van Eeghen and Maclaine (Vanmac), was to sell 51% of the share capital of its Tanganyika subsidiary to the Tanganyika Government. A new company was to be formed with five Government and four Vanmac directors who were to hold the franchise for International Harvester, Kolobero Sugar and other agencies. Together they set up the International Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika with an authorized capital of £200,000 of which £100,000 was paid up. The Government held 51% of the paid-up capital. In all these joint ventures, the Government held at least equal or majority of the shares. It made a determined bid to take control of the wholesale and retail trade. To get into the wholesale business it acquired control of a leading import house, Van Eeghen and Maclaine. To enter the retail trade it set up a Co-operative Supply Association backed with £200,000 and run by an Israeli firm.

In the meantime, Zanzibar was united with Tanganyika under the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act, 1964. Reforms in the economic structure of the country continued to be made. The Government nationalized the Zanzibar Clove Growers' Association and the Zanzibar Town Council on October 7, 1964. The Association handled about 10,000 tons of cloves a year and had a gross return of £2,500,000. With the harvest still coming in, stocks were valued at £4m.<sup>2</sup> In November 1964, the first state-owned shop was opened for sale of goods imported from East Germany and China. The East African Railways and Harbours Administration announced that stevedoring companies in East African ports would be nationalized within twelve months. Negotiations were begun for paying a "fair" price for the four stevedoring companies. The Government also took over the power plants. The Zanzibar Electricity Board, on which the Government was represented, was after the take-over named the State Fuel and Power Co-operative. Vice-President Sheikh Karume, explaining the

Government's policy, said a service such as electricity should be run by the Government. He asserted that the Government's policy was for the benefit of the masses.<sup>3</sup> The Official Gazette of November 21 carried the information that the Government had taken over 35 farms, of which 25 were European-owned, mostly Greek. The land involved was 22,000 acres. This brought the total number of farms nationalized in November to 56.

In the following year again, many private enterprises were taken over. Nineteen privately owned factories, including works handling coir (coconut fibre), soap, oil and copra were acquired by the Zanzibar Government. The Minister of Finance declared the policy of state ownership would benefit the people, as the profits could be shared by the workers and also used for improving social services. Economic necessity was not the only reason for these measures. Communist China was the main inspiring force.<sup>4</sup> Zanzibar in particular has been described as a laboratory for Chinese Communist experiments in African conditions. Although outright confiscation is usually avoided, under a decree issued in Zanzibar in March 1964, the Government can order confiscation of any property if it thinks this will be in the national interest, and that acquisition without compensation will not cause undue hardship to the owner.<sup>5</sup> All the land around the Bugruni area in Dar-es-Salaam was taken over for housing projects. An official statement said it was the declared policy of the Tanzania Government that all land belongs to the nation. The Government had the right to take over undeveloped land and develop it for the benefit of the people.<sup>6</sup> Six soft drink factories were taken over, bringing the number of firms nationalized in a period of 10 days to 200. Some 236 farms in Zanzibar, mainly Arab-owned, were also acquired. On June 11, 1965, the Government imposed exchange control regulations banning all capital movement unless the Treasury was satisfied that it was not detrimental to the country's economy.<sup>7</sup> The Government also barred private merchants from importing rice, wheat, maize, sugar and ten other items. They could be imported only through the State External Trade Corporation. The result of these economic measures was that the Government now controlled 30% of the import trade and 75% of the export trade.

The year 1966 saw Tanzania interfering more and more with private ownership. The Zanzibar Government nationalized<sup>8</sup> the Zanzibar Friends' Mission School at Mtambile, Pemba Island, and took over two more estates belonging to Arabs under a Presidential decree. Within a week the Revolutionary Council confiscated the land, homes and shops of some thirty Zanzibaris without explanation or compensation. It also ordered all the Island's Asian traders to work communally on Chinese-directed collective farms or be deprived of their allocations of basic foodstuffs such as rice and sugar. The Presidential Decree No. 10 of 1966 also nationalized the motor-car trade.<sup>9</sup> Article 5(2) of the decree said:

"The compensation shall be equivalent to the cost price of the property vested in the Government and shall be payable in instalments to be determined by the Minister of Finance. The first of the payments shall be made at a date not later than the 13th October 1967."

Compensation was, however, not to be paid in all cases. While this

decree was described as 'a decree to make provision for the nationalization of the motor-car trade' and it provided for compensation, manifestly confiscatory decrees, such as 'the Confiscation of Immovable Property (No. 97) Order, 1965', were also passed. These provided for no compensation. Section 2 of the latter decree simply stated:

"All those Houses Nos. 192 and 193 situated at Misufini Chake, Pemba, and belonging or said to belong jointly to Abasi Januwalla and Yusuf Ali Kadirbhai, are hereby confiscated."<sup>10</sup>

It is not even clear whether the confiscations were in exercise of the police power of Tanzania which is usually the constitutional right of a state. Confiscation is a penal measure and has to be normally justified on grounds of public health or order.

#### **Nationalization and Self-reliance**

President Nyerere's Arusha Declaration in February 1967 emphasized that Tanzania should no longer depend on the "begging bowl" of foreign aid and must be self-reliant. He recommended further steps to implement the avowed policy of socialism. In pursuance of it, a number of nationalization laws were passed. Banks<sup>11</sup> were nationalized by the National Bank of Commerce (Establishment and Vesting of Assets and Liabilities) Act, 1967; business firms and companies<sup>12</sup> were nationalized by the State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Interests) Act 1967; businesses of firms<sup>13</sup> producing agricultural products were nationalized by the National Agricultural Products Board (Vesting of Interests) Act, 1967; insurance business was nationalized by the Insurance (Vesting of Interests and Regulations) Act, 1967; industrial companies<sup>14</sup> and mineral resources by the Industrial Shares (Acquisition) Act, 1967. Thus, the major means of production were taken over. They included big industries, components essential to them and large plantations, especially those producing essential raw materials.

There is hardly any country today where there is not some degree of state intervention in economic activity.<sup>15</sup> In a gradation based on purely economic criteria, nationalization takes its place as the logical conclusion, the final stage of the controlled economy.<sup>16</sup> Nationalizations have been the order of the day in a number of developing countries since their independence. A few leading examples are those of Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. Nationalization has, therefore, become a fairly established and recognized practice which is seldom challenged. The root of the problem, however, is the amount of compensation that should be paid to nationalized firms. In a majority of cases Tanzania has promised compensation. But, there have been innumerable difficulties in arriving at a mutually acceptable quantum of compensation.

#### **Problems of Compensation**

Payment of compensation is determined by a number of factors involving subjective appraisal. It is therefore not always easy to assess "equivalent" or "full" compensation. The five Tanzanian enactments mentioned above provide for "full and fair" compensation. The term "fair" would seem to

qualify the term "full". Despite the clear provision for compensation in the nationalization laws, President Nyerere is said to have stated: "Compensation will not be automatic. We are not robbers, but we'll pay it if there is a case for it."<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the Finance Minister stated in the National Assembly that "full and fair compensation will be paid to the rightful owners."<sup>18</sup> This seems to leave the discretion of determining the rightful owner of property or assets to the Finance Minister, who is also empowered under the various nationalization laws to determine the manner of paying such compensation.<sup>19</sup> He can fix the instalments in which compensation is to be paid. The affected party has the right to be consulted. But the determination of the quantum of compensation was not as simple as one might have imagined. The British banks' claims for compensation were much in excess of what Tanzania considered "full and fair" payment. The banks are believed to have based their claims almost entirely on disturbance and loss of goodwill. In only one case was there a demand against assets. The Bata Shoe Co. refused to accept nationalization on Mr. Nyerere's terms. Since a mutually acceptable settlement was not in sight, Standard and Barclays Banks hastened to freeze Tanzanian assets worth £2.25m<sup>20</sup> in London. The act of nationalization itself was not much relished by the banks and other affected parties. The March issue of the *Standard Bank Review* commented: "Abounding enthusiasm and goodwill, when found dispensable without prior consultation, are not commodities to be retained through compensation agreements, even assuming it to be full and fair. The Tanzania Government was able to strike a deal with Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. by paying a compensation of £27,400. The Tanzanian Finance Minister said he saw no reason for giving any special treatment in favour of British banks whereas others have already come to terms. He alleged that they were alone in having refused to release to the National Bank of Commerce the net balances held by them in favour of their former branches in Tanzania. 'We are ready to discuss and settle claims for compensation submitted by the British banks in the same manner and to the same extent as claims submitted by others—two of which have already resulted in full and final settlement'." The Government was also able to settle its accounts with British-American Tobacco Co., Kilimank Breweries, Tanganyika Extract Breweries and Tanganyika Portland Cement. In some cases it became difficult to fix compensation because the records were destroyed.<sup>21</sup> These records were required for negotiations in those cases where the basis of compensation was to be the statement of accounts at the close of business for the year 1966.<sup>22</sup> On December 21, 1967, a compensation settlement was also reached with National and Grindlays Bank. It was to be paid £300,000 in six annual instalments beginning with the first on December 22.<sup>23</sup> The question of compensation also arose in the case of some tea estates which were nationalized by mistake. The mistake occurred during the take-over of a number of sisal estates. The Government wanted control of the sisal industry but it was not realised at the time that sisal firms also owned tea estates. One of the British tea estates that had been mistakenly nationalized declined a Government bid to restore it to their former owners and demanded compensation.<sup>24</sup> However, the effect of nationalization by mistake is not clearly spelt out either in municipal or in international law. Since there was no intention to nationalize these estates, the action of the Government was not arbitrary but the result of a *bona fide* mistake. A state could not be held responsible for an act which it did not intend to commit.

### **Capacity to Pay Compensation**

The majority of persons affected by the nationalization laws were foreigners. International law requires that foreigners should be given at least equal treatment in the matter of payment of compensation. It is contended that legislation should be non-discriminatory. There is also a traditional rule requiring "due, prompt and effective compensation". It is true that in some cases nationalization was effected without previous warning or legislation. This affected the prospects of foreigners getting the compensation they were entitled to. But generally, as one writer pertinently observes:

"The nationalizations were carried out in pursuance of a policy of socialisation approved and implemented by the country's political, administrative and legislative institutions; the nationalizations are not in breach of treaty obligations; the nationalizations do not seem to be discriminatory against alien interests; and the legislation provides for the payment of compensation which does not seem to fall below the internationally accepted minimum standard of compensation."<sup>25</sup>

Thus compensation agreements were entered into with an apparent shield of international law in the majority of cases, but there was a widespread doubt about the real capacity of Tanzania to pay compensation. To quote from a daily newspaper, "It is difficult to see how Tanzania, though promising compensation, will be able to manage it on any acceptable basis. For, the assets of the six foreign banks mainly involved are nearly equivalent to the annual national income of Tanzania which in 1966 amounted to £80 million. The compensation period is likely to reflect a sharp recession in the Tanzanian economy, never very robust".<sup>26</sup> New estimates put Tanzania's reserves at as low as £20 million—which full compensation might devour completely.<sup>27</sup> But Tanzania claimed that it was quite confident of its capacity to pay. John Malacela, Tanzania's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, said his Government was ready to pay for recently expropriated foreign banks and companies, but did not know what the cost would be. "We wouldn't have nationalized if we didn't think we could pay for them."<sup>28</sup> There is no dearth of writers who think that a state's inability to pay compensation does not rule out its right to nationalize foreign property. A different interpretation of the rules of international law "would be difficult to uphold because the interests...motivating the acts of nationalization are far too important to allow such (different) interpretation."<sup>29</sup> (brackets added). This conclusion appears correct because in most of the post-war nationalizations, lump-sum settlements have been reached and compensation paid is far less than the full value. Moreover, it is felt that nationalization may even be superfluous if full compensation is to be paid in every case irrespective of its merits.<sup>30</sup> As a practical solution to the problem it has however been suggested that "a more fruitful approach is to maintain the principle of compensation, and to try to develop indicia for compensation which are directly related to development."<sup>31</sup>

### **India and Tanzania**

Tanzanian nationalizations affected several businessmen of Indian origin. Representations were made to the Government on humanitarian

grounds and not on any legal basis. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, the then Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, said: "We recognize that it is the sovereign right of an independent country to enact measures concerning ownership of property, within its limits."<sup>32</sup> He recognized that there was no discrimination and nationalization measures applied uniformly to all nationals. The Minister also distinguished between Indian people and people of Indian *origin*. He said:

भारतीयों की किसी सम्पत्ति का राष्ट्रीयकरण नहीं हुआ है।  
भारत मूलक लोगों की सम्पत्ति का कुछ राष्ट्रीयकरण हुआ है।<sup>33</sup>

But this approach could be justified only if all people of Indian origin had become naturalized citizens of Tanzania. Otherwise, under the traditional international law every state has the right to diplomatically protect its own nationals. The Minister declined to disclose estimated losses as "it may prejudice their case in asking for compensation." Thus the Indian attitude to the nationalizations affecting the people of Indian origin has been one of non-interference. Indians were said to have only cultural and no political links with India. A policy of friendly persuasion has been followed to safeguard their interests. One-third of Tanganyika's retail traders were Asians and they controlled two-thirds of the country's business. Wholesalers were European and Asian firms with the former concentrating more on capital goods such as cars, and the latter on piece-goods. They were all affected by the Tanzanian measures. So were many Arabs in Zanzibar. However, of all the countries, only India has taken an unequivocal stand. The reaction of the United Kingdom is not available. Moreover, diplomatic relations between Tanzania and the United Kingdom have only recently been resumed after a break on the Rhodesia issue. Britain could not have recourse to the practice of diplomatic protection so common in the circumstances under review. Some of the other developing countries affected by the Tanzanian measures did not take a harsh view of them. Unlike the developed countries they have refrained from a war of wits.<sup>34</sup>

It is hoped that the developed countries of the world will take a more sympathetic and realistic view of the economic development problems facing the developing countries of Asia and Africa. In the meantime, the latter appear determined to get rid of any obstacle which may come in the way of their 'short-cut' journey to economic independence and prosperity.

At the end it will be appropriate to make a general observation: Higher standards of international law cannot be achieved without creating conditions for it.<sup>35</sup> Fawcett has made a similar observation when he states:

"Law cannot by itself create order. Every community, large or small, national or international, must attain a minimum of order before law can be effective or even be formulated."<sup>36</sup>

#### References

1. In 1963 earnings from sisal represented 35% of the total export earnings of Tanzania. It occupies the first place in world sisal production.



2. Large consignments of cloves are purchased by the Soviet Union.
3. It appears that this action was not supported by President Nyerere.
4. China and Zanzibar entered into an economic-technical pact whereby China was to give an interest free loan of \$14m.
5. *Egyptian Mail*, April 3, 1965 ; *The Times*, London, of the same date.
6. *Hsinhua News Agency*, April 11, 1965.
7. *Egyptian Mail*, June 12, 1965.
8. 'Nationalization' here would not appear to be the correct term to use in the legal context. A more neutral term like 'taking over' is better.
9. Legal Supplement (Part I) to the Zanzibar Gazette Extraordinary, Vol. LXXV. No. 4500 of 17th October 1966, pp. 46-47. The companies nationalized were : Auto Sales Service & Exchange Limited, Kapadia Motor Mart Limited, M. Takim Company, G. Pardhan and Mussa Jusbani & Sons.
10. Legal Supplement (Part II) to the Zanzibar Gazette, Vol. LXXIV, No. 4440 of 30th October 1965.
11. The banks nationalized were : National and Grindlays Bank Limited. The Standard Bank Limited, Barclays Bank D.C.O., Algemene Bank (Nederland N.V.), The Bank of India Limited. The Bank of Baroda Limited, Commercial Bank of Africa Limited, National Bank of Pakistan and Tanzania Bank of Commerce Limited.
12. Firms whose interests were vested in the State Trading Corporation with the countries of incorporation (in brackets) are : Smith Mackenzie & Company Limited (Kenya), Dalgety and Company Limited (England), Dalgety (East Africa) Limited (England), A Baumann and Company Limited (Kenya), Twentsche Overseas Trading Co. (E.A.) Limited (Kenya), African Mercantile Company (Overseas) Limited (England), Wigglesworth & Co. Limited (England), Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika under cap. 211, and East African Cotton Exporters Limited (Uganda). They are mostly staffed by British expatriates. Other firms whose shares are vested in the STC are incorporated in Tanganyika.
13. Interests of Rajwani Mills and Pure Food Products Limited were vested in the National Agricultural Products Board. Shares of some other firms were also vested in the same Board. For details of these items see VI *International Legal Materials*, Washington (November 1967), p. 1219.
14. They were : The Metal Box Company of Tanzania Limited, Kilimanjaro Breweries Limited, Tanzania Breweries Limited, B.A.T. Tanzania Limited, Tanganyika Extract Company Limited, Tanganyika Portland Cement Company Limited, East African Tobacco Company (Tanzania) Limited and Tanzania Bata Shoe Company Limited.
15. Andrew Shonfield in this regard makes a very pertinent observation : "It is somewhat ironical that today the United States is the only advanced country of the Western world in which the railways are stubbornly preserved, against considerable odds, almost as a kind of museum piece of private enterprise." *Modern Capitalism* (1965) p. 302.
16. Konstantin Katzarov, *The Theory of Nationalization*, The Hague (1964) p. 91.
17. *The Guardian*, London, February 7, 1967.

18. *The Times*, London, February 15, 1967.
19. Sections 12, 22, 17, 6 and 4 respectively of the Acts mentioned earlier deal with payment of compensation.
20. *Financial Times*, London, June 15, 1967.
21. *Ibid.*, September 9, 1967.
22. *Ibid.*, February 11, 1967. Book value was the basis of compensation declared in recent Zambian nationalizations also. Current market values were not considered realistic. See *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Financial and Technical Series), July 15-August 14, 1968, p. 1087.
23. *Ibid.*, December 22, 1967. National and Grindlays accepted about one-third of what they had originally asked for. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Financial and Technical Series), Jan. 15-Feb. 14, 1968, p. 921.
24. *The International Herald Tribune*, January 17, 1968.
25. A W. Bradley, "Legal Aspects of the Nationalizations in Tanzania", 3 *East African Law Journal* (Sept. 1967), p. 167; See also Western, "International Law and the Deprivation of Wealth"—Part I, 54 *Virginia Law Review* (1968), 1091 n. Under compensation agreements with Chande Industries Ltd., Ottoman Bank, Tanzania Millers Ltd., The Government agreed to pay 6% interest on outstanding balances from the date of nationalization. *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic Financial and Technical Series), Jan. 15-Feb. 14, 1968, p. 921, April 15-May 14, 1968, p. 1005, and May 15-June 14, 1968, p. 1033.
26. *The Daily Telegraph*, February 9, 1967.
27. Editorial in *The Guardian*, February 21, 1967. In this connection one may recall Iranian nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company whose assets amounted to about \$1,400 million, whereas the Iranian gold reserve at the time of nationalization amounted to only \$239 million.
28. *The New York Times*, March 16, 1967. It may be noted that in international law, expropriation and nationalization are distinguished. See Seidl-Hohenveldern. "Communist Theories on Confiscation and Expropriation: Critical Comments", 7 *American Journal of Comparative Law* (1958), p. 548; Katzarov, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-7, 142-7. The recent refusal by Tanzania to pay pensions under an agreement to Britons who had worked there before independence, may in some measure amount to expropriation of intangible property. However, no definite judgment could be made without going into further details as difficult problems of state succession in international law and other questions are involved. We are not taking up this problem, as it is not directly relevant to the discussion here.
29. Isi Foighel, *Nationalization* (1957), p. 76; see generally. S.C. Jain, "Expropriation of Alien Property and Minimum Standard of International Law," (1967), II *Supreme Court Journal*, Madras, pp. 1-15.
30. See Norman N. Mintz, "Economic Observations on Lump Sum Settlement Agreements, 43 *Indian Law Journal* (1968), p. 886.
31. Harrison C. Dunning, "Law and Economic Development in Africa: The Law of Eminent Domain," 68 *Columbia Law Review*, (1968), p. 1314.
32. (1965), 42 *Lok Sabha Debates*, Col. 12135.
33. *Ibid.*, Col. 12139. Trans.: No property of Indians has been nationalized. Some property of the people of Indian origin has been taken over.
34. It does not, however, mean that one should neglect a study of nationalization undertaken by developing countries of the enterprises of other developing countries themselves. The importance of such analysis has been stressed in Jain, Book Review, 44 *International Affairs* (July 1968), p. 525.
35. See Jain, Book Review, 17 *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* (1968), p. 539.
36. *The Law of Nations* (1968), p. 6.

## Prospects of Trade with Oil-rich Libya

J. C. SRIVASTAVA

LIBYA, the new Arab Republic\* in North Africa, is among the few countries in the world which have undergone a rapid economic transformation from a "wretchedly poor country"<sup>1</sup> in 1955 to a nation now "bubbling with prosperity"<sup>2</sup>. The discovery of oil in 1959 has changed the economic structure of the country and boosted its income from £L56 million in 1959 (1£L = Rs. 21) to £L 660 million in 1967. Its per capita income rose from £L40 to £L400 (or \$1,120) which is the highest in Africa. Scarcity of capital or balance of payments difficulties—limiting factors in the growth of an economy—no longer exist. On the other hand, the country is faced with a continuing challenge of devising suitable development programmes to make the best use of its ever growing oil income. Market potentials, increasing as they are in the wake of the oil boom, need to be explored and exploited for fostering larger trade and new economic links.

### Oil Resources

Libya, stretching deep into the Sahara desert, occupies the sixth place among the world's leading oil producing countries. It is the fourth largest exporter of crude petroleum—next only to Venezuela, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The output of crude oil has increased at a fantastic rate from 6.6 million barrels in 1961 to 620 million barrels in 1967.<sup>3</sup> The total oil production potential of Libya is estimated at 45,000 million barrels. In addition, the country is endowed with vast deposits of natural gas which remain largely unutilised. These natural resources, if properly taken advantage of, can pull the Libyan economy out of stagnation and place it on the road to dynamic development.

### Development Programmes

The Government of Libya is not unaware of this economic reality. It enacted an Oil Resources Law in 1958 under which 70 per cent of oil revenue is required to be invested for development purposes. This has given a new dimension to Libya's economic advancement and all-round development is taking place. The country has embarked on a plan to rehabilitate and modernise its agriculture which, owing to primitive method of cultivation and subsistence farming, is not yet in a position to meet the growing food requirements of the country. It has to import about one-fourth of its food requirements.

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\*After the coup on September 1, 1969, the kingdom of Libya is known as the Libyan Arab Republic.

Libya is also making every possible effort to be industrially self-sufficient. Establishment of industries in diverse fields is an important feature of its industrialisation programme. The country has come to realise that the growth of the economy cannot be sustained in the long run without a sound economic base. The First Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan (1963-68), based solely on the country's own resources, has laid considerable stress on creating the necessary infrastructure for rapid economic growth. The major portion of planned outlay—fixed initially at £L170 million which at the end of the Plan period is estimated to be £L350 million—has been allocated for the "construction of highways, ports, power stations, development of water supplies",<sup>4</sup> etc. The economy is now geared to a high level of development spending and a relatively freer import inflow.

### Foreign Trade

Foreign trade plays a crucial role in the development of the Libyan economy. The tremendous increase in exports during the last few years, as a result of the swift development of oil resources, has enabled the country to raise its volume of imports to meet the twin challenges of improving the living standards of the people and bringing about an orderly and fast rate of economic development. The trend in its two-way trade is indicated in the following table :

#### External Trade of Libya

(£L Million)

	1961	1965	1966	1967	1968
Exports	7.8	284.5	355.4	420.7	669.9
Exports of crude oil	4.1	280.1	350.6	416.6	667.3
Imports	53.3	114.4	144.7	170.2	230.2
Balance of Trade	-45.5	+170.1	+210.7	+250.5	+439.7

Despite the steady rise in imports, the surplus in Libya's trade account rose steadily from about £L50 million in 1963 to £L440 million in 1968 due to the accelerated increase in its exports of crude oil. Besides petroleum, which constitutes 99.5 per cent of the total exports, there are other products which have also been figuring in the export trade. Among such exportable products are hides and skins, groundnuts, scrap metals, wool, citrus fruits, etc. Their total exports amount to about £L 2 million. Their importance in export trade has however been declining partly because of the rise in consumer demand.

Since Libya has to depend for most of its requirements on foreign sources, the composition of its imports shows a wider diversification. There has recently been some basic changes in its import pattern. The share of commodities forming part of the development process is steadily increasing. For example, imports of machinery and transport equipment accounted for 38 per cent of total imports in 1966 as against 15 per cent in 1955. Imports of food stuffs, textiles, etc., have gone down in importance although the total value of their imports has shown an improvement. A sizable increase has also taken place in the imports of manufactured goods particularly in the field of building materials, iron and steel, manufactures of metals, footwear, chemicals and allied products.

It is however expected that the composition of imports will undergo further changes<sup>5</sup> as a result of the development programmes. For example, because of domestic production, imports of manufactured items like cement, textiles, readymade garments, soaps, etc., may decline. On the other hand, as a result of the heavy plan outlay for construction works, the demand for construction materials and equipment is likely to show sharp increases. Similarly, imports of capital equipment, plants and machinery will rise at a much faster rate. Consumer demand is also likely to shift in favour of sophisticated goods like refrigerators, cookers, radios, TV sets, sewing machines, electric fans, etc.

While exploring the prospects of increasing India's exports to the growing Libyan market, these developments have to be taken note of.

#### India's Trade Pattern with Libya and Prospects

India's trade with Libya is characterised by two main features. The first is that it has been almost one-sided trade in favour of India as our imports have either been nil or negligible. The second is that the volume of our exports which have shown an upward trend from Rs. 3 million in 1961-62 to Rs. 14.5 million in 1968-69 appears to be too small when compared to the size of Libya's total imports which amounted to £L230 million (Rs. 4,830 million) in 1968. The development of our two-way trade during the last few years is given below<sup>6</sup> :

	(Rs. Million)				
	1961-62	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69
Exports	3.0	6.2	7.0	11.3	14.5
Imports	Neg.	0.7	0.01	Neg.	Neg.
Balance of Trade	+3.0	+5.5	+6.9	+11.3	+14.5

(Figures for 1961-62 and 1965-66 are in predevaluation rupees and the rest in terms of post-devaluation rupees.)

The major items of our exports to Libya consist of a variety of products including traditional items like cotton textiles, jute goods, spices, unmanufactured tobacco and new manufactures such as readymade clothing, engineering goods, footwear, works of art, etc. The trend of their exports during the last two years is indicated below :

**India's Exports to Libya<sup>7</sup>**

(Rs. Million)

	1967-68	1968-69
Clothing (except fur clothing)	2.56	7.93
Engineering goods	1.53	2.80
Cotton manufactures	0.65	0.85
Works of art, collector's pieces and antiques	0.30	0.63
Footwear	0.27	0.62
Spices	1.52	0.52
Fabrics of artsilk & synthetic fibres	0.05	0.25
Coir yarn	0.35	0.12
Cotton yarn & thread	0.09	0.11
Jute manufactures	1.46	0.11
Unmanufactured tobacco	0.94	Nil.
Mica	—	—
<b>Total (incl. others)</b>	<b>11.25</b>	<b>14.48</b>

Although India's exports have more than doubled during last six years, our share in Libyan imports in fact declined from 0.59 per cent in 1961 to 0.35 per cent in 1967. One of the main reasons for our inability to expand trade with Libya at a relatively faster rate as pinpointed by the IIFT's Export Market Report in 1966, which holds good even now, is "that Indian exporters are by and large oblivious of the sweeping changes that have taken place in that country in recent years and the promising opportunity the country offers"<sup>8</sup>. It is, therefore, essential to get to know the needs and nuances of the Libyan economy. We have to attach importance to the changing pattern of consumer demand if we want to make a sizable inroad into this market.

**Export Prospects**

Libya, it must be noted, is a market of great potential in Africa. Unlike many developing countries, it is not handicapped by balance of payments difficulties or paucity of foreign exchange. On the other hand, imports are being encouraged by relaxation of import controls and reduction of customs duty. The inflow of foreign exchange on a large scale has created an unprecedented demand for all kinds of goods and services. The increased development activities have also reinforced import requirements.

It is against this background that the problems and prospects of stepping up India's trade and enlarging our economic relations with Libya have to be explored and examined.

The significant increase in our exports of readymade garments (clothing) and engineering goods suggest that India has the capacity to withstand foreign competition. Indian woollen sweaters and cardigans have been exceptionally popular in that country. Their exports in the year 1968-69 amounted to Rs. 7 million as against Rs. 2.3 million in 1967-68. Similarly, if efforts are made, cotton garments would find an equally good market in Libya.

In engineering goods, a larger offtake from India has taken place in items like pressure and non-pressure oil lamps, sewing machines, diesel engines, dry batteries, wire and wire products, auto parts, bicycles, etc. Shipments of plants and machinery have also been made recently. There are however immense prospects for engineering items, both capital and consumer goods. It must be noted that a real breakthrough in our exports to Libya has to be made in this field. The fast developing economy of the country with new industries coming up one after another offers a most lucrative market for plants, machinery and equipment. The demand for various kinds of agricultural machinery and equipment is also going up. India can and should meet most of these requirements. The intermediate type of technology and relatively less sophisticated type of machinery and equipment produced in India are most suited to the developing economy of Libya.

Among other items, construction materials offer an equally promising market. It has been estimated that about 70 per cent of the total investment allocated for development has been earmarked for construction work and about 75 per cent of the materials used in construction activities are imported.

Good scope is also reported to exist for food articles, such as prawns, shrimps, frog legs, tinned vegetables, pickles, confectionery, etc. India has been exporting these items to the most sophisticated markets of the U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Japan, Australia, etc. There is no reason why it cannot supply these items to Libya.

So is the case with tea. India has exported tea to Libya of the order of Rs. 30,000 in 1968-69 for the first time. It may, however, be noted that Libya is one of the leading tea-consuming countries in Africa with its per capita consumption estimated at 7 lb per annum. At present, Libya imports about 6,000 tonnes of tea every year. Ceylon and China are the principal suppliers. India, being the largest producer and exporter of tea in the world, cannot afford to be oblivious to the growing demand in Libya.

Imports of coffee are equally large and increasing. On an average, Libya imports about 6,000 tonnes of coffee, the bulk of which comes from Uganda, Kenya, Singapore, Italy and Brazil. So far, Indian coffee has not made any impact in the Libyan market.

Imports of spices have also been increasing at a brisk pace. India has been a major source of supply of pepper, turmeric, cardamom, etc., although there has been a setback in our exports in 1968-69. This, however, should not deter us from intensifying our sales efforts.

In textiles, the opportunities are not too insignificant although our exports have remained more or less stagnant. However, if efforts are made to supply items in accordance with the consumer's preference, we can step up our exports. Much progress can also be made in exports of man-made fabrics.

These are only a few examples. India could supply Libya with many more products.

#### **Some Limitations**

The vast and growing potential of the Libyan market cannot be tapped or taken full advantage of unless the handicaps restraining the growth of our exports are removed or mitigated. Among the major bottlenecks hindering our exports are the absence of a direct shipping service between India and Libya, lack of a planned marketing strategy to build business confidence among Libyan buyers, inadequate contacts among businessmen of the two countries and non-availability of requisite information in Libya about India's capacity to supply quality products at competitive prices.

While every effort has to be made to overcome these impediments, necessary arrangements have to be made to project the new industrial image of India vigorously. It is hoped that the newly established Indian Embassy in Tripoli will do some exploratory work in this regard. Advantage can also be taken by planned participation in the Tripoli International Fair organised every year by the Government of Libya. Significant progress in the Libyan market can be made through the "demonstration effect" rather than by mere publicity. Exchange of businessmen's delegations between the two countries more frequently than hitherto will help create the right kind of climate for expansion of trade.

#### **Imports from Libya: Possibilities**

International trade "is a two-way traffic". Thus while endeavouring to promote Indian exports, there is need to look into the possibilities of imports from Libya.

Libya is one of the leading exporters of petroleum. India imports crude oil worth Rs. 550 million per annum mainly from Middle East countries. The scope for importing some crude petroleum from Libya can be examined. In the non-oil sector, hides and skins, raw wool and metal scraps are significant exports from Libya. India has been importing these items on a large scale. It imported hides and skins worth Rs. 17 million and raw wool and animal hair worth Rs. 110 million in 1968-69. Similarly, imports of non-ferrous metals were of the order of Rs. 19 million and of iron and steel scrap worth over Rs 300 million. India should explore whether some of our requirements of these items could be met from Libya. If some headway is made in this direction it will go a long



way in strengthening our economic relations and bringing about lasting trade ties with that country.

### **Trade Promotion Through Joint Ventures**

India's trade with Libya, or for that matter with any other country, would increase at a faster rate if it is aligned to larger economic objectives and pursued in a spirit of co operation. Joint ventures have been recognised as a significant instrument of promoting economic co-operation and fostering larger trade relationships.

Prospects of establishing industries and other projects on a collaboration basis are good and increasing. The tremendous opportunities created by the oil boom are worthy of note. As rightly pointed out by the IIFT's Market Survey Report "the present boom conditions in the economy, rising tempo of public investments, continued local expenditure on a huge scale by the oil companies and substantial surpluses in balance of trade, have all combined to create an unprecedented demand for goods and services creating (thereby) a favourable climate for private investment in several fields."<sup>9</sup>

The anxiety of the Libyan Government to bring about rapid industrialisation so as to lessen the dependence of its economy on a single commodity, viz, oil, is reflected in the enactment of the National Industries Law granting certain privileges and concessions to new enterprises. In view of the inadequacy of entrepreneurship and technical know-how the Government has also introduced the Foreign Capital Investment Law to encourage inflow of foreign capital and know-how. An Industrial Bank to provide share capital and liberal credits to industrial ventures has also been operating.

Such facilities have attracted foreign investments in Libya on a very large scale. India can also make a decisive contribution in this direction. There is scope for undertaking contracts with Libyan participation for "civil works such as building construction, drainage schemes, road construction and electrical works".<sup>10</sup> In the manufacturing line, there is scope for Indian collaboration in such fields as "electrical lamps, automobiles and its spare parts, distilled water for industrial uses, steel rolling mills, builders hardware and various light engineering industries".<sup>11</sup>

There are several other fields, such as textiles, plastic ware, household utensils, steel furniture, assembling of air-conditioning and refrigeration equipment, oil engines, footwear, where India can collaborate competently. It has already gained competence and proficiency in setting up joint ventures in the developing countries of Africa and Asia as well as in highly advanced countries like the U.K., Canada, West Germany and Australia. As many as 80 projects covering a wide field have already been approved by the Government of India.

In Libya, at present only two joint venture projects are operating : one of them is a huge pipe factory which has already started production. Its production capacity is £L130,000 worth of RCC pipes on a one-shift basis. Another project to manufacture asbestos cement products was

initiated recently. Many other projects can come up if determined efforts are made by both our industrialists and Government.

### Technical Co-operation

In addition to joint ventures, there is considerable scope for technical co-operation. India can extend technical assistance to Libya in a number of fields such as "housing, manpower, industry, electrical power and professional lines."<sup>12</sup> Technical co-operation can also include training of Libyans in India. Provision has already been made through the India-Africa Development Association, which came into being in 1963, to provide in-plant training facilities to African nationals in Indian factories. Indian projects in Libya have also made arrangements for such training.

India can also provide skilled labour, technicians and other personnel. There is an acute shortage of "human capital" inhibiting the growth of the Libyan economy. By providing skilled personnel India will earn not only goodwill of Libya but also valuable foreign exchange. This will help introduce Indian tools and products in the Libyan market.

Libya, after the coup of September 1, 1969, has become a republic. But it is hoped that there will not be any major changes in its economic plans and programmes. The change in the political set-up should not deter us from making positive efforts to strengthen our economic relations with Libya. The Government of India should examine the possibility of entering into an agreement for the promotion of trade and economic co-operation on a mutually advantageous basis. It has already entered into trade agreements with Tunisia and Morocco, two of the four Maghreb countries. A similar agreement is under negotiation with Algeria. Thus, we cannot afford to overlook the opportunities that have emerged in Libya in the wake of the oil boom.

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## DOCUMENTATION

### **6th Session of OAU Summit**

The Sixth Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the countries associated with the Organisation of African Unity was held from September 6 to 10 in Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, where six years ago they took the historic decision to set up the OAU and worked out its Charter. The number of participants in this year's meeting reflects the changes which have occurred in the continent since then: representatives of 41 independent countries this year whereas in 1963 there were only 32 such countries.

The Assembly was greeted by the Soviet and other Governments and was attended by U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant. The latter fact undoubtedly added to its significance.

The main item on the agenda was the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in Africa. The Assembly discussed in detail the situation in the South which indeed represents a part of the body "cut off" by the racists and the colonialists. It hailed the obvious successes of the national liberation movement and at the same time analysed the circumstances which hindered the achievement of total victory over colonialism and racialism. The delegates noted that the imperialist powers had increased support to the racist-colonialist bloc in the South of the continent and critically analysed the activities of the OAU and its specialised body—the Liberation Committee—whose task is to co-ordinate assistance to national liberation organisations. The Assembly discussed and adopted a manifesto urging the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, condemning racial discrimination and apartheid, and supporting armed struggle against the racist regimes. The Assembly voted to make the manifesto the basic document determining OAU policy towards the racialist and colonialist regimes in the southern part of Africa.

At the session of the OAU Council of Ministers, which as usual met on the eve of the Assembly to draw up recommendations and draft decisions, some of the participants—though very few—objected to the inclusion of the Middle East problem in the agenda. Most of the delegates, however, overruled them, stressing that the OAU was directly interested in the discussion of the Middle East conflict because one of its members, the United Arab Republic, was a victim of aggression. In its unanimously adopted resolution on the Middle East the Assembly called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories and for the solution of the Middle East crisis as provided for in the U.N. Security Council Resolution of Nov. 22, 1967. The discussion of this problem

was especially timely in view of the Israel's latest provocations against the UAR. The Assembly passed an additional resolution censuring Israel and expressing solidarity with the people and the Government of the UAR.

The debate was particularly heated on the question of Nigeria, where a civil war is already in its third year. As is well known, there is no unanimity on this issue: four African countries have recognised the Biafran separatist regime for one reason or another while the overwhelming majority back the Federal government's action to preserve the country's unity and territorial integrity. The Addis Ababa Assembly adopted a resolution urging the belligerents immediately to suspend hostilities, institute peace talks on the basis of recognition in the interest of Africa, of Nigeria's territorial integrity, and ensure security and equal rights to all the nationalities in the country. Many observers are of the opinion that this resolution creates favourable conditions for the success of the mediatory mission of the recently established OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria.

Such were the Assembly decisions on the key issues on the agenda. The meeting has on the whole definitely helped in the implementation of the purposes of the Addis Ababa Charter—liberation of Africa from the political and economic yoke and development of co-operation among the African states.

*New Times*, Sept. 24.

#### **Inaugural Speech**

His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I made the following speech on the opening day of the Summit :

"On behalf of our people, Government and myself, we would like to extend our heartfelt welcome to all the distinguished Heads of State and Governments and to all delegates who are here to attend the sixth regular session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU. Your presence at this meeting, in spite of pressing duties in your respective countries, shows the great importance you attach to the OAU. We send our greetings to those Heads of State who have been unable to attend our meeting in person."

"We extend our congratulations to the delegates of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. We are confident that the difficulties which their country has encountered following accession to independence are being solved to the satisfaction of the people and Government of Equatorial Guinea. We would like to avail myself of this occasion to express our admiration and goodwill to the people of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea."

"We are also happy to welcome the observers and representatives of African liberation movements. When we extend our greetings to the freedom fighters who are on the battlefield through their colleagues present here, we cannot pass without calling to memory our brothers who sacrificed themselves for their countries fighting against powerful adversaries."

"The presence amidst us of H.E. U Thant, Secretary-General of the UN, at our session will give added significance to our meeting. His presence will underscore the identity of purposes of the UN and of the OAU. We are glad to welcome the observers from the various UN agencies and the African regional organizations who have also come here to share our thoughts.

"Mr. Chairman, with a young organization like ours, we believe we must review its past record on occasions like this with the view to appraising whether or not it has fulfilled, in some measure, the expectations of the founders. The OAU is not simply a forum where the leaders of African states meet from time to time to exchange views, but it is a very realistic instrument for the maintenance of peace and advancement of the well-being of the African people. Moreover it is an institution which has already proved itself to be essential. We cannot but recall that before the OAU came into being, critics were quick to point out that the idea of continental co-operation was an unrealizable idea. Happily, they have been proved wrong. The OAU has become a flexible institution serving the people of Africa to harmonize their economic, political, social and cultural developments. There have been and will be ups and downs in our efforts to achieve our objectives, but the people of Africa and their leaders have realized that only in unity of aims and of purposes can common problems be solved. This in itself is a great achievement. While we should take justifiable pride in what we have accomplished, we must continue to follow the path of co-operation if we are to fulfil the aspirations of our peoples in all human endeavours.

"The OAU has also grown in terms of the structure required advance its aims and purposes. Among the important decisions of the to first session of the Assembly held in Cairo, member states signed the Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration thereby committing themselves to solve inter-African problems through an African institution. Although so far not much use has been made of the Commission, we must not minimize the importance of having an institution ready to render its services when the occasion arises. Furthermore it is by the establishment of such institutions that we can develop the habit of resorting to them as the need arises.

"At the second session of the Assembly held in Accra, Ghana, another important decision urged Member States not to allow those refugees who flee from independent African countries to conduct subversive activities against their countries of origin. This decision has helped strengthen inter-African relations by removing a cause of friction.

"The fourth regular session of the Assembly held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, after thoroughly discussing the situation that was created by the mercenary phenomenon in Africa, decided to take all necessary steps to expel all mercenaries from the continent and consequently urged all Member States to see to it that these mercenaries would not return to Africa. We are glad that this has been successfully accomplished. Furthermore, the Kinshasa Summit set up the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria in order to assist that country to settle its internal

crisis. Following this decision, the Committee has made continuous efforts to bring about a reconciliation in Nigeria. In addition, the fourth Assembly recommended that Member States take a unified stand on the UN recommendations on the question of the Middle East crisis and help find a solution to it. Last year at Algiers, important issues like the conflict in Nigeria and the problem in the Middle East were dealt with at length. The Conference had urged the parties involved in the Nigerian conflict to bring the fighting to an end and requested the Federal Military Government to give amnesty to all those involved in the rebellion.

"We are now assembled here to discuss important questions which affect the future of our continent. As we look at the agenda, we find that we are going to sign the OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of the refugee problem in Africa. We know that there are over a million refugees in Africa who have been divided into two categories. One, those who leave their countries as a result of oppressive colonial rule and, two, those who come from independent States to seek asylum in other countries. This Convention is designed to alleviate the economic burden borne by the refugee recipient countries and at the same time to prevent refugees from carrying out political activities detrimental to their countries of origin. The draft Convention which will be presented to us supplements the UN Convention on Refugees. It has been carefully studied by the experts and has been approved by the Council of Ministers. We hope that the Convention will help provide solutions to the refugee problem in Africa.

"What we have outlined above shows that the Organisation is actively pursuing the task entrusted to it. We have given much time regarding the various issues inherited from colonial rule and what attempts have been made to provide them with solutions. The fact that we regularly meet every year in order to exchange views on these vital problems affecting Africa is in itself a success. The Organisation is fulfilling its *raison d'être* without minimizing the criticism that can be made of our institution. We believe the service that it has already rendered in some of the most serious political conflicts of our continent and the fact that the institution can render such assistance justifies our belief that we are entitled to deal ourselves with our own problems. In so doing, we believe we are discharging a collective responsibility that the Charter of the UN permits us to fulfil. As time passes, we shall realise more and more the need for the OAU.

"Some of the major problems which existed some years ago when we founded this Organization are still with us. Thus, most of the colonial territories which were under colonial and racist administrators are no nearer to their independence now than they were before. On the contrary, the oppressive colonial rule continues unabated. These past years have proved that the racist and colonial regimes in Africa do not listen to reason. We have learnt once more the bitter lesson that economic sanctions can never be effective against such recalcitrant States unless it is backed up by force. To do this, one has to have the co-operation of the major powers which so far has become difficult to secure. Ultimately, therefore, the liberation of these territories must remain the responsibility of freedom movements themselves. When we look at the report submitted by the Liberation Committee, the assistance extended to the liberation movements has not been adequate. True, we have economic difficulties in each of our

respective countries, but we should make sacrifices in order to assist the movements. For unless our brothers under colonial rule are freed our own independence remains in doubt. Not only that, world peace itself will ultimately be in jeopardy.

"In the economic field, we have made consistent efforts in the past six years to improve our situations. When the Organisation was founded, a number of specialised agencies were set up. These organs have submitted studies which deserve our support for their implementation at the national and regional levels. In this regard, we are happy to note that steps have been taken to institute regional common markets, customs unions and to co-ordinate infrastructural developments. These are measures which could truly give sustenance to our aspirations. We should therefore rededicate ourselves in order to see them bear fruit.

"The considerations which inspired us to set up our Organisation are still with us. The determination of the African peoples to overcome all obstacles in the path of unity cannot be doubted. We must therefore intensify our co-operation within the structure of our Organization. Our problems are similar; we have to raise the standard of living of our peoples, eradicate illiteracy, expand medical facilities, improve agricultural and industrial developments and many other similar necessities. Africa has remained the source of raw materials. But she has no say over the determination of the price of her resources. We can remove this situation only by sustained co-operation. Not long ago the tenth anniversary of the Economic Commission for Africa was held here when important decisions in the field of economic affairs were taken. These decisions will be submitted to the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments for political support. Such a collaboration between the two Organisations—the OAU and the ECA—will bear fruit only if we extend to both our full support.

"Before concluding, we would like to stress that at this session we must exchange views frankly on the Nigerian crisis—with the determination of finding a solution satisfactory to all. The situation in the Middle East continues to move from bad to worse as a result of the non-implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution. The situation is fraught with danger not only for the countries concerned and the major powers as well to find a solution to this long standing conflict on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. Finally, we would like to reaffirm once again that Ethiopia is prepared to participate fully in all these issues and to contribute her share in finding acceptable solutions.

"Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Heads of State and Governments, we would like to thank you for listening to our statement, and we pray to the Almighty to bless our deliberations. Long live African unity."

#### **Texts of Resolutions**

##### **1. On Israeli Aggression Against UAR**

According to information which has come to our knowledge, we, the Heads of State and Governments, meeting in Addis Ababa this day, 9 September, 1969,

*Deeply moved* by reports that a further aggression has been perpetrated today by Israeli forces against another part of the national territory of the UAR,

1. Condemn this act of aggression, like all other acts of aggression directed against a sister country ;

2. Desire to reaffirm, in these circumstances, our solidarity with the UAR ;

3. Appeal to the conscience of mankind to do everything possible in order to spare our continent, which has suffered all too often from invasion by foreign forces, from becoming afresh the scene of tension and conflict, with unforeseeable consequences for Africa and the rest of the world.

#### Text

#### 2. On continued Israeli occupation of part of territory of UAR

The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity, meeting in its Sixth Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 9 September, 1969.

*Having heard* the statement by His Excellency the Minister of National Guidance, Head of the UAR Delegation, of the situation prevailing in the Middle East and more particularly in the UAR, having regard to fresh developments and events in that area ;

*Deeply concerned* at the worsening of the situation in the area, owing to the fact that the withdrawal of the occupation forces has not been carried out, despite the Resolutions of the Security Council (Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967) and of the OAU (AHG/Res. 53 (V) and AHG-ST. 2 (IV) ;

*Recalling* resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 of the United Nations Security Council ;

*Reaffirming* its opposition to the occupation by forces of any part or the whole of one country by another ;

1. Takes formal note of the statement by His Excellency the Minister of National Guidance and of the determination of the UAR, which it has reiterated, to implement Resolution 242 of the Security Council dated 22 November 1967 ;

2. Reaffirms its solidarity with the UAR ;

3. Reaffirms emphatically the contents of Resolution AHG/Res. 53(V) adopted at the Fifth Summit Meeting in Algiers, in September 1968, by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU, which reads as follows :—



"The Assembly of Heads of State Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its fifth Ordinary Session in Algiers, from 13 to 16 September 1968 ;

*Having heard* the statement of the UAR Minister for Foreign Affairs on the situation in the Middle East in general and the UAR in particular ;

1. *Takes note* of the statement by the UAR Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

2. *Reaffirms* in this respect its support for the UAR;

3. *Calls for* the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Security Council on 22 November 1967, and appeals to all Member States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this Resolution.

### 3. On Nigeria

The Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Sixth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 9 September 1969.

*Having carefully* considered the progress report of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria for the period from September 1968 to August 1969 ;

*Considering* the vital importance of concerted and unanimous action by African Governments within the OAU for a happy solution of the Nigerian civil war ;

*Deeply concerned* at the continuance of the civil war in Nigeria and of the grave consequences resulting therefrom for Nigeria and for Africa ;

*Aware* of its responsibilities towards Africa and the world ;

*Determined* to help settle the civil war in Nigeria by peaceful means and in accordance with the basic principles of the OAU Charter ;

1. *NOTES* with satisfaction the progress report of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria covering the past year ;
2. *CONGRATULATES* the Consultative Committee on the efforts it has exerted and again expresses its full confidence in the Committee's ability to carry out the important mission entrusted to it, within the shortest possible time ;
3. *APPEALS* solemnly and urgently to the two parties involved in the civil war to agree to preserve in the overriding interest of Africa, the unity of Nigeria and accept immediately suspension of hostilities and the opening, without delay, of negotiations intended to preserve unity of Nigeria and restore reconciliation and peace that will ensure for the population every form of security and every guarantee of equal

rights, prerogatives and obligations ;

4. INVITES the Consultative Committee on Nigeria to offer its good offices to facilitate these negotiations ;
5. MAKES a solemn and urgent appeal to all Governments, International Organizations, humanitarian institutions as well as to all political, moral and religious bodies in the world to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution and to desist from any action, gesture and attitude likely to jeopardize the efforts of the OAU in finding an African solution to the Nigerian crisis.

## Politics of Defection

N.S. JAGANNATHAN

THE phenomenon of political defection is easy enough to recognise though it is somewhat more difficult to define. Part of the difficulty arises from the differences in the conceptual needs of those seeking a definition and the purposes for which the definition is considered expedient. For example, if the definition was being attempted in the context of combating the manifestly unhealthy political consequences of defection, one would have to take good care that permissible, and indeed morally compelling, acts of defections do not come within it and therefore within the mischief of any punitive sanctions against defection that might be devised. For our immediate purposes, political defection may be taken as the acquisition of new political loyalties by those elected to a legislature either as representatives of particular parties or as non-party independents. In particular it is concerned with the kind of transfer of loyalties that has bedevilled the politics of some of the States in India in the years after the fourth General Election in the spring of 1967. As the political experience of a country trying out with a deep sense of commitment the political processes of a Parliamentary system, these vicissitudes will be instructive to other countries similarly placed in Asia and Africa.

Change of political loyalties is not a sudden development after the 1967 General Election in the Indian Polity, though some of its more unsavoury aspects manifested themselves in all their stark nakedness only during this period. The fourth General Election was in many ways a decisive turning point in the evolution of parliamentary democracy in India. It ended a twenty-year-old near-monopoly of political power by the Indian National Congress. As the party which was mainly responsible for ending British rule in India and whose leadership had an unquestioned moral authority, the Congress Party won the ready acquiescence of the people in its assuming, as it were, the reversionary right to rule the country from the British. But in the years since independence, it has progressively shed its unique character as a national movement and acquired more and more the lineaments of a conventional political party. Latterly, it has also lived rather extravagantly on the moral capital it accumulated in the years before independence.

The years before the fourth General Election was therefore a period of growing disenchantment with the Congress Party. As a consequence, realignment of political forces on the basis of concerted anti-Congress alliances and electoral adjustments began to take shape. Political parties spanning the entire ideological spectrum from the extreme right to the extreme left readily subordinated their differences to the overwhelming need they

felt for dislodging the Congress from the seat of power.<sup>1</sup> Some of the contradictions inherent in this essentially negative approach were to return to plague the political scene after the general election and become a crucial factor in the politics of defection. But for the moment, these arrangements paid off.

Another relevant factor was the pre-election defection, if it can be so called, of many Congressmen who left the organisation, singly or in groups, with a variety of motives. These ranged from wholly admirable political integrity to the not so admirable umbrage at being denied a "ticket" to contest the election as the party's candidate. These erstwhile Congressmen, who often claimed to be truer Congressmen than the official ones, were another element in the post-election politics of defections.

As stated earlier, the fourth General Election broke decisively the Congress dominance of the political scene. On the eve of the election, the Congress was the ruling party with a comfortable and indeed unassailable majority in the Federal Parliament and in the State legislatures except in Kerala which was under President's Rule.<sup>2</sup> But after the election, the Congress Party was returned with a greatly reduced majority in the Lok Sabha.<sup>3</sup> In the sixteen States that went to the polls in February, 1967,<sup>4</sup> the Congress Party gained an absolute majority in eight<sup>5</sup> and failed to do so in an equal number of States.<sup>6</sup> It must however be remembered that even where the Congress failed to get an absolute majority, it was still the party with the largest majority except in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Orissa.<sup>7</sup>

Both at the Centre and in the States in which the Congress had an absolute majority, it has no difficulty in forming governments—at least to begin with, though one such government, that of Haryana, fell within twelve days of its being constituted and another, that of Madhya Pradesh, within five months. By the same token, in the three States in which the non-Congress groups were individually or jointly stronger than the Congress—Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Orissa—stable non-Congress governments were formed and endure to this day. Of these three, Tamil Nadu was unique in that a single non-Congress Party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, had an absolute majority in the legislature and was able to form the government on its own without having to go in for a coalition with its electoral partners.

Neither in these three States, nor in the six out of the eight States in which the Congress formed the government in March 1967, has any problem of defection arisen in any serious form. In other words, it is only in States where the electorate had not made a definite choice either in favour or against the Congress that the elected have been able to indulge in opportunistic floor crossing and defections with the electorate looking on more or less helplessly. These States are Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Of these Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had Congress governments to begin with. The others had non-Congress coalitions of varying degrees of stability and cohesion. Regionally speaking, the South and West of India have been free from the politics of defection in its virulent and unsettling form. North and Eastern India—with the exception of Assam—have been plagued by

this kind of politics, though the mid-term poll held in five of them has given some respite from it.

It is not possible to trace in detail—nor is it necessary—the complicated two-way traffic in loyalties. The broad pattern of behaviour is clear enough. Minuscule majorities that the leaders of the party in power commanded in the legislatures was the proximate reason for the frequent transfer—solicited or *suo motu*—of loyalties by the legislators leading to threats, actual or potential, to the governments. The expression “toppling” became a familiar reality in the months following the election. Conversely, attempts to meet these threats was another cause of the encouragement of defections.

The accompanying “defection diary” that attempts to record the climactic moments of the defection drama will give some idea of the political instability and administrative chaos brought about by defectors. Governments were formed in all the States after the fourth General Election in early March 1967 except in Rajasthan where defections stalled even the formation of the first government and President’s rule had to be imposed. (A Congress government, however, was formed after a good deal of defection and counter defection to and from the Congress, in April.) Before the end of March, one government—that of Haryana—had fallen (within twelve days of its installation). On the first of April fell another—that of Uttar Pradesh—within seventeen days of its installation. Before the end of July, the third government—that of Madhya Pradesh—had fallen. (All the three governments that had been “toppled” so far were Congress governments). By the end of November, three more governments—all of them non-Congress for a change—had collapsed. One of them, that of Haryana, was the second government to collapse in the State since the election and first non-Congress government—and a defector-led one at that—to fall. On the same day that the Haryana Government fell—November 21—the non-Congress United Front Government in West Bengal was dismissed after a month of bitter constitutional wrangling between the Federal government in New Delhi and the State government in Calcutta. A defector-headed government was installed on the same day. Four days later, another United Front Government was toppled by a defector in Punjab. November indeed was a memorable month with three United Front Governments falling in quick succession within five days.

Within nine months of the General Election, six governments had fallen in five States. These nine months saw the two-way traffic of defection and counter-defection at its most bewildering frequency and intensity. This was also a period of the most acrimonious feuding between the States and the Federal Government, owing no doubt to the circumstances that government at New Delhi was that of the Congress party. The table does not communicate the excitement of the happenings and the almost daily change of loyalties—often of the same people changing sides more than once—and the alarms and excursions of the defection drama. The situation had indeed its farcical aspects. One Mr. Gaya Lal, a legislator in Haryana, changed sides thrice within a fortnight, once within nine hours.<sup>8</sup> The expression, the politics of “*Aya Ram and Gaya Ram*” i.e. the politics of Ram that came and Ram that went, is believed to have been euphoni-

cally inspired by Mr. Gaya Lal,<sup>9</sup> and Mr. Hiranand Arya, whom Dr. Kashyap has rightly described as "Haryana's champion defector," changed sides five times in nine months.

This was also the period in which the loyalties of legislators had to be verified by the Governor by personal inquiries and by obtaining written declarations. These declarations were not always reliable. Claims and counter claims of support were made by rival leaders, often on the basis of the dubious loyalty of persons who were on the lists of supporters. This was also a period when the political system had to endure the indignity of legislators being paraded before the Governor and the President for the purpose of proving rival claims.

If this was the period during which the ugliest features of political opportunism manifested themselves in all their horror, it was also the period—and this is one of the more hopeful aspects of Indian democracy—that saw the emergence of a deep revulsion from the unprincipled politics of the turncoat. Public discussion of these issues led eventually to a resolution being passed in the Federal Parliament on December 8, 1967, calling for the appointment of a committee consisting of representatives of all political parties and constitutional experts to devise ways of combating the evil. Some of the recommendations of this Committee, popularly known as the Chavan Committee, are discussed later.

Though the intensity of the defector cross traffic had abated somewhat after November, it was serious enough throughout 1968 for several governments to fall and for President's rule to be imposed on these States. Thus in January 1968 fell the United Front Government in Bihar installed after the General Election, to be followed by a succession of defector governments in January and March until the chronic instability in the State led to the imposition of President's rule in June that year. Similarly, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab had President's rule imposed in February, April and August respectively. All the four States had their mid-term polls in February 1969. Except in Bihar where further political instability had led to the imposition of President's rule once again (but without the legislature being dissolved), the governments formed after the second verdict of the electorate are functioning in an atmosphere of reasonable stability with the defectors being less visibly active or, at least, effective. For the sake of completeness, it should be recorded here that Haryana, which had its mid-term poll in May, 1968, has had a Congress Government since. In Madhya Pradesh an act in March this year of counter-defection to the Congress by the erstwhile non-Congress United Front defector Chief Minister has led to the Congress regaining power in the State this year and this government endures to this day.

The political significance of defection will be clear from the fact that every change in government listed in the defection diary was brought about by a certain number of legislators switching loyalties. The magnitude of the problem will be evident from the number of defectors and the short period within which they have changed their loyalties. A study by the Policy Planning and Research Division or the Home Ministry of the Federal Government at Delhi, published in March 1968, has estimated that there

were 438 defections in the year after the fourth General Election against 542 defections in the preceding ten years.<sup>10</sup> According to Dr. Kashyap, since the fourth General Election, roughly one in seven of all the 3,500 and odd members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States and the Union Territories have changed sides and many of them more than once. In effect, some 14 per cent of the total membership of State Assemblies has been playing the game of defection. "This percentage would appear much more alarming—as much as over 23 per cent—if we leave out the membership in States like Madras, Kerala, Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland, Orissa and Maharashtra, where governments, whether Congress or non-Congress, have been somehow more stable and changes in political affiliations and defections from parties have not occurred".<sup>11</sup>

But the most sinister aspects of these changes in loyalties is that this can be directly related to either the lure of office and other blandishments, or, conversely, to disappointments in expectations of this kind. Thus Dr. Kashyap has estimated that in the year after fourth General Election, "as many as 115 defectors were rewarded with ministerial *gaddis*<sup>12</sup> in non-Congress governments or Congress supported and Congress governments. Also one was rewarded with speakership and several others with smaller offices like those of Parliamentary Secretaries."<sup>13</sup>

In ten governments formed after the General Election in about twenty four months, there have been three in which the new ministries consisted entirely of defectors, one in which 95% of the ministers were defectors and none in which defectors have not found a place.<sup>14</sup> There have also been allegations, made by both sides, of money having played a part, with figures ranging from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 100,000 being freely mentioned as the price for defection.

It would of course be wrong to think that all the political defection that has taken place had so mercenary a motivation. Nor is defection *per se* an act of political misdemeanour. Political rectitude of the highest kind has often provided the reason for abjuring long-standing political loyalties. This would be particularly true of those defectors who leave a party in disgust with factional tyrannies and sharp practice, and with the rule of caucuses and organisational musclemen. In all such cases it is not always ideological differences that have led to the parting of the ways. Despite the elastic—not to say inchoate—ideological permissiveness of the Congress Party, there have been defections from and to it. This is partly because of the factional nature of its politics, especially at the level of State leadership.

An in-built element in the situation is the natural rivalry between those who control the party machine and those who are in the government representing the party. The situation is, of course, interchangeable with the "ministerialist" of today becoming, as a result of factional manoeuvres, a party functionary tomorrow and vice versa. And since a person in the government has a rather larger patronage to dispense, there is usually fierce competition for getting into the government on the party's behalf. In order to do this or to prevent rivals from doing so, leaders form loyal factions of their own, often on the lines of caste and other loyalties. Thus "dissidence" within the party is a permanent source of friction with a dialectic

of its own. When a dissident Congressman reaches the point of hoping no further advancement by remaining within the party, he leaves it either to join another party or to start one of his own, taking with him his loyal followers in the parent party.

A by-product of this factional feuding of relevance to legislative defection is the refusal of party "tickets" for contesting elections on behalf of the party by the dominant faction to those belonging to the opposite camp. This often leads to the disgruntled persons contesting the elections as an "independent", often pitting themselves against the "official" candidate of the party to which they had all along belonged. Many of these independents win the election, especially where the electorate is insufficiently politicised and is susceptible to other more personal kinds of appeal. The large number of "independents" elected in the Indian elections is somewhat misleading, since quite a few of them are really either actual or potential defectors from or to organised parties. Dr. Kashyap has estimated that out of 174 independents elected to the Assemblies of Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur (a Union Territory), Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, as many as 90 joined various political parties after the election.<sup>15</sup> Often pre-election defectors joined after the election the very party they had left to contest the election, often at the invitation of those very persons who had driven them out of that party.

All this adds up to a certain "a-moral"—though far from "a-political"—attitude to party loyalties. But a posture of censoriousness towards this kind of situation is both unrealistic and unhelpful in isolating the more obnoxious aspects of opportunist political operators. Briefly the kind of defection that ought to worry us is the kind that has a manifest and immediate nexus with personal, particularly pecuniary, advantage. To try to combat defection of other kinds is not only not expedient but likely to lead to undesirable results.

There is a good deal to be said for the argument that the developments in the years since the fourth General Election are part of a profound readjustment of political forces in the country and it may be unwise to seek to freeze the process midway. For example, the political alliances entered into before the election were ad hoc opportunistic ganging up against the Congress. The unprincipled nature of these arrangements is being expressed in a variety of ways after the election. But nothing has shown up the absurdity of a politics founded on mere anti-Congress solidarity as the defections that followed the election that was won on that basis. If this exposure leads to a more programmatic commitment—which need not be ideological—by parties that would be a gain of some importance and we shall have owed this clarity to the defectors.

This said, it is necessary to recognise the threat posed by the kind of defection that has muddied Indian politics these last two years or so and to devise some means of containing the kind of politics it has released. The all-party Committee on Defections has examined the problem in some depth and its recommendations can be briefly summarised. These are of two kinds. The first is a set of suggestions for voluntary action by political parties. There is no need to be cynical about voluntary self-discipline by



politicians, especially since the ideas thrown up in the Committee have had the endorsement of all the important political parties in the country. First among these is a "code of conduct" that will respect the proprieties and decencies of party politics. By itself a code was felt to be ineffectual unless there was a machinery of sanctions against breaches of the code, but official initiative in erecting a punitive machinery of sanctions was rightly considered not feasible. There was however agreement on the need for a standing committee of men "highly regarded in the country for their experience of public affairs, objectivity, integrity and political neutrality" who could exert their moral authority in the form of "censures" that will be respected by all.

The second set of suggestions is for devising constitutional and legal steps that will make defection in the expectation of immediate rewards unattractive. The most significant suggestion in this regard is the one that debars a defector from being appointed to the office of Minister, or Speaker or "any post carrying salaries or allowances from the government or from autonomous public sector undertakings for a period of one year or until he gets re-elected after resigning his seat."

A more drastic suggestion was made by a sub-committee consisting of lawyer members of the Committee. It was to the effect that the law should be amended enabling a defector—defined somewhat narrowly to exclude the so-called independents and political "groups" that do not quite make the grade as a "recognised party"—being disqualified from continuing as a member, unless, of course, he resigns and gets re-elected. It was also considered whether, in addition, a legislator who has defected for proven pecuniary advantage or for an office of profit should not be treated to be guilty of an offence which could be visited with the punishment of not being allowed to contest elections for a prescribed period. However, both these suggestions were considered either not feasible or not expedient and given up. It was also suggested that the ban on taking office for a year merely punished the member but not the party that benefited from it. Indeed some members of the Committee have made punishment of the parties assisting the process of defection—by, for example, the loss for a period of two years of the distinctive symbol and of its right to be treated as a party for a period of two years—a condition of their accepting the reform suggested. However, with or without this qualification, the recommendation has the great merit of removing one of the potent attractions for defection, at least for a short period.

Certain other ideas—like the conferring of a "right of recall" of a defecting legislator on the constituency that elected him in the first instance and the strengthening of the Chief Minister's hand by making it possible for him to force a dissolution of the legislature when his majority is threatened—were considered but rejected, and rightly, as likely to create more problems than they will solve.

And even the ideas that were accepted may encounter constitutional difficulties arising from the fundamental right of free association guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. A further complication is that, as the law now stands, an amendment of the Constitution to make these innovations

possible cannot be attempted, since in a celebrated case, *Golak Nath and others vs. the State of Punjab and others*, the Supreme Court of India has, by a majority decision, held that the Indian Constitution cannot be amended in ways that may have the effect of whittling down the guaranteed fundamental rights. A bill to get this statement of the law changed—which might be challenged in turn when it becomes law—is before the Federal Parliament. When it goes through, some of the salutary legislative reforms that the Committee on Defections has outlined may be implemented. And when that happens, we should be in a position to put behind us the worst manifestations of the politics of defection.

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1. This was not the case always or everywhere. In West Bengal, for example, the two warring communist splinters the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party (Marxist), promoted different electoral alliances bitterly opposed to each other and to the Congress. This benefited the Congress at the polls. In the mid-term polls in February 1969, this disastrous (to themselves) strategy was given up much to the collective advantage of the anti-Congress United Front.
2. India is a Union of seventeen States—and four "Union Territories" with a Federal Parliament and Executive at the Centre. Each State has its own legislature. When for some reason the constitutional machinery breaks down the President of India "rules" the State directly for a limited period of six months in first instance and this may be extended for further periods not exceeding three years in all.
3. The Indian Parliament has two Houses, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. Election to the latter is indirect with a third of its membership retiring biennially. Election to the Lok Sabha and the Lower Houses in the State Legislatures is direct and on adult franchise. Where the State Legislature is bicameral election to the Upper House is similar to that to the Rajya Sabha.
4. The seventeenth State, Nagaland, did not go to the polls then.
5. These were Andhra, Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Mysore.
6. These were Bihar, Kerala, Madras (or Tamil Nadu, as it has since been rechristened) Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
7. In the light of subsequent events in West Bengal, it is worth noting that in the 1967 election the Congress was the party with the largest majority in that State, capturing as many as 127 out of the 280 seats. In the mid-term poll held in February 1969 it could barely muster 55 seats. See also footnote 1 supra.
8. See Suresh C Kashyap: *The Politics of Defection*, p. 95. Dr. Kashyap's book is an extremely useful compendium of the facts of the politics of defection.
9. *Ibid*, page 95.
10. *Ibid*, p. 8.
11. *Ibid*, p. 5-6.
12. *Gaddi* is a Hindi word meaning office or position.
13. *Ibid*, p. 36.
14. *Ibid*, Table on p. 38-39.
15. *Ibid*, p. 9.

## DEFECTION DIARY

	<i>Bihar</i>	<i>Haryana</i>	<i>Madhya Pradesh</i>	<i>Punjab</i>	<i>Rajasthan</i>	<i>Uttar Pradesh</i>	<i>West Bengal</i>
March 67	5th : Non-Congress United Front Government installed	10th : Congress Government installed. 22nd: Fall of above and U.F. Government headed by defector from Congress installed.	8th : Congress Government installed.	13th: Non-Congress U.F. Government installed.	13th: President's Rule imposed but legislature not dissolved.	14th: Congress Government installed.	2nd: Non-Congress U.F. Government installed.
April 67					26th: Congress government installed.	1st: Fall of above. 3rd : U.F. Government headed by defector installed.	
July 67			31st: Fall of above.				
August 67			3rd: Anti-Congress U.F. Government headed by defector installed.				
Nov. 67		21st: Fall of above, President's Rule imposed, Mid-term poll ordered.		25th: Fall of above Congress supported defector headed government installed the same day.			21st: U.F. Government dismissed and a defector government supported by Congress installed.
Jan, 68	25th: Fall of U.F. Government.  31st: Congress supported government headed by defector installed						9th: Coalition Government of above and Congress installed.
Feb. 68						25th: Assembly suspended.	20th: Fall of above. Assembly dissolved. President's Rule imposed. Mid-term poll ordered.
March 68	18th : Fall of above. 22nd : 2nd U.F. Government headed by defector from Congress installed.						
April 68						10th: Assembly dissolved. President's Rule imposed, mid-term poll ordered.	

## DEFECTION DIARY

	<i>Bihar</i>	<i>Haryana</i>	<i>Madhya Pradesh</i>	<i>Punjab</i>
May 68		Mid-term poll held. 22nd : Congress Government installed.		
June 68	25th : Fall of above. 29th : President's Rule imposed. Mid-term poll ordered.			
August 68				20th: Fall of above. 23rd: President's Rule imposed. Mid-term poll ordered.
Feb. 69	Mid-term poll.			Mid-term poll 17th: anti-Congress U.F. Government installed.
March 69	7th : Congress led coalition ministry formed.		10th : The non- Congress coalition led by G.N. Singh (a Congress defector) resigned. 13th : Same coalition under leadership of Raja Naresh Chandra Singh (with a record of defection) continued. 20th : The above Government falls. 19th : G.N. Singh rejoins Congress. 26th: Cong. Government under S.C. Shukla formed.	
June 69	20th: Fall of above. 21st : Non-Congress U.F. Ministry formed.			
July 69	1st : Fall of above. 4th : President's Rule imposed. But Assembly not dissolved.			

that a party boss is not Moses and that he was only a politician reacting to somebody else's action or statement.

The main contribution of the authors is their exposition of the Soviet dilemma from the ideological point of view in coming to grips with the African situation. The classical Marxist analysis did not suit the African continent. The irony of Soviet polity is that anything can be sold only if it is expostulated in Marxian tenets. We have therefore a spectacle where either Marxism is straight-jacketed in a mechanical fashion losing its touch with reality, or non-Marxian concepts are uneasily clothed in Marxian robes. This flexibility is a sign of the soundness and shrewdness of the Soviet mind. It is however their misfortune that while this process was under way, the 'schism' with China reared its ugly head. The authors have grappled with the ideological shift and the deepening of the schism as a consequence of it brilliantly.

The chapter on Soviet economic activity deserves special mention. The author traces the theoretical bases of Soviet assistance to African countries and outlines the limitations on Soviet aid in general. His own conclusion however is : "For the time being, the volume of Soviet African trade represents such a small share of the Soviet total turnover that it should not be very difficult to keep increasing it substantially, or even (if an urgent need should arise) dramatically. On the other hand, the absorption capacity on the receiving end is likely to remain small for quite a while. But as time wears on, the situation will become more difficult on both counts. We would therefore expect that the increase in the flow of Soviet aid will slow down substantially before it has been able to satisfy more than a fraction of the need." (pp. 82-83). This conclusion is remarkable when one realises that it was arrived at in 1963. A recent study by Mr. Baard Richard Stokke (Soviet and East European Trade and Aid in Africa, F.A. Praeger 1967) bears out that the Soviet aid curve to Africa has already started to flatten out.

The chapter on Yugoslavia by William Griffith is another study remarkable for its high quality. Yugoslavia began to cultivate friends in Africa to save its own standing in the battle with Kremlin. As long as that battle lasted the 'small power' (David) made an impact in Africa and Asia. Now in the ideological mess of imprecision it seems to have receded to the background. One would however like to know what its role is after the cold war and in the midst of the schism. Thus Brzezinski's book is rewarding in several respects.

Hevi's book is pure cold war hysteria. Though it is said to be on China's role in Africa, China props up like Jack in the box at the author's choosing. It is neither a coherent description of Chinese moves in Africa nor an aid to understand their motives. When China opens a mission in an African country it is sedition ; when Chou En-lai undertakes a tour of Africa it is insurrection. At one point the author quotes the *Indian Observer* to establish that a particular journalist was a Chinese spy (p. 107). The pathological condition is evident from the reliance on such sources. There are similar references to Communists taking recourse to witchcraft to win over Africans to their side. Some of the avowedly propaganda journals

used to publish this type of stories. Even they have stopped it now, presumably to create a favourable climate for the detente. Mr. Hevi has not apparently taken note of these developments. Mr. Hevi claims to have travelled widely and there are many references to his visits to Peking, Moscow and various parts of Africa. One would like to know more about the author. It however seems clear that he has not learnt one good lesson which Kremlinologists and Sinologists are expected to know already: there is a chasm between the spoken words of the Communists as propagandists and their actions as diplomats or foreign ministers. One should know which is significant and which is their swagger. The cold war hysteria of Mr. Hevi does not permit this sophistication or refinement.

S. SUBRAMANIAN

**IDANRE, AND OTHER POEMS : Wole Soyinka. (Methuen, 8s. 6d.)**

**P**OET, novelist, playwright, actor, producer, Wole Soyinka is among the most brilliant and versatile of the African writers. I saw his play, *The Road*, at the Theatre Royal in 1965, and it was an eerie and unforgettable experience. He has won the John Whiting award for his work as a playwright and the Jock Campbell award for his novel, *The Interpreters*. The current civil war has had a shattering effect on Nigerian writers: Chinua Achebe, an Ibo, is working for Biafra, and Soyinka, a Yoruba, is in prison at Kaduna. Achebe's *A Man of the People* (1966) was a prophetic novel, for it anticipated the military rising that suddenly ended Balewa's constitutional rule. Soyinka's poem, *Idanre*, written, like *The Road*, for the Commonwealth Arts Festival, has proved no less prophetic of the terrible civil war now raging in Nigeria. The present collection of Soyinka's poems was first published in 1967 and gave some idea of the measure of his talent. The paperback reissue will doubtless reach a wide audience.

*Idanre* is described as a creation myth of Ogun, the Yoruba god of Iron, akin perhaps to the Vedic god, Indra. In Soyinka's novel, *The Interpreters*, Ogun is a river, and also "the explorer, warrior, creative god". At the place where the bridge spans the river Ogun, the boulders appear "like those rugged Egba ancients in conclave". In *The Road*, Ogun is the god of the road, an iron god who is the protector of taxi and lorry drivers. But Ogun is often a hungry god too, and every bend of the road could be a death-trap for traveller or vehicle. In 'Death in the Dawn', one of the poems in the *Idanre* volume, Soyinka underlines this aspect of the road:

*The right foot for joy, the left, dread  
And the mother prayed, Child  
May you never walk  
When the road waits, famished.*

In the childhood of the race, man saw himself in close relationship with the forms and forces of Nature and built up myths to bring out this singular relationship. Although Soyinka has taken a degree from the University of Leeds and is fully familiar with the airs and graces of Western sophistication, he hasn't divorced himself from his racial memory or his Yoruba

sensibility. Rather is he deeply involved in the life of his people and of his 'dark' continent, though he also knows that the Old must make terms with the New, whatever the hazard.

*Idanre opens with primordial lightning, thunder and furious rain—  
When roaring vats of an unstoppered heaven deluge  
Earth in fevered distillations, potent with  
The fire of the axe-handed one. . .*

After rain, seeds swell, roots take flesh in the earth, and in course of time "men wake naked into harvest-tide". And Sango "the axe-handed one" or the god of lightning and electricity aligns himself with Ogun the god of iron and metallurgy:

*and cables danced  
In writhing ecstasies, point to point, wart to wart  
Of electric coils. . .*

Oya the wine-girl is consort of Ogun-Sango, she is the humaniser, the keeper of the hearth, the refuge from violence. In the way of Creation, the One had become the many as the result of mischance or treachery:

*Union they had known until the Boulder  
Rolling down the hill of the Beginning  
Shred the kernel to a million lights.  
A traitor's heart rejoiced, the gods' own slave  
Dirt-covered from the deed  
Man's passage, pre-ordained, self-ordered winds  
In reconstruction.*

Excrescence marks the ways of gods no less than of men, and going out to battle, Ogun in blinded drunken rage destroys his own men, and too late, too late, comes the recognition of his handiwork and remorse:

*Too late for joy, the Hunter stayed his hand  
The chute of truth opened from red furnaces  
And Ogūn stayed his hand  
Truth, a late dawn. . .*

Isn't this a prophetic anticipation of the Nigerian civil war? Soyinka himself says: "In detail, in the human context of my society, *Idanre* has made abundant sense...the bloody origin of Ogun's pilgrimage has been, in true cyclic manner most bloodily re-enacted". Must this cycle of karmas—creation and conflict and destruction—go on for ever? Is there no way of breaking through the sinister coil of predestination? After the terror and the pity of the last long night of misconceived mass destruction, may not a new Dawn rise to start the world anew?

*Dawn came gradual, mists  
Fell away from rock and honeycomb, Idanre woke  
To braided vapours, a dance of seven veils  
The septuple god was groom and king.*

This is the "postscript image of dawn", but it is "still awaited"—and in the meantime Nigeria, the world itself, are busy yet enacting, or re-enacting, Ogun's blood-boltered pilgrimage of self-destruction. Soyinka had written this poem, after a night of rain-storm, before the next nightfall. Notwithstanding its obscurity, *Idanre* is a powerful evocation of the creation-destruction myth centered in the demiurgic personality of Ogun.

The massacres in North Nigeria in October 1966 are the theme of some of the other lyrics included in the *Idanre* volume. Poems like 'Harvest of Hate' come fresh from contact with the blood of actuality. Soyinka is roused by a woman who "rejoiced" at the turn of events, and he pronounces this 'malediction' on her:

*Unsexed, your lips  
have framed a life curse  
shouting joy where all  
the human world  
shared in grief's humility.  
May this pattern be your life  
preserve. . .*

Many a poem shows Soyinka's anger, his tenderness, his humour, his vast disillusion, his fierce self-laceration. Compassion is rarely withheld, and the words acquire (in his own words) a "whirling incandescence". Such poetry is intense, it is utterly sincere, it is vibrant and disturbing :

*I think it rains  
That tongues may loosen from the parch  
Uncleave roof-tops of the mouth, hang  
Heavy with knowledge. . .*

*That dawn  
Her eyes were tipped with sunset spears  
Seasons' quills upon her parchment, yet  
The hidden lake of her  
Forgives!*

A highly integrated poet who is keenly conscious of the Yoruba cultural past and also of the necessity for its supercession by a new living culture—not a mere mimicry of the West—Soyinka is the Yoruba poet who is also universal man, he is the poet of anger and the poet of prophecy.

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
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## Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

### Visit of Mr. B.T. Burne

Mr. B.T. Burne, a former Director of the National Archives, Zambia, was the guest of the Council for four days from July 19 to 22. During his stay the Council made arrangements for him to visit major libraries of the Capital, including the Delhi University libraries, and meet scholars of African affairs. He also visited the National Archives, the National Museum, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Indian School of International Studies, Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre, etc.

The Council availed of this opportunity to seek Mr. Burne's expert assessment and opinion about the collection of research material in the Council library.

The visit, at a time when the Council and its library are going to have their own building, proved most useful.

### Visit of Dr. P.D. Pillay

Dr. P.D. Pillay, Professor of History, Dalhousie University, Canada, was the guest of the Council from August 7 to 11. He delivered a lecture on "South Africa and her Neighbours: Apartheid and Foreign Policy" on August 9 at India International Centre. The former Foreign Secretary, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, presided.

During his stay, Dr. Pillay discussed with Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Indian Council for Africa, ways and means of further improving the activities of the Council.

The Director of the Indian School of International Studies was host at a lunch in honour of Dr. Pillay. Meetings were also arranged with Dr. I.P. Singh, Director, Africa Division, Ministry of External Affairs, members of the Gandhi Centenary Committee, Rajghat, and Dr. A. Appadorai of the Indian Council of World Affairs.

### Other Visitors

The Council played host to Mr. Justice Saidi of the High Court of Tanzania and Mr. L.M. Makame, Registrar to the High Court, who visited Delhi after attending the World Peace Through Laws Centre Conference held at Bangkok. Col. B.H. Zaidi, M.P., Treasurer of the Council and a

former Vice-Chancellor of Aligarh University, gave a luncheon in honour of Mr. Justice Saidi, who is an old Student of Aligarh University.

Mr. Asoka Mehta, President of the Council, gave a dinner in their honour.

#### **Donations**

In response to an appeal, Messrs. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., Bombay, agreed to donate a jeep to the Council for the Zimbabwe African People's Union.

The Council appealed to Indian manufacturers for donation of scientific and laboratory equipment for the new University of Science and Technology set up at Kumasi, Ghana. It expresses its appreciation to the following who have responded favourably. Other replies are still awaited:

Messrs. J.M. Parekh,  
Durgadutt Nathmal Wadi,  
Amersi Road, P.O. Malad, Bombay-64.

The National Instruments Ltd.,  
1/1, Raja Subodh Mullick Road,  
Calcutta-32.

Supplies & Services (International),  
73, G.B. Road, Delhi-6.

The Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd.,  
Cantonment Road, Masulipatam,  
S. India.

Messrs. Gansons Private Limited,  
Industry Manor, 2nd Floor,  
Off Cadell Road, Bombay-25.

The Oriental Science Apparatus Workshop,  
Ambala Cantt.

Messrs. M.S. Rubber Company,  
81/A, Manicktala Street,  
Calcutta-6.

#### **Executive Committee Meeting**

The Executive Committee of the Indian Council for Africa met on August 11, 1969. It considered a report on the progress of the building work and finances. It reconstituted the Editorial Board of *Africa Quarterly* which now includes the following:

- |                    |   |
|--------------------|---|
| 1. Mr. Asoka Mehta | President, Indian Council for Africa.         |
| 2. Dr. Gopal Singh | General Secretary, Indian Council for Africa. |

3. Mr. Manubhai Shah      Former Minister for International Trade.
4. Dr. Anirudha Gupta      Reader, Commonwealth Studies, Indian School of International Studies.
5. Mr. Dinesh Singh      Minister for External Affairs.
6. Dr. P.D. Pillay      Professor of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
7. Mr. Nathan Shamuyaria      Associate Dean of Faculty of Arts, University College, Dar-es-Salaam.
8. Dr. B.O. Biobaku      Vice-Chancellor, University of Lagos, Nigeria,
9. Mr. Philippe Decraene      Editor, *Le Mois En Afrique*, Paris.
10. Mr. Basil Davidson      A British Africanist.

The Executive Committee invited the following to serve on the Journal Sub-Committee.

1. Dr. Anirudha Gupta
2. Mr. G.P. Deshpande
3. Mr. Ajit Gopal
4. Mr. S. Ansari
5. Mr. J.C. Srivastava
6. Mrs. S. Sadiq Ali (Executive Secretary)
7. Mr. R.K. Kakkar (Publications Officer) (Convener)

The Executive Committee invited Dr. Anirudha Gupta to be an Associate Editor of *Africa Quarterly*.

During this period the following became members of the Council:

1. Mrs. K. Lakshmi Raghuramaiah (Ordinary Member)
2. Mr. Jagat Dube      (    "    "    )
3. Dr. Miss Vanita Sabikhi      (    "    "    )
4. Mr. Syam Dhar Misra, MP      (    "    "    )
5. Mr. P.G. Mavalankar      (Life Member)
6. Dr. S.S. Kothari, MP      (Life Member)
7. Mr. Chandrashekar, MP      (Life Member)

#### Annual General Meeting

The Annual General Meeting of the Indian Council for Africa was held on August 27. Before the meeting started the members present observed one minute's silence to mourn the death of the President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain. The following resolution was passed :

"The Annual General Meeting of the Indian Council for Africa held in New Delhi on August 27, 1969, placed on record its deep sense of sorrow

on the passing away of the illustrious President of India, Dr. Zakir Husain. His was a life of supreme dedication, of inborn humility, of intellectual inquiry, of integrated viewpoints. When others were swayed by office, he was devoted to service. When others opted for communalism, he stood like a rock for undiluted nationalism. Nothing was narrow, small or ostentatious about him. God had combined in him the rare virtue of intellect with selflessness, religion with secular hope, politics with ethics, leadership with the goodness of heart. He was not only amongst the great of history, but, what is most rare, one of the good ones of God.

“May his soul rest in peace and shed its undying lustre on those who have chosen the path of public service, and good of mankind. His is an irreparable loss not only to his nation but to the whole world. What Einstein said of Gandhi could be applied to him as appropriately: ‘Generations to come would scarce believe that such a one as he ever trod on this earth’.”

The Annual Report and the audited statement of accounts and balance-sheet for the year ended 1968 were unanimously approved.

It was decided to form a sub-committee of the following members to go into the recommendations made by Dr. L.M. Singhvi on amendments to the memorandum and articles of association of the Council.

1. Shri Manubhai Shah
2. Dr. D.L. Mazumdar
3. Dr. L.M. Singhvi
4. Dr. Gopal Singh

It was decided that an Extraordinary Annual General Meeting be called early in October for the election of the Executive Committee as its present term expires on September 16, 1969.

## Book Reviews

**AFRICA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD** : Ed. Zbigniew Brzezinsky.  
Stanford University Press.

**THE DRAGON'S EMBRACE**: The Chinese Communists and Africa ;  
Emmanuel J. Hevi. Pall Mall Press, London.

IF Africa is the continent of the future, we should expect political powers to stake their claims (and ideologies) in that area. Diplomacy, we are told, is the area where this claim-staking is transformed into a fine art. The style may vary from diplomat to diplomat and country to country. It is a measure of technological progress that, as with war, diplomacy has also become *total*. It is no longer restricted to parleys at chanceries or palavers over dinner tables. It has its political, economic and propagandist variants. We have reached a stage when protection is sought even for espionage as a legitimate role of embassies. In this atmosphere, in books like the two we have chosen, we would expect an analysis of the diplomatic moves of the rival powers and, if possible, the motives behind their moves. An understanding of their motives would enable us to predict their subsequent moves in the arena. This will be a gain both to students of international affairs and to those responsible for shaping foreign policies in State Departments. Judged by this standard the two books under review fail to come up to our expectations. The failure of the former is regrettable inasmuch as it has been conceived and edited by a professor of eminence. The latter is a flotsam on the cold war current.

In Brzezinsky's book we have a collection of essays by an impressive group of writers covering many facets of the problem. There is an essay on the political activity of the Soviet Union in Africa ; there is another on the economic activity of the USSR. There are separate chapters on the role of East European countries, of Yugoslavia and, finally, of China. Brzezinsky closes the book with an assessment of the African challenge. All the authors have attempted to maintain high academic standards in dealing with the issues. But where they seem to have gone wrong is their assumption that the Soviet Union has no right to stake a claim in Africa. They seem to portend disaster even in small or innocuous moves of the East European states. This is a legacy of the cold war and it is not likely that the authors will maintain the same tenor in the future editions of the book. From the analytical point of view a major defect of the book is that all analyses of Soviet moves are attempted *in vacuo*. It is not as though Russia was acting unilaterally in Africa. Russian moves were in response to the action initiated by some Western powers. Kremlinologists seem to share this failing in common. They dig out obscure Russian references and statements made by party secretaries. At times they make mountains out of molehills. They seem to overlook the fact

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



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### **To Our Readers**

Because of late receipt of articles due to postal strikes in Italy, we  
regret we have had to postpone publication of our special number  
on "Italy and Africa" to January-March 1970.



## Elections in Ghana, 1969

DENNIS AUSTIN

*The editors are happy to publish this first-hand report of the Ghana Elections by Prof. Dennis Austin who visited the country on the eve of the elections in September 1969. Prof. Austin is the author of "Politics in Ghana—1956-64" and Professor of Government, Manchester University.—Ed.*

**A**N unexpected and nostalgic sight: propaganda vans combing the urban and rural areas in search of voters, abusing each other peacefully, campaigning for Busia's Progress Party—'Pro, Pro, Pro'; or for Gbedemah's National Alliance of Liberals (NAL)—'Victory, Victory, Victory'; or PAP, or APRP or UNP.<sup>1</sup> Pamphlets, manifestos, party papers, party broadcasts, and telecasts, political debates in the Constituent Assembly which finished its work shortly before the election, party quarrels in the small drinking bars which make life so pleasant in the towns and tolerable in the villages. Unexpected because the holding of a free election is a not very common occurrence in Africa in 1969, least of all in what used to be Nkrumah's Ghana; nostalgic because it recalled memories of earlier contests in the 1950s when the Convention People's Party was engaged in similar campaigns against its opponents until they were eliminated early in 1964. Then the CPP was eliminated early in 1966 by the army and police. Were there other parallels between the late 1950s and the late 1960s? The British had claimed to prepare the country for self-government, and were dismayed by the appearance of a single-party Republic. Would the soldiers who had paved the way for the return of party politics be similarly dismayed by the outcome of an election held under their protection?

### I: Matters of Fact

(1) The election was conducted in familiar British fashion: single-member constituencies and a 'first past the post' outcome. The style of voting was changed from that of earlier contests. Electors were given coloured voting slips corresponding to the number of party or independent candidates in the constituency; they selected the ballot paper they favoured, and dropped it in the ballot-box, casting the others into a bowl of acid. It says much for the pertinacity of the administration and the vigilance of the police that the election was conducted without incident

throughout the country on a single day, 29 August : or, almost throughout the country, for the weather turned against the election in the far north, and in one constituency—Chiana-Paga—voting had to be held a few days later, after the floods had receded. I have used the word pertinacity rather than efficiency since there were reports from some constituencies that polling was delayed until midday, ballot-boxes having arrived late, and polling and party agents being muddled about what to do; but, somehow, the election was got through. And those who were defeated could find nothing substantial to bring against the conduct of the election, though of course they complained that they had lost.

(2) There were 140 constituencies of which only two were unopposed—Agona Kwabre in Ashanti, taken by Progress; and South Tongu in the Volta region, taken by NAL. Of the 138 contests only 26 were straight-fights, a phenomenon of less significance than one might suppose because of the very many heavy majorities achieved by the successful candidates. Both Progress and NAL contested all the 138 disputed constituencies.

(3) At first reading, the turnout was high :

Registered Voters	Votes Cast	%
2,351,658	1,493,351	63.5

But one must remember (what many forget) that this is a percentage only of those who registered and not of those eligible to register. A rough calculation can be made as follows :

Total population: 8 million ?

Total adult population : 3 million ? (i.e., Ghanaians over 21)

Those who registered: 78% of the adult population ?

Those who voted: 49.9% of the adult population ?

There is therefore a very large untapped reservoir of votes.

(4) The percentage poll was uneven throughout the country, the highest being in Accra—70.41%; the lowest being in the North—52.99%; but of course the poll may be high where the registration is low. Further mathematics are needed.

(5) Seats were divided regionally as follows :

Ashanti	22
Western Region	13
Central Region	15
Eastern Region	22
Brong-Ahafo	13

Upper Region	16
Northern Region	14
Accra Region	9
Volta Region	16
	<hr/>
	140

(6) Who won ?	Progress—handsomely :
Progress	105
NAL	29
Others	6

(7) Handsomely—yes : but there was one ugly fact about the result, namely, the predominantly *Akan* basis of the party's victory, and the predominantly *Ewe* basis of the main opposition to Progress. By 'Akan' I mean the main areas of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, and the three Southern regions. By 'Ewe' I mean the main areas of the Volta region, viz :

Region	Seats	Progress	NAL	Others
Ashanti	(22)	22	0	0
Brong Ahafo	(13)	13	0	0
Central Region	(15)	15	0	0
Western Region	(13)	10	0	3
Eastern Region	(22)	18	4	0
Volta Region	(16)	2	14	0

(8) Indeed this Akan-Ewe division is sharper than appears even from the table. Of the seven seats lost by Progress in the Akan dominated Western and Eastern regions, two are in the extreme south-west where the Nzima people are still mourning the loss of their great countryman and patron Kwame Nkrumah;<sup>2</sup> four are in the eastern part of the Eastern region where the Akan peoples give place to Krobo, Akwamu and Ga-Adangbe peoples.<sup>3</sup> The one remaining seat (Amenfi) which the party failed to win went to a strong local candidate, P.K.K. Quaidoo.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, the two seats lost by NAL in the Ewe-dominated Volta region are in the border constituencies where the Ewe people are outnumbered by the Akan.<sup>5</sup>

The percentage voting pattern in the Volta (Ewe) region, and in the five predominantly Akan regions, tells its own story :

	Ashanti	Brong-Ahafo	Central	Western	Eastern	Volta
Progress	78%	85%	71%	53%	61%	18%
NAL	17%	14%	19%	16%	34%	77%

(9) What can be said to lighten this sombre picture ?

(a) The two northern regions and the nine Greater Accra constituencies were divided more evenly between the parties :

	Upper		Northern		Accra	
	Seats	% Votes	Seats	% Votes	Seats	% Votes
Progress	13	56%	9	48%	3	36%
NAL	3	32%	5	42%	3	32%
Others	0	12%	0	10%	3	32%

The result is that NAL and its allies, in opposition, represent minorities—Ewe, Ga, Nzima, and a number of northern groups: but these minorities are not concentrated wholly in one region, and NAL picked up *some* support throughout the country.

(b) Progress won a higher percentage of seats in Parliament than of votes in the country: as usual, to him that hath is given :

	Votes	%	Seats	% <sup>s</sup>
Progress	876,378	58.7	105	75%
NAL	454,646	30.4	29	21%
Others	162,347	10.9	6	4%
	1,493,371	100	140	100

The vote of 876,378 for Progress is more than double that given to the Convention People's Party in the last free election in 1956 :

CPP	398,141	:	57% of the vote in a 60% poll
Opposition	299,116	:	33% of the vote in a 60% poll.

But the percentage of the total vote given to Busia and Progress (58.7%) is not much more than that once given to the CPP. Progress is a *dominant* position, therefore, but it falls a long way short of being a *parti unique*. Even if one eliminates the votes in the Volta region, the non-Progress vote remains quite high : 487,820 or 36.4% of a total vote of 1,335,707 (excluding the Volta region).

(c) The 1969 election was possibly something special. As in 1951 so in 1969 a new start was made after the near paralysis of political life under the first Republic (1960) and the National Liberation Council (1966) : nine years in all. The 1969 election brought a return to civilian government as that of 1951 brought in a nationalist regime after colonial rule : the CPP then, Progress in 1969, was the chief beneficiary of a domi-

nant political desire. But it may not last and at the next election Progress, like the old CPP, may find itself troubled as much by internal differences as by external enemies. Success has dangers in almost equal measures with the bitterness of defeat and Busia's head may lie very uneasy crowned with such a wealth of laurel.

We are moving now from facts to conjecture. So :

## II : Questions of Opinion

(1) Do Ghanaians vote 'collectively'—by family, village, district, region, community? Yes: but these collectivities may be opposed *inter se*; and what appears to be an alliance at one point in time—e.g., the *Akan in 1969—can easily divide*—as the Akan were divided in 1956. There are many local 'territorial' conflicts as between rival chiefdoms, many traditional conflicts as in the Dagomba skin dispute, many local rivalries for jobs and contracts, and some proto-class conflicts in the main towns. NAL picked up nearly 200,000 votes in the 'Akan-dominated' regions and it would be absurd to argue that they reflect no more than the non-Akan minority in these regions. It was able surely to feed on local disputes of one kind or another—territorial and social—in addition to Akan-non-Akan differences.

(2) Do Ghanaians vote 'for the winning side' on the Akan principle *Obi nni sono akyi mmoro huaau?*<sup>7</sup> There are several other aphorisms one can quote: 'all power attracts, and absolute power attracts absolutely'; 'loss of power tends to corrupt and absolute loss of power tends to corrupt absolutely'. And I don't dispute the fact that Ghanaians like to be on the winning side, or that the victorious end of the see-saw tends to come down with a bump because of the rush to that end of would-be clients looking for patrons: contractors, job-hunters, small-time traders looking for a market-stall allocation, large-scale traders looking for an import licence, etc., etc. That's the stuff of urban and small-town politics. I have argued elsewhere that a primary reason why Busia and Progress won is that 'he seemed all along to have the mantle of victory upon him'. 'His early appearance on the political scene as the most influential member of the old opposition, his close and cordial relationship with the majority members of the NLC (particularly under Africa), his ability to attract the support of senior members of the administration like Richard Quarshie and J. H. Mensah: all these factors helped to weave the mantle for him. Power and the prospect of power (as said earlier) are marvellous magnets of attraction in countries like Ghana where so much is at risk. And here was the heir apparent to a government which would once again have the power to employ, disburse, and reward. Such very

likely were the conclusions reached by local leaders of position in the early months prior to the election.'<sup>8</sup> But now upon reflection I am not quite so sure on a number of grounds :

(a) The vote in the small Chiana-Paga constituency was held *after* the main election results were known, yet the result was very close.<sup>9</sup> True, it can be argued that Progress might have lost had it not been known that Busia had won : the fact remains that 6,879 majority voted against the party which was now to form the government. Why? Because of the fierce local lineage and inter-village disputes within the Kassena chiefdoms.

(b) Communal solidarity is easily fractured—as among the Ga in Accra who voted in almost equal measure for Progress, NAL, and the 'local party', UNP.

(c) Once again—the anti-Progress vote (which I had not seen when I wrote the articles in *West Africa*) is really quite high.

(d) I should like a longer run of one election before passing judgment on the likelihood of those in power staying there. And, as I say, the 1969 election—like that of 1951—was in a somewhat special category.

### (3) Why then did Progress win ?

(a) Not surely 'charisma', although Busia had a certain moral appeal perhaps for those who much disliked the bullying and corruption of the previous civilian regime.

(b) Not because of the *programmes* of the two main parties. They said much the same thing : a return to civilian rule and a better life for everyone. And that was all. Ideology had taken flight—an unexpected achievement of the Nkrumah period.

I would argue that Progress won for four good reasons :

- (1) The election was focussed on a single issue—the return to civilian rule. And Busia and Progress were seen to represent that issue, Busia because of the part he played during the interim period of transition as Chairman of the Centre for Civic Education etc., Progress because it contained a number of leaders who were also in the public eye during the quasi-military, quasi-civilian administration period.
- (2) Gbedemah and his followers were identified too closely—still—and despite their avowals—with the former CPP regime and its

defects : 'chopping money' and 'locking people up'. Certainly it was easy for Busia and Progress to tie these labels round their opponents' neck. And it almost choked them.

- (3) The fact that Busia is an Akan, Gbedemah an Ewe, was—and is—particularly unfortunate : but it was also a marvellously helpful bonus for Progress.
- (4) The 'mantle of victory argument' probably did persuade a number of local notables to declare their support for Busia: again a very useful bonus, but only a bonus.

### ENVOI

It used to be the fashion of a number of eminent authorities on Africa to explain what is, in terms of what had to be: single-party rule, for example, and even soldiers' rule were frequently defended as an inevitable result either of tradition or colonial rule or both. Any notion that competitive politics within a parliamentary framework might follow from colonial government or from a traditional pattern of political behaviour was ruled out of court: disproved by events and easily refuted in conceptual terms. The most intelligent critique was that argued by Bernard Schaffer, and I have no wish to qualify my admiration of the way in which he cast doubt on the notion that the British 'prepared' its colonies for self-government. Schaffer's view of course was that the principal legacy was in terms of the bureaucratic values and authoritarian practices of a colonial administration. But what now, in Ghana, in 1969 ?

Why did the army withdraw? Perhaps for the very reason it intervened: to protect its autonomy and unity of command? Nkrumah interfered with the army and police, so they interfered with him, but in ruling Ghana they found that everything predicted by Sammy Finer and others was true: they were becoming politicised—a horrid fate. And it is true that one easily forgets now how rough a passage the NLC had after 1966: Kotoka killed, Ankrah removed, the Otu affair, lines of communication formed (one is told) between Afrifa and Busia on one side, Harlley and Gbedemah on the other. Many of the NLC members must have complained that when civilian troubles come they come as single spies—and dangerously so. Time therefore to quit before they lost all sense of unity and force?

One can add, too, perhaps that the soldiers had to endure a catalogue of troubles which must have plagued them: unemployment, financial problems, international difficulties, and the like. They were not particu-

larly successful at tackling any of them, and—weary of the job—had already begun to transfer power to civilian administrators before completing the transfer to politicians.

There is probably some force in these arguments: but to describe the withdrawal of the soldiers in terms of a fear for their autonomy, and a weariness for the work they had to do, is much too simple an explanation. There was a deep dislike (I believe) of the bullying and corruption of the Nkrumah regime which led to its overthrow; there was also a deep desire for a return to elections and parliamentary rule among the army, police, administrators and the population at large. I stress the word 'return' for time and again when I was in Ghana, the election and the re-entry of the politicians were talked of not as innovations but as the restoration of what had once existed and had been lost.

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1. PAP : People's Action Party  
APRP : All People's Republican Party  
UNP : United Nationalist Party.
2. Nzima East, Nzima West : both going to the People's Action Party.
3. Ada, Yilo/Osudoku, Krobo, Manya, : all to NAL.
4. Quaidoo : Voting was 4,282, Progress 3,682, NAL 686, PAP 109
5. The Krachi and Nkwanta constituencies.
6. On a strict system of proportional representation the allocation of seats would be Progress 82, NAL 43, Others 15.
7. He who follows an elephant does not get wet from the dew!
8. *West Africa*, 'A Month in the Country', 6 September, 1969.
9. Progress : 5,343  
NAL : 4,839  
Others : 2,040



## **Appendix: Background to the Ghana Elections**

THE first General Elections in post-coup Ghana were the most costly (officially estimated at £1 million sterling) and keenly contested so far in the political history of Ghana. In all, five political parties contested the elections, namely, the Progress Party (P.P.); National Alliance of Liberals (N.A.L.) led by Mr. K. A. Gbedemah; United Nationalist Party (U.N.P.) having Dr. H.S. Bannerman, a medical practitioner, as its Chairman; All People's Republican Party (A.P.R.P.) under the leadership of Dr. E.V.C. de Graft-Johnson, an Accra barrister; and the People's Action Party (P.A.P.) with Mr. Ayarna Imoru, an Accra business man, as its leader. There was also a sprinkling of Independents.

The elections and the subsequent events that followed were the outcome of careful planning and preparations, which began almost immediately after the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) had consolidated its position as the ruling power in the country.

Against the background of the huge economic mess and other irregularities left behind by the ousted Nkrumah regime, the N.L.C. set itself the onerous task of cleaning the 'Augean stables' in preparation for civil rule, which it had pledged itself to restore to the country "as soon as practicable".

As an important step in the exercise an 18-member Constitutional Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice E. Akufo-Addo, the Chief Justice of Ghana, was appointed by the N.L.C. on August 24, 1966, "to ascertain as far as possible the wishes of all sections of the people of Ghana on the question of what type of constitution would be most suitable for adoption by Ghana", following the abolition of the Republican Constitution of 1960. After many months of painstaking work, well-thought-out proposals for a Constitution for Ghana were produced and presented to the N.L.C.

Consequent upon this, a Constituent Assembly of 150 members, made up of public-spirited individuals and representatives of "identified

bodies" was set up. The Assembly was charged with the responsibility of reviewing the Proposals of the Constitutional Commission, to ensure that they formed a workable basis for a new Constitution for Ghana.

After nearly eight months of close study and scrutiny, covering about 96 sittings, the Assembly, with Mr. R.S. Blay, a former Supreme Court Judge, as Speaker and Nene Azu Mate Kole, as Deputy Speaker, drew up a draft Constitution. The Constitution, duly signed by all the members, was presented to the N.L.C. Significantly, the Assembly was later empowered by the N.L.C. to enact the Constitution and accordingly, on August 22, 1969, a new Constitution for Ghana was promulgated to usher in the Second Republic of Ghana.

A significant outcome of the new Constitution was the setting up of a 3-man Presidential Commission to function for a period not exceeding three years. The Presidential Commission, inaugurated on September 3, 1969, comprises Brigadier A.A. Afrifa, D.S.O., (Chairman), Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, M.V., Inspector-General of Police (Deputy Chairman) and Major-Gen. A.K. Ocran, Ag. Chief of Defence Staff (member).

The need for an efficient electoral machinery to facilitate the smooth conduct of free and democratic elections in Ghana was considered imperative and necessary. Accordingly, a 16-man Electoral Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice J.B. Siriboe, now a Justice of Appeal, was appointed on December 22, 1966, to examine and make recommendations on the qualifications and disqualifications of electors and parliamentary candidates, the registration of electors and division of Ghana into electoral districts. Past electoral procedures and malpractices, including the methods of voting and the nomination of parliamentary candidates, also formed part of the Commission's terms of reference.

One of the principal recommendations of the Electoral Commission's Report, accepted for implementation by the N.L.C., was the creation of an independent body to see to the conduct of future elections in Ghana, namely, the Electoral Commission.

Following the establishment, on a permanent basis, of this Commission in March 1968, Mr. Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, a High Court Judge, was appointed to the Office of an Interim Electoral Commissioner and charged with the responsibility of organising general elections which were provisionally set for August 29, 1969, in readiness for the formal transfer of power to a democratically elected civilian government on September 30, 1969, in fulfilment of the pledge given by the N.L.C.

In order to acquaint himself with electoral systems and procedures in advanced countries, the Interim Commissioner paid visits to Europe not only to study various election techniques but also to observe the operations of equipment needed for the work.

One of the first tasks of the Commissioner was to organise Registration of Voters, which was undertaken during the period covering September 1 to October 27, 1968. Official estimates given by the Electoral Commission indicated that about 3.3 million people were registered during the period, representing 75% of the total number of potential voters in the country. This figure was considered "encouraging" for a country of the size of Ghana, with a population of nearly 9 million.

Altogether, 140 specially-equipped mobile vans, ordered for electoral purposes (one for each of the 140 constituencies into which the country is divided) were used in the registration campaign.

The campaign was preceded by a broadcast on the radio and television by the Interim Electoral Commissioner, followed by a launching ceremony at the Black Star Square in Accra, during which there was a parade of mobile election vans and registration equipment. Similar ceremonies were also held at the regional and district headquarters.

Apart from the Electoral Commission, other departments and agencies took part in the registration exercise. These included the Ministry of Information, the Department of Social Welfare and Community Development and the Centre for Civic Education, which has been set up to educate the people on their civic rights and responsibilities as well as on the ideals of public service, integrity, tolerance of differences and belief in those values which constitute the foundation of a free society. The Centre for Civic Education carries out its tasks mainly through organised lectures, seminars, symposia and free discussions.

On May 1, 1969, the ban on political activities, which was imposed on the country immediately after the February 24, 1966, revolution, was lifted. Then, there emerged a plethora of political parties, numbering about 16 at the outset. However, by the time of the elections, no less than 5 of them had survived—several of the splinter groups having joined forces with the stronger parties or fallen out.

The right of a political party to function as such, that is, to contest the elections was, however, dependent on the securing of a Certificate of Registration from the Electoral Commission and also the submission to the Commissioner, within a given time, of a statement indicating the

assets and sources of income of the party concerned. No foreign bodies or individuals were permitted to give financial support to any political party or candidate contesting the elections.

The various parties maintained party offices in the constituencies. The offices were manned by full-time secretaries, with ancillary staff. Numerous campaign vans bearing party colours and symbols and fitted with loudspeakers and similar gadgets toured the constituencies, canvassing support for their respective party candidates whose picture-posters were common sights everywhere. Mass rallies were regular features of the election campaign.

Apart from giving wide coverage to the election rallies on television the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation afforded the leaders of the political parties in the election race the opportunity of addressing the people through television broadcasts. In this way, many people were able, in the quiet of their homes, to assess the personal and other qualities of the leaders in relation to the programmes of their respective parties.

The national papers also played a leading role in educating and informing the public on all aspects of the elections. However, the two main parties—the Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals (N.A.L.)—ran their own party papers, which served to whip up the enthusiasm of their members and supporters, thereby keeping them ‘on their toes’ till the election day.

A total of 479 candidates filed their nomination papers, and contested the general elections. The breakdown of the candidates in the Regions was as follows: Ashanti 82; Eastern 78; Upper 54; Central 53; Volta 49; Northern 45; Greater Accra 33; and Brong-Ahafo 30. About 20 candidates stood as Independents. There were seven women candidates, one of them an Independent.

The Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals each presented 138 candidates; the United Nationalist Party 86; People’s Action Party 52; and the All People’s Republican Party 45.

Of the total number of candidates, 80 were barristers and 20 medical practitioners. There were also 10 university lecturers, eight journalists, four former Ambassadors and 20 former parliamentarians.

Precisely, 140 seats in Parliament (corresponding to the electoral divisions of the country) were contested by the candidates of the political parties and the Independents. The seats were spread regionally as follows: Ashanti 22; Eastern 22; Upper 16; Volta 16; Central 15; Northern 14;

Brong Ahafo 13; Western 13; and Greater Accra 9.

More than 8,000 polling booths were opened at vantage points in all the constituencies. In the urban areas, one polling booth was allocated to 1,000 voters, while in the rural areas, the ratio was one polling booth to 500 voters.

Voting started at 7 o'clock in the morning and ended at 5 o'clock in the evening though there were a few hitches which necessitated the extension of time in certain areas.

To ensure orderly and smooth elections, the use by voters of intoxicating drinks was forbidden and no drinking bars were permitted to open near polling stations for the sale or consumption of spirits, wine or beer on the election day.

On August 28, 1969, the eve of the General Elections, Mr. J.W.K. Harlley, Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Commission, then in his capacity as Commissioner of the Interior and State Security, in a radio and television broadcast to the nation assured the people that adequate precautions had been taken to enable voters to vote without fear of molestation. He called upon the voters to cast their votes in full realisation of the importance of the step they were taking and its effects on the country. "Our moment of decision and the destiny of the country will be determined by the choice the people will make at the polls", he observed.

Voting started at a slow pace, in most constituencies, but it increased gradually in course of the day so that by the scheduled closing time, all the voters who turned out had cast their votes. The voting itself which was held in an atmosphere of peace and calm was brisk and lively. Most of the voters were in good humour and waited patiently for their turn in the long, winding queues which were formed long before the actual time for the voting. About 61% of the registered voters went to the polls. There were only isolated cases of breach of the electoral regulations which were handed to the Police.

The results of the elections turned out to be something of a surprise to many observers of the political scene, judging by the majority of seats secured by the winning party and the trend of the voting.

Leaders of the political parties who won their seats are Dr. K.A. Busia; Mr. K. A. Gbedemah and Mr. Fred Segbefia, leader and first deputy leader respectively of N.A.L. as well as Mr. Ibrahim Mahama, the party's general secretary; Dr. H.S. Bannerman, Chairman of U.N.P.; Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo, Chairman of A.P.R.P., who incidentally is the only candidate of

his party to win a seat. Veteran politicians, notably Mr. S.D. Dombo, Mr. William Ofori-Atta and Mr. R.R. Amponsah (all P.P.), were returned. Mr. Harry Sawyerr is also the only Independent candidate who won in the elections.

Former Commissioners who stood for the elections on the tickets of the Progress Party won their seats. They are : Mr. J.H. Mensah (Finance); Mr. R. A. Quarshie (Trade and Industries); Mr. N.Y.B. Adade (Attorney-General); and Mr. K.G. Osei-Bonsu, the first Commissioner of Information.

The party leaders who lost their seats include Dr. E.V.C. de Graft-Johnson (A.P.R.P.), Mr. J.F. Cobbina (Chairman of N.A.L.), Mr. Ayarna Imoru (P.A.P.), Mr. Joe Appiah and Mr. M.K. Apaloo, both of U.N.P., and Mr. E.H. Boohene and Mr. E.K. Dadson, second and third deputy leader, respectively, of N.A.L. Prof. T.F. Sai (P.P.), former Head of the Dept. of Preventive and Social Medicine, Ghana Medical School, Mr. S.G. Antor (P.P.), a veteran politician, and Mr. Issifu Ali (N.A.L.), former Commissioner of Information, were among those who were not successful.

Mr. Victor Owusu, erstwhile Attorney-General, and Dr. G.K. Agama, lecturer at the University of Ghana, Legon, were elected unopposed.

Three of the eight journalists won their seats, namely, Mr. C.D. Reindorf, Mr. J.G. Amamoo, and Mr. Daniel Bayensi, all of whom stood on Progress Party ticket.

Out of 80 barristers who stood for the elections, 45 lost their seats; while a total of about 250 candidates, mainly from the smaller parties and the Independents, failed to secure one-eighth of the total votes cast in their respective constituencies, and, as a result, had their deposits forfeited.

The final state of the parties at the end of the counts was as follows :

Party	No. of Seats
Progress Party ... ..	105
National Alliance of Liberals...	29
People's Action Party ... ..	2
United Nationalist Party ... ..	2
All People's Republican Party ...	1
Independent ... ..	1

APPENDIX I  
(REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES)  
NUMBER OF SEATS CONTESTED

Region	Ashanti	B. Ahafo	Central	Eastern	G. Accra	Northern	Upper	Volta	Western	Total
No. of Const.	22	13	15	22	9	14	16	16	13	140
P. P.	22	13	15	22	9	14	16	16	13	138
N. A. L.	21	13	15	22	8	14	16	16	13	138
U. N. P.	18	4	8	16	8	7	6	14	5	86
P. A. P.	10	0	5	3	7	5	7	3	12	52
A. P. R. P.	8	0	10	9	0	4	6	1	7	45
Independent	3	0	1	6	1	1	4	1	3	20
Total No. of Candidates	82	30	54	78	33	45	55	49	53	479

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APPENDIX II  
(NUMBER OF SEATS WON)

Region	Ashanti	B. Ahafo	Central	Eastern	G. Accra	Northern	Upper	Volta	Western	Total
No. of Const.	22	13	15	22	9	14	16	16	13	140
P. P.	22	13	15	18	3	9	13	2	10	105
N. A. L.	0	0	0	4	3	5	3	14	0	29
U. N. P.	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
P. A. P.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
A. P. R. P.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Independent	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total No. of Candidates	22	13	15	22	9	14	16	16	13	140



## **The Ghana Constitution: An Assessment**

P. DASGUPTA

THE army's achievements in Ghana have been impressive. In early 1966 when it overthrew Dr Kwame Nkrumah the odds seemed very much against the return of civilian constitutional rule. In fact even under Dr Nkrumah the government, though civilian in every respect, had ceased to have any semblance of constitutionality. Under the army, with the civilian character also eliminated and the 1960 constitution abrogated, Ghana appeared well set for a long period of military regime. But the developments, unexpectedly, have been quite to the contrary. The National Liberation Council, that is the army junta, as soon as it consolidated its position, set up on August 24, 1966, an 18-member Constitutional Commission under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice, Mr. Akufo-Addo, "to ascertain as far as possible the wishes of all sections of the people of Ghana on the question of what type of constitution would be most suitable for adoption by Ghana". The Constitutional Commission submitted its report to the National Liberation Council and soon afterwards a Constituent Assembly of 150 members came into existence to work out, on the basis of the report, details for a new constitution. The Assembly's draft, presented to the National Liberation Council for approval, was duly processed, voted and enacted by the House to become effective from August 22, 1969. On August 29 followed the first general elections to the National Assembly of the Second Republic of Ghana with five major parties contesting : Dr. K.S. Busia's Progress Party and Mr. K.A. Gbedemah's National Alliance of Liberals ; the other three being People's Action Party of Mr Ayarna Imoru, All People's Republican Party of Dr de Graft-Johnson and United Nationalist Party of Dr H.S. Bannerman. The Progress Party, having won 105 of the Assembly's 140 seats, was called upon to form the government. The National Liberation Council thus handed over power and Ghana reverted to civilian constitutional rule; though for a maximum period of another three years, that is at the latest until August 1972, the army is to retain the overall supervisory powers. It is to exercise these through a 3-man Presidential Commission consisting of the Chairman of the National Liberation Council

and his deputy as well as the Chief of the Staff of the Army. This is a personal mandate for the three men. Either at the expiry of the three-year limit or the death of all three of the incumbents, whichever is earlier, the Presidential Commission will stand dissolved and in accordance with Article 41 of the constitution Ghana will proceed to elect the Second Republic's first President.

To assess the present constitution, the earlier one of 1960 is the real yardstick. That had been promulgated by Dr Nkrumah and, according to his opponents, was "worse than the colonial constitution of the 19th century" for the simple reason that all power under it was concentrated in the hands of the President. He chose his Cabinet, civil servants, and judges. He could veto legislative bills and dissolve Parliament on his own. Not only were these written into the constitution; what was more grave was the ruthlessness with which Dr. Nkrumah enforced these. Theoretically his Convention People's Party was only the majority party holding 102 seats in the National Assembly as against the United Party' eight.

In practice no other party was allowed to function. The civil service began to be replaced by loyal party men. Because of the close links with the government, the party was able to gather the various workers, peasants, and students organisations under its wings. If in spite of these the Convention People's Party failed at the end to retain its hold, the reason was that it lacked a definite programme and developed a bureaucratic outlook. There also developed a division within the top leadership—the extremists pushing the moderates to give the party a militant role. Mr Gbedemah belonged to the latter group. But more about him later. Here, the point to stress is that with the help of the 1960 constitution Dr Nkrumah created a strong presidency and a monolithic party. Side by side the country's conservative elements were suppressed. For instance, the system of chieftaincy was weakened and the Akan people who dominate the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and the three southern regions were edged out of power. Except for Mr. Edusei other representatives of this conservative tribe chose to remain in the opposition.

The present constitution, therefore, appropriately begins by declaring in its preamble in the name of "the chiefs and people of Ghana" that having "experienced a regime of tyranny" they are determined to secure "the rule of law as the foundation of our society". Its two most important chapters are about "Liberty of the Individual" and "President", with as many as fourteen Articles on the first and seventeen on the second. The constitution, in Article 153, further stipulates: "The institution of

chieftaincy together with its Traditional Councils as established by customary law and usage is hereby guaranteed". Article 3 (1) lays down: "Parliament shall have no power to pass a law establishing a one-party State". Under Article 15, no person can be deprived of his personal liberty "save as may be authorised by law"; any person arrested or restricted shall be "informed immediately" and brought before a court within twenty-four hours. Article 27 (4) declares explicitly that the Minister concerned must notify every month in the official Gazette the number, names and addresses of persons restricted or detained and the number of cases reviewed by the tribunal. Article 23 (1) guarantees: "No person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests". Though Article 35<sup>(1)</sup> qualifies this by prohibiting tribal or religious groupings, there is nothing which can suppress, as Dr Nkrumah's regime did, regional loyalties. In fact, the latest general elections to the National Assembly show conclusively that Dr Busia's Progress Party has secured 105 out of a total of 140 seats only because of its regional strength in Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and the three southern areas; more precisely, because of its popularity among the dominant tribesmen of the area—the Akans. That regionalism (not tribalism) is meant to be encouraged is evident from Article 154 which states that each Region will have a House of Chiefs. With five members from each House a National House of Chiefs will be created. Article 156 stipulates that, parallel with these, separate Regional Councils shall be formed. The strengthening rather than the creation of these two types of councils is the novel feature of the Articles. In the same way for electing the President, the electoral college is to be composed of representatives of the House of Chiefs and District Councils of each Region besides, of course, the members of the National Assembly. Dr Nkrumah had been elected President by a popular referendum. The real thrust of the present constitution is to restrict the electoral base and bring in assured conservative elements.

So much for individual liberty and regionalism. Now about the President's office. For electing him as also for removing him the National Assembly has been vested with decisive powers. The fact that the constitution spells out the procedure in such detail is an indication of the new regime's determination not to repeat the experience of the past. His powers too are very clearly defined. He is "the executive authority in Ghana" and the National Assembly must act through him (Article 37). But in the performance of his functions he "shall

act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet" (Article 38). The Cabinet's approval is likewise required for appointment of heads of financial and other corporations, head of the Police service (Articles 49, 147). There are areas, however, where he must act only with advice of the Council of State, such as the appointment of Auditor-General, heads of commissions, Ombudsman, chairmen of information corporations, Chief of Defence Staff and Chief Justice (Articles 48, 115, 151). The Council of State, indeed, is a major innovation of the constitution. Both its composition and powers make it clear that the intention of the new regime is to provide the President with an independent and impartial source of authority so that he does not become entirely an agent of the Cabinet, particularly in the matter of "national" appointments. The Council, according to Article 53(6), "shall form part of the office of the President" and will be composed, under Article 53 (1), of the Prime Minister, leader of the Opposition, Speaker of the National Assembly, President of the National House of Chiefs and a maximum of twelve other persons. The President's political powers, however, are nil. He can appoint as Prime Minister only the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly and, failing that, any other person who is likely to command the support of the majority in the National Assembly (Article 60). In the final instance the choice has to be the Assembly's. He cannot prorogue or dissolve the National Assembly without the approval of the Prime Minister (Article 88). The most he can do in the day-to-day governance is either to ask the Prime Minister to furnish him information or to ask the Cabinet to consider any matter of his choice (Article 61). He can reprieve any prisoner (Article 50), yet under Article 102 "the final judicial power is vested not in "any organ or agency of the executive" but in the judiciary. (The judiciary has jurisdiction also in all matters relating to the constitution.) Similarly, though he shares the legislative powers with the National Assembly (Article 69), the latter remains the final arbiter of any bill (Article 84).

But even Parliament, that is the President and the National Assembly, is bound by Article 169 of the constitution not to make any change whatsoever in:

- (1) Chapter One which makes Ghana a constitutional, democratic and multi-party State;
- (2) Article 127 which forbids any taxation to be imposed without an Act of Parliament;

- (3) Article 149 which forbids any person to raise an army without an Act of Parliament; and
- (4) Article 153 which guarantees the system of chieftaincy.

The thrust of the constitution is decidedly against the regime that prevailed under Dr Nkrumah. The constitution has done this with a vengeance, in Article 71 (2), by debarring from membership of the National Assembly anyone convicted of treason or of acquiring assets illegally which, in the present context, necessarily means only those associated with Dr Nkrumah. This has been done to keep the composition of the House safe. In view of this anti-Nkrumah stand, the electoral victory of Dr Busia's Progress Party was expected. The surprising thing, however, is—and this really reflects the new regime's desire for a genuine change from the earlier one-party autocracy—that Mr Gbedemah, in spite of his close links with Dr Nkrumah's Convention People's Party, has been able to capture in the recent elections as many as 29 seats, i.e., 21 per cent of the seats with 30 per cent of the votes. Even in the predominantly Progress Party constituencies the Opposition polled more than 36 per cent of the votes.

## **DOCUMENTATION**

### **Ghana Constitution in a Nutshell**

*A novel feature of the 1969 Ghana Constitution is the establishment of a Presidential Commission consisting of the Chairman of the National Liberation Council (N.L.C.) which was dissolved on September 30, 1969, the Deputy Chairman of the N.L.C., and the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Armed Forces. The Commission will exercise the functions of the President for three years with effect from October 3, 1969. Published below are the transitional provisions of the Constitution laying down the setting up of the Presidential Commission as well as a summary of the clauses which have a special reference to the N.L.C. and the Prime Minister and his powers.—Ed.*

#### **PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AND ELECTION OF FIRST PRESIDENT**

1. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Chapter 6 or any other provision of this Constitution, until the National Assembly otherwise decides the functions of President under this Constitution shall be exercised for a period not exceeding three years from the coming into force of this Constitution, by a Presidential Commission consisting of the Chairman of the National Liberation Council who shall be Chairman of the Presidential Commission, the Deputy Chairman of the National Liberation Council, who shall be Deputy Chairman of the Commission, and the Chief of Defence Staff of the Armed Forces of Ghana.

Provided that during the said period of three years if any member of the Presidential Commission resigns or retires or dies or is found in the manner prescribed by Article 47 of this Constitution to be incapable of performing the functions of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity, the remaining members or member shall continue in office and constitute the Presidential Commission.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the exercise by the Presidential Commission of any of the functions of the President under this Constitution may, if not signified by all members of the Commission, be signified by the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of the Commission.

(3) Any reference in this section to the Chairman or Deputy

Chairman of the National Liberation Council or to the Chief of Defence Staff shall be deemed to be a reference to the person holding any such office immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution.

(4) After all the members of the Presidential Commission have ceased to hold office as such members under the foregoing provisions of this section, an election of the first President under this Constitution shall be held in accordance with the following provisions of this part and from the time when all members of the Commission cease to hold office until the assumption of office of the first President the Speaker of the National Assembly shall perform the functions of the President as provided for by Article 38 of this Constitution.

(5) For the purposes of the election of the first President, the Presidential Electoral College shall be constituted as provided for in clause (3) of Article 41 of this Constitution:

Provided that where the election of the first President takes place before the formation of District Councils in all the regions of Ghana under the provisions of Articles 156 to 158 of this Constitution, then the Presidential Electoral College for the election of the first President shall consist of:

- (a) all the members of the National Assembly,
  - (b) twenty-four chiefs, three of whom shall be elected by each House of Chiefs from among the chiefs who are members of that House; and any such election shall take place within twenty-one days after the members of the Presidential Commission cease to hold office as referred to in subsection (4) of this section.
- (6) Any reference in this Constitution to the President shall, during any period during which the Presidential Commission is in existence, have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Schedule, as if it were a reference to the Presidential Commission.

2. The provisions of Article 40 of this Constitution shall apply to the election of the first President under the provisions of this Part of this Schedule.

3. (1) The Presiding Officer shall, at least twenty-one days before the date of the Presidential election, publish a constitutional instrument stating the date, the place and the time at which the election of the President shall commence.

(2) The Presiding Officer shall, seven days before the expiration of the date specified in the instrument referred to in the preceding subsection, summon the Presidential Electoral College which shall meet for the purposes of electing the first President under this Constitution.

4. (1) Before the ballot is ordered to be taken the Presiding Officer shall announce the names of candidates together with the names of the persons by whom their nomination papers were signed.

(2) If in a presidential ballot

(a) there are three or more candidates, and

(b) none of the candidates is elected, and

(c) one of the candidates receives a smaller number of votes than each of the others,

that one of the candidates shall not be a candidate in any subsequent presidential ballot at the same election meeting.

(3) If in a presidential ballot

(a) the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the immediately preceding subsection are satisfied but the condition specified in paragraph (c) of that subsection is not: and

(b) two of the candidates each receives the same number of votes and that number is smaller than the number of votes received by the other candidate or each of the other candidates, as the case may be,

a ballot shall forthwith be held for the purposes of determining which of any such two candidates shall be treated for the purposes of the immediately preceding subsection as the candidate mentioned in paragraph (c) thereof; and the candidate who receives the smaller number of the votes cast in that ballot shall be so treated and the provisions of that subsection shall apply accordingly.

(4) Where in a ballot taken pursuant to the provisions of the immediately preceding subsection each candidate receives the same number of votes, a ballot shall be taken to determine which candidate receives the smaller number of votes.

(5) Where in a presidential ballot no candidate is declared elected a further presidential ballot shall be taken at the same election meeting; and an election meeting shall continue until a candidate is declared elected in a presidential ballot taken at the meeting; but may be adjourned from time to time not for more than two days exclusive of the days on which and to which it is adjourned.



(6) The provisions of Article 41 of this Constitution, other than clause (5) thereof, shall apply to the election of the first President under the provisions of this Part of this Schedule.

5. (1) The Court of Appeal, as established pursuant to the provisions of clause (4) of Article 102 of this Constitution, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to the validity of the election of the President under the provisions of this Part of this Schedule, in so far as that question depends upon the qualification of any person for election or the interpretation of this Constitution.

(2) The Rules of Court Committee may by constitutional instrument, make Rules of Court with respect to the persons by whom, the manner in which, and the conditions upon which proceedings for the determination of any question as is referred to in the preceding subsection may be instituted in the Court of Appeal and other purposes connected therewith.

(3) Where the Court of Appeal declares the election invalid the Speaker of the National Assembly shall, as soon as it may be, reconvene the Presidential Electoral College and the provisions of this Part shall apply accordingly.

(4) A person found by the Court of Appeal not to have been qualified for election shall not be accepted as a candidate for any subsequent ballot for the election of the first President.

#### **CARETAKER GOVERNMENT**

14. (1) On the coming into force of this Constitution the National Liberation Council shall continue to exercise the legislative power of the State until the meeting of the National Assembly immediately following the formation of the Cabinet.

(2) On the coming into force of this Constitution and until the formation of a Cabinet the Executive Council shall continue to exercise such part of the executive power of the State as is not inconsistent with any special powers conferred on the President by this Constitution.

(3) On or soon after the coming into force of this Constitution every person who served as a member of the National Liberation Council shall be paid, as a token mark of the Nation's gratitude, such gratuity by way of a terminal award as shall be determined by the Government under this Constitution which immediately succeeds the National Liberation Council.

(4) Any member of the National Liberation Council who retires from public service at any time before or after the coming into force of this Constitution shall be paid a pension equivalent to the gross emolument to which he was or is entitled at the time of such retirement and any such pension shall be in lieu of any other pension to which any such member may otherwise be entitled on his retirement from the public service:

Provided that where the gross emolument at the time of such retirement is lower than what it was or is at any time before or after the coming into force of this Constitution then the pension payable under the provisions of this section shall be the higher amount to which any such member was or is entitled to at any time before or after the coming into force of this Constitution.

(5) Notwithstanding anything in Article 169 of this Constitution or in any other provision of this Constitution, until the death of all members of the National Liberation Council, Parliament shall have no power to amend this subsection or subsection (4) of this section.

#### **OTHER IMPORTANT CLAUSES**

##### **Article 3: Formation of One-party State Outlawed.**

Parliament is prohibited from passing any law establishing a one-party state. The sub-clauses contain provisions for the defence of the Constitution.

##### **Article 4 : Unitary Republic**

The Sovereign State of Ghana is a Unitary Republic.

##### **Article 5 et seq : Citizenship**

Birth alone does not confer automatic citizenship. One of the parents must be a citizen of Ghana. Dual citizenship is restricted.

##### **Article 12 et seq : Individual Liberty**

It contains provisions for the liberty of the individual.

##### **Article 29 : Universal Adult Suffrage**

It confers universal adult suffrage, minimum age being 21 years.

##### **Article 30 : Electoral Commission**

An Electoral Commission and the sole Electoral Commissioner are established.

**Article 36 : President (Head of State)**

The Head of State will be called the President of Ghana and also the Commander-in-Chief of Ghana. The executive authority of Ghana is vested in the President. The President should act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, except in cases where he is required by the Constitution to act in accordance with the advice of any person or authority, other than the Cabinet etc. The President will not leave Ghana without the consent of the Cabinet. In the event of death, resignation, absence etc., the Speaker of the National Assembly will perform the functions of the President. The President will be elected by an Electoral College consisting of all the members of the National Assembly; Chiefs of Regional Houses of Chiefs; and 15 members elected by the District Councils in each region. The term of office of President is four years and no person can hold the office of the President for a third term. The President can be removed by a Special Tribunal consisting of 3 Justices of the Supreme Court.

**Article 53 : Council of State**

Under this Article a Council of State to aid and counsel the President has been established. Its composition is : The Prime Minister; the Speaker of the National Assembly; the leader of the Opposition and the President of the National House of Chiefs, being ex-officio members; four persons to be nominated by the President who have held the office of the President, Chief Justice or Speaker of the National Assembly or Prime Minister; and 8 members of whom two shall be women and four shall be chiefs to be also nominated.

**Article 54 : National Security Council**

A National Security Council consisting of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Finance and the Attorney-General and such other persons as may be appointed by the National Security Council. The Prime Minister will preside at the meeting. The functions of the National Security Council relate to the national security and the integration of the domestic, foreign and military policies and to assess and apprise them of their objectives and risks of Ghana.

**Article 57 : Conduct of International Affairs**

The international affairs will be conducted in consonance with the accepted principles of international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interests of Ghana.

**Article 58 : Appointment of Diplomatic Representatives**

The President will appoint diplomatic representatives on the advice of the Cabinet.

**Article 59 : Conclusion of Treaties etc.**

The President can execute or cause to be executed treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Ghana on the advice of the Cabinet. If such a treaty relates to any matter within the legislative competence of the National Assembly, it will require ratification of the Assembly.

**Article 60 : Prime Minister and Cabinet**

It relates to the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Cabinet.

The Prime Minister will communicate to the President decisions of the Cabinet relating to administration and proposals for legislation, and furnish information on these subjects as and when the President may call for them and submit for consideration of the Cabinet if the President so requires any matter which the President considers should be considered by the Cabinet. The Cabinet will be summoned by the Prime Minister who will preside at all the meetings.

**Article 65 : Ministerial Secretaries**

It concerns the appointment of Ministerial Secretaries.

**Article 69 : Parliament (National Assembly)**

The Parliament of Ghana will consist of the President and a National Assembly of 140 members.

**Article 100 : Ombudsman**

It provides for the establishment of an Ombudsman.

**Article 102 et seq : Independent Judiciary**

It establishes an independent judiciary of which the Chief Justice will be the head. The judiciary will consist of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice. A Judge of the Supreme Court is entitled to a pension equivalent to the salary he drew immediately before retirement and who has served as a judge for a period of ten years or more.

**Article 126 : Laws of Ghana**

The laws of Ghana shall comprise the Constitution, enactments

made under the Constitution, orders, rules and regulations made on behalf of the Constitution, the existing law and the common law.

**Article 127 : Power to levy taxation**

Only the Parliament has the power to levy taxation.

**Article 150 : Armed Forces Council**

It establishes an Armed Forces Council consisting of the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Minister for Interior and two other persons nominated by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

**Article 153 : Chieftaincy guaranteed**

Guarantees the institution of chieftaincy together with its Traditional Councils as established by customary law and usage.

**Article 154 : National House of Chiefs**

Establishes a National House of Chiefs elected by the Regional Houses of Chiefs.

**Article 156 et seq : Local self-government**

Governs the establishment of local Government Councils, Local Councils, District Councils and Regional Councils.

**Article 169 : Amendment to Constitution**

Lays down the powers for amendments to the Constitution with checks and balances such as the levy of taxation, raising of armed forces, the liberty of the individual, the representation of the people etc. cannot be amended.

## **Nigerian Crisis:**

### **Legitimacy and Legitimacy of the January Coup**

F. OLADIPO ONIPEDE

When the coup came, it struck with such an impact that the ordinary man was bewildered. To the knowledgeable elements in society it was a welcome relief, but the sight of the army in the streets threatened their sense of security. The suspense that accompanied the first 45 hours of the coup was torturing. The violence that the coup unleashed did not register its impact until much later. It was the sudden death of the First Republic that generated fear and insecurity. What lay ahead was not known; even the coup plotters had their doubts within the first ten hours after the coup began. The coup as planned was one thing; but the coup as executed tended to deviate from its course. To what extent has this deviation affected the legitimacy of the coup?

What happened is now public knowledge. A military coup "Exercise Damissa" had successfully toppled the constitutional government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. He lost his life, but so had two others, his regional counterparts, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and Chief S. L. Akintola, the Are Ona Kakanfo, Premiers of the Northern and Western Regions respectively, as well as the Federal Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, and several senior military officers, mostly northerners and Yorubas.<sup>1</sup>

The process of action set into motion that produced a profound political change had been motivated by a number of decisions. All these historical decisions were made between the 14th, Friday, 2 p.m. and Sunday 11:05 p.m. January 16, 1966. The most important ones are:

The First Decision	—	Fatal and Political
The Second Decision	—	The Coup
The Third Decision	—	The "Coup within the Coup"
The Fourth Decision	—	No Foreign Entanglements
The Fifth Decision	—	The Acting President's Role
The Sixth Decision	—	The Handing-over
The Seventh Decision	—	The Acceptance

### **The First Decision**

Even before the life of the First Republic began, Kaduna had long become the virtual but unofficial political capital of Nigeria. Perhaps this was an historical irony. The man credited with the creation of Nigeria in 1914, Lord Lugard, had also created the new Kaduna in 1917 and intended it to be the Union capital.<sup>2</sup> But history denied him his wish.

Since 1956, there has been a widespread belief that any major decision affecting the destiny of Nigeria had to be made at Kaduna. The road to Lagos and to the rest of Nigeria was via Kaduna. Again, the first historical decision in this instance was also taken at Kaduna. It was political in nature, but it proved fatal. What was it about? On Friday January 15, 1966, Chief S. L. Akintola, the Premier of the Western Region, flew into Kaduna, for a private meeting with Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region. Besides, it was known that a number of Army officers were present, including Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, Commander of the No. 1 Brigade and the second most senior officer of the Nigerian Army. The main decision of this ad hoc meeting was to use the Army to resolve the Western Regional deadlock, which so far constitutional means and action of the Riot Squad Police had failed to end. A British weekly reported:<sup>3</sup>

This meeting was reported to have discussed the question of the recent discontent in the Western Region in the light of intelligence reports indicating that junior and middle-grade officers might be plotting a revolt...

Already tension was building up in the Army.<sup>4</sup> Before this meeting rumour had it that the new NNA Balewa government was bent on retiring the substantive holder of the post of the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was only 42 years old.

To use the Army to suppress a political revolt with constitutional overtones would amount to employing it to gain political objectives. Besides, it would create a military situation in which known or suspected coup plotters among the officers could easily be court-martialled. By now, it was known that the Army had become restive and politically ambitious. There was suspicion in the air. Mr. Patrick Keatley, correspondent of the *Guardian*, described the Kaduna meeting as a plot by Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of the Northern Region:<sup>5</sup>

...in the absence of President Azikiwe, to take over Federal power

himself with the support of Northern appointees of the Federal Army and Police Force.

But the fatal aspect of the Kaduna decision was the fact that it was leaked to the plotters who were middle-rank officers on the Majors' level.<sup>6</sup> When the "Young Turks" received the news, being soldiers, they knew what the consequences of their proposed coup meant. The threat of personal liquidation became too real on that Friday. It was further known that after the meeting, "a senior Northern officer, believed to be Lt. Col. Segena (Abogo Largema), was sent to Lagos to brief Major-General Ironsi, the G.O.C. of the Nigerian Army,"<sup>7</sup> In a political process, one of the most important factors affecting the effectiveness and execution of any policy-decision is the capacity to assess fully all the implications and consequent reactions. With the military it is different: a properly bid plan and speedy execution are what matter.

The "Young Turks" must have decided "tonight or never" some time after the Kaduna meeting. This becomes apparent when it was later reported that Lt. Col. Abogo Largema, after having a drink with a few of his military colleagues at the Ikoyi Hotel, Lagos, was shot dead in his room that same Friday night.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Second Decision**

The decision to stage the coup was clearly illegal and contrary to the Officers' Oath to defend their country. Like all other coups, it was a military decision that did not emanate from the appropriate authority. Nevertheless, it created a *de facto* situation on January 15, 1966. This very fact made the decision legitimate, given the background to the political upheaval in the country. This point is significant. Without a *de facto* situation, the Nigerian Army would not have been able to "invest" itself with political authority and a fabricated constitutional legality.

The "Young Turks" formed a broad section of the Nigerian Army. They were largely graduates—of Military Academies and Universities—who shared the anxiety and impatience of the younger generation of Nigerians. The coup was planned and decided upon by these young men.<sup>9</sup> But the timing was exclusively reserved for the "inner circle" of five Majors. Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, leader of the coup, said:<sup>10</sup>

There were five of us in the inner circle. We planned the details.

These Majors of the "inner circle" of five were all Ibos.<sup>11</sup> There were 25 "Young Turks" and they included several ethnic groups in the



country because the Army was about the only institution with the highest index of Nigerianism. Thus, when Major Chukuma Kaduna Nzeogwu revealed that the core plotters of the coup were five Ibo Majors, a chill ran through the vertebrae of the revolutionary-minded Nigerians who welcomed the coup. Within 24 hours of the coup two ugly and deceitful facts became apparent. These were :

- (a) The pattern of execution affected each of the other three Regions of the Federation, with the Eastern Region—the homeland of the Ibos—unscorched;
- (b) Furthermore, the coup took a heavy toll of senior military officers from mainly two Regions—the Northern and Western—while their counterparts of Eastern origin were spared.

These facts generated great human emotions—fear, insecurity and desperation. Of special significance is the fact that the military leaders executed were loved by the rank and file of their commands.<sup>12</sup> From the moment these facts became known, not only within the Army, but in the country, the coup lost its initial popular momentum. In other words, the coup lost the basis for its legitimacy. In terms of the immediate future for General Ironsi's regime, the prospects were disturbing. The nation's goodwill and legitimacy were being withheld. This disturbing feeling was gradually setting into a hardened attitude. The failure of General Ironsi to realise the tremendous implications of this hardening attitude at the moment of success reveals a political weakness which is inimical to the smooth functioning of any regime—a military regime is more vulnerable.

### **The Third Decision**

The general impression and the factual information available tend to indicate that the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, was not a party to the coup. Since the coup was an open secret, he must have heard of it. There is no record of his reaction. But his movements on the night of Friday, January 14, 1966, have been described.<sup>13</sup>

As officers of the Army, the plotters of the coup must have realised that General Ironsi was a vital factor for the success of the coup, dead or alive. The most authentic reports describe what happened as follows :<sup>14</sup>

A squad, under an officer not yet identified, set off to see General Ironsi at his home. But the Adjutant-General, Lt. Col. Jack

Pam, managed to warn Ironsi they were coming, then he was somehow caught and murdered.

Three officers next marched into Ironsi's house and demanded : Are you with us or against us? Ironsi temporised, but managed to satisfy them.

It is important to point out here that were it not for the loyalty of Lt. Col. Yakubu Pam (a northern officer) to his GOC, Major-General Ironsi (an Ibo officer), the latter might have been killed during the first phase of the coup. The feeling of Nigerianism was strongest in the Army. Another noble example was the case of the only Ibo officer killed in the coup, Lt. Col. Arthur Unegbu, Quartermaster-General. Army Headquarters, Lagos, who was in charge of the keys to the armoury and who refused to surrender them to the coup plotters. In Kaduna, we have another noble example, in the person of Major S. Adegoke (a Yoruba officer), who was at the crucial time Deputy Adjutant and Quarter Master-General. He made the supreme sacrifice. Therefore, if Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi decided to be loyal to his oath of office, he was merely being a noble Nigerian.

It must have been after this encounter with the coup leaders that the civilian authority contacted General Ironsi. As the officer responsible for the Army, he was called upon at one point in the progress of the coup by the remnant surviving civilian authority. This was believed to be between 3 and 4 a.m., Saturday. From that moment on, it must have been assumed that the decision was made. General Aguiyi-Ironsi proceeded to arrest the situation. Within the next ten hours, he turned the tide of the coup. First, General Ironsi had to ensure the loyalty of his own Federal troops.<sup>15</sup> The elite unit was the Federal Guards, under the command of Major D. Okafor, who was credited with the arrest of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance.<sup>16</sup> The final decision was under way in the negotiations between Major C. K. Nzeogwu and Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi.

The coup within the coup was smoothly organised and carried out quietly. The dean of the West African correspondents reported in an article captioned "Ironsi Retains Nigerian Control."<sup>17</sup>

According to diplomatic and other authoritative sources, what took place behind the scenes was a successful coup within a coup.

Once the GOC, General Ironsi, made his decision, his first weapon was to brand any unit or groups of units which did not submit to his

authority as "dissident elements." The fact that in his first pronouncement this undercover weapon was made public served to reinforce the contention that there was a struggle for power within the Nigerian Army during the 45 hours following the coup.

Later it became clear that Lt. Col. C. Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Commander of the 5th Battalion at Kano, was the first to surrender, and he was later rewarded with the governorship of the former Eastern Region. Then came the surrender of Lt. Col. Francis Adekunle Fajuyi, Commander of the Battle Group Course, the armoured squadron, and the only unit of its kind in the Nigerian Army, stationed at Abeokuta. He was rewarded with the governorship of the then Western Region. Thirdly, Lt. Col. Hilary Njoku, Commander of the 2nd Battalion, based at Ikeja, was received, but not before some exchange of fire. In the process, the popular Nigerian Army officer, Lt. Colonel Yakubu Pam, was killed.

But the first senior officer to profess loyalty to General Ironsi was Col. Victor Banjo, Squadron Commander of the Ordnance Depot (EME), who was the second in command to General Ironsi during the first 72 hours of the coup, but was later arrested and jailed.<sup>18</sup> Lt. Col. David Ejor was in Lagos on that eventful Friday night. He must have professed his loyalty, and he was sent to Enugu as Officer Commanding for the first week, before being sent later to Benin as Military Governor of the Midwest. The 4th Battalion was stationed at Ibadan under the command of Lt. Col. Abogo Largema, who was the first casualty in the coup in Lagos. His Chief of Staff was Major M. O. Nzeffili, who must have co-operated with his GOC.

It was obvious that by 6 p.m. on Saturday, January 15, 1966, the spirit of the coup had been arrested. But the bulk of the former Northern Region remained "dissident". Kaduna had two battalions besides the Defence Academy, and the Nigerian Military Training School. Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun was the officer commanding the No. 1 Brigade based at Kaduna. He was killed with his wife in bed early during the coup. His Chief of Staff and the 3rd Battalion commander was Lt. Col. George Kurubo, who escaped the purge. Later he was made the first Nigerian head of the Air Force.

Meanwhile, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi had ordered Lt. Col. C. D. Nwawo to fly home from his London assignment. It was Lt. Col. Nwawo who risked his life to intervene personally with Major Chukuma K. Nzeogwu at Kaduna.

By Monday, 1 p.m., Major Nzeogwu held his second press conference at Kaduna, in which he said, among other things, that <sup>19</sup>

I am anxious to hand over command to a superior officer but none has appeared.

We have let it be known that we will grant safe conduct to any high-ranking officer who wishes to speak to us. We think that some staff officers are not passing on our messages to the Supreme Commander.

The pattern of the coup within the coup was to win over the loyalty of the units at the various strategic locations. The bulk of the Army was under the coup leaders. Not until the Supreme Commander gave his assent to the five conditions suggested by Major C. K. Nzeogwu did the "dissident" army offer its loyalty. These conditions were :<sup>20</sup>

1. Safe conduct for (Major Nzeogwu) himself, his officers and all the men who "carried out the coup on the night of January 15".
2. A guarantee of freedom from legal proceedings, now or at any time in the future, for officers and men who took part.
3. An assurance that the "people we fought to remove will not be returned to office."
4. Compensation to be paid to the families of all officers and men who lost their lives in Kaduna, or other parts of Nigeria.
5. All officers and men arrested in the West to be released.

These conditions highlighted the fact that the coup within the coup was a struggle. At least the public came to know :

- (a) That in the West and in Lagos, Federal troops fought battles with units of the "dissident army." The casualties have not been made public.<sup>21</sup>
- (b) That among the officer ranks, there was shifting loyalties and some officers were no longer at their posts. On Monday, January 17, the Supreme Commander issued a decree commanding them to "return to their posts."<sup>22</sup>
- (c) For about a week, all the Federal military depots and installations, and some strategic locations, were heavily guarded with sandbags and dug-in trenches.

It must be noted here that the third clause of the agreement has great political implications. It is yet to be seen how it will be implemented during the life of the "interim military" rule and at the beginning of civilian rule. This was a vital "take-over" for Nigeria. Another mystery is : Was General Ironsi personally ambitious or was his honour

and oath of office challenged to the point where he was forced to take over complete military and political control? If so, why should he need the cover of constitutionality?

#### **The Fourth Decision**

The "Young Turks" did not plan any intervention from friendly or hostile foreign troops. Neither could General Ironsi have wished it. The two groups were agreed on at last one point. No commander of a national army, proud of its history and jealous of its achievements, could willingly invite foreign troops. Obviously in such an event the indigenous commander would become a pawn of international power politics. The memory of the ignominy of General Mobutu of Congo (Leopoldville) was too recent. What is more, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, had played some role in the Congo. He understood the implications of inviting foreign troops.

The restraint and discipline shown by the "Young Turks" on this point is crucial to saving Nigeria for posterity. Taken as a gesture of Nigerianism, it amounts to a testimony of their faith in the indissoluble union of Nigeria—the new order wherein no Nigerian "will be ashamed" of being a citizen. This was a dedication to which the leaders of the coup and the leader of the Nigerian Army discharged their duty to the nation in the best military tradition.

The first announcement made by the Council of Ministers on Saturday, January 15, at 2.30 p.m., represented the coup as a "mutiny" among a "dissident section of the Nigerian Army."<sup>23</sup> The "dissident section" kidnapped the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister of Finance. Nigerians received the news with caution, but to foreigners it must have sounded a most serious and reckless act by a mutinous Army. Already, a precedent had been set for the United Kingdom to give help to Commonwealth governments in such cases. One British publication editorialised as follows :<sup>24</sup>

A precedent for Britain giving military aid to African Commonwealth governments in trouble was set two years ago when Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda called for British troops to quell mutinies in their armies.

But the situation in Nigeria today is much more fluid and could represent a colossal risk.

It was also known that on the Saturday morning of the coup, at the Nigeria Police Headquarters, Lagos, Sir Francis Cummings-Bruce, British

High Commissioner in Nigeria, attended a meeting with General Ironsi, senior police officials, and three Federal Cabinet Ministers. It is reasonable to suppose that at this meeting the question of inviting foreign troops was raised by the Ministers who must have felt most insecure and unsure of their fate. A week later, two British publications announced to the world that the British Army had been alerted for a "call to Nigeria".<sup>25</sup>

At midnight the 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards at Caterham, Surrey, was put on 72 hours readiness in case there is a call for British military intervention in Nigeria.....Nigeria has no treaty with Britain which provides for military aid.

Seven days later, a Nigerian paper carried a denial by a spokesman of the British High Commission in Lagos.<sup>26</sup>

There is absolutely no truth in a report published in a British newspaper that a battalion of British troops had been placed on a 72 hour stand by for Nigeria.....The Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr. Arthur Bottomley, on Tuesday, denied reports that the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, had asked for military assistance from Britain.

This denial was a poor performance. First, the British newspaper in question was not named nor was the date of publication given. There were at least two different British newspaper publications on the subject. In the second place, the denial misplaced the emphasis. It is true that Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi did not ask for British troops, but the fact remained that two British battalions were reported by *The Times* of London to be "on 72-hour alert in view of the possible need to answer a call for more troops to be sent to Africa."<sup>27</sup> If there was no request, why should these battalions have been alerted?

Furthermore, the same newspaper explained the British practice under normal conditions when "extra precaution is not necessary."<sup>28</sup>

Spearhead battalions of the strategic reserve in Britain carry out their duties for one month, during which time one company, in rotation, is permanently on 24 hours alert, and the other elements of the unit on 72 hours.

In a debate in the British Parliament (week of 24-29 January), Mr. John Tilney raised the question of the safety of some 18,500 Britons in Nigeria—should the Nigeria Military Government "prove more unstable than expected would British lives be protected?" The answer Mr. Bottomley gave was, "Certainly".<sup>29</sup> No light is shed on how the British

Commonwealth Secretary intended to "protect British lives" in Nigeria.

But on January 19, four days after the coup, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana made a suggestion to the effect that, in case foreign troops should attend to a call from Nigeria, such "troops should go through the OAU only."<sup>30</sup> This was the first public statement on the question of foreign troops.

No doubt, the question of foreign reaction to the coup must have been uppermost in the minds of the anti-coup faction which set itself to the task of taking over the coup. These people included three groups; the first was the Armed Forces "brass" under the leadership of General Ironsi. The second group comprised the civilian politicians, especially senior Ministers, and the third group was the one-man team, the British High Commissioner to Nigeria.<sup>31</sup>

A number of interesting communiques were issued on Saturday, January 15, 1966.

- (1) Radio Cotonou reported that in the early morning hours a broadcast was monitored from Lagos saying that the military had taken over "to bring an end to gangsterism." It ended: "My compatriots, you will no longer need to be ashamed to be Nigerians".<sup>32</sup>
- (2) At 1500 GMT of the same day, Lagos Radio (NBC) External Service broadcast the following.<sup>33</sup>  
 "There was a mutiny by a dissident section of the Nigerian Army this morning. The Prime Minister (Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) and the Federal Minister of Finance (Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh) were apprehended and taken to an unknown destination."<sup>34</sup>
- (3) At 1700 hours, Lagos Radio said: "The statement adds that the Federal Government is satisfied that the situation will soon return to normal and that the ill-advised mutiny would be brought to an end and that law and order in the two disturbed areas of the country will soon be restored."<sup>35</sup>
- (4) In the evening of the same day, Radio Kaduna said, among other things:<sup>36</sup>

"In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces I declare martial law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria....."

Like good soldiers we are not promising you anything miraculous or spectacular but what we will promise every law-abiding citizen is freedom from fear or other forms of oppression, freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to reach the sky in any field of human endeavour, both nationally and internationally; we promise that you will no more be ashamed to say you are a Nigerian.

These communiques established the fact that the original coup toppled the First Republic, but they also reflect the effort and initiative of some Nigerians whose activities centred around the Nigerian Police Headquarters where a last-minute compromise was made to save the situation. The obvious leader was Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC. But before this unit got organised, the "Young Turks" had practically completed the coup.

The group of Nigerians at the Police Headquarters were the anti-coup faction while the other groups, centred around State House under the leadership of Dr. Nwafor Abysinia Orizu, the Acting President, were the pro-coup faction. During cross-consultations between the two factions, it was reported that:<sup>37</sup>

Following a Cabinet meeting, later in the day, it was reported that Dr. Orizu, acting President, had declined to appoint an acting Prime Minister.

There were only two alternatives under the circumstances. The first was to appoint an acting Prime Minister. This would have removed the need for recognition, since both the State and Government of Nigeria would have been preserved. The second alternative was to preserve the State and create a new government. This was done, but it entailed a risk. Not all governments who formerly recognised the old constitutional government might be willing to recognize the new *de facto* government. General Ironsi's promise to *return* the government to civilian rule must have helped indeed.

The choice of the second alternative made it incumbent upon General Ironsi to seize the military initiative at once in order to convince the world and the nation that he was in control. If this was the object of the pro-coup faction, it was effective and decisive. But it was a pyrrhic victory because it created a number of military-political problems for Major-General Ironsi vis-a-vis his capacity to consolidate the basis of legitimacy for his regime.<sup>38</sup>

Once the anti-coup faction was committed to be loyal, which meant arresting the coup, Communiques Nos. 2 and 3 followed normally. These communiques had a double significance. They were tailored to convince the outside world, particularly the UK and the USA, and contained coded messages for internal consumption.

Known to members of both factions was the plain fact that the bulk of the fighting men in the Nigerian Army were northerners. Furthermore, once the senseless execution of their senior officers was known, Major



Chukuma Nzeogwu in Kaduna and Lt. Col. Ojukwu in Kano would be as good as dead. At this crucial time, the anti-coup faction did not know this fact. It is reasonable to assume that Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi knew of the innocent killings of senior non-Ibo officers of the Army.<sup>39</sup> What was generally known was:

- (a) That both the Premiers of the North, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and of the West, Chief S.L. Akintola, had been killed in the course of the coup.
- (b) That the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Balewa, and his Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh, were missing. The hope that they might still be alive and safe lingered on, especially for the Prime Minister.
- (c) That in Benin and Enugu, both Chief Dennis Osadebay and Dr. Michael Okpara were under house arrest.

One more point in Communiqués Nos. 2 and 3. At the crucial time when they were issued, the confused and dangerous situation might have given the illusion that the First Republic and a Federal Government existed. Legally, this was not so, for the following reasons:

- (i) The very composition and venue of the meetings for the two factions were not only illegal but unconstitutional. In the anti-coup faction, there was present throughout their meetings a foreigner, the British High Commissioner. With the pro-coup faction, the virtual leader was the acting Head of State, a man who at all crucial times must be non-political. Besides all present were Ibos.
- (ii) "The executive authority of the federation" which the Acting President has sworn to uphold provides for the "maintenance of the Constitution" and not its nullification, even under the circumstances of the coup. In other words, the pro-coup faction forfeited all semblance of legality when Dr. Orizu refused to appoint an Acting Prime Minister and when his faction agreed to hand over the executive authority of the Federation.<sup>40</sup>
- (iii) The anti-coup faction, acting within the provisions of Section 89 of the Constitution, should have named one or the most senior Cabinet member as the Acting Prime Minister and then so advised the Acting President. This courage was lacking and instead they proceeded to bargain with a faction around the Acting President.

But it is obvious that the illegal use of the Federal Government power and influence helped to calm the insecure mood generated by the coup. On the evening of Saturday, January 15, 1966, when Major Nzeogwu's broadcast from Kaduna was heard, it created within Nigeria the very opposite effect. It was received with relief as a corroboration of Communiques Nos. 2 and 3. But Major Nzeogwu had intended the broadcast as a counter to the earlier two by the Lagos Radio.

In the outside world, Major Nzeogwu scored his point. First, it linked the first early dawn broadcast from Lagos with the coup leader and established him as the real leader of the coup. The import was that progressive Nigerians were "ashamed to be Nigerians" under the First Republic. Thus Major Nzeogwu unwittingly christened the "dissident army" as the "Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces." This further delayed for another 36 hours the establishment of a new government.

Sir Francis Cummings-Bruce came in with a formula that saved the situation. Formal recognition might not be necessary: it was the assurance from someone in control that would do the trick. Even so the master-formula did not ease the General's plight. More than half of the country was still in the hands of the "dissident army." Earnest negotiations began between the General and the coup leader, Major Nzeogwu.<sup>41</sup>

If Major Nzeogwu and his Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces holding the whole of the Northern Region persisted much longer, there was a real fear that some African states or world power might offer it recognition. Armed with recognition, the Supreme Revolutionary Council might not only challenge but lay claim to being the *de facto* legal government of the whole of Nigeria. (There are numerous examples. In 1949, to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the Communist head of China, declared China as the People's Republic of China; and President Chiang Kai-shek withdrew Taiwan (Formosa), still claiming to represent the whole of China. The U.S. continued to recognise the Chinese Government at Formosa; while the Soviet Union, the UK and France, to mention only a few, recognised the People's Republic of China under Mao Tse-tung.)

Then followed the crucial five-point conditional surrender terms. Major Nzeogwu had "offered" his loyalty to General Ironsi. Under a *de facto* situation such as a coup, this agreement was definitely legal. But as pointed out earlier, in General Ironsi's precarious position, wading between revolutionary legality and constitutional reality, i.e., the heritage of legitimacy that his authority needed, the General's honour was at stake.

### **The Fifth Decision**

Nigeria is a republic with a written constitution that embodies the fundamental law of the country. Relations between the Prime Minister's Office and the Presidency were always formal, cautious and in accordance with the fundamental law of the land. The same was true of their counterparts on the regional level.

The constitution of Nigeria, unlike that of the U.S., has special provisions for "judicial review" written into it.<sup>42</sup> This forces those holding high posts of public trust to be especially conscious of the various constitutional provisions limiting the functions of their office. Laws are always defined in the negative, never in positive terms. This negative character of law tends to restrict as well as to restrain the public actions and pronouncements of the representatives of the people.

It is therefore necessary to clarify the following concepts : constitutional, unconstitutional, non-constitutional, and extra-constitutional actions in respect of the functions of those under oath to uphold the Nigerian constitution.<sup>43</sup>

- (i) A constitutional action is an act of a public official in accordance with the provisions and spirit of the constitution.
- (ii) An unconstitutional action is an act of a public official that is either against or goes beyond the provisions and spirit of the constitution.
- (iii) An extra-constitutional action is an act of a public official that is beyond the provisions but not necessarily against the spirit of the constitution.
- (iv) A non-constitutional action is an act of a public official that is neutral to both the provisions and spirit of the constitution.<sup>41</sup>

The life-stream of politics is the constitution—written or unwritten; and without it, there will be chaos. Political decisions are not always made in a rational manner. Under the First Republic's Constitution, on January 15, the Head of State was Dr. Nwafor Orizu. He was the one who refused to appoint an interim Prime Minister. His refusal raises grave constitutional problems. The facts available when the Acting President made his decision were :<sup>45</sup>

- (I) That the loyalty of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian Army, was not in doubt.

- (2) That the self-styled "Cabinet" was confident that the "General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, and the vast majority of the Army remained loyal and were taking all effective measures to bring the situation under control."
- (3) The Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, had "been kidnapped and taken to an unknown destination."

Faced with such circumstances, the Acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu could :

- (a) appoint a member of the House of Representatives who would command the support of the majority at a critical time of national emergency, i.e., the coup of the "Young Turks." Parliament was in session;
- (b) appoint a member of the "Cabinet" to act as an interim Prime Minister;
- (c) seek a legislative mandate with greater powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to deal with the coup;
- (d) appoint any Nigerian who could bring his popularity and adroitness to bear to save the country;
- (e) refuse to accept the "unanimous decision" of the "Cabinet";
- (f) accept an unconstitutional "Cabinet" advice to "hand over the Administration to the Armed Forces."

Either of the first five alternatives would have been constitutional.<sup>46</sup> But Dr. Orizu, the Acting President, decided upon the sixth course of action which was definitely unconstitutional. It was also an illegal act and could not even be rationalized as an extra-constitutional measure, because the immediate result of the Acting President's action was the suspension of most of the provisions of the very constitution he had sworn to uphold.

Here lies one of the most glaring failures of the "Young Turks." There was no contingency plan to execute the Head of State or, in the alternative, the person deputising for him. This is clear from the pattern of the coup.

- (a) The substantive holder of the Office of the Presidency, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was an Ibo. The Acting President, Dr.

Nwafor Orizu, was also an Ibo. The coup did not take the life of any Ibo politician or statesman.

- (b) Recently, Dr. Azikiwe's captured documents included a letter written to the then Head of State, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, in which he, Dr. Azikiwe, gave an account of the approaches Lt. Col. Chukumeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu made to him in December 1964: "to assume emergency powers and form a provisional government.....that a number of his (Ojukwu's) colleagues in the army would support him if he did so."<sup>47</sup>

However, it should be noted that had the coup plotters planned to have kidnapped or executed both the Prime Minister and the President or his deputy, there would have been no constitutional loophole left over for any possibility of legal cover. This point was vital to the success of the coup, since the GOC of the Nigerian Army would have had no choice but to submit or be shot. But again, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi was an Ibo, and like the others he must have "been ashamed to be a Nigerian" under the First Republic. This shared attitude meant survival during the Nigerian coup of January 15, 1966.

The decision to "hand over" the executive powers of the Federal Government to the Armed Forces was supposedly made under the Constitution. The nation was made to believe that the "unanimous decision of the Federal Cabinet" was constitutional. This was at 11.05 p.m., Sunday, January 16, 1966, some 45 hours after the coup began. The fact is that there was:

- (i) no federal government during these 45 hours in any legal or constitutional sense;
- (ii) it follows that there could not have been a Federal Cabinet either during the same period;
- (iii) but the Constitution was still in force.

The irony of the confused situation was complete when the members of the "Cabinet" unanimously demanded adequate guarantees for their "personal safety." All this was supposedly done under the Constitution, most of the provisions of which were to be "suspended with immediate effect" thereafter.<sup>48</sup>

The first course of action was clearly provided for in the Constitution. Section 87, sub-section (2) says:<sup>49</sup>

Whenever the President has occasion to appoint a Prime Minister, he shall appoint a member of the House of Representatives who appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of the members of the House.

In a democracy, a general election is supposed to bring about an orderly change of government. A great social transformation may result. A recent example is the British General Election of 1945, which brought the Labour Party to power. In the U.S., the 1960 Presidential Election brought men of the New Frontier to power, headed by the late President John F. Kennedy. The Nigerian coup of January 15 created a political crisis revealing the need for a more dynamic leadership and a new social order. To only these conditions could legitimacy have been bestowed, and legality in due course.

It was within the province of the Acting President to have called on the leader of the progressive elements in the House of Representatives. Such a figure must of necessity be a member of the young generation—whose counterparts were the “Young Turks” in the Army. The coup leaders could have agreed to negotiate a settlement. But instead, the original coup of the “Young Turks” was finally compromised by a surrender.

The second course of action is perhaps the most logical. The Constitution provides that:<sup>50</sup>

- (1) Whenever the Prime Minister is absent from Nigeria or is for any other reason unable to perform the functions conferred upon him by this Constitution, the President may authorise some other member of the Council of Ministers of the Federation to perform these functions (other than the functions conferred by this section) and that member may perform those functions until his authority is revoked by the President.
- (2) The powers of the President under this section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister:  
Provided that if the President considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime Minister, owing to his absence or illness, he may exercise those powers without that advice.

During any marginal moment, this section gives the President wide powers for action, in order to ensure the continuity of the Government and the sanctity of the Constitution. Clearly, a “kidnapped” Prime

Minister whose whereabouts are not known is "unable to perform the functions conferred upon him by this Constitution." Any other Minister chosen by the Acting President could have been appointed to act until the political situation returned to normal. But the Acting President, Dr. Orizu, refused to employ this constitutional provision.

Since the advice of the Prime Minister (sub-section 2) was clearly out of the question under the circumstances of the coup, this section embodies in the Acting President the executive authority of the government. The question keeps recurring—why did the Acting President, Dr. Orizu, fail to honour his Oath of Office?

The third course of action could have been pursued. It would have been easier if the Acting President had been a former military man. Indeed, the coup threatened the "peace, order and good government" of the First Republic. To this end, the Constitution provides:<sup>51</sup>

Parliament shall have powers to make laws :

- (a) for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria (other than the Federal territory) or any part thereof, with respect to any matter included in the legislative lists;

The coup was directed against the "authority of the Federation" as stated in the Legislative Lists.<sup>52</sup> Parliament did meet on Saturday, January 15.<sup>53</sup> The Acting President had the unique opportunity to present to Parliament the facts as they were known, and present the G.O.C., who was honouring his Oath of Office. No doubt, Parliament would have passed special powers to be vested in the Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Army; and the Acting President of Nigeria, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, would have measured up to the challenge of the Office of the President of Nigeria.

On the Saturday in question, there was great anxiety in Parliament. No one seemed to know what was happening. The suspense and rumours, added to the presence of military guards on the Parliament Grounds—for the first time in the history of Nigeria—must surely have mellowed any opposition to granting the Head of State adequate powers to meet a threat of the magnitude of a coup.

The fourth course of action could be undertaken by a dedicated Head of State who believed strongly in the "superiority of civilian rule over the military." Since Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi had already demonstrated his loyalty to support the Government of the day all that remained was to

find a political as well as a constitutional solution. In this respect, the Constitution provided that :<sup>54</sup>

A person who holds office as a Minister of the Government of the Federation for any period of four consecutive months without also being a Senator or a member of the House of Representatives shall cease to be a Minister at the expiration of the period...

The Acting President could have appointed any Nigerian who had popular support and integrity as a Minister. Such a person would then seek a vote of confidence in the House of Representatives, thereby being invested either as an "interim Prime Minister" or as an "Administrator" with emergency powers.<sup>55</sup> For such a person to be acceptable to the leaders of the coup, he must not be a politician or leader of any political party. This was the only possible means to effect a constitutional hand-over of the Government of the Federation.

The Constitution is silent on whether any such appointment can be renewed after four months.<sup>56</sup> It can be assumed that such an appointment could be renewed every four months until the situation became normal. This constitutional provision grants the Acting President powers of review and accountability over the course of events.

The fifth course of action would have resulted in a stalemate. What is the purpose of such an action? The power to refuse assent is a prerogative of the Head of State. It is perhaps the most powerful instrument left to a non-executive President. It is to be employed to force acceptance of a course of action that is motivated by principle and demonstration of faith in the Oath of Office to uphold the Constitution and unity of Nigeria.

Such a refusal by the Acting President under the prevailing circumstances, namely the struggle for power and the fact that the Acting President himself was leading the pro-coup faction, would amount to :—

- (a) a challenge to the executive authority claimed by the anti-coup faction and the unconsolidated *de facto* powers of the GOC; Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi;
- (b) an ultimatum to the "Young Turks" to come to terms by throwing in their lot with the pro-coup faction.

In terms of the serious damage that the coup had already done to the unity of the country, for which the "Young Turks" were responsible, the pro-coup faction was in a strong position to enforce compliance in



order to consolidate its position. The Acting President's refusal to accept the "unanimous decision of the Cabinet" would have given the pro-coup faction a free hand to dictate the basis for a formula that would ensure the continued unity of the country.<sup>57</sup> It was this decision which shattered national confidence in the body politic of Nigeria. It was the same decision that ended the life of the First Republic which the electorate readily buried, often with instant glee and jubilation.

But the sixth course of action clearly reflects the decadence of the First Republic. Compromise was its code of honour and the custodians of the Constitution always temporised. There had grown a sort of wayward myth that for the Constitution of Nigeria to work, a consensus among the political overlords must always be obtained.<sup>58</sup> This myth was fabricated out of one of the finest principles of political rule—that constitutions are written in the hearts of the people. But in this case it equated the people with the leaders.

For Nigeria, the "hearts of the people" became synonymous with a posited notion of political consensus among three or four politicians. By the time of the coup it had become a popularly accepted fact in Nigerian politics that attempts to seek a compromise could never be illegal but merely extra-constitutional. This nebulous expression evades definition, but it had been operative in Nigerian politics for several years.

Three recent applications of employing extra-constitutional means to solve political crises were :

- (a) Chief S. L. Akintola rescinded the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest Court of Appeal for Nigeria, on May 27, 1963, in the celebrated case of *Alhaji Adegbenro vs. Akintola*. On the following day, he undertook to amend the Constitution of the Western Region accordingly with retroactive effect moved to October 2, 1960. On June 3, 1963, Sir Abubakar, the Prime Minister, introduced a bill in Parliament ratifying the amendment to the Constitution of the Western Region accordingly, which was passed by a vote of 242 to 18. The Premier, Chief S. L. Akintola, and the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, each undertook illegal and unconstitutional action.<sup>59</sup>
- (b) The General Election of December 30, 1964, was followed by an intensified struggle for power between the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the former Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Balewa. The latter summoned all the heads of the Nigerian Armed Forces in a show of strength on December 29. The day

before, the Nigerian Army had paraded the streets of Lagos in battle order.

After consultation with Sir Abubakar, but not after January 1, 1964, the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, also conferred with the heads of all the Armed Forces.<sup>60</sup>

- (c) In the aftermath of the 1964 General Election the President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, invited and conferred at the State House with:<sup>61</sup>
  - (i) the four Governors of the Regions on December 26;
  - (ii) the Governors and the Premiers of the Regions on December 29. The Governors and Premiers of the Northern and Western Regions did not attend.
- (d) The handing over of the Federal Government, which was recommended by a "unanimous decision" of the Cabinet without a Prime Minister, was accepted by the Acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu.

Illegal acts by governments and blatant abuse of extra-constitutional means by Nigerian statesmen and politicians who were the accredited custodians of the Constitution of the First Republic served to erode the very basis of legitimacy for these governments. Furthermore, it fostered a form of political apathy that bred contempt for the individual as well as cast a slur on the integrity of men in public affairs. The public had resigned itself and doubted the honour of practically all men holding posts of trust.

The Oath of Office of the President implies the sacred duty to defend the Constitution, even with one's life. The Constitution did not provide for it to be handed over under any circumstances. The Nigerian Constitution, or any constitution, can only be amended or abrogated by prescribed means. The Government of Nigeria could not be constitutionally handed over to any other group in society, including the military.

The course of action adopted by the "Federal Cabinet" to "hand over the Administration of the country" and the subsequent acceptance by the Acting President were both illegal and unconstitutional. On Saturday, January 15, only incorrigible optimists could expect the Prime Minister to be returned alive when he was kidnapped in a military coup in which two other of his leading colleagues had been killed. The Constitution states clearly that:<sup>62</sup>

The office of the Prime Minister shall become vacant if he ceases to be a member of the House of Representatives otherwise than by reason of a dissolution of Parliament.

If it was premature to suppose that the Prime Minister was dead, then the fact of his being "kidnapped" constituted sufficient reason to invoke the above clause of the Constitution.

The fact that the Prime Minister had "ceased to be a member" of the House is of profound constitutional importance. This means that at the crucial time, Saturday, January 15, Nigeria had no Federal Ministers who could act legally or constitutionally on behalf of the Federation. The Constitution says:<sup>63</sup>

The office of a Minister of the Government of the Federation other than the Prime Minister shall become vacant if the office of Prime Minister becomes vacant.

Thus, the "Cabinet meeting" held on the evenings of Saturday and Sunday, January 15 and 16, were not only illegal, but had no constitutional basis.<sup>64</sup>

The Government of the Federation had ceased to exist at the moment when the Prime Minister was kidnapped. The leaders of the coup chose this method rather than outright killing of the Prime Minister in his official residence. Whatever their reason, it created a serious constitutional crisis for the moment, which brought the life of the Government to a standstill. A Nigerian constitutional lawyer explains:<sup>65</sup>

The life of the Government *ipso facto* comes to an end when the Prime Minister ceases to hold that office.

But the office of the President continues and the Constitution remains in force. This is one of those rare intricacies of constitutional law wherein the fundamental law is silent. But by interpretation of implied powers, only the Acting President could have acted legally by invoking the appropriate provisions. Here, the Acting President, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, failed to rise to the unique challenge of the Office.

#### **The Sixth Decision**

The "unanimous decision" of what remained of the "Federal Cabinet" decision<sup>66</sup> was presented as advice to the Acting President. Obviously, the advice was accepted and acted upon. The acceptance constitutes another decision.<sup>67</sup>

The Federal Cabinet, which was a year old under the second Balewa Government, found itself in a very unusual situation on Saturday, January 15. Briefly, its background was as follows. Of all the Nigerian institutions of political rule, the Cabinet was more monolithic than any other, but it was very aware of its limitations vis-a-vis the political power structure in the country. Furthermore, it was a new Cabinet composed of two hostile factions. Though it was said to represent a broad-based government, nevertheless the UPGA Ministers and those of the NNDP were constantly at each other's throat. The NPC Ministers threw their weight around in response to party directives.

There were also the seniority rule and the "kitchen cabinet". The latter did not include all senior Ministers. There was a great degree of team-work among the "kitchen cabinet" members. The most important were: Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (the Prime Minister), Chief F.S. Okotie-Eboh (Finance), Alhaji Inua Wada (Defence), Alhaji Shehu Shagari (Works), Dr. M.A. Majekodunmi (Health), Dr. T.O. Elias (Justice), Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe (Trade), and Mr. R.O.A. Akinjide (Education).

The senior Ministers were: Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipoharima (Transport), Mr. R.A. Njoku (Communications), Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (Development), Mr. J.C. Obande (Establishments), Mr. Ayo Rosiji (Information), Alhaji Yesuff Maitama Sule (Mines and Power) and Mr. M.T. Mbu (Aviation). All others ranked as "junior Ministers". This line of division was vital to the successful functioning of the Cabinet.

At the hour of need, the blunted structural relation in the "Cabinet" became most acute. Of the members of the kitchen Cabinet, the first three in order of importance were not available.<sup>68</sup> The vacuum created by their absence intensified the confusion, and this led to a sudden fall-back upon the seniority rule. Once a rule of procedure has been constantly compromised it cannot be suddenly resuscitated and applied without strains and challenges. Among the public figures in Nigerian politics, after Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the next senior political activists were: Alhaji Zanna Dipoharima, Minister of Transport, Prince Adeleke Adedoyin (Labour), Chief H.O. Davies (Minister of State for Industries), Mr. R.A. Njoku (Communications), and Mr. K.O. Mbadiwe.

This was the background to the "last supper" of the Federal Cabinet. The only report available does not shed much light on the composition of the Cabinet during this last meeting.

The report says:<sup>69</sup>

In the evening there was a Cabinet meeting attended by two NPC leaders and several NCNC ministers. Following this meeting it was reported that Dr. Orizu, Acting President in the place of Dr. Azikiwe, who was in London, had refused to appoint an Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Sir Abubakar, saying he was trying to get in touch with Dr. Azikiwe.

The purpose was mainly to explain the *de facto* situation in the country and "suggested that the military take-over was a voluntary handing over of the Federal Government to the Armed Forces of the Federation".<sup>70</sup> The issue of appointing an Acting Prime Minister was not debated but it was merely reported that the Acting President had declined to appoint one. Later two reasons were reported in the press. These were:<sup>71</sup>

- (a) The absence of the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, and;
- (b) the Acting President's attempts to contact Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the substantive holder of the post, had not succeeded.

The refusal of the Acting President was beyond his prerogative rights. The first reason would make sense if it had been a kidnap case demanding ransom. In any case, the office of the Prime Minister had become vacant at the material time. There was a clear and urgent necessity for the appointment of an interim Prime Minister. The Acting President could refuse to appoint any person or persons recommended, but he had to appoint someone, either from among the members of the Cabinet or from the country at large. Here, the Acting President acted in an unconstitutional manner.

In regard to the second reason, the Acting President, Dr. Orizu, clearly betrayed the trust of the Office of the President of Nigeria. Under the Constitution, there was no provision for the Acting President to consult with the President before arriving at a decision. The Constitution says :<sup>72</sup>

(1) During any period while

- (a) the office of the President is vacant; or
- (b) the President is absent from Nigeria or is, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, unable to perform the functions of his office by reason of his illness; or
- (c) the President is prohibited by sub-section (8) of section 38 of this Constitution from exercising the functions of the office, shall subject to the following provisions of this section, \*be performed by the President of the Senate.

The fundamental law is clear. The Acting President has all the powers of the substantive holder of the post. The only point that is left to history is that the Acting President accepted the "unanimous decision" of the Council of Ministers to "hand over" the Government of the Federation "to the Armed Forces" of the country. The responsibility for this action is that of the Acting President. Under no circumstances can the substantive holder of the post share in this responsibility.

No doubt, the meeting of the "Cabinet" was extraordinary. It was called in haste and only a select few were contacted. But the question remained unanswered. Who "specially summoned" only 17 "Cabinet Ministers"? There were in Lagos during the coup at least 80 out of the 84 "Federal Cabinet" Ministers.<sup>73</sup> Their ranks and party affiliations are shown in Table I.

The information volunteered to the meeting contained the following four points:

- (a) "General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian Army, was loyal, together with a vast majority of the Army." The Army were protecting them.
- (b) The Acting President was safe.
- (c) A decision must be made to get the nation back on its feet, notwithstanding the fact that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance had been kidnapped. Alhaji Inua Wada was on a European tour and Mr. M. T. Mbu, Minister of Aviation, was in India.
- (d) Alhaji Zanna Dipcharima, (Transport), the most senior member of the assembled "Cabinet", and Dr T. O. Elias (Attorney-General) had been active for most of the day at the risk of their lives.

This was the "Federal Cabinet" when it met for the last time, and "unanimously decided" to advise the Acting President. There is one other point to be noted. This was the fact that at the Sunday evening meeting the two warring factions who were members of the Cabinet before the coup—the pro-coup and anti-coup factions—met together for the first and last time. This meeting was historic and it was held in style in the Cabinet Room to add glamour to humiliation.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, the act itself reflected Nigerianism at its best. The facts are that in an encounter between any two factions one is bound to win, either by compromising or by knocking the other faction out. But in Nigeria, a total knock-out is foul play under the rules of the game. The pro-

coup faction engineered a political coup and won, but the victory was proscribed by the rules of the game. This political coup provided the hardcore for the success of General Ironsi's coup within the coup. But it also preserved intact the political base for a future come-back. This is characteristically Nigerian in style of politics.

In Table I, it appears that the most important rank of ministers was full ministers, but as pointed out earlier, Sir Abubakar's "kitchen cabinet" defied the official lines of rank. In fact, it was not the 22 full Ministers who made all major decisions under the First Republic. Some Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries were powerful in their own right. Not to have "specially summoned" any of them amounted to a political sin. This slight had repercussions for the authority of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi in his later efforts to refurbish the imbalance in the Army's morale.

Taking together, i.e. the political coup of the pro-coup faction and Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi's "coup within the coup", it becomes obvious that the whole exercise injected the old malaise of tribalism into the new revolutionary situation.<sup>75</sup> The pro-coup faction's victory amounted to acquiring a title to the control of the means of physical compulsion and the people bestowed the control with legitimacy. There is a qualitative difference between :

- (a) seizing the control of the means of physical compulsion; and
- (b) the capacity to enforce control; and
- (c) the control of the legitimate means of physical compulsion.

Point (c) above implies both points (a) and (b), while (a) and (b) are mutually exclusive of each other. The fact was that the Ironsi regime was never in full possession of points (b) and (c), and was utterly lacking in real effect within the power context of Nigerian society. As pointed out already, General Ironsi struggled to seize the control of the means of physical compulsion from the very beginning until he was overthrown. Endemic to the body politic of the First Republic and the Ironsi and Gowon regimes was the failure to capture, i.e. possess the capacity to enforce control over the legitimate means of compulsion. Political tribalism is always a poor strategy to effect possession. Perhaps the failure of the Acting President, Dr. Orizu, was not merely the failure of one man, but the failure of the First Republic itself, because its coat of arms was cast in political compromise. It is a significant fact that when the First Republic ended, it ended on the political tone of compromise.

No.	Class	Responsibility	Rank	Total No.	Parties (a)									
					N N A					U P G A				
					NPC	NNDP	NDC	MDF	DPN	NCNC	AG	NEPU	UMBC	KPP
1.	The Prime Minister	With Portfolio	Cabinet	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2.	Full Ministers	With Portfolio	Cabinet	22	11	6	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—
3.	Ministers of State	Without Portfolio	Cabinet	11	8	7	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—
4.	Ministers of State	Without Portfolio	Non-Cabinet	23	3	4	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—
5.	Parliamentary Secretaries	Without Portfolio	Non-Cabinet	26	10	8	—	1	—	4	—	—	—	—
Total				83	33	25	—	1	—	23	—	—	—	—
No. of Seats Won					164	36	—	—	—	84	22	—	4	—
Total No. of Seats				312	N N A					U P G A				
					201					Independent				

SOURCE: *Nigeria Yearbook*, 1966 and *West Africa*, January and February 1965 issues.

Notes: Both Dr. T. O. Elias and Senator Dr. M. A. Majekodunmi were full Ministers. Dr. Elias was originally NCNC, and he is so classified but Dr. Majekodunmi is classified as NPC Minister.

<sup>a</sup> The abbreviations are: NNA, The Nigerian National Alliance, included the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) the Nigeria Delta Congress (NDC), the Mid-west Democratic Front (MDF) and the Dynamic Party of Nigeria. The UPGA, the United Progressive Grand Alliance, consisted of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Action Group of Nigeria (AG), the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), and the Kano Peoples Party (KPP). The NEPU, UMBC, and KPP formed themselves into the Nigerian Progressive Front (NPF), as a unit in the UPGA for the December 1964 Federal Election.

<sup>b</sup> There were two Independent candidates: one in the North, Dr. Paul A.A. Dada, who declared for the NPC immediately



### The Seventh Decision

Naturally, the sixth decision was political. It was claimed to be the logical result—"to hand over power to the Armed Forces". At the crucial moment, the Nigerian Army was under Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding. He was invested "with authority to save the nation from further bloodshed and confusion". There is a line of fine distinction here. The investiture of authority was political, illegal and unconstitutional. The acceptance was military in nature, a *de facto* legal action but again unconstitutional.<sup>76</sup> This contradiction creates grave problems. Problems of this nature are rather peculiar to the Nigerian style of doing things. Other coups merely suspend the whole Constitution and martial law takes over.<sup>77</sup>

The implication of this half-hearted military measure was to invite undercover political activities. The danger was that the acceptance by the Armed Forces gave the unintended impression that the Armed Forces were not insulated against subtle political overtures. Nigerians are adroit in such activities. Thus the military regime of Ironsi began its tragic journey with indecision which is inimical to any military rule.

The political plotters—since Decree No. 34 banned all political parties and activities—assessed the Armed Forces and saw a replica of the political pattern of the First Republic, i.e. the unbalanced structure of the Armed Forces. The Nigerian Army was the most powerful of the four units comprising the Armed Forces. As fortune would have it, politically the Army was the weakest. This is so because confidence and morale had been badly misplaced in the Army.<sup>78</sup>

There was a corollary to the Seventh Decision. It is characteristic of Nigeria always to establish the identity of the North as something separate and different. This was not different with the coup of January 15. Major Nzeogwu's "Extraordinary Order of the Day" raised the following knotty questions:

- (a) That the Major accepted responsibility for the coup only in the Northern Provinces.
- (b) Was there a real No. 1 leader of the coup to whom Major Nzeogwu and other coup leaders were to report?
- (c) Lt. Col. Odumegwu-Ojukwu was the Commanding Officer of the 5th Battalion at Kano. He took over the city and airport about the same time, but Major Nzeogwu treated this superior officer as being under his control.<sup>79</sup>

- (d) Later, it was revealed that some civilians were involved in the January coup. The Azikiwe letter has established that at least one member of the coup plotters was shopping for civilian collaboration.<sup>80</sup>

Until more facts are available, the precise answers may not be possible. But in attempting to understand the significance of the January coup, a number of facts must of necessity establish themselves. One basic fact is that the coup forced to the surface a *broad group* of knowledgeable Nigerians. It was the culminating point in the consciousness of the younger generation who were ardent believers in progress, i.e. rapid industrialization of society was the paramount objective and the motif was the image of the industrial man. Only through knowledge could one begin to arrive at the state of becoming.<sup>81</sup> The meaning of knowledge has been transformed into a philosophical concept which is shared by the political community. The drive and desire to progress is meaningful only in terms of the level of becoming that is actually attained. Perhaps no other ethnic groups in Nigeria are more aware of this fact than those situated in the North. Complacency is always a political sin, and the Yorubas suffered dearly for it during the First Balewa Government. The complacency and excessiveness of the pro-coup faction derived in part from self-delusion which equated *becoming* with being knowledgeable. It is a tragic error for any group of people, faction or ethnic group living within a larger political community to lose its social balance. In this respect the legitimacy the coup bestowed amounted to the culminative knowledge of the political community. The pro-coup faction failed to understand this fact and took for granted that knowledge comes only from itself.

For long-term consideration, two facts have established themselves. The first is that in public affairs, reason has replaced the cult of personal idiosyncracies. The second is that knowledge is a common commodity and acquireable by all Nigerians. The train of events set in motion by the coup ultimately resulted in the emancipation of minority ethnic groups.<sup>82</sup> In terms of immediate consideration, the pro-coup faction—civilian and military—successfully seized power. This faction under the Ironsi regime had legitimacy openly bestowed upon it. The revolutionary situation created by the coup conferred a *de facto* legality. But the period of gestation needed by the pro-coup faction to consolidate and establish a new order was short-lived and the opportunity lost for two simple reasons:<sup>83</sup>

- (a) Nigeria is a complex political community with an horizontal index of plurality. It follows that political tribalism cannot be used as an instrument of policy to establish a new order.

- (b) The pro-coup faction committed the simple political sin of complacency. The Ironsi regime became over-confident and excessive to the point of compulsion.

Legitimacy belongs to the political community and not to any person or group. While *de facto* legality can be enforced, legitimacy cannot be enforced. In the Nigeria of 1966, the Armed Forces' strength was only 33,000, i.e., the Army had only 10,000 men. What the world failed to realise at the time was not the virtue of law-abiding citizenry that made Nigeria's 55 million accept or welcome the coup but rather the willingness of a people who were and still are convinced of the oneness of their political community. The fact that the conviction is emotional rather than being strictly rational adds depth. Legitimacy flows only from such political consensus. Both the pro-and anti-coup factions on January 15, 1966, operated on the basis of a common political consensus and the same is true of every Nigerian, including those who had good reasons to be bitter against the coup.

Political consensus serves to buttress legitimacy, and the latter substantiates the meaning of power and authority. The attempt to separate and establish power in contradistinction to authority amounts to a political tragedy. In the body politic of Nigeria, tribalism as a political phenomenon has been employed in vain to structure the process of socio-economic concentration of power. The net result is to arrest the rate of normal development of legitimacy, which up to the time of the coup had manifested itself primarily in the failure of Nigeria to produce a national leader who could command a national consensus. The coup strengthens the conviction that the potentiality is there.

It must be mentioned that the basic reason why the pro-coup faction did not engineer the complete suspension of the Constitution was the false belief that there was popularity around the Constitution as being the fountain of legitimacy.<sup>84</sup> The belief is unfounded. It is true that constitutional political culture has become an integral part of Nigerian political life; it is by no means the fountain-head.<sup>85</sup> Political consensus cultivates the willingness to obey established authority, and this reaches far beyond the constitutional political culture. It has its basis in the traditional authority, which is now welded to the Nigerian constitutional political culture.<sup>86</sup> The coup and the subsequent events have further magnified beyond proper proportions the true scope of authority vis-a-vis legitimacy. It is true that British authority created Nigeria, and it was later inherited by Nigerians. The political leaders of the First Republic wrongly believed that they were the only inheritors. But the events following the coup

have shown that the real inheritors of authority were the civil servants<sup>88</sup>—a formidable contingent headed by the permanent secretaries reaching down to the lowest local government messengers in the remotest village. The degree to which a political community is democratic may be measured in part by establishing the complementary interdependence of the formal dichotomy between power and authority. Authority bears an integral relation to power, and when both are harmoniously substantiated, legitimacy results.<sup>89</sup>

The contention here is that had the anti-coup faction been triumphant, legitimacy would have also been bestowed on it. It must be conceded that it might not have been as spontaneous and overwhelming. The reason is clear. The coup ushered knowledgeable men into positions of power in either faction, and had already completely committed the country by demolishing the power structure of the First Republic. Under the circumstances of the coup, a new order had arrived, and, what is more, it was a *de facto* situation. The course pursued by each of these two factions is now current history. The anti-coup faction remained true to the political consensus of the country. This faction organised the July counter-coup. But legitimacy was withheld in part, and in the drive to ensure the basis for enjoying full legitimacy the supreme sacrifice, civil war, is currently being waged. To this end, the slogan has been :<sup>90</sup>

*"To Keep Nigeria One  
Is a task that must be done "*

Though General Ironsi led the anti-coup faction during its first hours, as soon as the pro-coup faction won, General Ironsi became its undisputed leader. The pro-coup faction was beset with the difficulties and trials that attend success. By monopolising political power and authority, which legitimacy bestowed so liberally, dangerous and explosive situations developed which culminated in the most bestial onslaught in the history of Nigeria. The pro-coup faction claimed that it was the mass massacre following the counter-coup that made secession a *fait accompli*—and secession gave birth to Biafra.<sup>91</sup>

### Conclusion

With every State and in any age, the conscious effort to direct the political process aims at strengthening the basis for legitimacy. With party politics, this is most easily resolved by the cultivation of political alliances—admitted that this is a slow process, but in the long run the evidence is that legitimacy is better established. At this point it should be

mentioned that the Nigerian coup was a revolution of innovation in many ways. The first aspect is the innovation of the use of the means of violence. The result was immediate, but a sort of power vacuum was thereby created. This situation created several new problems, and the most profound one was insecurity. The first requirement on the political level was for the new military regime to be able to dispel any sense of desperation which insecurity was bound to breed. To do this without alienating legitimacy is a most delicate task that the military mentality is not usually adept at undertaking.

The second aspect of innovation was the fact that knowledgeable men were put to the task of guiding the country. The basic problem here is the lag between theory and practice, and in the overall process of bridging the gap, there is always the danger of political contamination. The innovation gap in the political process presents a prized opportunity for the old-guard politicians. To the new regime the latter constitute a time-bomb. The danger is not only in the ambition of men—of both knowledgeable men and former politicians—but also in the rising expectations of the masses. Just as the modernisation process created the rising expectations phenomenon in the westernized elite under the First Republic, so also the masses were infected by the fever of rising expectations under the spell of the coup.

A third innovation results, and this must be distinguished from political tribalism. The innovation is the new restructuring of political power. No sector in society can be exempted, not even the Armed Forces. In short, what did emerge in Nigeria was power of the ethnic minorities. This was not intended by the pro-coup nor by the anti-coup factions. It was not quite visible at the time of the January coup, but subsequent events since the coup have established the fact beyond any doubt. The most profound significance of the January coup was the ultimate establishment of the ethnic minorities' power in Nigeria. This does not imply a minority rule, but rather an aggregate viewpoint of ethnic minorities will from now determine major national policies for the Federation. One immediate repercussion of this phenomenon is already evident, i.e., the myth of dominant ethnic entities is rapidly disappearing.

## References

1. Senior top military officers killed, who were of Northern origin were four, and the same number of Western origin, making a total of eight. For full particulars, see : *Nigerian Crisis 1966* (Lagos: National Press, n. d., c. 1967), p.7.
2. See Margery Perham: *Lugard—The Years of Authority* (London: St James' Place, 1960), p. 421. The author claims that Mrs. Lugard (Flora Shaw) was the first to suggest the name "Nigeria" in 1897, *Ibid.*, p. 11.
3. *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105. The coup was known to the authorities. It was the timing that was not known. A week after the January 15 coup, a British weekly disclosed that "The first coup—the real one—was planned by a group of majors. They had planned it for months. The original D-Day was December, then mid-January. The second postponement was because of the Commonwealth Conference." *The Observer* (London), January 23, 1966, p. 13.
4. The first Balewa Government (1960-64) was a coalition between the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC). For December 1964 Federal elections, the NPC and Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) joined forces to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).
5. *The Guardian* (Manchester), January 1966, p. 8. This appraisal was inaccurate and unfair. During the life of the First Republic, Sir Ahmadu Bello could have executed a political take-over of the country if he had wanted to.
6. "This information leaked out to the plotters who decided to strike immediately." *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105.
7. *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105. Lt. Col. Abogo Largema must have attended the Kaduna meeting, since at the material time he was the Commander of the Fourth Battalion based at Ibadan and was later sent to the GOC in Lagos, the same day.
8. The exact time has been put at about 3.30 a.m., Saturday, January 15, 1966, "before he had reported to the General". *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 1. January 1—31, 1966, p. 446.
9. "There were no more than 25 young officers—ranging from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel—in the group who tried to seize power over 55 million Nigerians." *The Sunday Times* (London) January 23, 1966, p. 13.
10. *New Nigerian*, January 18, 1966, p. 8.
11. "Major Nzeogwu and the other Majors in the coup are all Ibos." *The Observer* (London), January 23, 1966, p. 13. Walter Schwarz was not correct; there were Yoruba, Mid-westerners and officers of Northern origin involved honestly in the coup but they were eliminated. It was the conspirators within the coup who were all Ibos.
12. Special mention must be made of at least four of the noble sons of Nigeria :
  - (a) Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, the hero of the Congo and favourite son of both the civilian politicians and the rank and file of the Army.
  - (b) Brigadier Kur Mohamed, stern and ascetic, he symbolized devotion and purity to his men. He had a father image for his men, and had served with all the battalions.

- (c) Brigadier Z. Maimalari, the dashing image of a modern Nigerian who believed in social revolution. He was a brilliant soldier and loved by all his men.
- (d) Lt. Col. Yakubu Pam, the famous leader of the Nigerian contingent to Tanzania in 1964. He was a simple man, genial but a disciplinarian. His men of the 4th Battalion never recovered from his treacherous death. In the July counter-coup in 1966, it was his battalion that hit the hardest.

*The Times* of London assessed the situation as follows: "It cannot be said that the purge in the Army is completely over. Nigerian observers like to insist that there is little or no tribalism in the Army, but friendships were badly strained by the killing of an appreciable number of Yoruba and Northern officers, and General Ironsi is having to do a good task of reconciliation." January 26, 1966, p. 10.

13. "The genial General, remembered for good parties while commanding the U.N. troops in the Congo, went to two parties on the night of the coup. The first was at the home of one of the Brigadiers who was to die before dawn, the second on board the Elder Dempster passenger liner *Aureol*." *The Observer* (London), January 23, 1966 p. 13. The reference was to Brigadier Maimalari, Commander of the No. 2 Brigade, Apapa, Lagos.

14. *The Sunday Times* (London), January 23, 1966, p. 13.

15. The Federal troops, under the Army Headquarters, Lagos, consisted of the Federal Guards, the elite corps, the Ordnance and Depot Units, Yaba, and the General Staff Officers Corps, Apapa.

16. See: *The Sunday Times* (London), January 23, 1966. p. 13.

17. This assessment of the situation was by Lloyd Garrison, the *New York Times* (International Edition), January 20, 1966, p. 1. The American weekly *Newsweek* said: "At the end of the week, Radio Nigeria announced that Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the commander of the Army, had organised a counter-coup and was in firm control of the capital." January 24, 1966, p. 24. Mr. Lloyd Garrison later became emotionally committed to the Biafran cause and was expelled from Nigeria.

18. Col. Banjo was rumoured at the time of his arrest as one of the coup leaders who saw the "take-over" of General Ironsi as a betrayal and denial of the objectives of the coup. After the July counter-coup Lt. Col. Ojukwu released him, Major Nzeogwu and several others who were in prison in the Eastern Region.

19. *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), January 18, 1966, p. 8. It was only on Sunday night that the GOC, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, declared himself as the Supreme Commander. Major Nzeogwu now appeared to recognise the changed order of things.

20. *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), January 18, 1966, p. 8.

21. *New Nigerian* (Kaduna), January 18, 1966, p. 8.

22. Decree No. 1, *Nigeria Gazette*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

23. *The Sunday Times* (Lagos), January 16, 1966, p. 1.

24. *The Sunday Express* (London), January 23, 1966, p. 1. During the independence negotiations in 1960, Nigeria initialled a Defence Pact with Britain; this was never ratified.

25. *The Sunday Express* (London), January 23, 1966, p. 1. On Monday *The Times* (London), January 24, 1966, gave a fuller picture under the title, "Troops Placed on Alert." It said: "The Ministry of Defence has an additional battalion on 72 hours alert in view of the possible need to answer a call for more troops to be sent to Africa. The situation in Nigeria is still uncertain enough to cause Whitehall to take extra precautions."

"The present spearhead battalion is No. 43 Marine Commando, stationed at Bickleigh, Devon. At weekend the 2nd Bat., Scots Guards, at Caterham also received orders to be placed on the same 72-hour alert."

26. *The Morning Post* (Lagos), January 27, 1966, p. 10.

27. *The Times* (London), January 24, 1966, p. 8.

28. *Ibid.* p. 8.

29. *West Africa*, February 5, 1966, p. 161.

30. *Morning Post* (Lagos), January 19, 1966, p. 1.

31. Those representing the three groups were: For the first group: Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Lt. Col. V. Banjo, Mallam Kam Salem, Deputy Inspector-General of Police and his Deputy, Mr. T. Omo-Bare, and Commodore J. E. Wey, Head of the Nigerian Navy. For the second group, those present were: Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (senior Cabinet member), and Alhaji Nuhu Bamali, the Foreign Minister, and Dr. T. O. Elias, the Attorney-General. It is remarkable that during the two meetings that took place at the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Lagos, none of the NCNC members were present. But it was known that at State House, a number of them were holding private meetings with Dr. Nwafor Orizu, the Acting President. Those present with him were: Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe, Minister of Trade, Dr. B. U. Nzeribe, Deputy Speaker of the House, and Mr. R. B. K. Okafor, Minister of State. In the morning of the same day, Saturday January 15, Parliament met briefly: only 33 members assembled, and all were NCNC members from the Eastern Region. The third group was represented by Sir Francis Cummings-Bruce, the British High Commissioner in Nigeria, and his private secretary.

32. *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105.

33. *Africa Research Bulletin*, No. 3. Vol., January 1-31, 1966, p. 446 B

34. *Ibid.*, p. 446 B.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 446 A.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 446 C.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 446 C. The appointment of an acting Prime Minister was seriously contended by two Ministers: Alhaji Zanna Dipcharima, the Federal Minister of Transport, the anti-coup faction candidate, and Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe, the Federal Minister of Trade, the pro-coup candidate. When it was not possible to arrive at any agreement between the two factions, the proposal was dropped. But on the question of handing over power to the Armed Forces, the pro-coup faction acceded to the suggestion, and Dr. Orizu acted accordingly.

38. For discussion see the 6th and 7th decisions.

39. The men he would need most were Brigadier Z. Maimalari, Commander of the Second Brigade, Apapa, and second in command to Gen. Ironsi in the



Southern sector, Col. H. Njoku, Commander, 2nd Battalion, Ikeja, Lt. Col. A. Largema, Commander, 3rd Battalion, Ibadan, and Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi, Commander, Armoured Squadron, Abeokuta. Two of these men were of Northern origin, Brigadier Maimalari and Abogo Largema, and both were missing—both were among the first casualties of the coup.

40. See Section 85, *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (Lagos : Government Printer, 1963), p. 44.

41. Lt. Col. Nwawo was recalled from his London assignment and as General Ironsi's personal representative, he went to Kaduna. Col. Nwawo was Major Nzeogwu's superior officer in 1962 at the Military Training College. "We have mutual respect for each other and I knew he would put his trust in me. I don't think he would have left Kaduna with any other man at this time." This was the testimony of Lt. Col. Nwawo. *West Africa*, January 29, 1966, p. 130. Both men were Ika-Ibos from the Midwestern state.

42. The role of the US Supreme Court in reviewing the validity of Acts of Congress was acquired by interpretation. The US Constitution does not specifically provide for this function, as is the case with the Nigerian Constitution. For historical evaluation, see: Edward S. Gowin, *Court over Constitution*, 2nd edn., (New York : Peter Smith, 1950); and Charles G. Haines, *The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy*, 2nd edn., 2 vols. (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1932); and for a more recent exposition with emphasis on the judicial system as part of the political process, see: Jack W. Pletason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (New York : Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955).

43. For further discussion on written and federal constitutions, see: Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (London; Oxford University Press) 1936 edn., C. F. Strong, *Modern Political Constitutions* (London : Sidwick & Jackson, Ltd., 1950) and K. C. Wheare, *Modern Constitutions* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1951).

44. This concept is a legal fiction which constitutional lawyers find useful to establish what is *ultra vires* and what is not. An action may be said to be neutral if, in terms of the letter of the constitution or the Acts of Parliament, no clause is contravened. When the laws are silent, it can be presumed that no offence has been committed. But in terms of the spirit of the Constitution, it is exceedingly rare to come about a neutral action, because the moral import, by its nature, embraces the whole social and political fabric.

45. On Saturday, January 15, 1966, the President of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was in London and Dr. Nwafor Orizu was the Acting President. The reason for the absence of President Azikiwe is public knowledge. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe "left Nigeria on October 16, 1965, for London to receive medical treatment at the end of which he went on a cruise". *Daily Times* (Lagos), January 17, 1966, p. 16.

46. *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (Lagos : Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, 1963). Hereafter cited as *Nigerian Constitution*. See : Section 87, subsection (2) to C (11).

47. For full text, see: "Dr. Zik's Letter Reveals—Ojukwu Planned coup in 1964," *New Nigerian*, June 1, 1968, p. 12.

48. See : The first broadcast by Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, *Federal Republic of Nigeria—Official Gazette* (Lagos), Vol. 53, No. 5, January 26, 1966, pp. 1-3. Hereafter cited as *Nigeria—Official Gazette*.

49. *Nigerian Constitution*, p. 42.

50. *Ibid.*, section 92, sub-section (1) and (2), p. 45. The function conferred

by this section is : "Performance of functions of the Prime Minister during absence, etc." There are only two instances when the President *ipso facto* becomes :

- (a) the embodiment of the Government of the Federation for the brief period after a general election but before the appointment of a New Prime Minister.
- (b) the embodiment of the Constitution in an instance where it is reasonable to believe that the Prime Minister is missing. The January coup created such a reasonable instance.

51. *Ibid.*, section 69 (1), a. p. 36.

52. Item 45 in the Executive List says : "Any matter that is incidental or supplementary—(a) to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list; or (b) to the discharge by the Government of the Federation or any officer, court or authority of the Federation of any function conferred by this Constitution." *Nigerian Constitution*, p. 79.

53. Of the 312 members only 33 were present. It met for only 15 minutes before adjourning for lack of a quorum, see : *Sunday Times* (Lagos), January 16, 1966, p. 15. But on Friday, Parliament met in full force and adjourned at about noon as was the practice to allow the Muslim members time for Friday prayers. An emergency night session could have been called on Saturday. Once members were assured of their safety by the loyal Army, the full House could have met.

54. *Nigerian Constitution*, Section 87, subsection 26, p. 43.

55. The question of the "advice of the Prime Minister" does not arise since Section 92 of the Constitution would become operative as a result of the coup.

56. *Nigerian Constitution*, *Ibid.*

57. One of the most critical results of the acceptance of the "unanimous decision of the Cabinet to hand over the Administration" to the pro-coup faction was the psychological and political impact that accompanies the humiliation of a *vanquished return*. All the members of Parliament, including the Regional ones, felt frustrated and humiliated and invariably returned to their villages—the village is where the home is.

58. Originally these were the three leading architects of the Nigerian Constitution. In order of their power and influence in the country at large, they were Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier (1954-1966) of the Northern Region; Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe the Ogbuefi, and Premier (1954-1959) of the Eastern Region, who became the First President (1961-1966) of Nigeria and was succeeded as Eastern Premier (1960-1966) by Dr. Michael Okpara. The third leader was Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Leader, and Premier (1954-1959) of the Western Region, who was eliminated from the scene in 1962 and was replaced by Chief S. L. Akintola, the Are Ona Kakanfo and Premier (1959-1966) of the Western Region. See reference 89.

59. *Adegbenro vs. Akintola*. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's decision was announced over Radio Nigeria on May 27, 1963. The London *Times* of the same day reported the decision. The case involved a constitutional issue. Could a Governor dismiss a Premier on the basis of evidence (petition) not passed by a Regional Legislature? Lord Radcliffe, for the Lords, said "Yes." This decision reversed an earlier decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria which said "No." Thus it was illegal for Akintola's Government to rescind the Privy Council decision and unconstitutional to pass a retroactive amendment to the Constitution in respect of the same decision. For further discussion, see : H. H.

Marshall, "Interpretation of the Constitution of Western Nigeria : A Privy Council Decision," in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. XII, p. 280.

60. The President, Dr. Azikiwe, "is alleged to have pointed out that they owed allegiance first to him as President of the Republic and to have drawn General Everard's attention to the fact that the President was the Commander-in-Chief and that all officers took an oath of allegiance to him." John P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 590. "The State House Diary of Events," *op. cit.* did not make any entry on this fact.

It must be mentioned that if the opinion offered by the constitutional lawyers was valid, i.e., that the President must appoint Sir Abubakar notwithstanding the fact that the latter acted *ipso facto* as a *de facto* Prime Minister during January 1, to 4, 1965, then the Office of the Prime Minister of the Federation was vacant as a result of the "dissolution of the House of Representatives" and the President's decision informing Sir Abubakar that....."it was not his wish to appoint any person to form a government....." confirmed the vacancy constitutionally. (*Nigerian Constitution*, Section 87, sub-section (8a) and "The State House Diary of Events," *op. cit.*, respectively.) Sir Abubakar contended that ".....he had been in office until and during the elections. Then his supporters had won a clear majority in the elections and the President had no choice but to reappoint him as Prime Minister. Even without this confirmation in office, he remained the Prime Minister—the post had never been vacant." See John P. Mackintosh, *op. cit.* p. 590. There is no constitutional basis for this rationalization; there might be some legal basis for it.

61. "State House Diary of Events" in the *Daily Times* (Lagos), January 13, 1965. However, the Constitution did not provide for the Regional Governors and Premiers to have direct and unilateral relations with the President, except when the latter was on tour of a Region.

62. *Nigerian Constitution*, section 87, subsection 86, p. 43.

63. *Ibid.*, section 87, subsection 9, p. 43.

64. For brief discussion see: T. O. Elias, *The British Commonwealth—Nigeria: The Development of Its Laws and Constitutions*, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967), p. 457. Dr. Elias was one of the participants during the crucial 45 hours under analysis. This fact serves to strengthen the point that at least some of the participants in both factions knew that their deliberations and actions were unconstitutional.

65. O.O. Odumosu, "Constitutional Development," in *The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government*, edited by L. F. Blitz (Lagos: African University Press, 1965), p. 52.

66. Dr. T. O. Elias noted that besides the Heads of the Armed Forces present, the other group were ".....the seventeen Federal Ministers who had been specially summoned to the Cabinet room for the occasion....." Elias, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

67. See : "The Fourth Decision," *supra*.

68. Sir Abubakar Balewa, the Prime Minister, and Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh had been kidnapped by the coup plotters. Alhaji Inua Wada, Minister of Defence, was in Zurich undergoing medical treatment.

69. *West Africa* (London) January 22, 1966, p. 105. The meeting took place on Sunday evening, January 16, 1966.

70. T. O. Elias. *op. cit.*, p. 457.

71. *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105.

72. *Nigerian Constitution* section 39, p. 26. The prohibition referred to in section 39 (c) above concerns the "Removal of President from office", Section 38, sub-section 8. It lays down the procedural law by a motion in the House of Representatives.

There are three provisions of "this section", namely provisions (2), (3) and (4). Provisions (2) and (3) lay down the succession to the Presidency of the Federation in case the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are unable to respectively perform the "functions of the office of the President". The Council of Ministers is empowered to appoint any other person who, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, can perform the "functions of the office."

Provision (4) says: "The President shall not be absent from Nigeria except with the agreement of the Council of Ministers."

73. Two of the 17 Ministers invited were the most junior of them all. These two men, Mr. R. K. B. Okafor and Mr. Mbasulike Amechi, were made Ministers of State—the lowest rank—only on Friday (14-1-66) before the coup took place the following day. Chief T.O.S. Benson was also made Minister of State by the same instrument the same time. See: *West Africa*, January 22, 1966, p. 105.

74. T. O. Elias, *op. cit.*, p. 457.

75. Analysis of General Ironsi's administration has substantiated this observation. See: "Understanding the Nigerian Crisis," a public statement by the Government of the Mid-West state, in *West Africa* supplement, July 20, 1968, pp. 1-7; F. O. Onipede, *Nigerian Crisis: An Appraisal and Solution* (Lagos: 1966); *Federal Republic of Nigeria: 1966* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1966); and *Nigerian Crisis 1966* (Enugu: The Ministry of Information).

76. Under the Ironsi Administration, as established by the First Speech of the General (See: *Nigeria Gazette*, Vol 53 No 6), only parts of the Constitution were suspended. The Constitution, though its parts have been amputated, still lives on.

77. This was the original plan of the "Young Turks." Major Nzeogwu, in a 10-point "Extraordinary Order of the Day", on Saturday, January 15, 1966, at Kaduna, declared: "In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces I declare Martial Law over the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the legal Government and elected Assembly are hereby dissolved." *Africa Research Bulletin*, *op. cit.* p. 446B. The same is true of the Ghana coup. But Major Nzeogwu limited the authority of the coup. Does this "Extraordinary Order" suspend the Constitution of the Northern Region only or does it include the Constitution of the Federation as it applies to the Northern Region?

78. This analysis is not based on subsequent knowledge, but on the limited knowledge during the first 45 hours of the coup. Overseas Radio-Cotonu and the BBC fed constant news about the killings of Brigadier Ademulegun and two other Brigadiers. Brigadier Maimalari was missing, and the Northern block of politicians received the message with indignation.

79. There was ample evidence for this observation. The fact that Lt. Col. Ojukwu offered his loyalty to Major-General Ironsi at the critical moment forced him to reward Lt. Col. Ojukwu with the Military Governorship of the Eastern Region. In the Lagos Command area at the material time, full Colonel Hilary Njoku was the Commander of the Second Battalion at Ikeja. This senior Ibo officer was bypassed.

At a Press conference on Monday evening, January 17, 1966, Major Nzeogwu was able to say: "I am anxious to hand over command to a superior officer but none has yet appeared." *New Nigerian* 18-1-66, p. 8. There were right there in Kaduna Lt. Col. G. Kurubo, Commander of the 3rd Battalion and Lt. Col. W. U. Bassey—the first Nigerian to be commissioned as an officer in the Nigerian Army. Both officers were non-Ibo.

80. The captured Azikiwe letter is the second piece of evidence. The first came from the then Lt. Col. Gowon's 2nd speech, but no names were mentioned. (see reference 91 (c) below.) "Those who were the closest advisers to the late Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi must have been guilty by association at least." Nigeria had hoped that the country would move ahead to achieve greater progress under the Aguiyi-Ironsi Government. Unfortunately, the General abused the opportunities of January 15 by allowing prominent Ibo leaders in the army, in the public service and in public life to advise him on national matters to the exclusion of other ethnic leaders. Some of his Ibo advisers were Ojukwu, former military Governor of the Eastern Region; Dike, Vice-Chancellor of University of Ibadan; Onyuke, Federal Attorney-General; Nwokedi, Federal Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs; Eneli, Federal Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade; and Okigbo, Federal Economic Adviser. His conduct appeared to lend colour to the impression that the January 15 coup was designed to install Ibos in power. In "Understanding the Nigerian Crisis—A Public Statement by the Government of the Mid-West State, Nigeria," *West Africa Supplement*, July 20, 1968, p. 4.

81. For a discussion, see: Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964). But this writer cannot agree with the contention of the author about:

- (a) the failure of political theory as a conceptual framework.
- (b) that the developed countries have already arrived at a state of *being* while in actuality, they are only on a higher level of *becoming*. Is being not transcendental for the West?
- (c) Where does the *essence* lie in *becoming* or *being* an industrial man? If the author's *essence* is Aristotelian, then it amounts to a denial of his premise, i.e., that science is the basis of industrialization. If it is Platonic, then the classification is defective.

82. This fact was quite obvious long before Decree No. 12 created the 12 States. The January coup ushered in the rise of the ethnic minorities' power, one of its unanticipated consequences. For an ethnic distribution of the men who constitute the Federal Military Government, see: *Unity in Diversity—Federal Republic of Nigeria* (Lagos: The Times Press, 1967), p. 6-9.

83. Political tribalism is here defined as the attempt and manipulation employed to establish the representatives of one ethnic group and then proceed to endow them with power, while their authority emanates from the joint enterprise of all the ethnic groups in the country. For further discussion, see: F. O. Onipede, *Nigerian Plural Society: Political Constitutional Development 1870-1954* (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University, City of New York, New York, U.S.A., 1955), Chap. IV, Section 4.

Furthermore, political tribalism develops and gains momentum centripetally which results in an even wider political order. The latter's momentum is centrifugally generated, and it is bound to orbitise or disintegrate the former.

Any instrument of policy ushering in a new social order needs a political ideology to rationalize its role. In the case of a plural society like Nigeria tribalism cannot be rationalized as a political ideology. This would still be true if political authority and military force were available on a grand scale. The recent example is Biafra, where people of minority nationalities have made great contributions to ease the war effort of the Federal troops.

84. For an interesting analysis, see the discussion by J. P. Nettl on the process of ratification of legitimacy, *Political Mobilization*. (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), especially pp.198-212. Formal creation of a constitution for a country amounts to very little politically because it does not *ipso facto* create the political authority which cannot exist without legitimacy. Prof. Nettl scores the point when he says: "Elections and parliamentary parties are not designed to *build* legitimate sovereignty (as opposed to political authority), but merely to ratify or occupy it (as an institution)". Ibid., p. 199.

85. The Aburi Agreement concluded by the Nigerian military leaders at Accra resulted in Decree No. 8 of 1967. This decree created a *de facto* confederation of Nigeria. But it failed precisely because it lacked legitimacy. See the line of argument adopted by the leading men at the Accra meeting: *Federal Republic of Nigeria—Meeting of the Nigeria Leaders held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana*. (Lagos: The Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, 1967), hereafter cited as *Aburi Report*.

86. Professor Nettl has amply discussed the concept of constitutional political culture, op. cit., p. 81, especially footnote 2.

87. The notion that the Civil Service ran the country and that the coup brought this fact out is a partial truth. The full truth is that the Civil Service had always been part of the process generating political consensus, notwithstanding the tarnishes it had suffered. This has been written off as political interference or directives. It must be stressed that political consensus gave legitimacy to the Civil Service. For a brief description of the effects of Nigerianization on the Nigerian Civil Service see: J. Donald Kingsley "Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria" in Joseph Lapalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 301-317. However, for a discussion in terms of Africa, see the study by A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1965.)

88. The dichotomy appears again. The political leaders of the First Republic consistently attempted to arrogate power to themselves and relinquished authority to the Civil Service. But in practice, this dichotomy is not possible because power and authority are intricately interwoven. Political power has been defined as a process of policy-decision making. Since the civil service had been more knowledgeable than the corps of the politicians, the former had the unique opportunity of combining both functions, i.e., the making and execution of policy decisions for the country. This fact was the bone of contention in the move to get the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar, to dispense with the services of his secretary, Mr. P. H. G. Stallard (1959-63).

The status and prestige the civil servants enjoyed were enormous in society, especially during the pre and early post-independence period, as well as since the January coup.

89. Political power has been given several definitions. For a short summary, see Prof. Nettl, Ibid p. 31. Dr. M. G. Smith applied the socio-political conception in his study, *Government in Zazzau: 1800-1950* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), especially pp. 18-27. But the writer is most indebted to the lucid analysis of Prof. R. M. McIver, *Power Transformed* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1964). For an historical analysis, see: Bertrand de Jouvenal, *On Power* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962) and Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), chapter seven, pp. 110-127. The forerunner to the analysis of Dr. Deutsch is the short study by Prof. Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the study of political power," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXV (June 1950) No. 2, pp. 161-180.

90. In a rather interesting article entitled "Dead Heart of Biafra," Mr. Douglas Brown, a member of Lord Hunt's mercy mission that visited Nigeria recently, says: "The slogan is defective in logic, confusing, as it does, a continuing responsibility with a completed act. To crush or outwit the Biafran rebellion is certainly

the immediate task, but the maintenance thereafter of the artificial unity of Nigeria belongs to another order of effort altogether. The Federation, for better or for worse, was constructed as a stool with three legs—Yorubas, Hausa and Ibo. Take away one of the legs, and the stool collapses." *The Sunday Telegraph*, July 21, 1968, p. 7. Mr. Brown's article on the whole is relatively objective after the barrages of the Western press against the Federal efforts. In respect of the old order of things under the First Republic Mr. Brown's criticism may be almost correct. But in the present crisis, he failed to appreciate the overriding necessity and urgency in the scale of priorities of the Federal Military Government.

The slogan is forward looking, aiming as it does at re-creating the basis for legitimacy. The Federal Government went into the present armed conflict merely as an exercise of police action on a military scale. But it turned out to be a full-scale war. Under a war situation, the first primary objective is to keep the nation intact at any cost. The second line of the slogan merely underscores the fact of this objective. In the process of nation-building, historical facts abound, to show that a civil war may become inevitable. To refuse to undertake such a task amounts to abdication, regardless of the overriding consideration of rehabilitation. The complete slogan definitely provides for the latter. The Federal Military Government has in fact been humane because it did not seek a military solution, except as an ultimate resort.

Two other points reflect ingrained popular prejudice. Nigeria's unity was certainly not artificial in 1968. What should be said of the UK's national unity today, when the Welsh and Scottish national groups are demanding greater regional autonomy like Biafra but after 261 years? Nigeria's stool has more than three legs. For too long and to too many, only three legs have been visible. This is the crux of the crisis.

91. The following are five aspects of this process:

(a) Rumours about a coup have been associated with members of the pro-coup faction. The leading political members of this faction had on occasion made public pronouncements about secession. The second General Election of 1964 put the NCNC (in effect the Ibos) in a political vineyard, see: *Table I*. The threats of secession increased from members of the pro-coup faction.

(b) As established in this article, the January coup did not win for the pro-coup faction total power—political or military. The structure of the Nigerian Army was such that at that time the core of the infantry together with the bulk of the NCO's were of northern origin.

(c) After the July counter-coup, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gown became the Head of State, and on August 1 he made his first speech. After reviewing the events of January 15, he said: "According to certain well known facts which we have so far not disclosed to the nation and the world, the country was plunged into a national disaster by the grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the Army against the public. By this I mean that a group of officers in conjunction with certain civilians decided to overthrow the legal government of the day, but their efforts were thwarted by the inscrutable discipline and loyalty of the great majority of the Army and the other members of the Armed Forces and the Police." August 1, 1966—"Broadcast to the Nation on Assumption of Office," *Federal Republic of Nigeria: Nigeria 1966* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1966) p. 32. Since the politico-military upheaval in January, this was the first time that civilian involvement was made public.

(d) An article by Martin Dent, who was in the Northern Region during the July counter-coup, reported that it was the troops of the 4th Battalion, whose commander was shot during the January coup, that kidnapped the late Major-General T. J. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi and "took him away, interrogated and finally killed" him. During the interrogation "he apparently admitted complicity in the January

coup, and showed where documentary evidence was to be found linking important Ibo civilian figures with these murders and indicating that a more extensive series of murders of Northern troops was planned for August." Mr. Martin Dent's article was entitled: "Confessions that started Nigeria's tribal slaughter," *The Observer*, (London) October 9, 1966.

(c) There is a hidden ultimate meaning to the idea of Biafra. It is an attempt by the pro-coup faction, through military power, to eventually rechristen Nigeria as "BIAFRA". See: *Nigeria: The Dream Empire of A Rebel?* (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1968). This pamphlet contains documents captured at Enugu. The four photostat copies were in Lt. Col. Ojukwu's handwriting, showing his military plan to infiltrate and occupy the Mid-Western, Western and the Lagos States. This move was to be followed by the final assault on the Northern States. Lt. Col. Ojukwu dated the first document 7th September, while his troops were still occupying the Mid-Western State (August 9 to September 19, 1967).



## The Yaounde Convention: A Conflict of Doctrines

ROBERTO ALIBONI

*In the last issue of the journal, Roberto Aliboni analysed the trend of the negotiations that led to the renewal of the Yaounde Convention. In this article he makes some observations on the outcome of the negotiations.—Ed.*

ON July 29 last, after more than a year of exhausting negotiations, the 24 contracting parties to the Yaoundé Convention renewed their economic ties, once more in Yaoundé. Thus begins a new five-year period of *special relationships* between the European Community and the African and Malagasy States associated with it.

The term "special relationships", when applied to the link between the EEC and the AASM, somewhat condenses the problems which this association raises at the international level. The privileges which for a variety of reasons, economic, political and historical, have been becoming a feature of the relations between this northern sector of the world known as the EEC and the southern sector known as AASM have begun to take the shape, a *posteriori*, of an undisguised political doctrine, i.e. regional development. This rationalization has to some extent been provoked by the pressure of another theory which has been in the course of elaboration within the only organization where the North and South of the world meet face to face, namely UNCTAD. Here a theory of world-wide development has been developed, inherently antagonistic to special and privileged situations such as that of the EEC-AASM.

The conflict between the two theories and their actual or potential achievements formed the core of the problem dealt with in the negotiations for the renewal of the association. These led to a split, with the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands lined up in favour of the world theory, and France and, somewhat waveringly, Belgium behind the regional doctrine. Italy's position was undefined since in this country the discussion of certain themes, particularly those connected with international development, has been dragging on for some time and has only recently begun to bear fruit. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the Africans, though showing a united and conservative front as far

as renewal was concerned, on other points revealed differences which could lead to unexpected developments.

The conflict between the two doctrines tended to crystallize around three essential points: commercial preferences and a commodities policy; commercial preferences for manufactured and semi-manufactured products; the size of the Most Favoured Nation Clause in respect of the EEC.

For commodities which in the franc zone enjoyed marketing and price guarantees, the association system provided for fairly limited preferences and short-term financial loans as well as for grants under the Fund's development aid programme. This aid was designed to enable the Africans at the end of the five-year period to achieve world price levels, thanks to financial aid to encourage diversification. Needless to say, the mechanism has not worked both because of insufficiency of time and because the aim of attaining world prices is nonsensical. Thus while the combined preferences and the financial aid programme have failed to achieve a regional solution, it has equally prevented the EEC and the AASM from taking part in constructive negotiations to elaborate world agreements product by product. The new Convention, though making no direct provision, has cut down the marginal preference and, what is still more important, has removed the price-pegging mechanism. This will have the effect of leaving the door open for the EEC and the AASM to take part in world agreements for separate products. But now—and the occasion is at hand since the IBRD and IMF plan is to be discussed in the autumn—both the EEC and the AASM will need to make active contributions to such agreements, otherwise they risk throwing the baby away with the bath water.

Where however the EEC has clearly been left with a free hand is on the subject of non-reciprocal and general preferences for manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. The plan to concede to all, indiscriminately and without reciprocity, an identical preferential margin for these products of the developing countries had been steadily making a headway since the 1964 Geneva Conference until the proposal recently finalized by the EEC. The carrying out of such a design would shatter the very core of the EEC-AASM association which, in the final analysis, depends on the workability of vertical zones of free exchange. But the EEC proposal seems designed to do just this, though to what extent is not yet clear, as is seen in the protocol of the new Convention which states: "The regulations of the Convention.....do not exclude the realization of a general system of preferences".

Finally, the new Convention allows the African countries to enter into free exchange and common market agreements with their continental neighbours on more favourable terms than those conceded by the EEC associates. This was a victory of the more advanced African countries not only over the EEC but also over their more conservative colleagues. These expectations however remain to be realized as the policy of discrimination which the EEC continues to follow between the AASM system and the systems which link it to other African countries, such as East Africa, do not seem very promising.

Other aspects of the new Convention are also novelties compared with the preceding arrangements. For example the amount of financial aid has substantially increased, and there is now a limited preferential margin even for the products covered by the common agricultural policy. However, the three aspects referred to above are those which best serve to illustrate what the Yaoundé Convention means in general terms for the Community development policy.

The more or less explicit openings which are a new feature of the Yaounde Convention might well foreshadow a change of direction in Community policy, changing the accent from the particular to the general—or, in ritual terms, from regionalism to globalism. However, for the moment there is little to corroborate this hypothesis. In fact, it remains to be seen what Community reactions will be to the policy of African integration, as well as towards general preferences and the world policy on *commodities*. The door has been left ajar, and we must now wait and see if the EEC will open it still further by shouldering the world responsibilities invested in it.

# The Mauritanian Peoples' Party

MONIQUE SORDET AND EARNEST MILCENT

(*Le Mois En Afrique*, No. 45, September 1969)

*(Mauritania, in North West Africa, forms a bridge between West and North Africa. The country has about 140,000 people of Negro origin; the rest—about 490,000,—are mainly nomadic, of Arab and Berber origin. Mauritania's population is almost entirely Muslim; hence the country's choice in 1960 to become the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Mauritania became a source of conflict because of Morocco's claim that historically it formed a part of Greater Morocco. All these factors have relevance to the evolution of a single party as the authors of this article who recently toured the country show.—Ed.)*

**T**ODAY a majority of African countries South of the Sahara have adopted a single party system—even though legally, generally speaking, the governments in power have not abolished the provision conferring a legal existence on a multi-party system. Thus, under the existing law the citizen still has the right to create a new political group if he is not in agreement with the dominant party. But in reality whoever has the audacity to do so would soon find himself in prison for an indefinite period of time....

The Islamic Republic of Mauritania was left with no other choice by its leaders but to give constitutional recognition to a single party: "The Mauritanian Peoples' Party" described as "the Party of the State".

## The Beginnings of the PPM

This was not however always the case. On November 28, 1958, Mauritania joined the Community of States along with other territories of former French West Africa, with the sole exception of Guinea, and in 1959 Mauritania gave itself, for the first time, a constitution which established a Parliamentary system based on the Western pattern. Four different political groups existed in the country under this system.

It was clear however that differences between these groups revolved more round personalities or the origin of their leaders than on specific programmes or ideologies. The system resulted in perpetuating and encouraging racial, regional and tribal rivalries. This raised grave pro-

blems in a country which had been only superficially unified under the French authorities. For colonial Mauritania was composed of the Moors, traditionally nomads, and black sedentary tribes who had settled along the Senegal river.

Once Independence was proclaimed on November 28, 1960, the Government headed by M. Moktar Ould Daddah devoted itself to the task of putting an end to this constant source of friction and internecine conflicts. It took him a year to do and it was not till December 25, 1961, that the four Mauritanian parties, meeting in a Congress, decided to merge and to create together a new party—"Parti du Peuple Mauritanien" (The Mauritanian Peoples' Party)—"whose constant endeavour would be to remove discrimination and to destroy regionalism and tribalism, in order to forge national unity". (Moktar Ould Daddah, inaugural speech.)

#### **The Example of Guinea**

In the first flush of excitement at the Congress, all the delegates declared their agreement with this programme. However, in the months that followed personal ambitions and susceptibilities could be seen re-appearing rapidly on the scene. Hardly born, the P.P.M. was in danger of disintegrating again.....when a number of incidents instigated by Morocco came to its rescue and helped in reinforcing the unity of the new party. Throughout the country, popular militias and vigilance committees were set up at the initiative of the leaders to fight against subversion.

In October 1962, the National Political Bureau felt strong enough to call for the exclusion of all those who refused to abide by the policy laid down by it. And from this moment onwards the feeling grew among many of its members that it was not enough to have created a unified party. The need of the hour, they were convinced, was a single party.

In the meanwhile, the Secretary-General, M. Moktar Ould Daddah, and his colleagues began setting up branches of the P.P.M. in every important centre. The task achieved, they summoned all the militants to a national congress.

The Congress, a particularly exciting one, opened on March 25, 1963. Each section expressed its view freely and found a ready platform. M. Ould Daddah then put a resolution, later described as "historic", to vote, which recognised that "the time had come to establish our financial independence...by renouncing all French subsidies to balance our national Budget". This was implemented from the following July.

During this period, the financial position of Mauritania was far

from secure and the practical implementation of such a resolution implied putting into action a policy of rigorous austerity. M. Ould Daddah, fully aware of the obstacles, took it in his stride. He went ahead by putting to vote a number of items which among other things directed the Government to reduce the number of Ministers from 11 to 8, to increase taxation of higher income groups, to decrease official vehicles, to cut down the salaries of Deputies, Ministers and Ambassadors and, in particular, to put an end immediately to the financial autonomy of the National Assembly.

The prospect of such reforms raised a wave of criticism and protest among a circle of leaders. It particularly angered the Deputies, many of whom asserted publicly that the Government could not take away the right of Parliament to provide its own budget. Gradually the atmosphere degenerated and when finally in October the National Political Bureau met at Nouakchott to draw practical conclusions from the Congress, the Secretary-General found himself in a minority. He, however, succeeded in obtaining a directive to call a conference of the party cadres before whom he would place the difficulties encountered and to propose remedies.

M. Ould Daddah, however, took his own time before submitting to this injunction. As Head of State he had been invited by President Sekou Toure to visit Guinea. He decided to accept the invitation and utilise this opportunity to make a careful study of the organisation and system of the "democratic party" of Guinea.

He returned from there duly impressed by the efficacy of the system. "I understood", he himself confided the following year, "that the Western system is not suited to our countries. What is the liberty of a man who is hungry? Or, of one who suffers and cannot receive care? He who is ignorant and remains a prisoner of this ignorance? It is necessary, first, to liberate him socially and economically so that one day he may be able to say freely 'yes' or 'no'."

#### **The Historic Kaedi Congress**

Having thus been permanently cured of what he described as his "Montesquieu Complex", M. Ould Daddah returned to Nouakchott with the firm decision to convert the P.P.M. into a single party, the principal aim of which would be to involve the masses, to fight dissension and thus play a leading role in the reconstruction of the nation.

In this spirit, he called upon several members of the National Political Bureau to study the experience of the R.D.A<sup>1</sup> in Bamako and that of the Neo-Destours of Tunisia. As for himself M. Ould Daddah was

mainly interested in the organisation of the Arab Socialist Union of President Nasser and a delegation of which had just visited Mauritania. But above all the Secretary-General of the P.P.M. sought to win over to his point of view the representatives of workers, women and youth of his party, because he had returned from Guinea with the firm conviction that the most dynamic and yet the most neglected section of the population rallied round them and it was only with their support that it would be possible to do away with the privileges and monopolies of the traditional class of leaders.

Towards the end of the year Moktar Ould Daddah was ready to face the issue. He accordingly convened a conference of party cadres at Kaedi in January 1964. From the very start it was clear that he had triumphed. The majority of delegates rallied round him and approved the stand he had been advocating for months. He proposed, therefore, that the meeting be converted into an extraordinary congress of the party. This was accepted without any opposition. The members then taking up for consideration their own self-criticism acknowledged that the P.P.M. did not respond to the "national imperatives" and decided to reorientate it. The Congress proclaimed that the P.P.M. must become a special instrument to "strengthen national unity, raise the economic, intellectual, cultural and moral standard of all the citizens and to accelerate the progress of women". From now on it was clear in the minds of all present, as the President himself had underlined earlier in November before the National Assembly, that the task which lay before the party "necessitated not totalitarian but authoritarian methods which would reduce the place given so far to a democracy totally borrowed from the West, and to improve it by adopting some methods employed in totalitarian countries".

In this context the Congress also took a decision on the freedom of the Parliamentary mandate which amounted to the withdrawal of one of the last privileges of the Deputies.

#### **The Party of the State**

Some persons however refused to fall in line with this majority decision and during the summer of 1964 two attempts were made to create an opposition party. The Government put them down by force. This further led the National Political Bureau to introduce a motion in the National Assembly in November to amend the Constitution and to proclaim the P.P.M. as the "Party of the State" which in fact it did become in 1965.

But all these events made the Secretary-General and his men aware that the mere conviction that this was the best solution for the country was not enough to ensure that they could carry the country forward. In Mauritania, particularly, where the cadres were still few, the representatives of traditional organisations were in a position to control the most vital means to influence and exert pressure on the population. Thus, if the party was expected to play the role assigned to it by the Kaedi Congress it was essential to build up its own cadres of well trained militants at all levels. The 'reconstituted' Congress thus decided to set up a training centre at Nouakchott to prepare a hard core of new members for field work.

Accordingly in 1964 new cadres of the P.P.M. were reorganised and familiarised with its ideology at a two-month course in Nouakchott. Thereafter they were permitted to reconstitute their organisations at the base in all the regions of the country.

In June 1966, the Congress of Aioun, where 35 branches were represented, gave ample proof that the system was a success. And it was only then possible to start preparations for the Congress to meet at Nouakchott in 1968 which could define the role of the new organs of the party.

#### **An Organisation on a National Scale**

Article 3 of the Party Constitution lays down that "to be a member of the party, a Mauritanian citizen, enjoying civic and political rights, should be of at least 18 years of age, certified by a competent authority of the party and should subscribe to its statutes and rules and pledge to execute its orders. The pledge must be renewed each year."

Today, with its 180,000 members from a population of a million and a half, the party covers the length and breadth of the country. Its task is to mobilise and involve the masses in its programme. These far-reaching changes incorporated in the P.P.M. were facilitated by the administrative reforms vigorously undertaken in Mauritania in the beginning of 1969. Actually the aim, as declared at the Congress last January, was that President Ould Daddah be authorised to "reorganise the Party and the State". Essentially it was meant to work out a plan of regionalising the administration of the country. According to the new arrangements the country was divided into 7 economic administrative regions corresponding roughly to the former 'circles' of the colonial period, Nouakchott and its immediate surroundings becoming an autonomous district. In each new region Federal Bureaus of the party were set up to act as an intermediary between the local branches and the central organ of the party, the National Political Bureau (B.P.N.).



At the base, groups of 30 to 60 members constituted committees. These committees have their counterparts in cities, districts, in the bushes or villages and nomadic camps. A section for women and youth on whom the party leaders particularly depend to bring about changes in the archaic social organisations is also organised into similar committees and sections.

Election is compulsory at all levels of the party. But this democratic feature is conditioned by the need to obtain the ratification and approval (for the federal secretaries) of the B.P.N.

Committees, Sections and Federations elect Bureaus for one or two years which include 5 members from the first and 11 members from others and in which are always represented members of civic bodies: the mayor, the prefects of the region or the sub-division, the secretaries-general of youth and women's bodies.

The National Congress, the leading organ of the Federation, along with the Federal Political Bureau, is constituted of all the members of the Bureaus of the Sections as also members of the Federal Political Bureau.

The National Congress is the supreme body of the party. Composed of members of the Federal Bureaus, of the B.P.N. and Parliament, the delegates of the Sections, of the National Council and Ambassadors of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, it elects for 4 years by a simple majority the members of the B.P.N. The Congress assembles every 4 years while the National Council meets each year to check and scrutinise the decisions taken on general policy matters and the Plan. The B.P.N. comprises 16 members, 3 from legislative bodies—the President of the Republic, President of the Assembly, and the President of the Parliamentary group. The Secretary-General is designated by the Congress. The B.P.N. can also dissolve the Bureau of a Section "for grave political reasons". Expulsions can be pronounced against some members, however eminent, of the P.P.M.

Leaders and party officials constantly tour the country, particularly the rural areas, to rectify organisational problems and supervise the functioning of the Committees and the Sections. The members of the B.P.N. themselves are called upon to explain the resolutions of the Congress to the militants of the party. Fact-finding missions are undertaken to inspect the manner in which party orders are being carried out. On his part the President established personal contact with the entire people through a number of tours spread over a period of two years.

#### **The Connecting Link**

"The President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Secretary-

General of the Party holds important powers, political as well as constitutional," M. Moktar Ould Daddah declared in the National Assembly on November 28, 1964. "As long as he remains in power he shall only be prompted by a single-minded purpose to appoint a man who can be the leader of a responsible team, the backbone of the country. The power which rests largely on a single person is heavy and this man is fragile."

In keeping with the Articles of the Statutes, the supreme internal authority of the party is the B.P.N. But it is evident that within the B.P.N. itself the Secretary-General plays an important role. When in addition he happens at the same time to be the President of the Republic his predominant position in the political life of the country becomes unquestionable.

As a matter of fact M. Moktar Ould Daddah is the best example of what Ahmed Mahiou calls the symbiosis or the perfect union of the chief of the party and the chief of the State.<sup>2</sup>

He alone, along with Sekou Toure, has retained uninterrupted power in Black Africa since the first Councils of the Government were set up under the Loi Cadre.<sup>3</sup>

Regarded as the father of the nation, the Mauritanian President enjoys considerable personal popularity. He is symbol of national unity which had been rudely shattered by the colonial regime and tribal conflicts. Drawing his power from the people, he would like to utilise this support to involve them in the progress of the country 'on the road to emancipation'.

#### **An Instrument of Action**

In an interview with an Algerian daily, *El Moudjahid*, on March 25, 1967, Moktar Ould Daddah said: "The P.P.M. is at the same time a party of the masses and the cadres. The cadres are the part of the masses. And the masses embody the cadres and other workers. At one stage we were tempted to form a party of avant gardes confined to the elite. But this attitude posed several difficulties. Firstly, the elite in the country are not many. Then we found that the elite were more susceptible to divisive forces than unity. Now we are an underdeveloped country which needs to mobilise all its forces and energies to confront the problems of the day. Finally, Mauritania would like to integrate its cadres with the masses so that they always remain conscious of the need to remain united". Thus defined as the party of the masses, the P.P.M., as mentioned above, has been organised on this principle. And its recent reorganisation has

enabled the completion of the work initiated at the Kaedi Congress. In the subsequent two years the shortcomings, particularly with regard to rural areas which should have provided the "human investment", were criticised. For, the P.P.M., despite its mass political base—essential for such an effort—had for long revealed a certain incapacity to fulfil such a task. But already in the past year, during our tour of the Tangant region with President Ould Daddah, we were able to see that the idea of the "human investment" had made a start. Roads, tracks, barrages, mountain passes, all works of the party militants, testify to it in a convincing way.

Another success achieved is apparent in the manner in which the traditional leaders have been integrated into the organisation of the party. Some of their privileges have been totally abolished, others will disappear as will their holders "by extinction". But already here and there an appreciable number of tribal chiefs along with their sons are militants of the P.P.M.

The Mauritania Peoples' Party thus now appears—in keeping with the objective of the Secretary-General—to be fast becoming an instrument of action on a national scale. But it is much more than that. With constitutional sanction the P.P.M. has become "the only vital organ to conceive programmes and plans conducive to development and promotion of all Mauritians while the State organs, Parliament and the Government, must implement the decisions taken by the party itself."<sup>4</sup>

The dual concept of the Party and the State thus no longer exists in Mauritania. The source and origin of all power, the Mauritania Peoples' Party, is the brain and mainspring of all fields of national life. The administration is at its service. It must become the appropriate instrument "suitable for translating into action the different decisions of the P.P.M."<sup>5</sup> This applies also to the army which the B.P.N. recently decided to integrate into the party by adopting practical measures.

One could describe this as "totalitarianism" but it is none the less surprising that the P.P.M. has so successfully managed to project itself, as we have personally had the occasion to see, among the nomadic people, traditionally so jealous of their liberty. It is beyond doubt that these forms of organisation and structure have been regarded indispensable to realise and safeguard the unity of the country and ensure its development.

—Translated by Shanti Sadiq Ali

### References

1. R.D.A. : The "Rassemblement Democratique Africain, which was originally formed in 1946 with French Communist help, was the biggest and most important party to develop in French Africa. Until 1950 it had close connections with the Communists and at the height of its power in 1957 it controlled 7 of the 12 governments. Disagreements between the leadership however led to the breakaway of Guinea and Mali sections.—Editor.
2. Ahmed Mahiou : "The advent of the single party in Black Africa," Library of Law and Jurisprudence : p. 227.
3. Loi Cadre : In 1956 the French Parliament passed the so-called Loi Cadre (Enabling Law) which was a decisive step in French Black Africa's constitutional advance and which gave a large measure of self-government to the Black African territories.— Editor
4. Report on the state of the nation presented to the National Assembly on Nov. 28, 1965,
5. Speech of Moktar Ould Daddah at the conference of regional and party workers, Jan. 27, 1969.

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### Acknowledgement

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## Quarterly Chronicle (August–November)

VANITA SABIKI

### INDIA AND AFRICA

**Gandhi Centenary Celebrations in Africa :** Millions of Africans paid homage to the memory of Mahatma Gandhi on the occasion of his birth centenary. His role and contribution to Indian Independence as also his teachings, which inspired many African leaders in the struggle for their countries' independence, were remembered with gratitude.

In South Africa the focal point of the celebrations was in Durban where 400,000 of South Africa's half a million Indians live. The first Gandhi Memorial is being established in the Indian district 20 km north of Durban, at the Phoenix settlement which served as his headquarters from 1904-14. A scheme costing Rs. 2,600,000 is under way to restore his former house as a museum and to build a community hall, library, medical clinic and a memorial park.

In Johannesburg, the Indian community has undertaken to restore another shrine—Tolstoy Farm—where the Mahatma had established a community school—for the children of his imprisoned followers. At Ladysmith, where Gandhiji served as a stretcher bearer during the Boer War, the Sanatan Dharma Sabha has put up a Gandhi Statue and brought out 25,000 golden medallions to commemorate the occasion.

In Kenya, the week-long Gandhi Exhibition, inaugurated in Nairobi on October 2, was carried to all parts of the country. In Nairobi alone, Gandhian literature worth Rs. 50,000 was sold within days. A seminar organised at the University College was addressed by the Education Minister, Mr. Kiano.

The Government of Somalia initiated an intensive programme of activities, beginning from August 15, to commemorate the occasion. A commemorative stamp was issued and a road named after Gandhiji. A seminar was organised and a series of talks on his life held on October 2.

In the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, Emperor Haile Selassie named one of the main streets after Gandhiji. Earlier, Crown Prince Asfa Wossen unveiled a bust of Gandhiji at the Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Addis Ababa.

The island of Mauritius began its Gandhi Centenary celebrations with a broadcast of the Mahatma's favourite devotional songs. Earlier, on July 1, a set of Gandhi stamps was issued.

Among the Arab countries in Africa, Sudan, the UAR, Morocco and Algeria had special programmes on Gandhiji's birthday.

In West Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone in particular held solemn functions to mark the occasion. The Ghana Government organised a series of talks, film shows, exhibitions and an essay competition among the university students of the country.

A similar essay competition was held in Nigeria for school students. At the University of Lagos, the Mahatma Gandhi Library was opened by the Indian High Commissioner at a special function on October 2.

At an international symposium organised by UNESCO in Paris, Mr. William A. Eteki Mboumoua from Cameroon advocated united action by the developing countries—a "Swadeshi" movement on a third world scale to counter the "egoism and immorality of industrial nations".

**Indian Health Minister in Cairo :** The Union Health Minister, Mr. K. K. Shah, visited Cairo early in September at the invitation of the UAR Health Minister, Dr. Abdul Sallam. Later the Minister attended the International Red Cross Conference at Istanbul from September 7-10 and visited Yugoslavia before returning to India.

**Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation Supports Palestinian Struggle :** An Al Fatah delegation arrived in India early in September to canvass support for the Palestinians' struggle for the recovery of their homeland from Israeli occupation. The visit was sponsored by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation.

In Bhopal on September 3, the Madhya Pradesh Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity and World Peace deplored the burning of the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. It adopted a resolution saying that the act of desecration was aimed at creating hatred and enmity among the nations and communities.

**Indian Wagons for Ghana :** The Ghana Railway and Ports Authority has placed with an Indian firm, Braithwaite and Company of Calcutta, an order worth about 900,000 new cedis (about Rs. 78,75,000) for the supply of 150 sheet covered railway wagons.

**Sudan Minister in India :** Sudan's Minister of Communications and Tourism, Sayed Mohamed Habeeb, was on a 12-day visit to India at the invitation of the Union Railway Minister to explore the possibilities of getting India's assistance in modernising the Sudanese railway system.

The Sudanese Minister, who also visited the Research, Design and Standards Organisation of the Railways at Lucknow, said this organisation could render considerable assistance to the Sudanese railways.

Mr. Habeeb said Sudan was interested in sending some railway officers to India for training. India recently signed contracts with Sudan for the supply of 200 railway wagons valued at Rs. 1 crore.

**Special Emissary of President Nasser in Delhi :** Mr. K. Rifaat, UAR Minister of Labour and a special emissary of President Nasser, visited India leading a 3-member delegation to explain to the Government of India his Government's attitude and policy concerning the Rabat Summit. He conveyed to the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh, the UAR's appreciation of India's support to the Arabs and said the "UAR from the very start had supported India's participation at the Rabat Summit". He expressed regret over the exclusion of the

Indian delegation from the closing session of the Summit".

(see also under Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat)

**Indian Parliamentary Team Visits East Africa :** A team of members of the Indian Parliament headed by Mr. R. S. Panj hazari, visited East Africa in mid-October. Speaking at Nairobi, Mr. Panj hazari said during their stay in Kenya the group studied industrial and agricultural development and operational and other problems of the Shipping Corporation of India services on its East African route. The team visited Dar-es-Salaam before returning to Bombay.

**Indian Banks in Uganda :** An Indian High Commission spokesman announced in Kampala on October 27 that both the Indian banks in Uganda—the Bank of India and the Bank of Baroda—had decided to continue operations as Ugandan companies following the legislation enforcing local incorporation of all banks. The spokesman added that this reflected India's confidence in Uganda.

In addition to local incorporation the banks must provide 20 million Ugandan shillings (about £ 1,000,000) as capital for investment in assets approved by the Uganda Finance Ministry.

**Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference in New Delhi :** The 5th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was inaugurated in the Central Hall of Parliament, New Delhi, on October 30 by the President of India, Mr. V. V. Giri. This was the first time that the Conference was held in India which has been a member of the world organisation since 1949.

In a message to the Conference, U Thant, Secretary-General of the UN, said many of the items on the agenda were of great importance to the UN and expressed his happiness that the Conference would discuss "measures for the prohibition of the production and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons".

The following countries from Africa were represented: Cameroon, Congo (DR), Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and the UAR. On the eve of the opening day the UAR announced its decision to boycott the entire meet in protest against certain adverse remarks on the West Asian situation made in Secretary-General Andre de Blonay's report. It said these were factually incorrect.

The deputy leader of the Indian delegation, Mr. R. K. Khadilkar, protested on behalf of India against certain "objectively incorrect" statements and observations on India made by the IPU Secretary General in his report. He also took strong exception to the agenda of the conference which failed to take serious note of the liberation struggles in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the imposition of a white minority regime in Rhodesia and the unabashed practice of apartheid in South Africa. He reminded the Council that it would be failing in its moral responsibility if it did not support these liberation struggles.

Later, Mr. Andre de Blonay told the plenary session that the report on the political situation would be modified the following day to clear the misunderstandings that had arisen over certain portions of it.

The 105th Council meeting of the 69-nation IPU on October 29 suspended the membership of Pakistan, Libya, Sudan and Somalia in view of the dissolution of Parliament in these countries following coups. It decided to postpone consideration of the applications of East Germany and North Korea for admission.

The Inter-Parliamentary Council on November 5 unanimously approved a resolution on Mahatma Gandhi which was later presented to the concluding plenary session on November 7.

The Committee of the IPU on Non-self-governing Territories and Ethnic Questions adjourned on November 6 without transacting any business for want of a quorum. Before it adjourned, the Chairman, Mr. L. Tanada of the Philippines, said in a tone of disappointment that if the work of such an important committee was not of sufficient interest to members it might just as well dissolve itself. The importance of its work, he added, could be judged from the fact that some 38 or 39 territories were still not self-governing. Moreover, Portugal and South Africa had consistently flouted UN resolutions.

The Conference, which concluded on November 7, unanimously adopted all the resolutions before it except the one on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty on which one member of the Indian delegation voted against, one for, while the other 18 abstained.

The main resolution urged Parliaments to contribute to the rapid conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the installation of nuclear and other weapons of mass extermination and ratify the non-proliferation treaty. On the role and responsibilities of medium and small powers in the maintenance of international peace, the conference accepted the Yugoslav amendment expressing the hope that the heads of governments would lead the delegations of their respective countries to the 25th session of the General Assembly next year. Another resolution adopted unanimously was on the role of Parliaments in the protection of the human environment and conservation of natural resources for future generations. The resolution on Special Progress as a factor and condition of economic development appealed to Parliaments to support the work of the International Labour Organisation. It also called on the economically advanced States to implement the decisions of UNCTAD-II and help developing countries in accelerating the pace of their economic development. Without a debate, the Conference adopted a resolution on cultural exchanges as a means of increasing understanding among the countries. It was decided that the spring session of the IPU be held at Morocco from March 31 to April 5, 1970.

—*Press Trust of India, Oct 29-Nov 7.*

**New Envoys to UAR and Mauritius :** The Indian Ambassador to the UAR, Mr. I. J. Bahadur Singh, presented his credentials to President Nasser at Kubbeh Palace on November 15.

Mr. D. S. Kamtekar was appointed India's Ambassador to Mauritius in place of Mr. Avtar Singh who took over as India's Ambassador to Kenya.

**Tanzanian Team in India :** A team of the Tanzanian Government headed by Mr. F. K. Burengelo, Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Communications, Transport and Labour, arrived in India in the third week of November to recruit engineers, doctors and teachers from India.

**Indian Firm's Present to Liberian President :** An Indian firm, Bhawaney Brothers, offered a donation of \$50,000 to the Liberian President, Mr. William Tubman, on his 74th birthday on November 29. Following the donation Parliament voted a Bill setting up a \$1 million Tubman scholarship foundation for Liberian students.



**Nigerian Wins First Prize in Essay Competition :** Mr. Edward A. Anjorin, a 24-year-old Nigerian student of geography at Mysore University, won the first prize in an essay competition on Indo-African cooperation sponsored by Africa Publications.

**Scholarships for Africans :** A survey figures reveal that 6,416 foreign students are studying in India. Of these, 3,835 are from Asia, 2,355 from Africa and 226 from Western countries. Advance and highly specialised education has so far been given to nearly 2,000 doctors and 1,500 engineers from Asian and African countries. Apart from training in the country, India has also made experts available to Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia in engineering, forestry, agriculture, public administration, banking and finance, water resources development, small-scale industries and atomic energy research.

## **OAU SUMMIT CONFERENCE**

The sixth Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Governments opened in Addis Ababa on September 6. The conference was preceded by the 13th meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers which devoted much of its time to the future of the OAU Liberation Committee. The debate on this subject was based on reports by the OAU Secretary General, Mr. Diallo Telli, and by the Committee for Coordination and Liberation which met in Dakar (Senegal) in July.

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia opened the conference with an appeal to the Big Powers to help find a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict. He said a frank exchange of views should take place with the determination to find a solution to the Nigerian civil war which all parties could accept. Recalling the creation of the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria in 1967, the Emperor, who heads the committee, said the group had spared no effort to reconcile the two parties. He added that the aid accorded to African territories still under foreign domination was insufficient and called for more sacrifices to help the African liberation movements.

The Emperor said economic sanctions could never be effective against "recalcitrant States unless they are backed by force". But to use such force needed the cooperation of the Big Powers—"and up till now this cooperation is more and more difficult to obtain...In the final issue, the liberation of territories under racist and colonial regimes must come from the liberation movements themselves", he said.

Emperor Haile Selassie said the presence of UN Secretary General U Thant would stress the "identity of the decisions of the OAU and the UN".

Cameroon's Head of State, M. Ahmadou Ahidjo, who was elected Chairman of the Conference, in his speech warned that the continuation of the Nigerian conflict threw doubts on the capacity of the African continent to solve its problems.

Reporting on the OAU's activities last year, President Boumedienne of Algeria said the difficulties facing Africa could have been eased if the OAU had shown more firmness and if the coordination of African countries' efforts had been increased.

U Thant, who addressed the conference on September 7, stated that the

expectations aroused by the adoption nearly nine years ago of the Declaration of Decolonisation "have very largely remained unfulfilled in Southern Africa". There had been "understandably widespread dissatisfaction at the failure of the UN to effect any change" in the situation in South Africa "despite the grave dangers which it poses of violent conflict in that part of the world".

The ability of the international community to ward off these dangers, he added, depended not only on the determination of Governments to shoulder their responsibilities under the Charter and the UN resolution but also on the willingness of some great Powers and the major trading partners of South Africa to take effective measures "to turn that country off its present course".

Referring to "the tragic fratricidal strife in Nigeria", U Thant said it was a matter of universal distress that a just settlement of the civil war had not been attained through the relevant decisions of the OAU.

The Summit Conference adopted, with only minor changes, the political decisions submitted for its approval by the Council of Ministers. Most noteworthy was the Summit's agreement to submit proposals for a reform of the Liberation Committee to an as yet undesignated experts committee.

The Conference concluded on September 10 with the approval of resolutions on the Middle East and Nigeria and a Manifesto on Southern Africa. Agreement was also reached on an emblem for the OAU and on the next summit, which will be held in Addis Ababa in September 1970.

The Manifesto on Southern Africa stated that the best method of solving the Southern African problem was negotiation, but that African States would have no alternative but to resort to force if "the adversary" proved itself unyielding. The document defined "the least painful means of reaching a settlement of the South African problem", a spokesman said. President Ahidjo was entrusted with the task of going to the U.N personally to present the document to all member countries.

*(See also under U. N. and South Africa)*

The Conference unanimously condemned Israel "for the aggression committed...against the UAR's territory", and expressed solidarity with President Nasser. It unanimously decided to send a message to President Nasser expressing its solidarity and condemning the Israeli raids. The Conference called for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from UAR soil.

The Conference also reaffirmed a resolution adopted at the Algiers Summit which noted the worsening situation in the Middle East, expressed African support to the UAR and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory in conformity with the U. N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

*(See also under U. N.)*

The Conference adopted a resolution urging the two sides to the Nigerian civil war to call a cease-fire and negotiate for a united Nigeria. The four countries which have recognised Biafra (Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon) abstained as did Sierra Leone.

In his closing speech, Emperor Haile Selassie said the Sixth Summit had "undoubtedly added strength to our endeavours in further promoting the great

cause of African unity." "This session has not only afforded us an opportunity to exchange views and reach important decisions on matters affecting the destiny of Africa but it has also enabled us to conduct bilateral talks and to know one another better."

—*Condensed from Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 9.*

Earlier at the 13th ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, which met at Addis Ababa on August 27, a 25-point agenda covering a wide range of issues was approved. Mr. Dialo Telli, Secretary General of the OAU, submitted his report on the general political, economic and social situation in Africa to a closed session of the Council.

In his report on Rhodesia Mr. Telli accused Britain of "cowardice", "double-dealing" and "cynicism" in its handling of the Rhodesian affair.

Conference sources said Mr. Telli also accused Western Powers of using the "infernal machinery" of the NATO in that part of Africa. He charged that France had become the main supplier of arms to Rhodesia through South Africa. He claimed that Rhodesia's economy did not suffer from the sanctions policy, and was now booming. Part of the blame for this rested with African States which lost the chance to force Britain to take a tough stand on Rhodesia when most of the Foreign Ministers of 38 African countries meeting in extraordinary session after UDI refused to vote a resolution providing for a general severance of diplomatic ties with London.

France, Japan, Britain and the United States were criticised for maintaining substantial commercial relations with South Africa in the report on apartheid. The report accused the US of having lifted the embargo on military supplies and listed 260 American firms in South Africa representing investments totalling \$600 million—12 per cent of the total investment in the country.

After noting that 400 British firms were operating in South Africa, the report said Japan's bilateral trade with South Africa amounted to \$170 million per year. South Africa was also negotiating with several Latin American countries for the formation of a South Atlantic Military bloc. France is the principal arms supplier, according to the report. South Africa's military budget for 1969 is \$218 million; seven times what it was in 1959, and \$28 million more than in the previous year.

—(*Condensed from Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 6 No. 8*)

## ECONOMIC COOPERATION

**African Development Bank :** The 5th Annual Conference of the Board of the 31-member African Development Bank was held in Freetown from August 25 to 29. No communique was issued afterwards, but a resolution adopted said the meeting had been "held in a cordial atmosphere".

Addressing the meeting, the President of the African Development Bank, Mr. Mamoun Beheiry, appealed to developed nations to offer better trade terms to the developing nations.

According to a report submitted to the Bank, African agriculture had a better year in 1968, compared with the previous year. Agricultural prices, notably those of rubber, cocoa, sisal, citrus, sugar and vegetable oils, were higher in world markets.

According to Agence France Presse, only half of the Bank's expected capital of \$88 million has been paid so far.

**Second "Yaounde Convention" :** The Second Yaounde Convention was signed in Yaounde on July 29 by representatives of the six European Economic Community countries and the 18 African Associated States (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (DR), Congo Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper Volta). The new convention renewed and revised the former association agreement that expired on May 31.

African representatives expressed disappointment with the new terms. Cameroon President Ahidjo noted "with bitterness" that sales of African products instead of increasing and diversifying had declined in relative value. Other suppliers were succeeding in improving their positions on the European Market. Mr. Ahidjo also stressed the serious threat "that the lowering of the European Community's external customs duties posed to the sale of African coffee, cocoa and fats. In Fort Lamy, Chad's Finance and Economy Minister, Mr. Aboulaye Lamana, expressed dissatisfaction with the convention because the support for world rates of tropical products was no longer automatic.

**West African Economic Community Treaty :** The Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) presented a Note on economic co-operation among African countries to the fourth joint meeting of the working party on intra-African trade and the OAU Expert Committee on Trade and Development which met in Geneva in August. The Note envisages a draft treaty for the West African Regional Group, formally established at a Heads of State and Governments meeting in Monrovia in April 1968. The treaty, based on the findings of a recent ECA mission to a selected number of West African countries, suggested that there was considerable scope for increased penetration of each country by goods that could be supplied competitively from the other countries; Governments should be assisted in making the necessary organisational and legal changes to facilitate this trade; enterprises identified to be potential exporters to neighbouring countries should be assisted to organise their commercial contacts and exporting arrangements and a long-term programme of policies favourable to exports and export promotion, with particular emphasis on training. An Economic Commission for Africa Regional Adviser is now assisting West African countries in preparing a request to the UNDP for the establishment of a Special Fund Project in trade promotion to tackle these tasks.

**Conference on Investment in Africa :** At a meeting in Paris in October, representatives of the private sectors of 14 capital exporting countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the three Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, the UK, the USA and West Germany) decided in principle to set up a Multinational Investment Corporation to provide private capital and resources for Africa. In the chair, signifying African interest and approval of the idea, was the African Development Bank.

According to an official statement from the meeting, initial issued capital of the proposed company would be about \$15 million. A committee has been established to draw up detailed proposals by March next year.

—*Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 10.

**Japanese Economic Missions :** The Japanese Government is planning to send

two economic missions to Africa. One team, sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, will tour Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Gabon to make a first-hand survey of primary products. The team would concentrate on oil seeds and raw cotton in Nigeria, coffee and cocoa in Ivory Coast and mineral resources in Gabon.

The other team, to be sent by the Foreign Ministry early next year, will be a top level economic mission of business leaders.

The Japanese Power Industries is also to send a 16-member team to Kenya, Somalia and Niger to explore the possibilities of prospecting for uranium ore. The Government-financed Japan Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation is also planning to send a uranium resources survey team to Congo (DR), Niger, Somalia, Angola, Nigeria and Senegal.

—*Uganda Argus*, Oct. 31.

(See also under Algeria, East Africa, Cameroon, Congo (DR), Madagascar, Tanzania and UAR)

## UN AND UN AGENCIES

**Security Council Debate on S. W. Africa :** The Indian Ambassador, Mr. Samar Sen, speaking in the Security Council on August 4, during the debate on Namibia (S.W. Africa) suggested the setting up of a Government in exile for Namibia and the seating of that Government in the UN. He also suggested reaffirmation of the ban on the sale of arms to South Africa and steps to secure its effective implementation. He said the UN, as the legally appointed administering authority, should consider the possibility of "claiming the revenues due to it from mining and other enterprises in Namibia" and "claiming indemnities and reparations from South Africa for the deprived and dispossessed Namibian population".

**Call for South Africa's Withdrawal :** The Security Council on August 12 called on South Africa to withdraw its administration from Namibia "immediately and in any case before October 4, 1969". In the event of South Africa's failure to comply, the Council decided that it would meet immediately to determine "effective measures in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the relevant chapters of the UN Charter".

On October 2 South Africa formally rejected the resolution in a written reply handed over to UN Secretary-General U Thant.

**Committee on Non-self-governing Territories :** The UN Committee on Non-self governing Territories passed a resolution on October 26 drawing the attention of the UN General Assembly to the worsening situation in Namibia following South Africa's refusal to relinquish its hold over South Africa's former mandated territory. Portugal and South Africa voted against the motion, which was adopted by 96 votes, with six countries abstaining. The resolution reaffirmed the right of the Namibian peoples to independence and condemned South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw its administration.

The UN Council for South West Africa, charged with taking over and administering the disputed territory, admitted total failure for the third year in a report to the UN General Assembly on October 29.

**Sub-Committee on Apartheid :** The six-member sub-committee of the UN Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa visited Africa from August 17 to 28. It held meetings with leaders of liberation movements and Government representatives in Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. Later it had consultations with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The movements which submitted memoranda to the Sub-Committee were the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO), and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo).

In a statement issued in Dar-es-Salaam on August 22, the Sub-Committee said : "We wish to emphasize that while the UN has a role to play in the campaign against the racist minority and the colonial regimes in Southern Africa; the leaders of the liberation movements have stressed that the main burden of the struggle falls on the people themselves."

**Al Aqsa Blaze :** Twenty-three Muslim countries on August 30 asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the fire in Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21. The resolution called for an international inquiry into the partial destruction of the mosque, Islam's third holiest shrine, and the protection of holy places in Jerusalem, if necessary through an international presence in the holy city.

African signatories included Guinea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR.

*Press Trust of India, August 30.*

On September 16 the UN Security Council condemned Israel for its failure to abstain from measures designed to alter the status of Jerusalem and pointed out that the fire was linked with Israeli acts aiming at the annihilation of Arab East Jerusalem. The motion was approved by 11 votes to nil, with the US, Finland, Paraguay and Colombia abstaining.

**UN General Assembly Meets :** The UN General Assembly met on September 20 with Miss Angie E. Brookes of Liberia as the new President. She was welcomed by all the delegates.

**General Assembly Pays Tribute to Gandhi :** At the UN, Secretary-General U Thant and other members of the General Assembly's various committees paid tributes to Mahatma Gandhi whose principles, it was said, formed the very basis of the UN Charter. India's Foreign Minister, addressing the General Assembly on the occasion, noted that today the UN was still dealing with the same problems that were with us at the organisation's birth and member States in a position to bring about a solution of the problems of the peoples under racial and colonial subjugation in South Africa had been evasive, stopping short of taking any concrete action.

On West Asia, the Foreign Minister said the "Security Council and its permanent members have a special responsibility to ensure the faithful implementation of the November 22 resolution".

Describing the Non-proliferation Treaty as unequal and ineffective, he said : "We have, on a matter of principle, rejected the validity of an instrument which seeks to bind the hands of the powerless and to license the further accumulation of armaments by those whose stockpiles threaten our very existence."

Referring to the report of the Second UNCTAD presented by him to the 23rd session of the General Assembly, he said there was a growing tendency to detract from the importance of the basic objectives and put emphasis on pallatives. He said a beginning had been made, however modest, to advance the objectives of cooperation among developing countries and to prove that they did not intend to spare any efforts in carrying out the declaration of the Algiers Charter and UNCTAD-II.

*Patriot, New Delhi, Oct. 4.*

**UNCTAD Conference—Ninth Session :** The Ninth Session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development adjourned in Geneva on September 23. The Secretary-General, Mr. Perez Guerrero, said at the close of the discussions : "The Board has unfortunately failed to do what it set out to do—define UNCTAD's rôle in the Second Development Decade".

The Board President, Mr. Asante of Ghana, said this meant the discussions had failed to produce agreement on important matters. He said developing countries had been told they had not mobilised their own resources sufficiently, and this was "a valid criticism". But he wished it had been made in a more friendly way.

The basic difficulty during the 9th session was the conflict of interests between the Latin American countries and other members of the "Group of 77" developing countries. The session will resume in Geneva next February.

**Elections to International Court of Justice :** Five new members elected to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on October 27 included one from Africa, Mr. Ignacio-Pinto of Dahomey. The Asian candidates from India and Thailand were defeated.

The Press Trust of India's representative at the UN commented in a despatch on October 28: "The ultimate result was somewhat of a surprise and appeared to be the outcome of a deal between the Latin American nations and the Spanish and African nations to protect each other's candidate."

**UN Assistance for African Refugees :** The Executive Committee of the UN High Commission for Refugees on October 28 approved a \$5,769,000 programme for 1970. As during the last five years, more than half the financial aid (\$3,100,000) will go to African refugees. The largest allocation for a single country goes to Uganda (\$950,000) for 6 settlement centres for Rwanda refugees, next come Ethiopia (\$649,000) for a rural settlement for Sudanese refugees and a sum of \$458,000 for Tanzania for the settlement of refugees from Mozambique, and \$420,000 for a settlement centre in Sudan for Ethiopian refugees.

**Cooperation between UN and OAU :** Presenting the Manifesto on Southern Africa (see under OAU) to the UN on October 8, President Ahidjo of Cameroon described it as a "cry of alarm" from African countries. Africans were ready for talks and negotiations but if their appeals were unheard, they would be ready for a long and difficult struggle.

Thirty-seven African countries later requested that the Manifesto be included in the agenda of the UN General Assembly under the heading "Cooperation between UN and the OAU—Manifesto concerning Southern Africa".

**Special Political Committee Debate on Apartheid :** The Indian delegate to the UN, Mr. Arjun Arora, MP, suggested at the Special Political Committee of the

General Assembly on October 30 that the Security Council resume consideration of the question of apartheid under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and take effective steps against South Africa.

The Security Council last met on the apartheid issue in 1964 when it voted an arms embargo.

Mr. Arora said a massive build-up of South Africa's military forces had turned the country into one of the strongest oppressive powers in Africa.

*Press Trust of India, Oct. 31.*

**Rhodesia :** The General Assembly's Trusteeship Committee on November 3 again called on Britain to use force to prepare for African majority rule in Rhodesia. Voting 79 to 8 with 17 abstentions, the Committee also urged extension of existing sanctions against the white minority regime of Ian Smith to South Africa and Portugal.

*—U. P. I., Nov. 4.*

**China Gains New Support from Africa in UN :** The UN General Assembly on November 11 voted against the admission of the People's Republic of China. Forty-eight countries favoured UN recognition, 56 voted against and there were 21 abstentions.

New votes for China came from Libya, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritania in Africa apart from Canada, Italy and Belgium.

*—Reuter, Nov. 6.*

**UN Assembly Condemns UK Over Rhodesia :** The General Assembly adopted on November 21 a resolution condemning Britain's failure to take effective measures to end the Rhodesian secession. The resolution, in 16 operative paragraphs, particularly condemns "the intervention of South African armed forces in Southern Rhodesia which constitutes an act of aggression against the people and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe, and calls on the UK, as the administering power, to ensure the immediate expulsion of all South African forces from Southern Rhodesia".

Eighty-three countries voted in favour of the resolution, seven including Britain and the US voted against and 20 abstained. Though the resolution expresses the wishes of the majority of the UN members its implementation is not compulsory.

*—Reuter, Nov. 22.*

**UN Body Condemns Israel :** On November 20 the UN Social Committee adopted by 51 votes, with 11 against and 50 abstentions, an urgent Afro-Asian backed resolution condemning Israel's alleged practice of "collective and area punishments" in the occupied Arab territories. Among the African countries which opposed the resolution were Dahomey, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Rwanda and Swaziland.

The resolution was sponsored by India, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Pakistan and Yugoslavia and is expected to be the only one adopted at the UN on any aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict during the 24th session of the Assembly.

*—Reuter, Nov. 21.*



## ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The Islamic Summit Conference was held in Rabat under the presidency of King Hassan of Morocco from September 22 to 25. Out of the 45 countries with large or sizable Muslim populations 35 were invited, 25 attended and 10 were represented by their Heads of State. Most of the absentees were from Africa, though two important Arab countries, Syria and Iraq, stayed away. The countries represented as full members included Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, UAR and Yemen Arab Republic. The Palestine Liberation Organisation attended as an observer. The Indian delegation headed by Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, Minister for Industrial Development, was excluded from the conference on Pakistan's objection presumably because of pressure of public opinion in Pakistan. Earlier 14 Arab Foreign Ministers and representatives had met in an extraordinary session of the Arab League Council at the League headquarters in Cairo on Aug. 25 and 26 to discuss the mosque fire.

The earlier agenda restricted to the discussion of the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque was enlarged by the Preparatory Committee consisting of King Hassan of Morocco and King Feisal of Saudi Arabia to include discussion on the change of status of Jerusalem, the restitution of rights of Palestine and Israeli aggression against the Arabs.

In the final communique released on September 25 the Summit appealed to all nations, particularly to the Big Powers, to take into consideration the deep attachment of the "followers of Islam" for Jerusalem and the solemn resolve of their governments to struggle for its liberation.

"The Islamic people and governments are deeply concerned about the prolonged military occupation by Israel of the Arab territories since the aggression of June 1967 and of Israel's refusal to take the least notice of appeals by the Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly demanding the restoration of the status of the holy city of Jerusalem", the communique added. The joint statement also called for strengthening of links between Islamic states and gave full support to the Palestine people. It was decided that the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic countries would meet again in March next year in Jeddah to lay the foundation of a permanent secretariat.

Informed sources disclosed, according to an AFP report, that Algeria intervened in the last day's session to declare that the part of the statement devoted to West Asia was 'politically' insufficient.

Addressing a press conference on September 26 King Hassan attacked the extremist anti-Israeli guerrilla movements as having "wild and harebrained" ideas which did not serve "the Palestinian cause, the Arab cause or the Muslim cause".

King Hassan said Morocco supported anti-Israeli fighters "who fight at the front openly, who fight at the U.N., who fight to convince states of their cause and their right". He criticised the blowing up of the trans-Israeli pipeline which cost Saudi Arabia millions of dollars.

The semi-official Cairo paper *Al Ahram* on September 26 wrote that the negative results in Rabat were not unexpected since the summit "was not preceded

by sufficient preparatory work". It listed three reasons for the "negativeness" of the Islamic summit conference.

1. "obdurate attempts by certain countries to liquify the resolutions";
2. "the attitude of the CENTO countries over India's participation which detracted the conference from its original goals and drowned it in side issues"; and
3. "the attitude of Iran, Senegal and Turkey during the final session—flat rejection of any resolution stating support for the Arab resistance movement of implying any obligation to a certain stand towards Israel".

The *Statesman's* special correspondent in Beirut, G. H. Jansen, commenting on the conference resolutions on September 29, 1969, wrote: "They seem, but only seem, to be a victory for the militant Arab group because of sweeping references to Palestine besides mention of the Al Aqsa Mosque. But what has happened is Muslim countries such as Iran that are friendly to Israel put up so much resistance to condemnatory resolutions that they succeeded in blocking the suggestion that the conference should ask them to break off their relations with the Jewish state. In short the conference was successfully diverted, from anti-Israel action into anti-Israel verbalization".

*The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept. 29.*

On the question of India's exclusion, on September 27 UAR's Foreign Under-Secretary, Salah Gohar, conveyed to the Indian Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. I. Bahadur Singh, that UAR disapproved of the exclusion of the Indian delegation from the meeting of the Rabat Islamic Summit conference. On the same day *Al Ahram* wrote "the UAR believed that the participation of the Indian delegation in the Summit was in accordance with a decision of the heads of State and Governments of the participant countries. Accordingly it was not right to demand its exclusion from the conference".

Earlier on September 25 in a statement in New Delhi clarifying Algeria's attitude, Ambassador Ali Lakhdhari, said: "Algeria firmly supported the participation of the Indian Government in the Rabat summit. This was the stand my country took at Rabat."

India's exclusion from the Conference was assailed and caused a wave of criticism throughout the country and in the press, calling for a reassessment of India's foreign policy. *The Indian Express* in an editorial comment on October 1 stated: "There is no reason why India should not have friendly relations with Israel and the Arab world as Nepal, Ceylon and Burma do with no detriment to themselves or others".

*The Statesman* commented editorially: "The bleak truth is that India has no foreign policy". In a special feature, however, *the Statesman's* correspondent, G.H. Jansen, wrote on October 4 that "for India the Rabat Conference had the inestimable benefit of forcing her to acknowledge which countries are friendly and which antagonistic towards her. It is the West Asian monarchies—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco—that are unfriendly towards India. India found it had quite a few friends at Rabat—Egypt, Sudan, South Yemen, Libya and Algeria."

*The Times of India* urged "rethinking and replanning of foreign policy". *The Hindustan Times* described the Rabat incident as "a high watermark in the mismanagement of the country's foreign relations".

The left-wing *Patriot* urged the recall of Ambassadors to "make it clear that we do not propose to stand any nonsense and indecent conduct". *The National Herald* editorially supported the Government and said in a leading article: "If India was rebuffed and insulted at what has been called the Islamic Summit held at Rabat it is the responsibility of others, not of India, and it is they who should be ashamed and not India".

Leaders of political parties were equally vociferous in condemning the "Rabat debacle". Mr. Dange of the Communist Party of India disapproved India's participation in Rabat because it was held for religious interests. The Socialist Party leader, Mr. Madhu Limaye, viewed the episode as a manifestation of "a terrible inferiority complex; they (the Government) are all the time worried about the effect of Pakistan's propaganda among the Muslim States". The Praja Socialist Party leader, Mr. S.N. Dwivedy, said the Government deserved the strongest censure. The Bharatiya Kranti Dal, a splinter group of the ruling Congress Party, suggested establishing diplomatic relations with Israel as a measure of revenge. Mr. M.L. Sondhi, a member of the right-wing Jan Sangh Party, saw in it "an international conspiracy to discredit India". Members of the conservative Swatantra Party demanded a public apology from the Government and suggested closing down the embassies of the Governments concerned. The Gandhian leader, Mr. J.P. Narayan, said: "India is neither a Hindu nor a Muslim country. It is a country of Indians. As such it had no place at the purely Muslim summit at Rabat". The Jamait-ul-Ulemai-Hind, the Muslim Majlis and the Shia community, while supporting the Government, adopted resolutions deprecating the attitude of Pakistan towards Indian participation in Rabat. Mr. Mohammed C. Chagla, a former Minister of External Affairs, pointed out that India's policy all along has been to oppose the kind of conference that was held at Rabat "because it would divide the world into religious camps and give an edge to fanaticism and intolerance."

An adjournment motion on the Islamic Summit conference at Rabat in Parliament by opposition parties which coincided with the split of the ruling Congress party was however lost. Mrs. Indira Gandhi had as far back as October 3 ruled out in a Press interview any change in India's policy of support to the Arab cause because of what happened in Rabat. Though the Summit was described as "Islamic" it was none the less political in her view.

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, told the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) in reply to the debate on Rabat that there was no departure or deviation from the policies laid down by the late Mr. Nehru. While emphasising the need for developing closer relations with countries in West Asia and Africa Mr. Dinesh Singh made it clear that India had no animosity towards Israel. This, he said, had been made abundantly clear both inside the House and elsewhere. "We have recognised Israel and we are not in favour of the elimination of Israel. But we are opposed to the policies of Israel as they are in West Asia today."

"We in India have ourselves seen that two countries have occupied parts of our territories," he said and pointed out that India could not oppose aggression on its own territory while remaining indifferent to aggression on others' territory. India was in favour of the progressive Arab States and would support them and work closely with them for developing a society free from any domination from outside.

*Press Trust of India, November 17.*

Earlier India decided to recall her Ambassadors from Morocco and Jordan.

(See also under India and Africa, UN, UAR and IPU Conference in New Delhi).

## EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

**Agreement with EEC:** The new association treaty between the European Economic Committee and the three East African countries—Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda—was signed in Arusha (Tanzania) on September 24. It gives East Africa a virtually duty-free market in Europe in return for lower duties—between 20% and 90% concessions—on 58 specified products coming to East Africa from Europe. Restrictions have been placed on three East African exports—coffee, cloves and tinned pine-apple.

—*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol 6, No. 9*

**Japanese Goodwill Mission:** A 14-man Japanese goodwill trade mission visited East Africa in the first half of September. Kenya has had an adverse balance of trade with Japan since 1965.

The trade imbalance was also stressed in Tanzania, where the Minister for Commerce and Industries, Mr. Babu, told the mission that restrictions on Japanese goods would be lifted as soon as Japan imported more from Tanzania. In Uganda, the leader of the mission, Mr. Takeo Terao, suggested that the two countries reach a trade agreement.

—*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol 6 No. 10*

## Kenya

**Warning to Foreign Embassies:** The Vice-President and Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, warned all missions in Kenya on August 5 to refrain from attacking countries friendly to Kenya. He gave as an example the *Peking Review* which had assailed the Soviet Union and distributed copies in Kenya through the Chinese mission. He also reminded Israel and the UAR to keep the Middle East propaganda war within the confines of their own borders.

**Mboya Assassin Sentenced to Death:** Mr. Nahashon Isaac Njenga Njoroge, who was found guilty of murdering Kenya's Minister for Economic Planning and Development, in Nairobi was sentenced to death on September 11.

**Illegal Oaths Condemned:** On September 19 Vice-President Moi issued a statement condemning the alleged administration of illegal oaths and beatings. "The Government condemns those who are going round the country molesting people and forcibly administering unlawful oaths and collecting money illegally."

**British Journalists Deported:** Three British journalists were served with deportation notices on September 26. No reasons were given. But it was presumed the deportation was connected with what the Vice-President had condemned as "malicious and irresponsible reports about Kenya in foreign papers" on the wave of secret oaths being forced on people in some parts of the country.

**KPU Banned:** The Government on October 30 announced that the

opposition Kenya People's Union had been banned with immediate effect. It said "the KPU has been increasingly responsible for the deliberate fomenting of inter-tribal strife". It had made use of substantial sums of foreign money in 1969 and KPU leaders had paid frequent visits to "certain embassies." The "subversive nature" of contacts between the KPU leaders, in particular Mr. Oginga Odinga, and certain foreign diplomats in East Africa had shown that the KPU had been seeking assistance to overthrow the Government.

Earlier on October 25 when President Kenyatta visited Kisumu, clashes occurred resulting in 11 deaths. The Government statement described this as an attempt to threaten the life of the President.

On October 26 Mr. Odinga deplored the "shameful shooting of innocent people" and denied that the violence had been planned.

On October 27 Mr. Odinga and the deputy leader of the KPU, Mr. J. M. Nthula, were placed under house arrest. Six other members of Parliament and the KPU's Publicity Secretary were also arrested and detained on October 30. Later Mr. Odinga was moved to an unknown destination.

President Kenyatta announced the dissolution of the National Assembly on November 6. This cleared the way for Kenya's first general elections since 1963, scheduled to take place on December 6.

On November 22 Mr. Kenyatta was elected, unopposed, for the second time, as President. His was the sole nomination for the post of Head of State.

## **Tanzania**

**Nyerere's Foreign Tour :** President Nyerere paid official visits to Canada, Sweden, the USSR, Hungary and Yugoslavia from September 28 to October 18. Before returning to Dar-es-Salaam he visited the Vatican and was granted an audience with Pope Paul.

Speaking at a dinner given in his honour by the Soviet Government on October 8, President Nyerere said Tanzania's first priority was to guard its independence against external aggression, neo-colonialism and against externally promoted international subversion. "We are African nationalists first ; all other aspects of our policy come after that.....we desire to be friends with all peoples and all nations which are willing to respect our independence and our human equality and dignity." Relations between Tanzania and the Soviet Union had become strained after the Czech crisis.

A joint communique issued in Belgrade following President Nyerere's meeting with President Tito expressed their conviction that in the present-day deteriorating international situation "it is urgently necessary for non-aligned, newly liberated and other countries, and for all progressive forces to intensify their efforts within the UN and outside it, in the struggle against all forms of recourse to the policy of force, for peace and respect to the sovereignty of states, for the respect of the right of every people to decide freely its own destiny, and to stand firm against all forms of the policy of force and discrimination in international relations".

**Attempt to Overthrow Government :** On October 13 six people were arrested in Tanzania for "activities not conducive to law and order". They included Mr.

Michael Kamabya, former trade union leader and Cabinet Minister; Bibi Titi Mohammed, former Women's Union leader and party functionary, and 4 officers of the Tanzanian People's Defence Force.

On October 26 the First Vice-President, Mr. Karume, announced at a rally in Zanzibar that 4 people had been shot for attempting to overthrow the Zanzibar Government. Ten others had been imprisoned. One, Mr. Abdallah Hanga, was a former Vice-President of Zanzibar and former Tanzanian Minister for Union Affairs. Another, Mr. Othman Shariff, was former Tanzanian Ambassador to the US.

(See also under Zambia, Malawi)

**Japan to Help in Dam Construction :** Japanese experts are to carry out a feasibility survey of Tanzania's £42 million scheme to build multi-purpose dams across the Rufiji River. The Japanese Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, a semi-official body, has been awarded the contract. The scheme, called the Seigler Gorge Project, provides for the construction of the largest hydro-electric power, irrigation and flood control dams in Tanzania.

## **Uganda**

**The Pope's Visit :** Pope Paul VI arrived in Uganda on July 31 to consecrate the altar of the new Roman Catholic shrine to the Uganda martyrs, Africa's first saints. He was received at Entebbe by President Obote and by Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kay Ganda of Rwanda and Micombero of Burundi.

The Pope met separately the leaders of the Nigerian and Biafran delegations. The discussions covered the "possibility of commencing talks looking towards a solution of the present conflict and concerning relief in food and medicines to the victims on both sides".

**Common Man's Charter :** President Obote announced a "common man's charter" on October 8. The 18-page document states: "In our move to the left strategy we affirm that the guiding economic principle will be that the means of production and distribution must be in the hands of the people as a whole. The fulfilment of this principle may involve nationalisation of enterprises privately owned".

**Restrictions on Trade :** An order listing 34 specified goods trade in which will be restricted to citizens was issued by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Kelema, on October 8.

## **Zambia**

**New Constitution for UNIP :** Following the resignation of Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe on August 25, President Kaunda announced that he had decided to invoke the emergency powers conferred on him by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1961 and dissolved the Central Committee. In its place an interim Executive Committee was established and for the time being President Kaunda decided to lead the party "not as President, but as Secretary-General".

President Kaunda also decided to set up a commission to review the present constitution with a view to drawing up a new one which would meet the requirements of the party and the nation "more satisfactorily". The interim Executive Committee would remain in office until the party elections were held under the new

constitution approved by the General Conference. President Kaunda said this decision was taken for "the fundamental and vital interests of this nation" and to safeguard "the real threat to our independence and national unity". The commission started its work on October 20.

In reorganising the party, the President said, he intended to change the relationship between the party and the Government, taking into account the supremacy "of the former over the latter". Giving reasons for his resignation Mr. Kapwepwe said he was trying to save Zambia from tribal bloodshed. The Northern or Bemba-speaking people, to which he belonged, had suffered considerably at the hands of other tribes because of his occupancy of the post. Mr. Kapwepwe withdrew his resignation the following day after a two-hour meeting with President Kaunda and was included in the interim committee.

In a cabinet reshuffle on August 26 Mr. Kapwepwe retained the Vice-Presidency but the portfolio of Development and Finance held by him was given to Mr. E. Mudenda. The President said he himself would lead a new Ministry of State Participation to carry out his recently announced takeover of Zambia's copper mines. He also took over Foreign Affairs in addition to Defence which he already holds.

**Chinese Road Technicians and Radio Transmitters for Zambia :** Forty Chinese road technicians and engineers arrived in Lusaka on October 1 to start survey and design work on a new road from Lusaka to Mankoya to be built at a cost of K.12m. An advance party of Chinese had come in June to investigate the route, and since then 140 miles of the 394-mile route have been investigated.

Earlier Mr. Sikota Wina, Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, who returned to Lusaka from a 3-week visit to China and North Korea on September 19, said Zambia will receive three powerful radio transmitters from China (CPR) for its broadcasting services.

An agreement was also signed on November 15 in Lusaka between Tanzania, Zambia and China (CPR) on the 1,060-mile Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Survey of the railway has not yet been completed by Chinese engineers.

**Licensing Restrictions :** Restrictions on the issue of retail trade licences to non-Zambians by which expatriates (mainly Asians) are permitted to carry on retail business only in certain city centre areas were extended to the wholesale trade under a Bill which is expected to come into force when trade licences for 1970 are issued.

**Changes in Constitution :** The Government on October 7 introduced a series of Bills in Parliament to amend the Constitution. One constitutional amendment Bill puts aliens who are not Commonwealth citizens on the same footing as aliens who are. There is also a provision for compulsory acquisition of property so that the Government can deal with absentee expatriates who have left farm land idle. Another clause gives the President powers to detain or restrict a person for up to one year before a tribunal reviews the case. A further Bill permits him to remove certain fundamental rights in times of war or emergency.

**Emergency Extended :** Parliament on October 17 renewed the declaration of emergency which has been enforced continually since independence. The extension was criticised by the opposition.

President Kaunda announced an amnesty for all political prisoners at a rally in Lusaka on October 25. On October 31 Mr. Nalumino Mundia, a former leader of the outlawed United Party and now Deputy President of the opposition African National Congress was to be released as he had given an undertaking to condemn violence publicly.

—*The Times of Zambia, Nov 1*

**Govt. Shares in Shell B. P. :** On October 20 the Government took over 51% of the shares of Shell-B. P. Oil Marketing Organisation. The business of Shell B. P. is worth K20 m. a year. It is the biggest oil firm in the country. President Kaunda also announced that agreement had been reached on the proposed 51% takeover of Zambia's copper mining industry. The two copper groups—Ango-American and RST—have agreed to hand over control of the industry to the Government on January 1, 1970.

## Ethiopia

**Foreign Hand in Student Unrest :** Emperor Haile Selassie on September 9 granted pardon to university and other students who had been sentenced to prison terms and suspended from schools for their part in the student disturbances in March 1969. He said "foreign elements have been the cause of student disturbances, and this has come to light from the nature of the leaflets distributed and the nationalities of the authors".

On August 12 seven student passengers who were involved in hijacking an Ethiopian Airlines' plane to Khartoum had, according to the Ethiopian Herald, made a statement that communist disciples of Mao Tse-tung had forced the pilot to change course and land at Khartoum so that they could continue their journey to Communist China.

*The Ethiopian Herald, Aug. 13.*  
(See also under OAU and Somalia)

## Somalia

**Army Takeover :** The army and police seized power in a pre-dawn coup in the desert Republic of Somalia on October 21—six days after the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke by a policeman. An announcement on the radio said the revolution had been staged to save Somalia from the "corrupt malpractices of the ruling classes" who had violated the law and the constitution. "Worse things have happened," it said. "These led to the assassination of the President".

Another broadcast stated that steps had been taken by the Revolutionary Council to dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss its deputies, abrogate the Constitution and to rule the country by decree till a new Constitution was drafted. All members of the deposed Government had been arrested and would be brought before the court for trial.

Another statement broadcast on October 22 said the Supreme Revolutionary Council, which "recognises man's noble rights and accepts the UN Charter and the OAU Charter, has decided to work for the unity of all peoples with the aim of achieving freedom and peace in the world, in particular with all peace-loving and socialist oriented countries".



The name of the Somalia Republic was changed to the Democratic Republic of Somalia. A communique from the Council laid down seven points for its foreign and internal policy. The Council will maintain a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, respect existing international relations and treaties, follow the principle of peaceful co-existence and non-interference, support rightful causes of liberation movements, respect individual liberty and human rights, repudiate war as a means of settling differences, and establish effective national guidance to eliminate tribalism.

*The Indian Express, Oct. 25.*

Addressing the 24 members of the Revolutionary Council on November 1, the Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, said he did not wish to accuse the previous leaders. "Though there was some blame at times, there were also a lot of things they had done for the country...They should not be called criminals unless the crimes committed by them had been proved". The principles of the revolution were not personal, he said, "but for the betterment of the general interests of Somalia and Somalis".

On the same day the Council announced a new 14-member government to replace the one overthrown on Oct 21.

**Strategic Minerals Found :** The UN Development Programme (UNDP) entered into an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Somalia on October 27 to provide for the implementation of the second phase of a mineral prospecting and exploitation project jointly financed by the Government and the UN. The first phase ended in 1967.

**Central African Regional Grouping :** The Foreign Ministers of Burundi, Congo and Rwanda met in Kinshasa on October 17 and 18 to find ways of increasing cooperation among the three countries. A communique said the Foreign Ministers would meet again shortly before a conference of Heads of State scheduled to be held before the end of 1969. All three countries were governed by Belgium before independence.

## **Burundi**

**Abortive Coup :** Military and civilian leaders of the Hutu tribe which comprises 85% of the population were intending to overthrow the Government on the night of September 16-17, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Labare Ntawurishira. 20 persons were arrested and the Government subsequently declared the Belgian Ambassador, who had already left for Brussels for consultations, *persona non grata* for allegedly backing the abortive coup.

## **Congo-Kinshasa**

**Belgian Company to be Compensated :** A long-standing dispute between the Belgian Company, Union Minière, and the Congolese Government over compensation for the assets confiscated early in 1967 was resolved. Gecomin, the state controlled Congolese company set up to take over Union Minière's assets, will repay the latter from its profits over a period of 15 years. This will be done in the framework of an extended technical cooperation agreement to provide Gecomin

with the qualified personnel it needs to operate the mines and to market Congolese copper and cobalt.

**Mobutu Halts Expulsion of Indians :** An official decree was issued in August stating that foreigners doing business in the Congo are required to have money assets equal to £49,000 if they want to continue trade. At least 1,500 foreigners, West Africans, Europeans, Pakistanis and Indians of whom there are more than 500 families living in the Congo, were affected by this measure. 100 persons of Indian origin hold Indian passports while others British or East African passports. The enforcement order was however halted by President Mobutu through a directive to the Governor of Bukavu province following a visit by the Indian Ambassador to the Congolese Foreign Office on September 5.

General Leonard Mulamba, Ambassador of the Congo in New Delhi, explained these measures at a special press conference. He assured that there would be no discrimination and unnecessary hardship to Indians or any other foreigners. He said the relations between India and his country were extremely good and he was negotiating with the Government of India for technical collaboration, particularly in the diamond mining industry.

## Madagascar

**Opposition Party's Fears :** The Opposition Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar held its congress in Tananarive on September 19 after two years. The final resolution adopted by the congress condemns the installation of US bases in the Indian Ocean and expresses fears of Madagascar joining a South Atlantic Military Pact. A tribute was paid to Ho Chi-Minh.

**Japanese Collaboration :** Three Japanese companies have established a joint venture with local interests to produce meat extract and have agreed to establish a similar enterprise with Ethiopian interests. The Japanese companies, which hold 49% shares in Madagascar and 70% in Ethiopia, said they decided to establish these projects in Africa because of the low cost of cattle.

## WEST AFRICA

**West African Economic Community :** President Tubman of Liberia said in Monrovia on October 16 that the Conference of West African Heads of State and Governments would most certainly not take place as scheduled. The Conference, postponed in April, was to have been held towards the end of 1969. President Tubman said the French-speaking nations which were to attend the meeting had asked for a postponement and that "certain elements" did not want the proposed West African economic grouping to work.

**Uranium Marketing Organisation :** A new organisation, Uranex, has been set up to sell uranium produced by Franc Zone countries--France, Gabon, Niger and the Central African Republic. Mines in these countries account for about 10% of the world's known resources. Previously, the U.S., South Africa and Canada were the only sellers.

—A.R.B., *Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, Vol. 6 No. 10.

## **Cameroon**

**Constitutional Reforms :** On October 22 Parliament approved a series of measures revising the constitution for "reasons of efficiency". A major change is that if a President of the Republic resigns, his resignation will not become effective until a new elected President is sworn in.

## **Chad**

**Civil War Threat :** The guerrilla operations against President Tombalbaye's regime spearheaded by Dr. Abba Siddick, the 44-year-old leader of the Chad Liberation Front (FROLINA) and a former Education Minister, resulted in the biggest French-Chad military operations since Chad attained independence 9 years ago. *Le Monde's* military correspondent who toured the troubled areas wrote that the dissident Toubous, an Islamic people, make up nearly half of the country's 3.5 million population covering an area as large as France.

*Le Monde's* correspondent writes that at present the most active elements among the country's youth, which make up more than half of the population and are specially critical of Tombalbaye's regime, "see the seeds of 'Congolization' in the administrative decentralisation of an insufficiently developed country".

Both the country's youth and Moslem circles who do not fully back FROLINA mention Dr. Outel Bono as an alternative to Mr. Tombalbaye. A former Director of Health he was sentenced on June 13 to five years hard labour for "inciting trouble". They also consider that government by a one-party minority has proved unsuitable for their country.

*—Le Monde, Oct. 15.*

## **Congo-Brazzaville**

**CAR-Brazzaville Relations Improve :** The President of the Central African Republic, M. Jean Bedel Bokassa, paid an official visit to the Congo Republic in August. The relations of both the countries with Congo-Kinshasa have deteriorated recently. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit stated they had agreed to maintain regular and closer contacts between the two governments.

**Chinese-built Textile Complex :** Major Ngouabi inaugurated on August 12 the industrial textile complex of Kinsoundi built with aid from China (CPR) under a technical economic cooperation agreement signed in October 1964. The complex includes equipment for spinning, weaving, dyeing and printing. The estimated annual turnover is about 1,000m CFA francs. Production began in the beginning of 1969.

A contract for the installation in the Congo Republic of a naval dockyard for the construction of low-tonnage wooden boats was concluded with China (CPR) in September.

**Prime Minister Visits China :** The Prime Minister, Major Alfred Raoul, visited Peking from September 21. He was received by the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai. The Chinese Mission has been in the Congo for two and a half years.

Major Ngouabi, President of the Congo Republic, ordered the arrest of former President M. Massemba-Débat and former Prime Minister Pascal Lessouba along with 20 others on October 17. They are to be tried by a Revolutionary court in connection with events during the power changeover in July-August 1968. Differences between the two arose over policy when President Massemba-Débat constituted a provisional government and distributed portfolios to moderates with few concessions to the extreme left led by Major Ngouabi, then Commander-in-Chief.

**Coup Foiled :** On November 8 Associated Press reported that police and troops had foiled an attempt by a group to seize power, according to Radio Brazzaville.

The radio broadcast a speech made by President Marien Ngouabi at a mass meeting in Brazzaville which accused supporters of former President Abbe Youlou of being involved in the plot. Among the 37 plotters arrested were officials of the Foreign and Agricultural Ministries.

## Dahomey

**Former Head of State Imprisoned :** Ex-Lt.-Col. Alley, a former Head of State, was sentenced along with 17 others on October 4 to 10 years imprisonment for attempting to overthrow the present regime on July 12. The Army Chief of Staff and former Premier, Lt. Colonel Maurice Kouandete, narrowly escaped death when the assailants missed his car on October 19.

## Gambia

**Republican Constitution :** The Prime Minister, Sir David Jawara, said on August 26 that his Government had drawn up a draft constitution and as soon as it was approved, probably in April 1970, by a referendum, Gambia would be declared a republic.

## Guinea

**Rapprochement with Mali :** The Head of the Africa Division of the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Ali Bangoura, visited Bamako, Mali, towards August-end with a message from President Sekou Toure to the Malian Head of State. This was the first direct contact between the two states since the deterioration in their relations following the fall of M. Modibo Keita's Government which has considerably obstructed the activity of the Organisation of Senegal River States (OERS). It was stated that this was an indication that relations between Mali and Guinea are to be normalised and the activity of the OERS resumed.

—*Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. No. 8.

**Chinese Aid to Guinea :** Radio Conakry reported on October 31 that as a result of a Guinean Mission's visit to Peking, China (CPR) had promised to repair the Conakry-Kankan line and the port of Conakry to provide assistance with a large agricultural programme and to build a cement plant.

## Mali

**Abortive Attempt to Bring Back Keita :** According to reports, an attempted

coup on August 12 aimed at the overthrow of the present military regime and return of ex-President Modibo Keita was a failure. The conspirators were said to have taken advantage of the absence of the Minister of Defence and Security, Captain Charles Samba Sissoko, who was on an official visit to Moscow. Though official sources were silent, it is learnt that several arrests, including those of military governors, were made.

**Franco-Mali Talks :** France and Mali held financial talks for 5 days ending September 26. The Mali Minister of Finance, M. Louis Negre, stated that the talks dealt mainly with Mali rejoining the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) which is due to come into force in the near future.

**Chinese-built Radio Station :** A new radio station outside Bamako, built with aid from China, will come into service by the end of the year. Four 50 KW short wave transmitters will enable Radio Mali to be heard in the Middle East, Europe and parts of Asia and America, in addition to neighbouring African countries.

## **Senegal**

**Constitution to be Revised :** The draft Bill on the revision of the Constitution was adopted by the Cabinet on September 16. The reforms include the appointment of a Prime Minister and decentralisation of the institutional system. A clause was later introduced which forbids the President of the Republic from standing for a third five-year term. Dissolution of the National Assembly need no longer be followed by the resignation of the Head of the State. The reforms will be submitted to a referendum in February 1970.

**University Reforms :** Under an agreement adopted on October 11 by the joint Franco-Senegalese Commission on higher education with special reference to the University of Dakar, which has been the centre of student unrest, new reforms will come into force gradually from the academic year 1969-70 and will involve Africanisation of the teaching staff and participation of teachers and students in the university administration.

## **Togo**

**Chiefs Support President :** Togo's traditional chiefs held a meeting on September 21 at which they pledged support to the policy of President Eyadema's Government. They condemned multi-partism and approved the President's decision to found the "Movement of the Togolese National Rally" (MRNT). President Eyadema had announced his plans for a single party at the end of August.

## **Upper Volta**

**Return to Civilian Rule :** President Lamizana announced on August 5 that the next 3 months would mark the resumption of political activity in Upper Volta followed by the creation of new institutions in the country. "The truth is", the President said, "that the country is not yet strong enough economically to stand political instability. My government will ensure an orderly return to civilian rule and then it will be up to the civilian government to accomplish what has been left undone".

## Ghana

**General Elections :** The first general elections since the fall of Dr. Nkrumah in 1966 swept into power Dr. Kofi A. Busia's Progress Party with an overwhelming two-thirds majority in Ghana's new Parliament. Organised late in August, the elections, after three and a half years of military rule, have given Ghana the long promised civilian Government. Dr. Busia was appointed Prime Minister by the National Liberation Council. The new leader, a professor of sociology, in a policy statement outlined plans for the Second Republic.

*For details see article on Page 204 in this issue.*

The Second Republic of Ghana was inaugurated on October 1. Present on the occasion were President Tubman of Liberia, President Zinsou of Dahomey, the Vice-President of the ruling Mali National Liberation Committee, and heads of delegations from Togo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia.

Dr. Busia announced on the occasion that the vision of the new civilian government was that of "a democratic welfare society in which everyone is his brother's keeper". The Government's actions would be governed by the doctrine of political neutrality so that in every situation "we reserve the right to make our own judgments and come to our own decisions". He stressed that the Government would in no way be tied to the "apron-strings of any country, whether East or West, although it could not run away from the facts of history. It would be an unconvincing pretence, however, not to acknowledge the fact that Ghana shared more common interests now with some countries than with others, thus demanding that the Government forged the closest links with 'our brothers in Africa, particularly with our neighbours with whom we share common boundaries'".

A day earlier, in a farewell speech, the Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Brigadier Afrifa, said : "My colleagues of the NLC and I wish to emphasise that the Presidential Commission of which I am now privileged to be the Chairman is in no sense a mere carry-over from an extension of the NLC of February 24, 1966. It is part and parcel of the new civilian administration and is subject to the Constitution which the people have chosen for themselves and under which the new administration has come into being and is to operate.

*Ghana Times, Oct. 2.*

In his address to the first Parliament of the Second Republic in Accra on October 2, Brigadier Afrifa stressed that the Government recognised the opposition as a necessary part of the machinery of democratic rule and would at all times afford respect to the opposition and treat it as a complementary part of democratic government. In the field of foreign relations, Brigadier Afrifa said, the Government would seek to develop the closest political, economic and cultural relations with the neighbouring States of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Senegal, Guinea, Dahomey and the Gambia. It would participate fully in the movement for a West African political and economic community and take an active part in the work of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and in the strengthening of African unity and economic cooperation. The government would also support "genuine freedom fighters" struggling to achieve freedom, justice and dignity in their own countries

*Ghana Times, Oct. 3.*

## **Nigeria**

**Biafra Rejects Red Cross Compromise Plan :** Biafra rejected the compromise plan agreed upon between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for daylight relief flights from Cotonou, capital of Dahomey, to Uli, the Biafran airstrip, on the ground that it "contains no adequate guarantee against Nigerian military exploitation of the flights". In a statement issued in Geneva on September 14, Dr. Sylvanus Cooke, the Biafran relief co-ordinator, said the terms agreed upon between the Lagos government and the ICRC were entirely different from those presented by the ICRC to both sides in August. The Biafran rejection indicated that the earlier August 1 proposals did not mention inspection at Lagos and this was politically unacceptable to them.

On October 25 General Ojukwu appealed to the U.N. to call for a cease-fire in the Nigeria-Biafra war and unconditional negotiations in a message to UN Secretary General U Thant and the President of the General Assembly, Miss Angie Brookes.

**International Observers' Report :** In its latest report published in Lagos on October 8 the team of international observers from Canada, Poland, Sweden and the UK in Nigeria praised the Federal Military Government for resettling displaced persons as soon as they emerged from rebel territory. The team also commended the steps taken by the Federal Government at the prisoners-of-war camps in Lagos to provide adequate conditions.

**British Arms Aid to Nigeria :** Mr. Michael Stewart, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, admitted in the House of Commons on November 17 that there had been an increase in the amount of British arms sent to Nigeria. He explained the fact by pointing out that it was the result of the increased size of the Nigerian Army. The British contribution still remained at about 15 per cent of the arms Nigeria received from abroad. This statement angered many MPs who wanted all supplies of British arms to cease.

## **NORTH AFRICA**

**Maghreb Cooperation :** Algeria and Morocco signed in September a trade agreement providing for a substantial increase in commercial exchanges between the two countries. Under the terms of the agreement, concluded in Algiers, following talks between delegations led by the Commerce Ministers of the two countries, the volume of trade is expected to touch the record figure of £40 million. It was also agreed to create a joint commission to implement the agreement.

Meanwhile, the earlier Algero-Tunisian agreement for the transformation and exploitation of El Borma petrol has reached the implementation stage. Under the agreement, petroleum products from El Borma in Algeria are now being routed across Tunisian territory to the tanker port of La Skirra.

## **Algeria**

**French Military Aid :** France, according to a *Le Monde* report of August, is to supply Algeria with 28 fighter planes (Fougamagisters). So far Algeria has relied mainly on the USSR for military aircraft and equipment. According to a statement by the former Minister for the Armed Forces, Mr. Messmer, there

were 341 French military personnel in Algeria at the beginning of 1969.

**Trade Agreement with Pakistan :** A trade agreement between Pakistan and Algeria was signed on September 12. Under the agreement, each government undertakes to give imports from the other country the most favourable treatment regarding customs duties and licences.

**French Foreign Minister's Visit :** The French Foreign Minister, M. Maurice Schumann, visited Algeria at the beginning of October. The object of the visit, according to *Le Monde*, was to assure Algeria that French policy towards that country had not changed.

Talks were held on outstanding problems in Franco-Algerian cooperation. The French delegation stated that some increase might be made in the quota of wine imported from Algeria. (France had placed a near embargo on imports of Algerian wine which was prejudicial to its economy). However the French Government attached great importance to the granting of compensation to French companies nationalised by the Algerian Government in the last few years.

M. Schumann indicated that France would support the application of Algeria to open negotiations with the EEC as soon as possible.

—*El Moudjahid, Oct 6*

**Revolutionary Council Meeting :** The Council of the Revolution, the supreme organ of President Boumedienne's regime, met on October 15 for the first time in two years. The meeting was held "on the basis of an activity report presented by the leader of the party machine, M. Kaid Ahmed. The Council of the Revolution will meet every fortnight in future to "follow the implementation of the programme agreed upon." The leader of the party was instructed to prepare for the national Congress of the FLN in 1970.

(See also *Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat, UAR and UN*)

## Libya

**Army Coup :** In Tripoli on September 1, an army coup dispossessed the Government of King Idris of all powers and proclaimed a Socialist Republic. The seizure, which came at a time when King Idris was in Turkey for medical treatment, was organised by the Revolutionary Command Council, a band of young army officers led by Colonel Saadudin Abu Shuweir, an officer virtually unknown outside his own country.

Later a proclamation announced the dissolution of the Libyan Parliament and all legal organs of the old regime were abolished. Martial law was imposed throughout the country and the former Libyan army and security chiefs were arrested. The Revolutionary Command Council however assured that all international agreements would be respected, including the pacts with oil firms contracted by the Royalist Government. Foreign diplomats were told that the main goal of the coup was to get rid of corruption and the "negative international policy" of the King.

Colonel Shuweir sent a message to President Nasser pledging the new regime's support for the principles of Arab nationalism. He said the toppling of the monarchy had been carried out by the nationalist elements of the Libyan Army.

The new military leaders on September 8 announced the formation of a nine-man Government to run the country under its republican regime. The Cabinet,



which includes seven civilians and two army lieutenant colonels (holding the two key ministries of Defence and Interior), is headed by Dr. Mahmaud Suleiman Al-Maghribi. The former Deputy Chairman of the Libyan National Assembly, Salah Bousseir, is the new Foreign Minister. Explaining the aims of the new regime, Foreign Minister Bousseir said: "Libya respects human freedom, religion and agreements already concluded". The new government, he added, was pledged to a policy of moderate Arab socialism. "We are part of the Arab world in its fight against the historic enemy, Israel."

Tunisia issued a statement 36 hours after the coup describing it as an internal event "which could not cast doubts on the diplomatic relations, fraternal co-operation and good neighbourliness between the two countries." Commenting on Tunisia's delayed recognition of the new regime, *Le Monde* wrote: "The Tunisian Government would be likely to feel hostile to a regime which was granted immediate recognition by Iraq and any way tends to be generally hostile to military juntas as was shown at the time of the Algerian coup in 1965".

Recognition was promptly extended to the new republic by Algeria, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Sudan.

Moscow gave a clear-cut but cautious welcome to the coup. Quoting an official communique Tass said: "The Soviet Government, guided by sentiments of friendship towards the Libyan people, has officially recognised the Arab Republic of Libya". The US Government said the "close ties" between the two countries should be continued.

The Government of India accorded recognition to the new regime on September 8. The announcement said the Government believed the recent events to be of an internal nature and as such did not in any way affect friendly relations between the two countries.

**Internal Reforms :** The new regime proposes to introduce a series of social reforms, the most important being the emancipation of women. Making this announcement, the Revolutionary Command Council said the first move would be to release women who continue to wear veils from the world of the stay-at-home, recognise their right to vote, apply for jobs and take part in public life generally.

**Bases Banned :** The Revolutionary Government on October 29 called on Britain and America to withdraw their military bases and to effect the early evacuation of all troops from the country. The request to Britain was made in a Note handed by the Foreign Minister, Salah Bousseir, to the British Ambassador, Mr. Donald Maitland, in Tripoli. Earlier, on September 19, the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahmoud Suleiman Al Maghribi in a policy statement had indicated that the agreements governing foreign bases in Libya would not be renewed after their expiry.

**Banks Nationalised :** Other major measures undertaken were the nationalisation of foreign banks (Nov. 14) which affected the British Barclay's Bank, two Italian banks and the Jordan-based Arab Bank. Earlier it was announced that all business, except banking and oil, will have to be "100% owned by Libyan nationals". Arabic would be the exclusive language and all posts held by foreigners would be transferred to Libyans "after adequate preparations".

**No Political Parties to be Allowed :** Parliamentary life, according to an interview with the Minister of the Interior, Colonel Mussa Ahmed, would return to Libya with the election of people's representatives from among workers, farmers, non-exporting capitalists, the intelligentsia and soldiers. However no political parties would be permitted at present or in the future.

*Middle East News Agency, October 17.*

## Morocco

**Relations with Mauritania Improve :** *Le Monde* reported on October 27 the arrest of the editors of the Istiqlal Party's two daily newspapers, M. Abdelkrim Ghallab of *Al Alam*, and M. Mohammed Berrada of *L'Opinion*, and commented that these "arrests are regarded as an effect of the rapprochement with Mauritania to which the Istiqlal is opposed."

A statement made earlier on September 27 by King Hassan II at a Press conference, according to observers, amounted to recognition of Mauritania. A meeting had taken place at the Islamic Summit Conference between King Hassan and President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania at which President Boumedienne of Algeria was also present. Before leaving Rabat after the summit, President Ould Daddah said future relations between the two countries could be viewed "with optimism and confidence." There was nothing any longer opposed to the normal development of these relations in a bilateral, regional and sub-regional framework "because we all belong to the Organisation of African Unity."

## Sudan

**Premier Replaced :** Sudan's Revolutionary Council leader, Major-General Jaafar Mohamed El Nemeiry, took over the premiership from Mr. Abu Bakr Awadallah on October 28. In a broadcast, General Nemeiry said Mr. Awadallah had willingly submitted his resignation and would now be Foreign and Justice Minister. He will also be Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council under General Nemeiry who retains its chairmanship.

**Leadership Divided :** Earlier the *Indian Express* correspondent in Cairo had reported differences having arisen among the rulers of Sudan on the extent to which they should associate themselves with the communists. "The Prime Minister, Mr. Awadallah", he wrote, "is for a lot of it but the army-led Revolutionary Council, the Supreme authority in the Republic, is against it."

That the internal situation has not yet stabilised was evident from the announcement by Omduran Radio on September 15 that 79 Southern secessionists had been killed during "a battle with the Sudanese armed forces", the Revolutionary Council's decision to re-establish censorship of the Press on October 1 and *Al Ahram's* report on October 14 that nine army officers and seven civilians had been charged with trying to foment a plot to overthrow the Revolutionary regime. Most of the military men detained after the May coup had however earlier been freed, according to a member of the Revolutionary Council.

**Sudan-UAR Economic Integration :** Following talks in Khartoum with the UAR, a number of agreements on economic cooperation were signed, according to a communique published on September 2. The most important was the agreement on economic integration which envisages the co-ordination of joint action in

different spheres. Economic and technical cooperation is envisaged in agriculture, especially the development of cotton growing, in the building of artesian wells, the development of communications, navigation of the Nile, and the working of the natural resources of the two countries.

*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol 6, No. 8.*

**Sudan-Soviet Cooperation :** In a communique issued at the end of their visit to the Soviet Union prior to General Nemeiry's halt in Cairo, Russia promised to buy more Sudanese cotton and supply machinery as part of a new programme to strengthen economic and political relations between the two countries.

## Tunisia

**Collectivisation Abandoned :** By a law enacted in Parliament in September on "reforming the structures in agriculture", Tunisia revised its earlier policy of collectivisation. About 4,500,000 ha. of land has already been returned to private holdings from the cooperative sector. These changes in agriculture will encourage private enterprise in other branches of the economy, including industry.

The Manifesto of the Socialist Destour Party, which gives President Bourguiba's programme for the next five years, includes among other items "the promotion of a healthy democracy; the promotion of a policy of partnership by which all those who participate in the creation of wealth draw profit from their work". In foreign policy it rejects "fanaticism and alignment" in favour of cooperation, particularly with Maghreb countries; it denounces colonialism, racial segregation in Africa and Asia and, most of all, in Palestine where Zionist colonialism is rife."

President Habib Bourguiba was re-elected unopposed for the third time in the Presidential election held on November 2.

## UAR

### Middle East Crisis

**Rumania-Arab Relations Deteriorate :** Rumania's decision to raise its diplomatic representation with Israel to embassy level was considered as an unfriendly step towards Arab countries and the Palestinian people by the UAR and Libya. The Sudanese Cabinet on August 20 decided to cut off relations with Rumania.

**Arab Foreign Ministers Meet :** Fourteen Arab Foreign Ministers and representatives met in an extraordinary session of the Arab League Council at the League headquarters in Cairo on August 25 and 26 to discuss the Al Aqsa Mosque fire on August 21. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Jordan, Syria, the UAR, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, a Minister of State of Tunisia, the Ambassadors of Morocco and Algeria to the UAR and the Charge d'Affaires of the People's Republic of Yemen. A delegation representing the Palestine Liberation Organisation also attended.

A statement issued after the meeting said : "The Council has determined that the aggressor Israel had given conclusive evidence of its plans against Muslim and Christian holy places and against the Arab presence on the land Israel is occupying under arms. The Council believes that the road to liberation lies in power, organisation and preparation". The Council decided to call a meeting of the Joint Defence Council and consider holding an Arab Summit Conference.

Morocco and Saudi Arabia were entrusted with the task of holding an Islamic Summit Conference. The Ministers approved a unified plan of action for the Arab delegations at the next UN session and to provide all material aid and arms.

**Arab Heads of State Meet :** President Nasser, King Hussain of Jordan, Dr. Nureddin el Atassy, Syrian Head of State, and General Ammash, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, met in Cairo on September 1. The Chairman of the Sudanese Revolutionary Council, Major General Jaaffar Numeiry, joined the talks on September 3.

The summit ended with a final communique saying it had taken "the necessary steps" in all fields discussed. These steps marked a starting point for the liberation of occupied territory. The resources of the Arab nations had not yet been sufficiently exploited, the communique added. "The situation demands that all Arab countries should redouble their efforts".

**Nasser Calls for Battle of Destiny against Israel :** President Nasser in a speech in the National Assembly on November 6—the first since July 23—disclosed that Egypt has a defence allocation of half a billion pounds and half a million men under arms. He said : "There is absolutely no doubt that we have no alternative other than to wage the battle of destiny against Israel. We must fight our way to victory",

*Agency France Presse, Nov. 6.*

The US Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, commenting on President Nasser's statement, said in Washington on November 6 that President Nasser's call for war was a setback to efforts to find a peaceful solution of West Asia in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution and that President Nasser was mistaken in describing the US as an enemy of the UAR.

*—A.F.P. Nov. 25.*

**Ali Sabri Resigns :** Mr. Ali Sabri, former Prime Minister of the UAR, resigned from the post of Secretary of the Permanent Organising Committee of the Arab Socialist Union following an investigation into charges that he had been involved in excess importing of foreign goods when he returned from a visit to Moscow in July. He would however continue as a member of the Union's Supreme Executive Committee. Al Ahram on September 21 denied reports from abroad that Mr. Sabri had been dismissed after trying to mount a coup. Mr. Sharawi Gama succeeded Mr. Sabri as Secretary.

On September 18 President Nasser appointed Major General Mohamed Ahmed Sadek as Chief of Staff of the UAR Armed Forces in place of Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail.

**US Official's Visit :** A senior US Defence Department official arrived in Cairo on November 28, the first since the UAR broke relations with the US in 1967.

A French envoy, Planning Minister Andre Bettencourt, also arrived on an official visit on the same day as President Pompidou's personal representative. He said M. Pompidou would continue General de Gaulle's policy of maintaining friendship with the Arabs.

The UAR, the Financial Times reported on November 17, has officially informed the Common Market countries of its intention to apply for a trade pact with the Community.

**UAR Resumes Ties with West Germany :** With the UAR seeking a formal association with the European Economic Community for improved trade and working out an ambitious £2.5 million five-year plan for which large foreign credits will be needed, the Times of India correspondent in Cairo reported that the hopes of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Egypt are brightening.

## **SOUTHERN AFRICA**

### **Liberation Movements**

**Africa in Portuguese Elections :** Commenting on the first Portuguese free general elections on October 26, the London Observer (November 2) wrote that Portugal's Premier, Dr. Marcello Caetano, was seeking a mandate for his home and overseas policies. In fact, it points out, Portuguese Africa is the dividing issue on all fronts, even within the ruling National Union, where rightwing extremists condemn Dr. Caetano for allowing the African situation to become an issue at all. "There were no opposition candidates for Angola, Mozambique or Portuguese Guinea, yet the poll in these places was over 90%, chiefly because the 10% who have a vote in Africa dare not risk forfeiting Government military protection against the nationalist guerrillas".

**Angola Movements Divided :** A letter from the UNITA leader, Dr. Joao Savimbi, published in the Times of Zambia on August 18 says one of the main resolutions passed at the United Congress in Angola calls for the urgent formation of a "Democratic United Front" in Angola, presumably comprising UNITA and the rival MPLA and GRAE or Mr. Roberto Holden. Dr. Savimbi adds that the Congress criticised the OAU, accusing it of playing power politics and trying to impose a one-party system on peoples who have not even liberated themselves yet. The fact that the OAU only backs MPLA is undemocratic and will prove ineffective. The letter reveals that "UNITA forces are poised to push their activities throughout Angola into areas which until now have been considered safe by colonialists".

## **Mozambique**

**Portuguese Protest over Swedish Aid to Freedom Fighters :** In reply to a Portuguese protest to the Social Democratic Party over Sweden's financial support to "rebel groups" fighting the Portuguese in Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, the Swedish Government stressed that its aid to nationalist movements was humanitarian and in conformity with UN resolutions.

—*Reuter*, Oct 20.

**Frelimo Split :** In a statement issued in Dar-es-Salaam on November 5 Rev. Uria Simango made a series of accusations against the other members of the ruling body of the Mozambique Liberation Front—Senhor Mercelino dos Santos, Secretary for External Affairs, and Senhor Samora Machel, Secretary for Defence and Commander of the Guerrilla Army. He said Frelimo was torn by tribalism and regional disputes. The military commanders were having party supporters killed and defections had increased sharply. He sought the immediate opening of negotiations with those who had left the party and the exclusion from all Frelimo activities of Mrs. Janet Mondlane, the American born widow of the late President, Eduardo Mondlane.

The other Frelimo leaders pointed out in reply that a recent article in the movement's newspaper had stated that two groups had been formed since Dr.

Mondlane's death—one of militants and the other of reactionaries, some of whom had crossed over to the Portuguese.

### South West Africa

**Alleged Conspiracy :** Five Africans, convicted of terrorist activities in South West Africa, were each sentenced on August 22 to life imprisonment. A sixth man was imprisoned for 18 years. The six, all members of the Ovambo tribe in the north of S. W. Africa, were found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the South-West African administration by force and replace it with a Government led by the South African People's Organisation (SWAPO).

(See also under OAU and UN)

### Botswana

**BDP Returned to Power :** The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) headed by President Seretse Khama was returned to power, winning 24 of the 31 elected seats in the General Election of October 18—the first since the country gained independence in 1966.

### Malawi

**Relations with Neighbours :** President Banda, in his address to the closing session of Parliament on August 1 reported considerable improvement in the relations between Malawi and her neighbours. He referred to the Heads of State meeting held in Lusaka (See Africa Quarterly, April-June) which had resulted in an encouraging development in her relations with the north.

Bilateral talks were held between Malawi and Tanzania on matters of common interest. "The discussions", the President said, "took place under an atmosphere of friendliness and good neighbourliness", first in Mbeya, Tanzania, and then in Lilongwe. The next series of bilateral talks would be held in Blantyre.

Relations with other neighbours—Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana—continued to be good, he said. He emphasised that his policy of existence with neighbours like South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique was the best.

—Daily Digest, July 22.

**New Warning to Asian Traders :** Asian traders were warned in August not to compete in local business which the Africans were doing. The warning was given by Mr. John Tembo, Minister of Trade and Industry.

**South African Parliamentarians in Malawi :** A delegation of South African parliamentarians visited the country in August. The leader of the delegation, Mr. H. J. Klopper, who is Speaker of the South African Parliament, said at the end of the 12-day visit, that South Africa would continue to help Malawi achieve prosperity. On South Africa's relations with other African states, Mr. Klopper suggested that Malawi should play an important role in helping them come together and share a common understanding.

**Mozambique Governor General in Malawi :** The Governor-General of Mozambique, Dr. Balthazar Rebello de Souza, visited Malawi at the invitation of President Banda from November 9-15. In a communique issued at the end of the visit Dr.

de Souza agreed with Dr. Banda that racial problems in Africa could not be solved by boycotts, isolation or ostracism but by a steady flow of exchange visits by black and white leaders.

—*National Press Agency, Paris, Nov 27.*

**African Slant to Malawi Courts :** A bill giving local courts in Malawi the right to try more serious of criminal and civil cases and to impose the death penalty was passed by Parliament on November 18. The Bill is regarded as a triumph for the traditional African concept of justice, which accepts circumstantial evidence as sufficient proof of guilt. The purpose is to remove "technical" obstacles which British law puts in the way of African justice.

## **Rhodesia**

**More Land for Whites :** A Land Tenure Bill which was tabled in Parliament on October 14 and forms part of new constitutional proposals increases the area of European land by about 9 million acres and declares that the interests of each race will be paramount in its own area. The area of land allocated to Black and White, about 45 million acres each, is entrenched, but within its framework the Minister of Lands has wide discretionary powers. Successive Governments will be able to make significant changes in the implementation of the Act.

**Britain Renews Sanctions :** The House of Commons, on October 16, approved the renewal of the 1965 sanctions order against Rhodesia. The Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, opening the debate, said a complete change in Rhodesia's policy and scrapping of the proposed constitution would be needed before Britain could resume talks with Salisbury.

**Constitution Bill Passed :** The Rhodesian Parliament passed by a two-thirds majority the controversial Constitution Bill on November 17. This assures Mr. Ian Smith's government of all-white rule. The Bill follows closely the provisions of the White Paper containing the proposals which the Rhodesian electorate accepted by a majority of more than two to one in June and paves the way for the introduction of legislation aimed at separating the races formally if the Government would wish to move in that direction.

**India Urges Britain to Act :** In an aide-memoire the Government of India urged the British Government to take energetic steps to isolate further the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia and discourage the Government from according any kind of recognition to the Republic which it proposes to establish. This was in reply to a communication received by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, from the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, on the recent developments in Rhodesia.

The Government, while noting the assurance contained in Mr. Wilson's message that Britain would do everything in its power to implement fully the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, felt that some of these members "have not taken all the steps possible in compliance with the resolutions and further steps could still be taken".

On the question of the need for the use of force to overthrow the Smith regime, the Government of India continues to hold the view that "Britain, as the administering power, is ultimately responsible for ensuring majority rule in Rhodesia

and for taking effective measures, including the use of force to bring down the illegal regime".

### **South Africa**

**First Coloured Elections :** The elections to the "Coloured Persons Representative Council" were held on September 24. Of the nearly 280,000 votes cast, the Labour Party, which is against separate development, received less than 124,000 votes (26 out of the 40 seats) while four other parties which are pro-separate development received more than half the votes. The elections were for 40 out of the 60 seats in the Council. The other 20 seats are to be nominated by the Government.

On October 11 leaders of the coloured parties which contested the elections with the exception of the Federal Party condemned the Government action in packing the "Coloured Persons Representative Council" with pro-apartheid Federal Party members, especially those rejected by the voters.

The Minister of Coloured Affairs, Mr. Viljoen, announced that the Chairman of the Council will be Mr. Tom Swartz, the leader of the pro-apartheid Federal Party, who was badly defeated in the election by the Labour Party candidate.

**Subversion Trial :** Mrs. Winnie Mandela, wife of Mr. Nelson Mandela, the former leader of the banned African National Congress, and 21 other Africans appeared in court on charges under the Terrorism Act. Among the charges against them is plotting sabotage. A British subject, Mr. Philip Golding, who has been detained since May, is alleged to have been approached by Congress members and asked to raise money for the ANC. On September 10 nine Africans, including one woman, were charged before the Pretoria Supreme Court with conspiring to upset the rule of law and order and with taking part in terrorist activities between 1966 and 1968 in the Elands Fontein (Transvaal) region.

On September 27 the leader of the Cape Town's Moslem Community, Imam Abdullah Haron, 44, died suddenly in prison. He was detained on May 28 under the Terrorism Act.

**New Opposition Party :** Three Nationalist Party members of Parliament who were expelled from the party early in October formed a new right-wing political party. Dr. Albert Hertzog, a former Cabinet Minister, was unanimously elected leader of the party which is to be known as the *Herstigte Nasionale Party*.

The new party has defined its policy in a 22-point "programme of principles". It says the word of God as defined by Calvinism forms the basis of the party. It wants a stricter implementation of the policy of "separate development". In foreign affairs, it insists that South African relations with other States and international organisations must ensure that her sovereignty and independence are not affected and that no financial or commercial considerations must influence such relations. Immigration, it stresses, must be geared to ensure the expansion of Christian national civilisation.

It was later announced that the Republican Party, which claims to have a membership of 60,000 and is led by Prof C. F. Van der Merwe, had disbanded itself and would support Dr. Hertzog's new party.

*See also OAU and UN.*



## Administration in a Developing Country

SATISH C. SETH

ADMINISTRATION is the product and reflection of the history and culture of a people. Developed or developing countries are all alike in this respect. In both types of countries we can easily discern features which owe their existence to a particular historical trend, and such peculiarities which stem from the socio-cultural ethos of the people who are immediately concerned with or are affected by a given administrative set-up. Thus the administrative systems operating in London, Moscow, Washington, Nairobi, Cairo, Accra, New Delhi, Canberra or Tokyo will in some way reveal the impact of their respective histories and national cultures.

If we look closely at the administrative systems evolved in both the developed and the developing countries in their so-called public or private sectors, we shall find some contrast as well as a great many common features. The major differences arise *inter alia* in the administrative systems of these countries because of the dissimilar stages of the socio-economic, scientific and technological developments they have attained so far, since these factors influence tremendously the aspirations of the people who live in these states as also their 'goals' for future development. After all, administration is only an instrument, a means to realise the objectives set for it by those who are authorised to determine the social, economic, political, cultural and other ends towards which a 'people' or 'a nation' ought to move.

The progress of mankind has been uneven from one territory to another, from one state to another, or from one part to another in the same state. This has led to the existence of sharp differences in the standard of living between man and man, becoming almost a global socio-economic tragedy. One of the paramount goals of all administrative processes is to try and equalise, as far as possible, this 'disparity of development.' It is this task which ultimately sets the goals, functions, targets and administrative style of fulfilling them.

We have to remember that a developing country is essentially a nation in a great hurry. It is a country which, during the course of a few recent decades, has tried to evolve an administrative apparatus which is feverishly attempting to narrow down the 'developmental gap'.

Of course, it has to be realized that the so-called 'developmental gap' is something very relative. For example, in some respects the United Kingdom can be relatively under-developed compared to the U.S.A., say with respect to space technology. In respect of industrial progress India is far behind both the U.K. and the U.S.A. and yet most of the so-called less developed countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia are well developed in the field of art and culture.

Apparently, administration in a developing country has to be a very sensitive and forward looking instrument. It has to continuously apply itself to the fulfilment of multiple programmes affecting the state of development in different walks of life.

A glance at the following table will illustrate some of the points stated so far. In the context of the Indian administration, if its attainment of Independence be treated as an important historic divide, we can see how the character of administration in this developing country has altered both in terms of its history and culture :

<i>Phase of History.</i>	<i>Nature of the Polity.</i>	<i>Key-note of Public Administration.</i>
1. From political slavery to Independence.	A Police State belonging to the Imperial category.	(a) Revenue collection and the maintenance of Law & Order. (b) Restrained pace of Development.
2. From Self-Govt. to socialistic pattern of Society.	A welfare State belonging to the Republican category.	(a) Planned exploitation of socio-economic resources. (b) Internationally aided administration. (c) War-oriented administration particularly since '62.

Clearly, the new trends that have emerged in our public administration have been caused by the main events of our past history. In the main, those of the recent two decades. From World War II,

shall we say, to the cessation of the Indo-China border hostilities; our administration had faced the problems of large-scale manpower development, discharge of civilians and war responsibilities; of coping with famine and acute food shortage; of Partition, large-scale exodus and rehabilitation of population; of exchange of offices and officials, and partition even of books and furniture; of constitution making and political integration; of electioneering and setting up of parliamentary democracy and parliamentary control; of national planning and economic reconstruction, of democratic decentralization and social welfare; of industrialization and economic development; of rural development and self-sufficiency in food; of public health and hygiene; of education and cultural development; of national integration and international co-operation; of administrative organization, personnel recruitment, placement and training; in short, of every problem associated with the expanded responsibilities of a 'welfare-cum-security' committed state.

Today's administration is thus a developmental administration dedicated to fulfilling the new aspirations of the people, and one which is committed to the new 'socialistic' objectives of the state. All this has led to many a new trend in Indian public administration as also some new problems. The following five types of changes thus establish an empirical frame-work in which one could easily glean the character of developmental administration of the countries in Asia and Africa. These are :

- (i) Politico-constitutional developments
- (ii) Functional developments
- (iii) Organizational developments
- (iv) Procedural developments and
- (v) Academic developments

We can briefly illustrate some of these changes with respect to Independent India.

#### **Politico-constitutional Changes**

Of the various developments under this head which have had a direct impact on India's public administration, a reference may be made to three important points: the first is the concept of a Welfare State as envisaged in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy enumerated in 16 Articles (Article 36 to Article 51) of the Constitution of India. The objectives of the Preamble—that "Justice, social, economic and political" shall be secured for all citizens—can

be achieved only through a series of administrative actions. The same is true of making effective the various provisions of the Directive Principles, particularly those of Article 38 which enjoins upon the State "to secure and protect a social order which stands for the welfare of the people".

Secondly, the establishment of parliamentary democracy and cabinet government has since been completed in a long-drawn evolution of the basic principles of administration that were first implemented in this behalf, somewhat half-heartedly by the British in India. These were :

- (i) The growth of an executive which is part and parcel of the legislature, and is collectively responsible to it;
- (ii) The concept of ministerial responsibility; that is to say, for every action of a ministry or department, even if it be undertaken by one of its civil servants, eventually the Minister alone would be responsible and accountable to it;
- (iii) The development of a politically neutral and loyal civil service.

It need not be stated that these three elements were not fully operative during the British Raj, but they are so today.

Finally, it is important to draw attention to the republican character and quasi-federal structure of the Indian polity, which made a great impact on our administration, particularly from the point of view of the Union-State relations.

### **Functional Developments**

These changes are far too numerous to be catalogued in terms of the new administrative trends caused by them. We could perhaps refer to a vital change of principle. There was a time when every student of public administration was taught about the subtle distinctions between private administration and public administration. These distinctions still remain in theory and can be found in many text-books though they are by and large non-existent. Until the other day no one ever heard in India that it could be one of the functions of the state to manufacture steel, penicillin, aeroplanes, ammonium sulphate or to grow potatoes, hatch eggs and run hotels. Today, the State is looking into every aspect of our life and is trying to deliver the goods on sound commercial principles so characteristic of private

administration. It may be useful here to recall that the authors of the Third Five-Year Plan for the first time categorically demanded that all state undertakings which are of a commercial nature ought to show 'profits'. Clearly, this was the beginning of a new trend in our developmental administration.

### **Organizational Developments**

The aforesaid changes have affected the machinery of public administration in India both in respect of its departmental system and in respect of the structural organization of bureaucracy.

In so far as organizational problems pertaining to the ministerial structure are concerned, one could trace them back to the views formulated in the Gopalaswami Ayyangar report on the Machinery of Government of India. He tried to draw a distinction between a ministry and a department and suggested a 'Basic Plan' for administrative reorganization. Accordingly, a new trend emerged in our administrative history in that some fresh thinking was done on the problems of administrative organization. After all these things were not a normal feature under British rule. One cannot ignore that the work done in the Ayyangar report in 1949 had been gone through in the U.K. by the Haldane Committee in the year 1919, and could as well have been profitably initiated much earlier in India. These developments have, however, emerged slowly and are still in a state of evolution. Curiously enough, much of the post-independence thinking on organizational matters first came to light in the reports of the Estimates Committee of the Parliament of India. For instance, the Estimates Committee of the first Lok Sabha in its ninth report (1953-55) enunciated a new principle of organization which almost reversed the traditional pattern of administrative organization. It directed that hereafter "the nature of activity ought to determine the nature of form an administrative unit should have", that "the secretarial part of the government should be kept separate from the executive side of the administration". One could quote at length several such innovations which have been behind the entire evolution of the 'thought and practice' under this head.

As stated earlier, these new trends in the field of organization are still beset with problems which are a subject of international discussion. It can be inferred by a remark of the 80th Estimates Committee in that "the trends are definitely in the direction of creation of more and more public undertakings" and that it is high time "the lines on which they must be developed" be considered.

And thus the search for better ways is still on. The work entrusted to the Administrative Reforms Commission of India, and similar tasks undertaken by previous commissions set up by the State Governments are ample proof of the serious interest India is taking in this respect.

The problems of bureaucratic organization are equally complex. It too shows several new developmental trends. The provision of the two All-India services, the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.) and the Indian Police Service (I.P.S), was made in the Constitution itself; the growth of various new services at the centre, e.g. the Indian Foreign Service (I.F.S.) and later the I.F.S.B., the Central Legal Service, the Central Health Service, the Central Information Service, the Central Secretariat Service, etc., constitutes a new development in the field of personnel administration. Should or should not there be so many services? Could not we give up the present mode of recruitment, the existing classification system, as recommended by the Second Pay Commission, and instead adopt the modern methods of job analysis and introduce position classification in our administration, and thus remodel the very hierarchy and organizational structure? These are a few of the several points of future development to which the reformers of our administration are now giving their earnest attention. And similar is the case with other developing countries in Africa and Latin America.

### **Procedural Developments**

These changes pertain to the day-to-day working of the administrative machinery. They cover a vast range, from the elementary task of maintaining an office file to the development of a more sophisticated movement known as the Organization and Methods (O & M). A unit responsible to discharge O & M duties was set up by the Central Government in India in the year 1954; it has since developed into a full-fledged department of administrative reform and is engaged in finding ways and means of improving efficiency and devising methods to speed up disposal of administrative work.

Procedural methods in the field of fiscal administration, in matters such as performance budgeting, audit, grants-in-aid, central financial assistance and control, and foreign aid utilisation have also undergone several changes. In fact similar changes can be seen in several other developing countries engaged in modernising their administrative work methods.

### **Academic Development**

Changes in the realm of teaching of public administration are still

being tamely handled in most developing countries. In India, the subject of Political Science still seems to accommodate in its syllabus one or two papers on public administration as something of a pariah or a 'displaced person'. The paucity of funds and of imagination could be considered retarding factors in a speedy adoption of more specialized and full-fledged courses in this discipline. The landscape in this field is perhaps slowly changing for good. The literature on administration and management so far developed by Indian authors continues to be feeble and is wanting in several respects. The same applies to other developing countries which need to carry out intensive research and produce more indigenous textbooks on administration.

### **Conclusion**

The most significant fact in the administration of a developing society is the continued importance of the role of bureaucracy. Whether the term bureaucracy is to be understood as authoritarian officialdom, or as a body of civil servants, dedicated to serve the people, the ever increasing role of state administration in the life of developing societies has come to stay for ever. The power content of the individual bureaucrat will vary from a traditional to a modern and sophisticated administrative set-up. But his role as an agent of the government, assigned to carry out certain specific duties, is basic and unchangeable. We shall not try here to go into the merits or demerits of bureaucracy. What is important for our purposes is a reference to the 'more familiarised and more recent' meaning of bureaucracy as applied to an organisational structure. Here it refers to "a type of structure manned by trained personnel who are grouped in a specific command relationship. Bureaucratic organisation in a sense is equally and conspicuously serviceable for a large variety of public and private purposes in industrial societies". And in this respect certainly there have been significant administrative developments of a quantitative as well as qualitative nature.

To sum up, the upshot of a developing administrative struggle has been mainly in three directions, namely

- (a) Increased planning and programme goal setting.
- (b) Dispersal of power-resource: political, legal, fiscal or of organized and not so organized pressure groups.
- (c) Modification, re-designing and reform of the existing administrative set-up.

Apparently, any realistic assessment of the progress of a developing country, which ultimately is also a reflection of the degree of 'refraction' and 'refinement' of its administrative system, will have to take into account the degree of change in these three components in a developing society which if, symbolically expressed, would indicate their relationship to the degree of development as follows :

$$\text{i.e. Degree of development} = Q \frac{\text{DdXPp} \times \text{RrX} \frac{1}{\text{PGRD}}}{\text{Programme Planning X Redesigning \& Reform Pressure Group Resource Distribution}}$$

Where Q is the development constant which will vary from country to country and from one phase of history to another.

The point being made here is simply this :

- (a) The degree of development is directly proportional to the accuracy of planning and programming. It is equally dependent on the redesigning and reforming both of the 'substance' and 'process' of administration.
- (b) The degree and quantum of development is indirectly proportional to legal, fiscal and socio-economic pressure groups in a given developing society. Apparently, their balance or imbalance will affect the pace of development and developmental growth.

The administration of developing countries would thus show two extreme situations:

Firstly, if power group resource distribution, i.e. PGRD is in a disturbed state then the developing society would be in a state of political instability, beset with legal wrangling, economic maladministration and social chaos. It will, therefore diminish the pace of development and administrative efficiency.

Secondly, if however PGRD in a developing society has struck a balance, and if it has reached a state of mutual adjustment between the different segments of society, say, between capitalists and people's representatives, Chambers of Commerce and Industrial regulators, Ministers and Civil Servants, to name only a few such contending pressure groups, then, even if a state is not committed to a very progressive ideology in terms of its 'political commitments' the pace of development can be steady, if not



swifter. And the administration can prove an effective instrument of change and development.

A study of development administration thus calls for a deep and penetrating investigation of the several factors against a time-scale. Suffice it to say that 'development' is a continuous process. The important fact is that a developing society does spur its administration into action, which in turn becomes the supreme instrument of the totality of the developmental progress that may eventually take place in a given country. A good administration, which is sensitive, alive and self-corrective, truly holds the key to all-round change. It sets the pace of history, and enriches and alters the socio-cultural configurations of a people. But with different peoples and different societies such a thing happens differently and at a dissimilar pace which is but natural. Happily, thanks to the untiring efforts of the United Nations and the 'will' and 'effort' of the national institutions of the developing countries, a great deal of cross-fertilization in administrative know-how is taking place today. It has helped in enriching the quality of administration and management in different developing countries. These countries are fully convinced that only a quick pace of bureaucratic reform and a scientific attitude towards administration can alter the pace and tempo of development. And this indeed is a sign of progress. After all, in the colonial era, administration was not supposed even to be a subject of 'thinking' and 'change'. Yet today the fact of change and development reflects the presence of an effective, efficient and modern administration. A developing society certainly needs it badly for on a sensitive and dynamic administration depends the happiness of millions.

## **Activities of the Council**

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter:

### **Dinner for IPU Delegates**

The President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta, gave a dinner on November 6 in honour of African delegates to the 57th Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference which took place in New Delhi.

### **Exhibition of African Arts and Crafts**

The Council places on record its appreciation of the donations and loans of replicas of art objects, books, photographs and films the following have made for the Exhibition of African Arts and Crafts to be organised by the Council in February 1970:

- (1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of France.
- (2) Reitberg Museum, Zurich, Switzerland.
- (3) Musee Royale de l' Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, Belgium.
- (4) Linden Museum, Stuttgart, West Germany.
- (5) Ethnographic Museum, Budapest, Hungary.
- (6) Centre Des Sciences Humaines, Abidjan, Republic of Ivory Coast.
- (7) National Museum, Nairobi, Kenya.
- (8) Government of Senegal.

### **Executive Committee Meeting**

The Executive Committee of the Council met on December 15 to review the position of the finances of the Council. The meeting mourned the death of Mrs. Voilet Alva, Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, who was an active member of the Council.

### **Dinner for Indian Envoys**

The Council gave a dinner on December 24 in honour of Indian envoys to Africa who were in Delhi for a conference.

### **Scholarship**

The Council expresses its deep appreciation to Mr. U.H. Worah, Calcutta, for donating money for a scholarship to a Sudanese national for journalism in India.

## Book Reviews

**Problems and Techniques of Administrative Training in Africa.**

Ed. by Adebayo Adedeji; University of Ife Press (1969); pp. 157, sh. 25/-

In 1965 the Institute of Administration, University of Ife (Nigeria), organised a Conference on Administrative Training Techniques. The co-sponsors of the Conference included the Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, and the Ghana Institute of Public Administration. This book contains some of the papers presented at the Conference. In addition, the Editor has added another paper entitled "Administrative Training in Nigeria" which considerably compensates for the fact that the publication of this volume was delayed by three years.

The book consists of three parts. Part-I deals with a Survey of the General Problems of Administrative Training; Part-II with the Problems of Staff Development; and Part-III includes papers describing the various techniques of administrative training.

Training is perhaps one of the most important tasks of any modern government or, for that matter, of any organisation, industrial or otherwise. Mere recruitment of staff is not enough. The staff needs to be developed, they need to be taught the tricks of the trade. Most governments have realised this but they tend to be spend-thrift in this respect.

The needs of training, however, vary from organisation to organisation and from country to country. Since training resources are usually scarce and training needs far too vast, it is necessary that there should be a great deal of coordination between the various training institutions which could conveniently pool their expertise and resources to be able to impart training to the maximum number with the minimum of financial burden. Consequently, any discussion on training calls for a serious consideration of:

- (a) The economics of training;
- (b) the contents and techniques of training;
- (c) the production of indigenous training literature; and,
- (d) the training of trainers.

That most of these points did get highlighted at this conference is apparent from the Editor's various observations, such as the following:

*"One thing which became quite clear during the 1965 conference is the need to bring African trainers together more frequently than in the past for an exchange, on a continuing basis, of their experience in developing administrative training in the continent".*

At another place, he explains that the African efforts in this direction however have made little progress with respect to "the exchange of staff and of teaching materials".

As regards the tools of training the Editor points out:

*"At present most training institutions in Africa depend on published materials based on the experiences of other continents particularly those of Western Europe and North America for teaching their courses. While some of these are relevant, a great deal is not. It is, therefore, essential for the development in Africa that the various institutes should collaborate closely in exchanging teaching and research materials as well as doing the same with staff."*

Thus the book makes a valuable record of the conference. The different papers included in it have more than a mere passing value. For example, an article written by Victor Mamphey, who is Principal of the Ghana Institute of Public Administration, brings to light several shortcomings of the training apparatus in use in Africa. He points out that although there are more than 45 training institutes in Africa about 95 per cent of them are hardly five years old and they teach a variety of subjects but on the whole they are not in grip of the indigenous training requirements. Whereas, he says, it is essential that various aspects of public administration are taught, the urgent need lies in a different direction, viz, the establishment of an institution for organising, in Africa, a course for departmental training of officers with a African conditions and requirements in mind.

Mr. Mamphey, however, rightly warns that "development of staff is a slow process; there are no short-cuts". The same point is elaborated by S. S. Richardson, who was formerly Director of the Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University, and is presently Professor of Public Administration in the University of Mauritius. He writes: "Institutional training, at best, will produce potential rather than expertise. The experience necessary to develop the expertise can only be obtained on the job in the exercise of responsibility in life situations. Every officer in the agency must be a training officer in building up his relationship with the trainee. Too often the young recruit who has gained the theoretical know-

how in a training establishment but lacks practical experience himself serving an unsympathetic master who does not recognize any responsibility for his further training. Much institutional work has become bogged down in undertaking instruction in the 'nuts and bolts' of a job when routine procedures of this kind would be more effectively learned in post. No amount of institutional training will produce a competent official if he is not given adequate opportunity to develop his skills and exercise responsibility in the field." He advises that "a careful balance must be struck between the urgent need to train for the tasks of today and to prepare the trainee for the further development which will be required of him in the future."

John E. Sargent, Deputy Director, Royal Institute of Public Administration, in his paper makes a reference to a variety of training programmes that can be used to develop staff but fails to do full justice to the title of his paper, "Administrative Training in Africa—A Review of the Present Position."

The paper by Colin Fuller and Robert Chamers, "Training for the Administration of Development in Kenya", is very interesting indeed. It gives an excellent account of the variety of training exercises used in Kenya. It is frank in its criticism of the training programmes used before independence for Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Servants. The author pleads for the development of training programmes which may utilize the local expertise and practical exercises geared closely to the country's needs.

The problem of Africanisation is another aspect of the problem of training in African States. Adebayo Adedji, in his paper on "Administrative Training in Nigeria," writes :

*"Before independence, the over-riding purpose of training was in order that it might assist in accelerating the assumption of responsibility in senior government posts by young Nigerians. In other words, the government's training policies were a means of achieving their Nigerianisation objective; administrative training and Nigerianisation were closely intertwined. Since the attainment of independence there has been a shift in the purpose and scope of administrative training."*

In this connection he refers to the work of the Adebo Committee on the training of administrative officers. This committee was of the view that

*"a general university education, in-service training programmes, on-the-job training, or management training outside the context of Nigerian economic and social problems (e.g. in the United Kingdom or in the United States) are inadequate, singly or in combination, to equip Nigerian administrators for their role in this national effort".*

The committee had also recommended the establishment of the Institute of Administration at the post-graduate and professional level in Nigeria within the University of Ife. The implementation of the report of the committee was entrusted to the Institute of Public Administration, New York, in 1963. In fact, after this Institute came into being it tried to evolve training programmes which are neither too academic nor too pedestrian.

The Institute is now engaged in finding adequate answers to a number of problems which have since emerged in the field of training and which the Editor of this book, being also Director of the Institute, rightly says, "are not necessarily peculiar to Nigeria." One of the problems, however, appears to be very much Nigerian. This involves the bringing on a uniform basis the training of officers belonging to the so-called administrative class of the public service of the Federal Government, and that of the 12 States, into which Nigeria is divided. Another problem springs from the question of incentives. African trainees have several times asked: "What will be our reward for undergoing such a strenuous course?" It is a very familiar request. Training does raise hopes. Perhaps the trainers and trainees have to pose a counter-question as well: Should training be for promotion or for efficiency?

Another problem is regarding the balance that should be struck between "the training of officials of the Governments of under-developed countries abroad and locally." Perhaps Mr. Adebayo Adedeji gives the right answer in saying that "overseas training should be complementary to local training and not competitive with it." The training of officers at the very highest echelons is another problem which the Institute of Administration has tackled successfully. It reached the senior administrative and professional personnel under whom trained young administrative officers would work. And as the Editor remarks: "It has helped to bring together senior officials from the various ethnic groups from the different parts of the Federation" generating an *esprit de corps* amongst officers.

The close collaboration between the Government and academic bodies such as the University of Ife and its Institute of Administration is

indeed a healthy development. No Government can convert itself into an academy of training. It has to rely on outside expertise in this matter. Of course, it shall have to have a full hand in shaping the contents of the training programmes and syllabus. It is in this direction that the African effort is praiseworthy.

There are a number of other aspects which could have found a place in this volume but have remained untouched; the economics of training is a case in point. All in all, it is a very useful record of the problems and techniques of training in Africa.

S. C. SETH

**The Partition of Africa Illusion or Necessity :**

Edited by Robert O. Collins; John Wiley & Sons, New York.

**T**his fascinating little book is one of a series on Major Issues in History. A most appropriate theme for the editors because the partition of Africa towards the end of the last century and the beginning of the present one had a profound influence, not only on the course of African history but also on Europe and the rest of the world. The impact of the partition is being felt in almost every part of Africa even to this day, as testified by the experiences of the five-year-old Organisation for African Unity.

In their search for unity, Africans are trying to undo some of the damage done by the partition under which neighbouring Africans with identical cultural traditions and languages suddenly found themselves subject to different laws and learning different languages of their European rulers and using new transport routes to carry them to ports and cities. The new colonial frontiers shaped the political future of the new entities.

This book has been divided into six parts, written by experts in their respective fields. It begins with the adventures of Belgian King Leopold II who regarded his intervention in the Congo as the beginning of civilisation in Africa. This is followed by a treatment of the German, Italian, British and French scramble for Africa. The concluding chapter, The End of the Scramble, deals with the broad implications for Africa of the struggle of the European powers.

How prophetic Belgian opinion was when it openly expressed fears that their King's methods in the Congo would eventually lead to international brawls in the heart of the continent! What happened in the Congo after independence in the sixties is too well known to be recounted here.

Historians of Africa have to this day tried to grapple with the question: Who started the scramble for Africa? Two of the foremost among them, Professors Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, believe that Leopold, if not actually precipitating the scramble, created the atmosphere in which the partition took place.

Other writers suggest that the French, British, German and other European powers would not have entered the scramble if they had not been provoked by King Leopold's designs in the Congo basin.

Yet, there is other equally weighty evidence that it was the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 which gave rise to the scramble, or the French ratification of Brazza's treaty followed by the declaration of protectorates in West Africa, though reasons for France installing herself in the Congo have never been sufficiently analysed.

Britain's controversial historian, A. J. P. Taylor, says that Bismarck had no real interest in German overseas expansion and was motivated in colonial ventures by his desire to bring France and Germany together over imperial quarrels with Britain.

At that time, Britain's interests in Africa were two: to settle British colonists in South Africa and to preserve and strengthen its influence in Egypt—a vital point on the route to India.

According to an old "myth", the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 led to the partition of Africa (Jawaharlal Nehru also says so in his *Glimpses of World History*), but the analysis of the conference by Prof. J. D. Hargreaves shows otherwise. In fact, according to Hargreaves, the vague provisions of the Berlin Act had little effect on the scramble. Territorial questions were specifically excluded from the conference agenda, and those requiring settlement were dealt with in a series of bilateral agreements extending over many years.

Scholars have tried to provide a comprehensive interpretation for the partition of Africa, but the complexities of the scramble defy any such interpretation. Sweeping generalisations are not possible on account of the great diversity of Africa and its peoples and the inextricable interests and motives of the European powers, as the editor says in his concluding remarks.

In his view, "a more meaningful and accurate understanding of the partition will be found by examining the scramble in the disparate regions of Africa where the limits of human perception can more easily encompass the complexities of human motivation".



Reading this book, one cannot escape the overwhelming impression that it was the disunity among the Africans and the "unity" and determination of the European powers that forced the pace of the partition and occupation of Africa. No doubt the resources of the African states were weaker compared to Europe's technological superiority, but it is evident that wherever they ran into a strong African state, the Europeans forgot their differences at home and supported one another against the common "enemy". The lesson for the Africans is quite clear.

AJIT GOPAL.

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**A correction**

In the documentation on the 6th Session of the OAU Summit (AFRICA QUARTERLY, July-Sept. 1969) it was incorrectly said the Assembly adopted a manifesto on Southern Africa "supporting armed struggle against the racist regimes." The manifesto in fact stated that the best method of solving the Southern African problem was negotiation but that the African States would have no alternative but to use force "if the adversary proved unyielding." The document defined "the least painful means of reaching a settlement of the South African problem" according to a spokesman. President Ahidjo of Cameroon was entrusted with the task of going to the UN personally to present the document to all member countries.

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
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
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## Twenty Centuries of Italy's Relationship with Africa

TEOBALDO FILESI

A PROPER description of the relationship that tied Italy and Africa together for 20 centuries will require far more space than we are allowed here. In this article we aim to give an idea of the consistency and fullness of this relationship justified by historical and geographical factors.

It is well known that of the three continents of Africa, America and Asia, the first is in closest contact with Europe, thanks to the Mediterranean basin that has been the heart of the classical civilisation. Among the European countries facing this basin, Italy since ancient times seems to be a sort of natural bridge projected towards the African coast, so much so that Tunisia and Sicily are within visible distance of each other.

When Rome, already known as a terrestrial power, began to venture with success on the seas it met with strong competition from Cartago which had built its mercantile imperialism with a fleet comprising urban population and skilfully manned by an oligarchy of merchants, ship-builders and wealthy people. In the ensuing wars Rome chose to blockade the enemy. Through these merciless wars which lasted over a century (263-146 B.C.), Rome overpowered and relentlessly destroyed its proud opponents and established itself (thanks to Italy's position in the Mediterranean) on the African continent and became the undisputed monarch of the Mediterranean Sea. The borders of the original Roman settlements in Africa were extended by Caesar and Augustus to include large and rich regions east and west of Tunisia. The town of Cartago was rebuilt—bigger and more splendid than before—and became the third biggest town of the Empire, after Rome and Alexandria in Egypt.

In North Africa, the Roman domination assured (in spite of some sporadic rebellions) order, prosperity and justice. The political administrative system introduced during Caesar's time remained unchanged for more than two and half centuries and included the provinces of proconsular Africa (including Tripolitania, Tunisia and a part of Algeria), Numidia (east of Algeria), Caesarian Mauritania of Tingitana (modern Morocco), Cirenaica (administratively leading to Creta) and Egypt, considered to be the imperial province geographically annexed to Asia.

But the Roman presence was not limited to the coastal regions. Security, emergencies, thirst for knowledge and large horizons drove the

Roman eagles on adventurous expeditions and arduous reconnaissance missions under the command of Lucio Cornelio Balbo, Svetonio Paolino, Settimio Flacco, Giulio Materno, Caio Petronio. They reached the fabulous Garamanti's Fezzan in 19 B.C. and 86 B.C. with the Atlantic on one side, and the High Nile and the ramifications of the Ethiopian plateau on the other. Unfortunately, we have no records of these expeditions (nor of the ones to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean) except for the geographic work of Tolemeo, the relation of Plinio il Vecchio (the Old Man) and the "Circum Navigation of the Eritrean Sea", written in Greek in the 1st century A.D., which is a vivid and interesting document about the West African coast—from Cape Guardafui to Tanganyika. But in spite of lack of written testimony innumerable are the wonderful signs and monumental vestiges that, until today, are proof of the ineffaceable Roman conquest of Mediterranean Africa. Everywhere the Roman Empire left footprints of its enlightened conceptions and the ardour of its constructive programmes which reached (as many modern authorities on Africa acknowledge) universally proclaimed high levels. "The Romans", wrote J.C. de Graft Johnson, in his 'African Glory—The Story of Vanished Negro Civilisation', "did not subdue the world as conquerors and did not plan to keep their blood pure by racialism or theoretical justifications as Herrenvolk had said. Rome has never claimed the reputation of being a pure race or of noble birth, nor of being a homogeneous people; the ties between one Roman and another never were of blood, race, colour or religion; they were the bonds of a common law or civilisation." Culture spread and at the same time harbours, roads, aqueducts, wells, markets, granaries, monuments and theatres came into being. The meeting of Roman masters and African subjects resulted in the making of African emperors, jurists, writers such as Settimio Severo, Papiniano, Apuleio and—with the coming of Christianity—the making of African Fathers of the Church, apologists and theologians, such as Tertulliano, San Cipriano, Origene and Saint Agostino.

Thus North Africa, which had been divided before and afflicted with several internal problems, became (as Henri Basset says) "a huge garden the splendour of which even during the Arab civilisation still lived in the memory of all men". And when, in the 19th century, France established its power in these ex-Roman Provinces, the well-known scholar, Gaston Boissier, wrote—almost with regret—in his "L'Afrique Romaine" (Roman Africa): "One cannot go into anyone of our North African estates, no matter how far or primitive they may be, where Roman footsteps have not been put before ours. There is not a town in the world where there are so many ruins; they come into sight everywhere, not only in fruitful soils, but also in the most wild lands where life would seem impossible".

## II

Having reached the pinnacle of its power and glory, the Roman Empire began to decline. On Roman Africa descended the Vandals' punishment and the dark period of this rule (430-633 A.C.) left these rich lands prostrate and in misery. The Byzantine conquest, brought about by the great Justinian, restored to the redeemed lands part of its former

prosperity and glory, a restoration which lasted for about a century, only to be shadowed once again by the advent of the darkness of the Middle Age.

In the African lands surrounding the Mediterranean these dark ages were swept away by the Islamic civilization—a civilisation that attracted the Italian people—especially those of the powerful maritime Republics of Genoa, Venice, Pisa and Amalfi. They developed friendship with the local African kings and signed commercial and settlement treaties allowing them to settle on the land under the rule of consuls and construct warehouses and buildings for lodging. For example, by the commercial treaty between Pisa and Tunisia in 1313, not only were the people of Tunisia granted security of their properties but were also allowed to build a church, a warehouse and other establishments in every port.

From Sicily, the Normans and then the Swabian, Angevin, Aragonese courts several times raided African coast lands across the Mediterranean and forced submission of the various Mussulman kings and forced them to pay homage and tribute. Sailors of the Italian Republics—particularly the Genoese—ventured beyond the Pillars of Hercules and discovered the Canary Islands. Most probably the same sailors discovered Medeira and Azores towards the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century. The legendary Vivaldi brothers set sail in 1291 off the African coast on a trip supposed to aim at South Asia but unluckily did not return. Later, when the Avis dynasty started Portuguese discoveries, brave Genoese pilots (such as Antoniotto Usodimare and Antonio da Noli) or Venetians (such as Alvise da Ca' da Mosto) under the command of Enticoil Navigatore—reached (between 1455 and 1456) the river Senegal and visited Green Cape, the Cayon region and the Gambia river. They then went as far as Casamanco, Red Cape and Rio Grande and also discovered the group of Bissagos islands. Another contribution made by the Italian people to the discovery and description of the African continent was in their maps. It is enough to remember the African map of Marin Sanudo, the Old Man (1321), the nautical Atlas (1351), better known as "Gaddiano 9", the planisphere of Andrea Bianco (1436), that of Giovanni Leardo (1452) and the famous globe secretly made by Fra Mauro Camaldolese for Prince Henry of Portugal, which is especially interesting for the information concerning West Africa and so-called "Aethiopia".

Meantime, in 1447 another Genoese, Antonio Malfante, made a trip that can be considered marvellous because of the period in which it was undertaken. He penetrated (from the Moroccan coast) at least 1,000 kilometres into the Sahara desert and reached the Tuat oasis recording the names of the towns situated along a large river—probably the Niger. Thirty years later (1469) a Florantine, Benedetto Dei, carried on in the footsteps of Malfante and penetrated as far as Timbuctu.

Of equal importance were the attempts of the Roman Church which had been trying to establish relations with the legendary priest, Gianni. In 1177, Pope Alexandro III sent a mission to Ethiopia led by Dr. Filippo, who carried a message in the Holy Father's own hand. In 1440,



during the Ecumenical Council in Florence, Pope Eugenio IV sent a diplomatic mission to Levant under the leadership of Alberto da Sarteano with the intention of inviting the Oriental Christian churches to the Council. Alberto left Venice for Jerusalem and met the Abbot, Niccodemo, the chief of the Ethiopian community. The invitation was accepted and an Ethiopian mission left for Florence where it arrived on August 26, 1441, and was welcomed by the same Pope in Santa Maria Novella. This meeting and the subsequent arrival in Rome on October 10, 1441, were immortalized in two bronze panels done by the artist Antonio Averulino (the Filareto) that can still be seen on the main door of St. Peter's Basilica in Rome.

At the end of the 17th century the Portuguese began missionary work in the Congo region with good results and after the evolution of Lisbon colonization approached the Apostolic See with the hope of receiving its protection and support.

The first mission was entrusted to Duarte Lopew in 1583, but was attended with poor success in 1588. In 1604 King Alvari II of Congo sent Antonio Manuel ne Vunda (a cousin) with detailed instructions and important grants for the Pope. After a long and exhausting trip the noble ambassador died in the arms of Pope Paul V. He was given an impressive funeral and the Pope ordered that a monument be built in his honour in Santa Maria Maggiore Basilica. After that Congo had an ambassador appointed by the Holy See and a Congolese Cardinal protector.

North Africa, by about the end of the 15th century, began to be troubled by anarchy, and came under the barbaric regencies of Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli which received all their resources from the Corsair war and exercised control on the Christian ships and the Italian seashores. This compromised seriously the unity of the Mediterranean countries, a unity that in the past had tied in advantageous civil contacts different countries and continents.

However, the relationship between the Italian Republics and the African coasts was kept alive during this period. Wars, reprisals and threats were alternated with treaties of peace, truces and negotiations. Payment of tributes and redemption of Christian slaves were the main problems of the times. In the meantime—with the establishment of the Holy Congregation de Propaganda Fide in 1622—religious people, especially the Capuccini Fathers, brought great comfort and help to the people in these lands. The Capuccini Fathers, the majority of whom were Italians, left for Black Africa in 1645 (especially for Congo and Angola and to a lesser extent for the Guinea, Gulf Coast) where, for two centuries, they worked to convert and assist the people. They left behind information of inestimable value regarding the African people and their lands. It is enough to remember the work done by Father Giovanni Francesco Romano, Father Francesco Maria Gioia from Naples, Father Dionigi de' Carli from Piacenza and Father Michele Angelo Guattini from Reggio, Father Giovanni Antonia Cavazzi from Montecuccolo, Father Gerolamo Merolla from Sorrento, Father Antonio Zucchelli from Gradisca and so

many others whose writings are kept in the archives of the Capuccini Fathers and are still unpublished.

With the extension of geographical knowledge of Africa (particularly that of the coastal regions where the colonial powers were established and fiercely competed with each other over the cruel and destructive slave trade) remarkable progress was made in the cartographic field. The activity of the Italian people left a strong impression, for example: the monumental map of Africa covering eight sheets and made in Venice (1564) by Giacomo Gastaldi, a map which was widely commented on, drawn a little less than 20 years later by another Venetian, Livio Sanudo whose "Geography", which is in 12 volumes with maps, is concerned mainly with Africa and was printed in 1588, just after the author died. Notwithstanding all the information collected by the Christian Fathers and the greediness that brought Englishmen, Dutchmen, Portuguese, French, Swedish Brandeburgese to sack the African continent indiscriminately, it remained, almost to the end of the 18th century, an undiscovered continent with all its vast interior still unexplored. When the great epoch of exploration and land survey started, the barbaric laws pertaining to the slave trade were rejected by the European people's governments; but in the same period great modern colonial empires were born and man witnessed the "scramble for Africa".

### III

In the 19th century, Italian pioneers, travellers, soldiers, cultured men and missionaries explored the African mainland. They were not men seeking to build an empire but men thirsty for adventure or knowledge or inspired by Christian charity. It is with respect that we remember the venerable personality and generous work of Daniele Camboni, Giustino da Jacobis, Guglielmo Massaia, who, besides doing missionary work in the Sudan and Ethiopia, explored lands and helped Italian explorers in Africa.

Officials, such as Romolo Gessi and Gaetano Casati, opened new routes in the Nile regions and strict persecutors of the slave traders, Giovanni Miani and Andrea de Bono, penetrated the equatorial Great Lakes (1859-1860); Vittorio Bottego discovered and explored the basins of the Omo Giuba; Pellegrino Matteucci and Alfonso Massari were the first Europeans (1880-81) who crossed the African continent—from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Guinea—overcoming natural obstacles and covering regions difficult of access such as Kordofan, Darfur, Waday and Bornu. Many other Italian explorers and scholars, such as Antonori, Chiarini, Cerchi, Bianchi, Porro, Ferrandi, Giulietti, Piaggia, Duca Degli Abruzzi, Robecchi Bricchetti, Baudi di Vesme and Franchetti also explored the African continent.

To the Italians, Africa was not only a continent to conquer but a continent in need of the mind and work of other men. Being a country poor in natural resources and preoccupied with internal problems Italy had neither the ambition, nor the strength, arrogance and superiority complex that were the trade marks of the big colonial powers at that time.

Nevertheless at a certain point the Italians went to Africa even though in shabby dress and without enthusiasm. One could ask if they went for ethical reasons or practical objectives, for reasons of State or life. Probably all these factors played their part. The imperialistic dream in fashion at that time was entirely out of their minds. A very interesting piece of evidence of this was the letter supposed to have been written by Lenin, in which he said (1912) that his point of view on the Italian conquest of Libya was that it was not to be considered as an act of imperialistic aggression, but rather the action of a proletarian people looking for new possibilities of work and survival.

Still weak and vulnerable after the war of independence in 1861, with strenuous and bloody fights, Italy was not prepared for overseas adventures. If she was looking across her borders it was essentially to satisfy economic and social requirements that were frustrating her people. Diplomatic history tells us clearly that she was encouraged and warned by other Powers and above all, by England, in the game of international politics particularly complicated at the close of the 19th century. "She went to Eritrea, said an illustrious jurist, to counteract France, went to Somalia to restrain the expansionist schemes of Germany, went to Libya for the same reason and for reasons far more complicated and vital in the Mediterranean balance of power—after accords reached in 1887 with England, 1900 with France, 1909 with Russia". In such conditions and circumstances it was natural that Italy should want to get the positions established by other nations in lands less rich in natural resources. The gains acquired could have been considered as worthy of respect considering the unfavorable natural conditions in which Italy found herself to face the first attempts of colonization, of her initial inexperience and scarcity of means. Everywhere their sense of humanity, communicativeness, spontaneous solidarity with the local population made the Italian colonizers not masters but good work companions. The first step of Italy in Africa could not have been more cautious and soft. An ex-liturgical missionary, Giuseppe Sapeto, on November 15, 1869, bought for the Society of Navigation Rubattino of Genoa from the local Sultan the Assab Bay in the Red Sea through a regular stipulated contract. In 1882 such property was ceded by the above-mentioned society to the Italian Government for the amount of 416,000 lire.

From this moment Italy officially entered the colonial contest.

#### IV

The feeling that guided Italy from the beginning and the Italian people in Africa has already been mentioned. But it will be more meaningful to remember exactly the orientations of the principle of Italian colonial policy as expressed in Parliament by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, in the report on the Law of July 5, 1882, about the assumption on the part of Italy of the establishment of Assab.

"We", said Mancini, "have assumed in that part of the Red Sea a mission of civilisation and peace; but with the aim that we will succeed

in our duty, for the sake of the general human cause. To constitute a title of honour for the people that who initiated it, it is convenient that we keep in mind, from the beginning, a full and clear understanding of the many great difficulties of the purpose. It is not with general legislative Acts and preconceived legality that we will have the possibility of overcoming them, but with a patient and precise study, with the experience and, above all, great respect of the religious creeds of those populations, of their needs, family relations and of those traditions and habits that are not supposed to be incompatible with universal morality. We will not be rulers, guardians or innovators, but friends and helpers; we will guide our new fellow-citizens to understandable and expected improvements. This is our programme concerning Assab; only by such a behaviour will we manage to give a prosperous and powerful life to our property and to enable it, when it is time to reach the point of efficiency, to look after itself."

These ideas expressed 87 years ago in the Italian Parliament must be considered at least revolutionary in a period in which colonization was still considered in its crude conception of dictatorship. Principles of this kind were in fact formally sanctioned in 1945 in the UN Charter after two World Wars that involved directly all the colonial systems.

Further Italian steps in Africa led to a sort of dramatic development, above all, in the first-born colony in the Red Sea with the occupation of Massana (1885) the Italian people started to expand on the Eritrean tableland where they found their passage barred by Negus Giovanni and his chiefs—particularly Ras Alula who on January 25, 1887, unexpectedly faced a column of soldiers of Major De Cristoforis and wiped them out with overwhelming strength on the elevation of Dogali.

Giovanni was killed by Darvisci and Metenna on March 10, 1889, and Menelik II, his successor, signed on May 2, 1889, in Ucciali a treaty of peace with Italy in which the Eritrean borders were fixed on the Ethiopian side and an ambiguous Italian protectorate was accepted on Ethiopian territory. A conflict arose out of the interpretation of Item 17 of the treaty and led to open hostilities. The Adua Battle (March 1, 1896), which proved so tragic for the Italian Army, was the conclusion of the first stage of the Italian vicissitudes in Africa. Peace was restored under the treaty of Addis Ababa on October 26, 1896. The previous misunderstandings were clarified and the Eritrean borders were mapped out with greater precision. An Eritrean political-administrative organization was established, first under the Organic Law of July 5, 1882, then another one of July 1, 1890, and, finally, under the last one of May 24, 1903.

In all these laws and other initiatives of the Government authorities was evident the commitment to give to that colony and its people, juridical, social and economic institutions, capable of taking them towards gradual progress with the firm object of respecting their traditions and their chiefs. The assumption of direct administration from the Italian Government of the property in the Red Sea drew the attention of Italy towards the coasts of the Indian Ocean—an attention that was also shared by Great Britain. After a commercial treaty entered into by

Captain Antonio Cecchi with the Sultan of Zanzibar Said Bargash on May 28, 1885, Italy rented in 1893, for a period of 50 years, from the successor Sultan Hamid-bin-Twain the harbours of Benadir (Brava, Merca, Mogadiscio and Warsceik), expanded later with part of the territory situated in the Chisimaio Bay (agreement of London, 1905). Benadir was at first administered through private organizations, then, under the Law of August 11, 1906, was undertaken by the Italian Government.

In the north of Somalia, the Sultans of Obbia and Migiurtina in 1889 asked for the protection of Italy and for about 20 years this was provided by the Italian Consul in Aden. Inland and specifically in North Somalia, Italy and Great Britain (in Somaliland) were frustrated till 1921 by rebellions with a political-religious background led by Santon Mohammed-ben-Abdullah (to whom the Italian Government, under the treaty of Illig, 1905, recognised as the proprietor of the Negal Valley).

With the Organic Law of April 5, 1908, all the authority, political and administrative, was transferred to the Governor of the Colony named "Somalia Italiana". (In 1925 all the Protectorates of the North Sultanates were to be cancelled and the territories united directly with the colony.)

On July 15, 1924, according to the English-Italian Convention of London, Great Britain offered to Italy, as a reward for her participation in the world conflict, the territory on the right side of the river Giuba, including the Giubaland and an area of the north district of Kenya, which were joined to the Somalia colony. About the Italian conquest of Libya, we can say that it was only the late realization of an old dream and a natural projection towards the "north coast" that had always, throughout centuries, appealed as a logical continuation of the Italian peninsula. The war with Turchia, which broke out on September 29, 1911, ended with the treaty of peace of Losanna or Ouchy on October 18, 1912, under which the sovereignty of Italy over Tripolitania and Cirenaica was recognised. But the hostilities did not cease from this date, because of the activity of the Senussi Confraternity supported by Turchia and later—during the first mondial conflict—also by Germany. The Italian internal garrison on the coasts had to be withdrawn and concentrated only on the bases of Tripoli, Homa and Zuara. On April 17, 1917, Italy signed in Aroma an accord with the Senusse Sidi Idriss (who, after the coup d'état in September 1969, had to renounce the throne) for a peaceful way of living; the accord was followed by the Convention of Regima (October 25, 1920) that gave to the same Idriss the title of Emiro of the Senussi with very large territorial and juridical concessions.

The aim of the Italian political Government in Libya during the period immediately after its occupation was described in essence by the Minister of Colonies, Bertolini, in Parliament, thus: "To practise and ensure justice, for which the people have been longing; to respect its religions, traditions and family relations; to help the native population co-operate with the government of the country, not on the basis of a false European democracy but to rule through their chiefs and to reserve for

Italian officials, few but valiant, overall supervision and control of direction. To these orientations of strict collaboration that were already evident in the beginning were added, at the end of the first mondial conflict, very interesting and enlightened rules known for their liberality and breadth of thought.

Italian colonialism in Libya in fact had a double aim—peaceful reconquest of Tripolitania and creation of an Italian Senussita government in Cirenaica. On June 1, 1919, a statutory charter was given to Tripolitania and on October 31 to Cirenaica under which the natives were granted “Italian-Libyan citizenship”, and civil and political rights. Libya was provided, on a statutory basis on the occidental pattern, a local Parliament and local Councils, with wide functions.

But most probably the time and the people were not ripe for an experimentation of that sort; the liberal programme was misunderstood and considered a sort of weakness and the results were completely negative, also because the Senusso's attitude was one of stubborn resistance in spite of the accords of Regima.

The advent of Fascism (1922) brought to Libya a more steady colonial political basis. In order to give the colony a more efficient system it was necessary, first of all, to reconquer it and bring it under Italian sovereignty. The military action lasted several years and was sometimes accompanied with hard repression. Under the Organic Law for Tripolitania and Cirenaica of June 26, 1927, was established a new “Italian-Libyan citizenship” on a limited juridical basis and a Government Council and a General College which allowed a certain degree of participation by the natives in the government of the colony. Starting from 1934 a new programme of intense agricultural and economic activity with the idea of helping Italians and Libyans was evolved and an administrative sub-division of the coastal regions formed on the same basis as the Italian sub-division—creation of the Provinces of Tripoli, Misurata, Bengasi and Derna—and extension to the Libyan people of rights of social legislation and trade unionism and corporative Italian order.

But the colonial Italian adventure in Africa reached its highest peak in the conquest of Ethiopia, an adventure, desired by Fascism as a demonstration of its strength and prestige, that proved fatal. This was the last and most spectacular and disputed of the colonial conquests. For its serious international repercussions and the dynamic lines of the development programme for the lands subjugated, the short period of the Italian occupation of the Ethiopian country will remain a singular watermark in the history of colonialism.

The vast territorial complex comprising Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia was denominated as Italian Oriental Africa (A.O.I.) and under the Royal legal decree of June 1, 1936, rules were framed for the organisation and administration of A. O. I. (changed afterwards by the Law of January 11, 1937) whose character was to match, as much as possible, the needs and characteristics of the ethnical and religious groups living in those various areas.

A judgment on Italian policy in Africa, and particularly on the lawfulness of the Ethiopian conquest, is quite uncomfortable for any Italian person who loves his country, without regard to the rights or wrongs of history. Anyway it is a common axiom that colonialism is always colonialism and that this system is not justified by the morals of our era. But it is possible to distinguish between good and bad systems of colonialism. Italy, as a poor nation, went to colonise lands still poorer than herself and ended up with giving and not taking anything from the natives of her colonies. She was not free from blame but she did not altogether betray what she always considered as her mission: to uplift and support the natives not with arrogance or intolerant paternalism, but with a brotherly hand. Right, justice, human respect—in the sense of Roman humanities—were the corner-stones of her policy to govern, accomplished by sacrifices, really incalculable, if we think about the primitive conditions prevailing in some regions of Italy herself.

Unlike the great colonial powers, used to colonising with the arms of other people, Italy faced everywhere the hardest tasks, side by side with the natives, always without imposing forms of degrading discrimination. Everybody—and always—had to recognise these virtues. Also in 1941—when Italy was passing through the tragic period of a wrong war—the English Deputy, Christopher Hollis, in an article entitled “Italy in Africa” wrote: “As colonisers and improvers of a territory, the Italian people demonstrated, from a certain point of view, that they were the heirs of ancient Rome and from among the nations of modern Europe Italy showed an exceptional quality—a virtue after all—even if it can give rise to dangers; they never felt ashamed of working with their own hands, side by side with the natives. This is really an attitude of equality, far deeper than that of those nations which believe to have accomplished their democratic duty when, to every citizen, they gave the right of the vote”.

## V

### **The Work**

On the basis of the relations between Italy and Africa we can find in every period of history the work done by the former. A long history full of contrasts but in which is always present a constant...hard work and constructiveness. The Italian work in Africa is a monument of sorrow and glory of which there are traces in memory and in the archives, ineffaceable tracks from Roman times till today.

In Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, since the end of 1700, patriots, scientists, doctors, jurists, officials, architects, skilled workers have formed the fulcrum of every activity and progress. The construction of towns, the creation of harbours and industries, the reclamation of the desert and uncultivated lands were carried out in a spirit of sacrifice by the Italians. By Luigi di Negrelli was constructed the Suez Canal project; by Italian people the construction, in the reign of Mulay Hasan, of a factory of arms with a foundry, a mint and very modern machines at Fez, in Morocco; by the architect Sebastiano Castagna the monumental church of San Giorgio in Addis Ababa, built on the ruins of the very old one by another Italian, Nicolo Brancalone; by the Italian Consul in Nigeria, Giambattista Scala

was made the first arduous attempt, towards the middle of 1800, to introduce to the Yaruba population rational agriculture methods and active commercial exchanges. They were urged to fight against the plague of the slave trade brutalizing their lands. "I will teach them, Scala wrote in his memoirs, that men engaged in agriculture, commerce and navigation are the real source of the riches of a country. I will explain that the slave trade impoverishes a country depriving it of production and corrupts the souls, making them insensitive to the miseries of our fellow-beings".

Those were the times when roads and railways were opening up the interior of the African continent to establish contact with the coasts and the external world. In Tunisia the Society Rubattino built the railway Tunisi-La Goletta; in Algeria Italians were engaged in the construction of Algeri-Oran and Costantina-Algeri; in Egypt Italian labourers were in the first place not only in the construction of the railways but also in the digging of the Suez Canal; in Eritrea they laid from Massaya to Asmara the most arduous African railway track, extended afterwards to Agordat; in Ethiopia the first telegraph line and the first telephone system were the work of Italians, and great was the help of the Italian people in the construction of the Gibuti-Addis Ababa railway—brave labours despite the climate, diseases and dangers of every sort in the infernal regions surrounding the track of the railway Matadi-Stanley Pool in Congo, and Tananarive, Benguela, Kenya, Damaraland, Pretoria—Lourenço Marques, Saint Louis, Dakar, Nigeria and Gold Coast. In many places the names of those who fell are listed on a common grave marble as soldier: perspiration and blood, with little glory and small compensation.

## VI

The end of World War II opened a new period in the history of the relationship between Italy and Africa. Under the treaty of peace of Paris on February 10, 1947, the winners, the four Great Powers, directed Italy to renounce "all rights and titles to the African territorial properties (Art. 23). After discussions, compromises and postponements that for about 10 years left Eritrea, Somalia and Libya under a precarious government of occupation, previously military and later civil, the General Assembly of the UN decided by the resolution of the November 21, 1949:

(a) That Libya (Tripolitania and Cirenaica and Fezzan) will become independent of January 1, 1952 (actually became effective on December 24, 1951);

(b) Somalia will also become independent after a decennial period of Italian administration (that ended before the term, so the independence came earlier);

(c) The destiny of Eritrea will be decided by a second resolution of December 2, 1950. It was decided that the ex-Italian colony should become a self-governing entity federated with the Ethiopian Empire (with effect from September 11, 1952).



The ex-Italian territories became the first important step towards African freedom and independence—a precedent that had great influence on the elites and leaders already looking for more organic and stable systems in the battle against colonialism.

Italy was leaving Africa not with humiliation but conscious that the decisions of the UN were not to be stopped but honoured. The fact that the countries under her administration for so many years were mature for independence was actually a certificate of merit in the eyes of Africa and the world. The hundred thousand of Italians who had gone to the Africa continent were coming back to their motherland, but there were new and fabulous opportunities on the horizon for them. Africa no longer required poor skilled workers or humble villagers as before but important entrepreneurs, technical advisers, dynamic industrial firms, experts. Quality was superimposed on quantity. New Africa was calling for Italian help and Italy was again stretching her arms to Africa, under the banner of work, of mutual respect and friendship. In some fields, such as construction of big hydro-electric barrages, buildings, roads, railways, airports, agriculture, oil research, oil pipelines and refineries, big industrial complexes, Italians had the opportunity to gain in the last 20 years a position of prestige all over the African continent under the light of her marvellous past. The cyclopean dams of Kariba, Koca, Akosomb, Roseires, Khaslm-el-Ghirba; Kainj, the imposing public works of Nigeria, Ghana, Libya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Congo, the Sudan, Kenya, Zambia, Cameroun, Costa d'Avorio, Tanzania, Uganda, UAR, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa; the great programmes of agricultural drainage in the High Nile and in the Delta; the ever-increasing success of the E. N. I. These are only some examples.

In the field of commercial exchanges the increase during these years of import-export reached a surprising level. Imports of goods from Africa, which in 1966 had reached 410 milliards of lire, rose in 1968 to 564 milliards, and exports to Africa were 319 milliards in 1966 and 425 milliards in 1969. Not less important are the exchanges in the cultural field, economic co-operation, financial co-operation and technical assistance.

It is a historic process that is going on, changing in modern times with the needs and aspirations of human beings looking towards horizons of greater justice, uniting everybody in loyalty and resolve to end the lack of balance and harmony that is poisoning the world.

Today it is necessary to tone down or bridge the gap between peoples with great means and poor ideals such as the developed countries and peoples with very poor means and great riches of ideals (countries on the way of progress).

Italy and Africa can work with solidarity of purpose and success in this struggle.

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## Italy and the Arab World

GIAMPAOLO CALCHI NOVATI

AS a member of NATO and the Western bloc, Italy has a distinct place in the dialectics which characterize the international scene. Italy, however, has never been confused with the colonial powers. This is for two reasons: the unusual nature of her colonial experience in Africa and her limited economic means. Geographic propinquity, a rich historical heritage, and the circumstantial fact that it has not been identified with the colonial powers in the post-war years place Italy in a favoured position to play a possible mediating role with reference to the Arab countries.

Italy was actually the last European power to pass from a commercial type of colonial policy to an imperialistic policy, lining up for its expansion when imperialism, having reached its apex, had already begun its descent. As Carlo Giglio has written, Italian imperialism responded pre-eminently to prestige motives while the national economic benefits of the annexation of Libya, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia were few: "Without doubt Italy gained other advantages of strategic value or of political and moral prestige, but her economy in general, aside from a few limited categories of beneficiaries, achieved no advantage"<sup>1</sup>. In a certain sense this situation favoured the abandonment of the colonies. It must also be understood that there was a considerable aversion on the part of Italian public opinion towards the colonial undertakings of the twenty-year span of the Fascist era. Italian colonial administration was characterized, above all, by subjugation, although in East Africa (not in Libya) some timid experiments were made with "differentiation," always, however, within the context of direct rule. The distinctive feature of Italian colonization was the transfer in mass to Africa—beginning with Libya—of settlers ("demographic colonization").

During the war, the Italian colonies were occupied by British and French forces. The post-war governments tried to guarantee to Italy at least the pre-Fascist colonies (thereby renouncing Ethiopia), but the victors were reluctant to make concessions, preferring to keep to the precedents, inaugurated in 1919, of depriving the vanquished of their overseas possessions. Article 25 of the Treaty of Peace (February 19, 1947) took away from Italy all her rights over former possessions in Africa, entrusting their ultimate disposition to the four Great Powers, or, in case of disagreement, to the UN. The UN, in fact, was given this mandate in September, 1948. The decision was taken on November 21, 1949. The General Assembly established that Libya was to become independent not later than the first of January, 1952 (independence was

proclaimed on December 24, 1951), entrusted Italy with the trusteeship of Somalia for a period of ten years from the date of approval of the accord (Somalia became independent, five months before the fixed date, on July 1, 1960), postponed for one year the decision on Eritrea, which was made an autonomous entity federated with Ethiopia and later assimilated by Ethiopia as a province (1962). Italy therefore lost all of her African possessions but was given by the UN the administration of the territory of Somalia, in the form of trusteeship. But even this Italian trusteeship had special characteristics, because Somalia, unlike the other territories under trusteeship, had a date specified for its independence, and it was stated that sovereignty belonged to the Somali people.

Therefore, in the case of Italy, one cannot actually speak of decolonization. It was forced to renounce colonies which, after all, had been the fruit of a rather artificial and anomalous expansion (when compared with the colonial imperialism of the major powers) which sprang from the search for an escape from demographic pressures rather than from dynamic economic forces, and which did not have serious consequences for the development of the nation. On the other hand, Italy was spared the travail which the liquidation of colonies caused to the other powers. Italy's responsibility in decolonization stemmed from other considerations; it was in fact due to her solidarity with the other Western nations, her partners in the Atlantic Community.

Deprived of her possessions immediately after the war, Italy was able to present herself to the neo-independent nations as a country relatively disinterested in the developments of decolonization which did not concern her. Thus, Italy has been spared from suspicion on the part of the governments and peoples of the third world about States with a past or a present which tended to be imperialistic. Italy's limited economic resources have in this way become an advantage too because there has been removed from Italian initiative all danger of neo-colonialism. One can conclude that Italy found herself in an ideal situation to act positively as a *trait d'union* between the Western world in its inclinations toward an opening to the third world and the new countries of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It should be remembered that the presence of a strong labour movement has always kept alive in Italian public opinion a sensitiveness to the problems of independence and the development of colonial territories. The weekly, *Relazioni Internazionali*, in 1956 spoke of Asian leaders' liking for Italy. "This sympathy provides the basis for profitable relations in the fields in which the recently independent States...aspire to strong international co-operation which, leaving aside the orientations of the world political situation and their interferences, can contribute to economic and social consolidation".<sup>2</sup>

Without attempting here to draw up a final balance-sheet, it can be said that Italian action has not been equal to the favourable conditions surrounding her. Her membership of NATO has, on the one hand, given Italy a more direct and perhaps more efficacious participating share but it has seriously impeded her freedom of expression. The Atlantic *raison d'etat* which has even contaminated the anti-colonialism of the United States has not been without its consequences for Italy in the sense

of dulling its autonomy and subordinating it to Western "interests". It may be surprising, but the Italian delegation at the United Nations was among the least ready to accede to the requests of the Afro-Asian group to take a position on the resolutions of the General Assembly against the continuing colonialism and racism in Africa and Asia and limited itself to welcoming "with relief" the agreements which put an end to the most bitter colonial conflicts and wars, especially in French North Africa. The alliance with Portugal (through NATO) continues to make the Italian Government a virtual ally of a colonial power.

Some of the initiatives which the Italian Government has taken at various times with reference to areas closest ideally to Italian influence in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world are worthy of mention, for their intentions if not for their practical results. After her admission to the UN (December 14, 1955), Italian foreign policy could satisfy more international, as opposed to strictly regional, needs and the Near and Middle East were the regions which had first priority in attracting Italian diplomacy. Previously, relations between Italy and African and Asian countries had been of a sporadic, investigative and research nature.

#### Nationalization of Suez

An important episode which serves to illustrate the real substance of Italy's "Arab" policy was the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Official Italian circles reacted negatively to the decision of the Egyptian Government, and for some time Arab-Italian relations were in a difficult phase. The reasons for opposition had been dictated by Italy's solidarity with France and Great Britain—the Western States more directly interested in the financial aspects of the controversy—and by vague fears about the future of the Canal (and its neutrality) once its control had fallen into the hands of one country. In the crisis which followed, however, Italy did not fail to try to find a way towards conciliation.

Italy adhered to the London Conference held by the Western Powers in order to draw up an agreement to ensure the freedom of transit through the Canal, justifying its own acceptance by expressing the hope that the conference would contribute to easing the tension between Cairo and the Anglo-French. In London, the Italian delegation followed a policy of moderation, similar to that of Washington, to avoid a break in the negotiations. In Christian Democratic ranks some reservations of a neutralist kind arose and the *Osservatore Romano* counselled Italian "mediation" which was not followed. In certain ways, however, Italy dissociated herself from the "hard" line of Paris and London, for example, by refusing to have her ships pay toll to the Canal Users Association which the British and the French set up to avoid giving in to the Egyptians. Italy also abstained from participating in the mission of the Menzies Committee. Above all, while deploring the unilateral nature of the nationalization of the Canal and denying its validity under international law, Italy always firmly ruled out resort to force as a means of restoring the "violated order".<sup>3</sup>

When the hostility of France and Great Britain toward Nasser's Egypt degenerated into the organized aggression signalized by the October 30 ultimatum, Italian opposition was firm. The Government showed some uneasiness about choosing between the United States, on the one hand, and France and Great Britain, on the other; but, very soon, realizing the dangers of war in an area so close by, Italy favoured searching for a solution through the UN, thus implicitly condemning the military action London and Paris had taken in collusion with Israel. Italian reproval of the two allies, already expressed on October 31, was in line with Western solidarity, thanks to the position taken by the United States, a position which Italy shared without reservations. Taking the occasion to emphasize her opposition to a policy of revenge on the part of other Western Powers, Italy urged a "global" policy for the Mediterranean area, one which through the medium of the UN and through a better co-ordinated allied policy would help deal with the pending serious problems in addition to the imminent warlike contingencies. At the UN, the Italian delegation voted with the majority, which included the United States, for an end to fighting and for the creation of a UN force to keep the peace. But Italy abstained from voting on the November 24 resolution which called for the immediate withdrawal of Anglo-French-Israeli troops from Egyptian soil, thus giving the impression of wanting *in extremis* to soften her strong disapproval of the military operation against Nasser.<sup>4</sup>

After the crisis of 1956, Italy again resumed her policy of creating an opening to the Arab world. This was inspired by two considerations: recognition of the legitimacy of nationalistic endeavours, and the certainty of a Western "presence" in the Middle East free of imperialist overtones. In 1951, De Gasperi had already emphasized the need to "reconcile the just aspirations of those peoples with the necessity of defending the common civilization of the Mediterranean". It is significant that in all the "revisionist" or "neo-Atlantic" examples of Italian foreign policy an important component was its vigorous autonomy with regard to the Arab and Middle Western world. Gronchi's visit to Iran (September 1957) and Fanfani's mission to Egypt (January 1959) were interpreted in this sense. The concern in some Western quarters about such "deviations," however, proved unfounded. The absence of clear objectives and conformity with NATO kept Italian diplomacy from finding something which might represent a "third way". For example, the Pella Plan, a proposal for multilateral economic assistance to Middle Eastern countries aiming at the removal of political conditions attached to Western aid, yielded no result.

The Italian position in the Middle East has however remained good. And among the Western countries it is the least compromised with Israel. One of the reasons may be found in the Vatican pressures against recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Hebrew State. Friendship treaties were signed in 1949 with Lebanon and in 1952 with Jordan. Co-operation with Yemen, which has old traditional ties with Italy, has been excellent. Italy abstained from participating in the Pact of Baghdad which could have been her concern as she was content with the "shelter" which came from the adherence of Greece and Turkey to



NATO. While choosing moderate force from among the Arabs, the Italian Government thus avoided openly displeasing the radicals who, under Cairo's guidance, opposed that organization as an expression of Western Power. Italy, however, approved the Eisenhower Doctrine.<sup>5</sup>

The first contacts with the Egyptian revolutionary class were established in February 1953 with a trip to Cairo by the then Minister of Defence, Pacciardi. The *avances* attributed to Gronchi, noted for his vaguely "neutralistic" tendency, followed and were climaxed by the announcement in February 1958, on the eve of the consecration of the Syro-Egyptian union, of Nasser's visit to Italy. The visit, however, never took place. Instead, the President of the Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fanfani, went to Egypt, in January 1959, giving rise to other polemics, in spite of the continued references by Fanfani to a Western "investiture". Fanfani was very active, too, in the crisis of July 1958 in Iraq and Lebanon, demonstrating that he did not completely agree with the unilateral action by the Anglo-Americans who, nevertheless, were able to use Italian air bases for the operation. After the ministerial crisis of February 1959, and the appointment of the Segni Cabinet, Italy's interest in the Middle East was not continued with the same intensity.

To the name and work of Fanfani, another diplomatic page of particular interest has been added on the basis of his faithful ecumenical conception of foreign policy: the round trip of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Arab Middle East in March 1967. He visited Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In November 1966 the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Riad, officially had visited Rome. During his visit to the Arab countries and his meeting with Mr. Riad, the Italian Minister underlined his country's efforts to solve the political tension in those lands (an open allusion to the Israeli problem) and improve development of economic and technical contacts with the Arab countries. On his way back from the Middle East, Fanfani said: "On the basis of the conversations, plans and conclusions reached with the governments of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon we can say that the Italian policy of participation in the development of these countries has been understood and appreciated by all of them. And they assured their co-operation in the advancement of these purposes".

Of similar meaning was the visit of Fanfani to Algeria (February 1968). It was the first time that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a Western country was paying a visit to Algeria after its independence. During the visit Fanfani expressed Italian willingness to open cordial talks with all Arab governments without distinction in spite of the tension which had arisen after the war of 1967. He underlined Italian sympathy for all Arab governments.

The peace in the Middle East was broken again in 1967 after the "six days war". The possibilities of influence for the Italian Government were fewer than in 1956. The Italian Government, in spite of the public opinion which sympathised with the Israeli Government, more for sentimental reasons than as a result of political understanding, tried to follow a sort of neutrality and did its best to avoid the worst.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fanfani, reported on June 7 to the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Senate—when the war had already started—about his efforts to stop the hostilities. “On the basis of friendly relations with both sides and in line with the UN of reaching a large measure of understanding of the problems of all countries concerned our activity has been developed in every field”.

The plan supported by Italy on that occasion can be put in a few words: “Israeli is a consistent, human reality that we cannot ignore. Between the Arabs and the Israelis we must find out a middle way to promote understanding and peace. The more dramatic problems of the Arab countries (above all, that of Palestinian refugees) must be solved without delay.” Italy pointed out that the only place suitable for serious discussions concerning these regions, before and after the war, was the United Nations. The Italian Government had already suggested the UN as the best forum for a declaration concerning navigation in the Aqaba Gulf on the eve of the Israeli attack.

When the problem of the Middle East was brought for judgment before the UN General Assembly—convened in an extraordinary session—Italy adopted on the whole a vague attitude with a view to avoiding condemnation of Israel. It decided to take steps favouring the Western Governments and dropped its neutral attitude. At the time of voting on the different suggestions—July 4—Italy voted against the Yugoslav suggestion (pre-Arab) and for the Latin American proposal. Both of them, passed with a simple majority, did not get the required two-thirds majority of votes. Italy did not also favour the suggestion accepted by the majority that Israel should abstain from taking steps to annex Jerusalem. After that time Italy always favoured discussion of the Arab-Israeli problems by the UN and not by other Great Powers.

Oil played an important part between Italy and Arab countries. The two main reasons for it are commercial and political. Oil is playing a very important part in the exchanges between Italy and Africa: Libya is the first commercial partner of Italy in Africa and it is oil that Libya exports to Italy.

ENI exploration activity has been directed mainly toward the Asian Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Abare Dhabi, Iran). Other concessions for exploration were allowed in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The explorations ended in Morocco in 1967 without any result. In Tunisia were organised in 1960 four combined societies for the exploration, exploitation, refining and distribution of oil.

The intervention of Italian State enterprise in the countries of the Middle East has often had a disruptive influence. Beginning with the agreements made in 1957 with Iran something new was introduced in the way of dividing profits by bypassing the strict 50-50 plan and promoting a special parity between the Western country and the country owning the oil wells. In this way ENI began its strategy of penetration in the Afro-Asian countries, which, because it was done by a State

organization, had greater possibilities of making economic profits consistent with a more strictly political view. Opposing the Anglo-French monopoly in the Middle East, ENI not only carried out a technical operation but a political one because of the manifold links in these areas between economic supremacy (oil production is the principal economic activity of the modern sector) and political influence, and between economic interests and political privileges. What was really new in the Teheran agreements was the emergence of a Middle Eastern State as a petroleum contractor, the very thing the consortium of big oil companies feared most. A mixed company was also created by the agreement with Morocco on July 26, 1958, and with Tunisia in June 1960.

The effectiveness of ENI's activity has not, however, been commensurate with the means employed. The few practical results of oil exploration in Iran, Tunisia and Morocco as well as in other countries where "concessions have been obtained have progressively removed "aggressiveness" from its transactions and its engagement to compete successfully with the monopoly of large trusts, a monopoly which is so harmful to balanced development of the economies of oil-producing countries. The political criteria for choices did not, however, stand up for long because investments were made in countries with completely different systems of government and did not take account of what would have been preferable to regimes consistently working for the progress of their nations. ENI's experience seems to prove that the laws of profit are not exactly compatible with the needs of developing countries.

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## Italy and Ethiopia : The First Four Years of the Resistance Movement (1936-41)

RICHARD PANKHURST

AFTER the occupation of Addis Ababa on May 6, 1936, and the proclamation of the Italian Empire on May 9 the aggressors still had much to do in the military field. Graziani, the Italian commander responsible for operations against the forces of Ethiopian resistance, and later Viceroy of Ethiopia, appears to have been in a by no means confident mood, for he is quoted by Canevari as declaring: "The situation that I inherited was the opposite of happy; on the contrary it looked more and more serious as each single aspect was examined. In the capital which, as is well known, lies in a great wood of eucalyptus trees, there were only 7,500 of our men, virtually surrounded by the remains of the Negus's armies, that is more than 100,000 armed men". Seeking to explain his difficulties he went on to declare that "the Ethiopian people had for many years been targets for anti-Italian propaganda which was intensified with the war. The country was full of arms that flowed in steadily from the neighbouring British possessions. In fact, our troops were in control of only a very small part of the immense territory of Ethiopia. Moreover, the rainy season, which begins regularly at that time of the year, would make the arrival of reinforcements and supplies almost out of the question."<sup>1</sup>

Vigorous efforts were now made by the Italians to disarm the Ethiopian population, who had long possessed large quantities of firearms,<sup>2</sup> and in some instances had actually obtained them as gifts from the invaders. Earlier in the fighting, it may be recalled, the latter had distributed weapons freely to dissident tribesmen in the hope that they would use them against the Emperor's armies. Thus foreign war correspondents reported in November 1935 that General Mariotti took 10,000 rifles to give to the Dankalis.<sup>3</sup> Matthews, describing the distribution of these weapons, noted that the Italians "were playing a dangerous game in Ethiopia, and were willing to use dangerous tactics". The guns, he says, were "a miscellaneous and antique selection: French Gras rifles, 1874 model, Label, 1886 model, and the Daudeteau". He nevertheless adds: "They may have been antiques to us, but the joy of the Danakils on receiving them was genuine and immense". This was not surprising, for "many of them," he was led to believe, "had never had guns before."<sup>4</sup> Several hundred Azebu Gallas, according to the same observer, were shortly afterwards given rifles at Dolo,<sup>5</sup> while Badoglio, the Italian commander in the north, says that immediately before the battle of Enderta

these tribesmen were armed by his men with 3,000 guns "and formed into units of varying strength and constitution".<sup>6</sup>

After the occupation, however, Italian policy inevitably changed, and orders were given that the local inhabitants should surrender their weapons. On May 9 Badoglio reported that in the first four days of the occupation the population of Addis Ababa surrendered 3,500 rifles, 89 pistols, 35 machine-guns, two cannon and "numerous" spears and swords.<sup>7</sup> Less than a week later he announced that these figures by May 15 had risen to 7,853 rifles, 80 pistols, 156 machine-guns and 51 cannon, as well as an "enormous quantity" of ammunition.<sup>8</sup> Italian insistence on the surrender of arms was, as may be imagined, very unpopular. Wiese towards the end of the year went so far as to declare that it constituted "perhaps the greatest obstacle to pacification."<sup>9</sup>

The fascists, who were well aware that the war was by no means over, were determined to continue the ruthless policy of repression which had characterised the earlier stages of the conflict. On May 13, 1936, Mussolini therefore sent Graziani "peremptory orders to shoot the so-called Young Ethiopians",<sup>10</sup> who consisted in the main of the few hundred young men educated abroad in the previous decade or so.<sup>11</sup> The Viceroy, hesitated, however, in part perhaps the situation seemed to him both unstable and tense. It was a sign of things to come when on May 4 Lij Haile Mariam Mammo attacked invading troops passing through Debra Berhan on the way to Addis Ababa, thus becoming, as Woizerit Salome Gabre Egziabher noted three decades later, "the first Patriot of Shoa".<sup>12</sup> Ten days later Graziani telegraphed Lessona, the Minister of the Colonies, to report: "Yesterday afternoon our native company working on the road Jigjiga-Harar at 34 kms. from Jigjiga was attacked by groups of armed Abyssinians. The attackers were driven back with serious losses.....Through my message distributed everywhere by means of aircraft and by messengers I have told Ethiopian chiefs and private persons after the fall of the Empire of Haile Selassie, those who dared to commit hostile actions against our troops would be considered as rebels and treated as such, while I guaranteed immunity to those who surrendered; so I have given orders that the prisoners taken shall be shot immediately .....Of this I have notified chiefs and soldiers who have not submitted by means of another appropriate message which will be distributed by aircraft and messengers. And I have warned them that this fate will befall without mercy all those who hereafter commit acts of rebellion."<sup>13</sup>

The said "appropriate message" was addressed by Graziani to "all the people of Ethiopia", and declared: "H.M. the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia has sent me here to uphold the government of the Empire. Mussolini, the Duce of Italy and of Fascism, has given me orders to lead all the people back to peace and tranquillity. Do not listen therefore to false news spread by ill-wishers. Italy is now the absolute master of all Ethiopia and will remain so at whatever cost, using extreme severity towards those who seek to rebel and the greatest generosity towards chiefs and followers who freely and loyally submit. Give up your arms, because he who is hereafter found in possession of them will be inexorably punished! Return to the fields to work, and to your commerce! If you listen to these words of the Duce Italy will make all

the territory of the Empire rich and prosperous. Rebels, on the other hand, will be destroyed and annihilated." <sup>14</sup>

The prime objective of the fascists at this time, as later explained in *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana*, was, however, largely limited to ensuring the safety of the Addis Ababa-Dessie road, their main communications route with Eritrea, their colony and base of operations to the north. On May 15 reinforcements were accordingly despatched to Debra Berhan and Debra Sina and succeeded in occupying Ankober on May 21.<sup>15</sup> Graziani noted on June 30 that the inhabitants of the Debra-Ankober area had "spontaneously" handed in 447 rifles, 20,000 cartridges, 4 machine-guns and 170 artillery projectiles—the more important question as to how many they retained he did not discuss.<sup>16</sup>

The Duce fully concurred with Graziani's policy of repression. On June 5 he sent him an urgent telegram declaring, "All the rebels made prisoners should be shot",<sup>17</sup> and on July 8 observed in a longer telegram: "I once more authorize Your Excellency systematically to conduct a policy of political terror and extermination against rebels and implicated populations. Without the law of tenfold retribution one does not cure the wound in good time."<sup>18</sup> Lessona also urged the need for rigorous repression, particularly against the Young Ethiopians who, he declared, on July 10, had a "false Veneer of Europeanized culture", and being "at the head of every xenophobic movement", were "particularly poisonous and dangerous". Recalling the Duce's previous command that they should be shot, he declared that the then existing situation rendered it "necessary that such orders be executed completely" so that the persons in question be "eliminated, without mercy or pardon."<sup>19</sup> Graziani, however, once more decided against so stringent a policy, and telegraphed back on the same day that he would instead exile the young men to a camp at Danane on the Somali coast.<sup>20</sup> This was, however, no very great act of clemency, for one of the detainees, Mikael Tesema, who had previously been educated in Italy, later testified that out of 6,500 prisoners at Danane no fewer than 3,175 died, while Blatta Bekele Hapte Mikael, an Ethiopian judge, declared on oath: "The food which the Italians gave us was very bad for our health", and consisted of rotten biscuits with many worms in them."<sup>21</sup>

Though not going to the full length urged by his superiors in respect of the Young Ethiopians Graziani devoted most of his energies to a policy of coercion. On July 8 he reported that he had given orders suspending for fifteen days the right of the ex-Legations to send radio messages,<sup>22</sup> and on July 15 announced that his "organs of police and information" were "at last on the track of the organization" through which the "rebel" leader, Aberra Kassa, was in contact with the inhabitants of Addis Ababa.<sup>23</sup> The Viceroy was moreover as determined as Mussolini that anyone involved in resistance should be mercilessly punished, and in a telegram of July 30 to the Minister of the Colonies declared: "Repressive action continues against armed groups scattered in the bush. All prisoners have been shot. Inexorable repressive measures have been effected against all populations guilty, if not of complicity, at least of absence of reaction."<sup>24</sup>

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The rainy season of 1936, which began at the end of June, greatly hampered Italian offensive operations and thus provided the Ethiopians with a much needed breathing space in which the Patriot movement developed.<sup>25</sup> The first significant incident of this phase of the struggle occurred on July 6 when a force of Patriots, described by Bollati as "incited by the sons of Ras Kassa," cut the railway and telegraph lines between Akaki and Mojo, derailed several carriages near Ada, thereby, according to Corrado Zoli, causing an eight-day interruption of traffic,<sup>26</sup> and proceeded to attack an Italian force near Adama on July 9.<sup>27</sup> Evelyn Waugh, who travelled by rail from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa shortly afterwards, reported that "there had been sharp fighting in the previous month. A train was derailed and sacked, two bridges destroyed and a station besieged for a day and a half. For ten days trains could not get through." The Italians were, therefore, taking strong precautions: "There was a machine-gun section", he says, "posted at the front of the train; another at the rear".<sup>28</sup> Patriots a little to the north-west were also engaged in fighting at Debra Berhan and Koromesh on July 19,<sup>29</sup> and launched assaults at Ankober on July 21 and 22.<sup>30</sup>

Addis Ababa itself was attacked for the first time on July 28 when Patriot forces attacked from the north-west and south-east. Zoli describes them as a "strong nuclei of dissidents and rebels" under Abera Kassa and Dejazmach Balcha,<sup>31</sup> while Bollati says that a "strong force of armed men under the sons of Kassa infiltrated the woods around the capital, attempting to attack it in the hope of provoking a revolt in the city."<sup>32</sup> Waugh was later informed by the Italians that "several hundred armed raiders got into the centre of the city before they were discovered and wiped out in the gulleys",<sup>33</sup> while Woizerit Salome Gabre Egziabher investigating the matter a generation or more later learnt that contrary to Italian statements, the attacking force was supported by "almost the entire population of the town".<sup>34</sup> According to Zoli, Italian aircraft attacked the Patriots around Addis Ababa fiercely "throughout the day of July 29, bombing them, machine-gunning them and thus finally dispersing them."<sup>35</sup> Patriots were also very active to the east in the Chercher area where Zoli admits that though the population surrendered 24 machine-guns, 320 Mauser rifles and 1,100 other types of rifles, the Italian advance proceeded slowly.<sup>36</sup> Ethiopian forces counter-attacked in this area, attacking the Italian garrison at Kolubi on August 14 and 19, on which day they captured the local church,<sup>37</sup> while other groups far away in the north launched an attack on Warra Illu on August 20.<sup>38</sup>

Addis Ababa was again attacked a few days later, this time by Dejazmatch Balcha, on the night of August 26.<sup>39</sup> On the following day Graziani telegraphed Rome that he had given instructions that all coded telegrams from the ex-foreign Legations, now reduced to consulate level, should be held up to prevent the diffusion of "alarmist news" until the Minister of the Colonies had been able to release his own version of events.<sup>40</sup> Waugh, who was in the city at this time, recalls that the official of the Italian Ministry of the Press who was looking after him "seemed embarrassed." The Patriots, he adds, were "attacking the aerodrome. Bombers arrived from Dire Dawa. It was quite a battle".<sup>41</sup>

Describing conditions in and around the capital at the time of his visit the English writer goes on to say that "there was a general sense of insecurity". Writing, it should be remembered, as a sympathiser of Italy, he added: "The raids on the town were futile; the chance of a rising inside it, remote. But all the time there was an illusion of being besieged. The thick groves of eucalyptus which surround Addis on all sides provided a perfect cover for attack and retreat.....the bandits could and frequently did advance unobserved to a few yards of the outer defences; more than this, the circumference of the town is so large and its boundaries so ill-defined, the ground so broken with water-courses and footpaths, that they could effortlessly penetrate the defences at twenty places."<sup>42</sup> Such incidents, however, were few and far between, and the Italian garrison, Waugh explains, often had "nothing to do except sit about sheltering from the rain and gaze out from the sentry posts into the dripping eucalyptus; to go into action when it suited the temper of the marauding bands to come and shoot at them. It was a severe test of morale."<sup>43</sup> Dr. Ladislav Sava, a Hungarian physician then practising in the capital, writes more sympathetically of the Patriots, and declares that "guerilla troops often approached Addis Ababa from the forest, harassing the Italian troops whenever they met them. Graziani was master of the town, but on the Gulali road, for instance, in the Italian hospital there, one could often hear quite clearly the noise of rifles and machine-guns in the near neighbourhood."<sup>44</sup>

Outside the capital fighting was even more frequent. Italian records tell for example of battles with "strong rebel forces" in the Debra Sina area, as well other parts of Shoa and Harar province at the end of August,<sup>45</sup> of Patriot attacks between Kolubi and Chalenko on September 1,<sup>46</sup> and of guerilla operations in Menz and near the Termaber pass around September 7,<sup>47</sup> the Ethiopians attempting to capture Debra Sina on the following day.<sup>48</sup> Resistance was in fact so widespread as to enable the Ethiopian Legation in London to report on September 21 that "the occupation by the Italians.....far from being extended, has in some cases been confined to certain points, and in others troops have had to be entirely withdrawn. This has been due partly to the setting in of the rainy season which has prevented movements of Italian troops and precluded the employment of their weapons of destruction and terror, and partly to the fact that the Ethiopian population has recovered from the effects of their first shock of surprise and is opposing with their full vigour the Italian advance." Turning to the forces of resistance the statement went on to declare that the "armies still in the field" included those of Ras Desta, in Sidamo, Bajirond Fekre Sellase, in Arussi, Dejasmach Beyene Merid, in Bali, and Dejasmach Abera Kassa, in Sallale, all of whom were under the direction-in-chief of Ras Imru, at Gore."<sup>49</sup> The whole of Western Ethiopia, it should be emphasised, was still unoccupied. A British officer, Captain Brophil, reported at the beginning of September that he had "just returned" from a visit to this area and that "Ethiopia west of Addis Ababa is completely in Ethiopian hands. There is not, so far as I could discover, an Italian between the capital and the Sudan frontier. Trade is being carried on, and the markets are open."<sup>50</sup>

Large-scale Italian offensive operations were, however, resumed in September when the abatement of the rains enabled the Italian air force to



launch a fierce assault, making considerable use of poison gas, as a prelude to renewed fighting on the ground which began again in November.<sup>51</sup> On September 11 Graziani gave orders for a major drive against the Patriots of Lasta. "Reprisals without mercy", he telegraphed, "should be effected against all districts of Lasta without listening to the flatteries that the priests now try to put forth." Lasta, he continued, "is the stronghold of the brothers Kassa, now tenacious rebels. Consequently the villages must be systematically destroyed in order that the people be convinced of the inevitable necessity of abandoning their leaders. Since it is now impossible to use troop columns owing to the rains.....the goal can be attained by the use of all means of destruction from the air day after day, mainly using asphyxiating gases."<sup>52</sup> Reporting progress on the morrow he telegraphed: "All seven planes which left this morning have returned after accomplishing their task. I have given orders.....that tomorrow morning all aircraft at the airport of Asmara should carry out bombing with yperite on four zones indicated as the refuge of armed men and leaders of the Lalibela and Bilbela Ghiorghis formations".<sup>53</sup>

Patriot forces none the less kept up their pressure on the invaders in other regions. Italian sources admit attacks in the Kolubi area on September 18 and 20, and at Debra Sina on September 25,<sup>54</sup> and state that trains were attacked at Dukam on October 9 and near Adama on October 16,<sup>55</sup> while the line was cut near Walankiti on October 18. The Ethiopian Legation in London, subsequently commenting on these operations around the railway, declared: "The fighting was hot. Ethiopian soldiers fought together as one man. That was sad news for the Italians, but it was a great day for Ethiopia".<sup>56</sup> Confirmation as to the extent of resistance, and the manner in which the Ethiopians were now fighting back, comes from a European long resident in Addis Ababa as an employee of the Bank of Ethiopia who reported: "Italian posts are often attacked by the Ethiopian warriors. There are skirmishes all the time. It appears that the Ethiopians overtake them more cleverly, attacking them unexpectedly and retiring before the arrival of reinforcements. One often hears news of burnt lorries on the Dessie Road and of attacks at Bishoftu, Dukham, Mojo, Ambo, etc.,"<sup>57</sup> i.e., places within only a hundred kilometres or so of the capital. Still concerned with the need to secure their lines of communication with the north Italian energies, as noted in *Gli Annali dell'Africa Italiana*, continued to be largely directed to the triangle Debra Berhan-Ankober Debra Sina.<sup>58</sup>

Aerial operations, again involving the use of yperite gas, were extended further afield. Some of the most vigorous Italian attacks were launched in the vicinity of the railway, just east of Addis Ababa, as the Viceroy reported on October 21. "This morning", he declared, "I have ordered the air force.....to carry out reprisal action on the line of villages Mount Zuquala and the plain between the said mountain and the railway line Moggio-Adama". Describing the operation in some detail he continued: "In the densely populated districts seasonal movements of rebels and peasants had taken place with the usual questioning between those who had submitted and those who had not submitted (see identical phenomenon in Cyrenaica). Twenty-five airplanes took part in the action, among which were ten bombers. Villages were destroyed first with explosives and incendiary bombs and then with yperite. Particularly two

large villages, one situated at the top and the other half way up Mount Zuquala, were almost destroyed by the action of bombers. In those villages are the two well-known monasteries whose prior some days ago presented himself at Moggio with several hundred priests to make a solemn act of submission, but during the recent attacks they have given asylum to the rebels. The above mass action will continue throughout all districts along the railway without taking any account of the so-called submissions; accompanying that is the large-scale action by Mariotti's brigade to destroy rebel centres near the railway. All this has already been included for some time in the operational plan of this command, but could not be started before, for well known reasons dependent on the rains and insufficient forces." Turning to the role of aerial warfare as he envisaged it Graziani added: "The air force which, throughout the rainy season, has made a wonderful contribution, suffering very serious losses... has nearly completed its offensive regrouping for the operations in progress..... Following the stormy period of the rains.....and freed from the mud a fortnight after the end of the rains all ground and air forces have speeded up their rate of movement according to the will and directions of the Duce and nothing will stop them."<sup>59</sup>

Italian reports now tell of "repressive action" east of Addis, which was effected on October 19 despite "lively enemy opposition", "punitive action" near Walankiti on October 23, the dispersal of a rebel nucleus" near the Awash on October 27, and "repressive action" near Mount Yerer on November 4, and again on November 9.<sup>60</sup> Such operations often caused the local population great deprivations, and was accompanied by savage acts of repression. An Ethiopian judge, Blatta Haile Wolde Kidan, later testified that at Gorro "the Italian army gathered all civilians who had no rifles at all, including mothers who carried their babies on their backs, and shepherds who were found round there, in a hollow-place and machine-gunned them".<sup>61</sup>

An Italian offensive in the difficult Chercher hills was also reported at about this time, but made slow progress.<sup>62</sup> "The three columns operating between the Ramis and Burca valleys to mop up rebels", Graziani recorded on November 13, "yesterday rested to get provisions and to send back the wounded. They will probably rest today as well, because of the difficulty in getting the necessary supplies there. The rest is necessary also because the troops are very tired. Meanwhile the rebels are encircled on three sides and the fourth has been yperited. Of course, the region is large and the ground very broken. Escape in small groups will thus always be possible. Fighting on the 5th, 9th, and 10th has shown the rebels setting up a dogged defence and understanding how to lead the fighting to ground that is favourable to them. This explains our losses. Rebel losses are, however, believed to be great and the fighting has split up their formations."<sup>63</sup> Three days later, on November 16, he reported: "Military action with four hard battles has reduced the rebel resistance between the Ramis valley and the Burca valley, is having its effects in the political field. Our patrols are mopping up the valley, forcing submissions followed by disarming. Inevitably, groups, even large ones, have fled westwards, crossing yperited zones, where they have no doubt left victims".<sup>64</sup> This extensive use of aircraft was also reported at the time by the Jibuti correspondent of *New Times and Ethiopia News*, who declared on

December 20 : "I learn from Dire Dawa that the Italian aeroplanes go out from there every morning towards Garamullata; and they are all bombers. They come back at noon for fresh supplies of bombs, and go out again in the evening. This happens every day; they are trying to destroy the Ethiopians who are fighting round Garamullata."<sup>65</sup> Supported in this way from the air the Italians succeeded in advancing, and by about the end of the year had captured in Harar province, as Zoli records, 26,000 rifles and 26 heavy and 26 light machine-guns.<sup>66</sup>

Similar aerial operations took place in Southern Ethiopia where, Graziani telegraphed on November 16 : "Addis Ababa air force will..... intensify from tomorrow the same action from the north, bombing and yperiting Irgalem and Agheresalem and Allata".<sup>67</sup> The importance of these tactics was not lost on the Ethiopian Legation in London which commented on January 30, 1937 : "When the Italians wish to occupy any place they never send their soldiers until they have performed their cruel business of bombing and gassing that place and the surrounding countryside, killing both people and animals. Then they send their soldiers to occupy the devastated place."<sup>68</sup> Italian forces were now advancing southwards into the hitherto unoccupied territories to capture Ghimbi and Dilla on November 9, Wadara on November 13, Lekemti on November 15, Jubdo on November 17, Jiren on November 18, Gore on November 26, Yirgalem on December 1, Bonga on December 13 and Gambela on December 17.<sup>69</sup>

Repressive action meanwhile continued in the main areas of resistance to the north,<sup>70</sup> particularly in Shoa which the Italians regarded as the heart of Ethiopian resistance. On December 12, for example, Graziani telegraphed one of his commanders, General Tracchia, declaring : "In this region from which have originated all the offences that caused us the infernal situation during the rains it is necessary to disarm and liquidate immediately without mercy and illusions". He went on to state that the inhabitants of the area were "now mostly obsequious because of the circumstances", but added : "I ask you not to be moved."<sup>71</sup> Italian reports continued to tell of considerable Patriot initiative in this area, notably near Tegulet on December 19, and in around Koromesh on the following day.<sup>72</sup> Active Ethiopian resistance was also reported by the Jibuti correspondent of *New Times and Ethiopia News* who observed on December 20 that "it is said that the Ethiopians gained good victories near Gore and Arussi, and near Caramullata" as a result of which the Ethiopian Consul at the port, Andargachew Masai, had hoisted the Ethiopian flag as a sign of rejoicing.<sup>73</sup> Perhaps the hardest fighting for the Italians, according to their own reports, was now against Ras Desta, Dejazmach Gabremariam, Dejazmach Beyene Merid and Shimellis in the Gedel mountains in late January and early February 1937.<sup>74</sup>

By the end of 1936 however the organised Ethiopian armies, as opposed to Patriot units, had reached breaking point, and this led to the capture of most of the principal Ethiopian leaders. Wondwossen Kassa was captured on December 10,<sup>75</sup> Ras Imru on December 15,<sup>76</sup> and Wondwossen Kassa's brothers, Aberra and Asfawossen Kassa, on December 21.<sup>77</sup> The three Kassa brothers were shot in accordance with the general fascist policy, but Ras Imru and another nobleman, Taye Gulelat, were treated by the special order of Graziani as prisoners of war, and flown to Italy on

January 4, 1937, though the Viceroy noted that their submission, being "scarcely spontaneous", special precautions would have to be taken to prevent their escape.<sup>78</sup> Beyene Merid was taken prisoner on February 20,<sup>79</sup> and Ras Desta Damtew on February 24, both leaders being immediately shot.<sup>80</sup> At about this time the Italians announced that since the beginning of the war up to December 20, they had captured 95,727 rifles, 473 pistols, 555 machine-guns and 155 cannon.<sup>81</sup>

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The Patriot struggle entered a new phase as a result of the attempt on Graziani's life on February 19, 1937. The story of this crucially important incident was told later in the day in a secret telegram which Graziani despatched to the Italian Minister of the Colonies. Copies, to be personally decoded, were also sent to the various Italian provincial governors allegedly to "prevent the diffusion of incorrect and alarmist news." In this message the Viceroy declared: "This morning at eleven o'clock I had convened at the Ghebi (i.e., palace) the chief notables representing the Coptic and Muslim religious communities in order to distribute in their presence gifts for churches and mosques and alms for about three thousand poor people of the city in honour of the birth of H. R. H. the Prince of Naples. At twelve o'clock while proceeding to the distribution itself persons who up to now had been unable to identify themselves infiltrated among the chiefs and threw some ten Breda type hand-grenades at the official party. As a result some thirty persons were wounded". Graziani proceeded to list the principal victims, who included his chief of Cabinet, and two generals, and quoted the medical report on his own condition which stated that he had suffered multiple shrapnel wounds causing considerable bleeding, but that his general condition was "satisfactory" and his morale "most excellent". In the telegram he went on to explain that he was continuing to exercise control of the government, through His Excellency Petretti and General Gariboldi who had been given joint powers to protect the security of the capital, and that he had already ordered "exceptional police measures". He reported, however, that the market that morning had been crowded, that there had been no prior indication that the incident was in the offing, and the population still "remained tranquil", though some 200 persons had been arrested, and the military authorities had begun investigations and interrogations.<sup>82</sup> Two days later it was officially announced in Rome, as the *Daily Telegraph* reported, that "2,000 natives" had been "arrested as suspects", a figure also later cited by Zoli.<sup>83</sup>

Recalling these events a decade or so later Graziani gave a slightly different account. He observed that the attackers had "hurled at least 18 bombs at me, trying to wipe out at one blow not only myself, but the whole government", and, turning to the ensuing security action, added that the plot "did not.....make me swerve from my fixed line of conduct by one millimetre.....repressive measures were taken with extreme promptitude and prevented a rising of the native population of Addis Ababa. It was intended that they should take our defence lines from behind and join hands with the rebels who surrounded the city on the outside, thus overthrowing the heart of our power. Instead the whole thing proved nothing more than an episode which left over 250 splinters of steel in my body, which I still bear as a souvenir."<sup>84</sup>

The "repressive measures" referred to by Graziani were described by other eye-witnesses as nothing short of a massacre. The events immediately following the bomb-throwing were later described on oath by an Eritrean archivist, Dejazmach Rosario Gilazgi, who was in the palace compound at the time. "I heard shooting", he says, "cars going here and there, people running, machine-gunning, it was a big disorder—Ethiopians running from Italians, Italians running from Ethiopians. The Italians apparently suspected that the rebels had got into the city. It had been said before that Ras Desta would menace the city and that the Ethiopian patriots would come and kill every Italian".<sup>85</sup> Another description of these events was given by Sava, who reports: "Blackshirts were running all over the town, ordering every shopkeeper to close his doors, and everyone else abroad to return to his home. In an hour there were no more people in the streets."<sup>86</sup> Dejazmach Rosario goes on to recall that he went with two Italians to the fascist headquarters where they met the fascist secretary, Guido Certese, and a "good number" of other fascists to whom the latter declared: "Comrades, today is the day when we show our devotion to our Viceroy by reacting and destroying Ethiopians for three days. For three days I give you *carta bianca* to destroy and kill and do what you want to Ethiopians."

"They went out", Dejazmach Rosario continues, "well equipped with their arms, and started their work. People who were not arrested by the *carabinieri* and were found in their houses or in the streets were killed.....I saw with my own eyes burning houses.....I saw young boys coming out from burning houses, but the Italians pushed them back into the fire.....The next day, Saturday, the Italians were still burning small houses. On the bigger houses they wrote their names to keep them for themselves. They broke down the doors and went in looting. They could not find a single man to kill; the ones who were not killed had been arrested or had run away.....At about 6-30 p. m. on Saturday we saw the flames from the petrol when they tried to set fire to St. George's cathedral. The windows broke from the heat, but the building resisted".<sup>87</sup>

Sava confirms much of the above statement. He declares that "Cortese convoked the blackshirts to the seat of the Fascio, the chiefs to a consultation, and the others to wait for orders. Very soon they sped from the Fascio in every direction, fully armed. Everyone in the town was a prey to anticipation, but what really happened was worse than anyone had feared. I am bound to say, for it is true, that blood was literally streaming down the streets. The corpses of men, women and children, over which vultures hovered, were lying in all directions. Great flames from the burning houses illuminated the African night.....

"The greatest slaughter began after 6 o'clock in the evening..... During that awful night, Ethiopians were thrust into lorries, heavily guarded by armed blackshirts. Revolvers, truncheons, rifles and daggers were used to murder completely unarmed black people, of both sexes and all ages. Every black person seen was arrested and bundled into a lorry and killed, either in the lorry or near the Little Ghebi, sometimes at the moment when he met the blackshirts. Ethiopian houses and huts were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants. To quicken the flames, benzine and oil were used in great quantities. The shooting never ceased

all night, but most of the murders were committed with daggers and blows with a truncheon at the head of the victim. Whole streets were burned down, and if any of the occupants of the houses ran out from the flames they were machine-gunned or stabbed with cries of "Duce! Duce! Duce!!! From the lorries in which groups of prisoners were brought up to be murdered near the Ghebi, the blood flowed on to the streets and again from the lorries we heard the cry, 'Duce! Duce! Duce!!!'"<sup>88</sup>

"I shall never forget", he concludes, "that night Italian officers passing in their luxurious cars through the blood-drenched streets, stopping at some point whence they could have a better panorama of the murdering and the burning, accompanied by their wives, whom I am very reluctant to call women".<sup>92</sup>

Another eye-witness report, released by the Ethiopian Legation in London, declared that "the streets were strewn with dead bodies...No one dared venture out. From that time began a method which was followed thoroughly during the three long days.....The method consisted of setting fire to the houses, waiting for the inhabitants to be driven out by the fire and massacring them without distinction, with daggers, bayonets, hand grenades, cudgels, stones and, at times, with guns. One could see groups of fascists chaining the poor men to lorries and amusing themselves by dragging them along from one part of the town to the other until their bodies fell to pieces.....In certain quarters the corpses entirely covered the streets and the squares. In St. George's Square, already robbed of the equestrian statue of Menelik II, the dead bodies formed a veritable pile. Now the appearance of the city is like a field of battle after the fighting is over."<sup>90</sup> The missionaries Hebert and Della Hanson report that on visiting the city shortly after the incident they "found large areas burned that had formerly been covered with inhabited huts. Even around the hospital walls, where there had been many huts, all was blackened ruins. It made us heart sick to see the devastation, especially where we learned that many of the huts had been burned with their owners in them."<sup>91</sup>

Other observers, speaking later on oath, corroborate these accounts. Thus an Armenian merchant, Edouard Garabedian, related that on the first day of the massacre he heard Italians "saying they were waiting orders for reprisals", and that "at about five o'clock, I saw them with my own eyes beating every Ethiopian they could find. These Italians were civilians. They were using what they could find, as cudgels etc....I learnt from some of the Italians that they had received orders to burn different Ethiopian quarters. They were burning houses during the whole night... Next morning I heard that many Ethiopians had been killed during the night when the Italians were burning their houses. The following day I started to go to my work at 9 o'clock, but there was a great panic and Ethiopians were running from everywhere without self-control. The Italian blackshirts were pursuing them and beating them.....That day I did not go out from my house; but from there I heard much shooting and I saw burning houses all around. On the third day I went to my shop. This time there were no Ethiopians to be seen in the streets, but many Italians were circulating. I heard many of them saying that they had burnt such and such places and that they had murdered so many Ethiopians."<sup>92</sup>

Captain Toka Binegid, an Ethiopian in the Addis Ababa municipal fire-brigade, likewise testifies that when the first signs of fire were seen his commanding officer ordered them to the Sidist Kilo area of the town to put out an assumed accidental conflagration, but "when we arrived there we saw the Italians burning the houses intentionally, so our officer ordered us not to put out the fire, saying he understood what it was all about. While still standing there we saw many people being killed by Italians while trying to escape from burning houses. "The Italians", he adds, "divided themselves into different formations : while some of them were murdering, some collected the corpses and threw them on the trucks. They were gathering the corpses from the roads with iron rakes. Among the persons who were pulled by the iron rakes many were alive ..... I saw Italian soldiers being photographed while standing on the dead bodies of their victims. The burning of houses and killing of people which started on Friday.....continued up to Monday morning."<sup>93</sup>

Another observer of these events, Blatta Dawit Ogbazgi, who was arrested on Friday and detained with "about a thousand people" in a police station near Ras Makonnen Bridge, later testified that "the same day people were brought in lorries; they were taken without distinction and most of them were bleeding from hits. The fascists used to throw them down from the lorries. Some of them rolled down to the river, because they were thrown from the lorries, and these the Italian shot in front of us. All the houses and tukuls which were in front of us were burning."<sup>94</sup>

During this massacre the Italians murdered a number of the foreign-educated Ethiopians, above all those who had studied in Britain or the United States. The death list thus included Tsege Marqos Wolde Tekle, Gabre Medhen Awoqe, Ayenna Birru, Yohannes Boru, and Yusuf and Benjamin Martin, sons of the Ethiopian Minister in London, all six of whom had been students in England, Besha Worrid Hapte Wold and Makonnen Haile, who had both studied in the United States, and Kifle Nassibu who was French educated.<sup>95</sup> A special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* later recorded that the French Minister in Addis Ababa reported that "6,000 Ethiopians" were "murdered in three days", while the British Consulate "knew over 2,000 names of the killed;"<sup>96</sup> subsequent missionary accounts claimed that "thousands" were arrested, and "any suspected person shot without trial", the whole incident being "the worst massacre for a century or more".

This great massacre, it is generally agreed, had a profound influence on Ethiopian thinking, and gave new strength to the resistance movement. The *New Times and Ethiopia News* correspondent in Jibuti reported shortly afterwards on March 11 that Addis Ababa was "almost empty of Abyssinians", and added that as a result of the incident "the Abyssinians know there is nothing left for them but to fight, and the world will presently hear that they are everywhere attacking anew. Those who fled from Addis well know what to expect from Italy and they will fight again".<sup>98</sup> Blatta Dawit, giving his evidence a decade later, confirms that one of the most important results of the massacre was that Ras Abebe Aregai, the principal Patriot leader in Shoa, "had his forces increased immensely, at least by 10,000; also other Patriot forces received reinforce-

ments, because when people heard of what had taken place...they left their homes and went away from the neighbourhood of Addis Ababa."<sup>98</sup> Woizerit Salome Gabre Egziabher, studying the question three decades later likewise attached considerable significance to this development, and declared that "many of the people of Addis Ababa who escaped from the shootings went to join the Patriots who were living in the forests around the capital".<sup>100</sup>

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The Viceroy's attempted assassination also resulted in intensified repression all over the country. Mussolini, on receiving Graziani's first report, immediately telegraphed back, on February 20, that without attributing to the incident "greater importance than it really had" it showed the need for "that radical clean sweep which, in my mind, is absolutely necessary in Shoa".<sup>101</sup> This message set the tone for the events which followed. On February 25 one of Graziani's commanders, Archimede Mischi, the officer in charge of the western stretch of the railway, reported the execution of 42 Ethiopians, whom he described as "dangerous elements", guilty of "continual activity of rebellion",<sup>102</sup> while on March 1 the Viceroy ordered General Nasi, his governor of Harar, to shoot all the "Amhara notables and ex-army officers" who had surrendered. "I order", he commanded, "that they all be shot immediately according to the directions of the Duce repeated a thousand times..... It is time to put an end to it. Your Excellency may keep in mind that those who made the attempt on my life—which although being a miserable thing yet represents Italy—were all Abyssinian notables in the very same positions who had received pardon in many places. Keep in mind also that here I have already aimed at the total destruction of Abyssinian chiefs and notables and that similar measures should be completely carried out in your territories. A better opportunity could not be found to get rid of them. Give assurances with the word 'shot', but let the assurance be serious".<sup>103</sup>

Nasi, on receipt of this order, at once telegraphed to his subordinate officers, on March 2, saying: "His Excellency the Viceroy has demanded rigorous adherence to the directions of the Duce for the treatment of rebels. Consequently I give you orders to shoot all—I say all—rebels, notables, chiefs, followers, either captured in action or giving themselves up after leaving their formations or isolated fugitives or cunning elements hiding among the local populations or who even though they have not taken active part in the revolt are suspected of bad faith or of being guilty of helping rebels in a concrete way or only intending to, or if they hide arms. Women are, of course, excluded, except in particular cases, and children. The commandants addressed will give necessary directions to subordinate commands and proceed meanwhile to execute elements captured hitherto or who are found to be in the categories mentioned by me above.....Commanders addressed will give me immediate assurance with the word 'shot', and communicate to me as soon as possible the measures taken and which they will take from time to time in accordance with these orders".<sup>104</sup>

Similar instructions were despatched by Graziani to other commanders, among them Gelose, his governor at Jimma, whom he telegraphed



on April 8, reminding him of "the directions of the Duce which aim at the complete destruction of Amharic elements in territories of former Abyssinian conquest; give a pinch more of courage in this respect to the civilian officials who are nearest you and to column commanders who, with the instinctive generosity of the combatant, are sometimes led to make terms by easily understandable sentiments. Be assured, Your Excellency, that by acting thus in a very short time, having now been furnished with all the troops and materials necessary, you will assuredly obtain complete pacification in your territory."<sup>105</sup> Despite this optimistic note fascist intelligence reports revealed extensive opposition. Thus Major Giuseppe Franceschino, reporting on April 17 on the situation at Dessie, frankly declared, "We cannot have confidence in either the priests or the nobles : the sentiment of rebellion is latent in all".<sup>106</sup>

Doubts as to the wisdom of the policy of indiscriminate execution were also sometimes voiced. Thus on April 23 General Nasi in Harar sent the Viceroy a long telegram in which he recalled that "600 chiefs and followers" had been executed after their unconditional surrender in Bale and that "to encourage the dispersion" of enemy forces near the Webe Shibeli he had later obtained Graziani's special permission to spare the lives of those who surrendered, as a result of which it had been possible to persuade some 4,000 persons to give up the struggle who "would otherwise.....have dispersed into the country, thus creating the phenomenon of brigandage which might have given us serious trouble and difficulties, specially during the rains." He now urged a similar policy of expediency in respect of 54 Chercher chiefs who had relatives among the Italian "native" troops, and argued that the "mass execution" of these chiefs would have "damaging repercussions on the efforts for pacification". The mere fact of their having been put into a concentration camp, he noted, had given rise to the rumour that they had been executed, and this had "created panic and commotion". He therefore "earnestly" begged the Viceroy "to allow court procedure to take its place", but added : "I assure you that it will deal with the utmost severity and will end with capital punishment for the leaders most compromised and dangerous".<sup>107</sup> Graziani accepted this plea, and replied : "Since in these questions it is shades of opinion that count, I leave Your Excellency to settle the matter as you think best."<sup>108</sup>

The Viceroy had, however, by no means abandoned his aim of eliminating the Amhara chieftains, and returned to the question in the following month. Somewhat disingenuously he complained, on May 11, of the "hypocrisy and falsehood of the Abyssinian people" who had replied to his "goodness and kindness" with "treachery and bombs",<sup>109</sup> and on the following day despatched a telegram to all his provincial governors, praising what they were doing against the rebels "be it to disarm them or be it to eliminate all the Amhara chiefs large or small." The rest of the population, he declared, was "but an apathetic mass which once the chiefs are eliminated can easily be absorbed by us. Everyone must understand this. Civil officials and military commanders, without any false humanitarian pity, we must have before us but one aim which is that of consolidating the conquest of the Empire, above all after the experience acquired during a year, and to which the Amharas and inhabitants of Shoa have replied

with bombs."<sup>110</sup> At about this time the fascists in Addis Ababa, as Sava recalls, erected a gallows on which "ten people could be hanged at one time". It stood 8 feet above the street between the wood market, and the straw market, and a couple of electric lights were placed nearby to illuminate the scene as the bodies, closely guarded by troops, were often left hanging overnight, and sometimes two days and two nights. Besides each victim, the Hungarian adds, was "placed the rifles and other weapons taken from him in life, that people might understand that men were hanged for using weapons in the defence of their country."<sup>111</sup>

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The Viceroy had meanwhile also directed his attention to another section of population, the so-called "wizards and soothsayers", who were reported to be dangerous opponents of the fascist regime. On March 15, 1937, one of his aides Princivale noted that Addis Ababa had "already been cleaned of all spell-binding groups of wizards and soothsayers", and that "a similar cleansing" was anticipated throughout Shoa where such "treacherous elements" enjoyed "great power among the population" and were "particularly dangerous".<sup>112</sup> A few days later, on March 19, the Viceroy telegraphed to Lessona that after the attempt on his life one month earlier "the political organs and police" had "shown me that among the most dangerous disturbers of public order one must enumerate the travelling minstrels, soothsayers and wizards because they treacherously spread among the primitive, ignorant and superstitious population the most untruthful news concerning catastrophic events: the complete destruction of the entire population by the Italians, coming attacks on the capital led by imposing rebel formations with foreign help, the forthcoming return of the Negus at the head of an imposing army etc." Turning to the supposed influence of such persons and the need to eliminate them he added: "The population, though mistrustful of these agitators and reporting them to the authorities as dangerous elements nevertheless does not escape from the spell of their prophecies... Convinced of the necessity of completely eradicating this evil plan I have given orders that all wandering minstrels, soothsayers and wizards in the town and the surroundings be arrested and shot". These orders had in fact already been partially carried out, for he adds: "In all today seventy have been arrested and eliminated. This measure has produced an excellent impression and a sentiment of alleviation among the native population. By a special order the exercise of the above professions in the future has been forbidden under pain of death."<sup>113</sup> Mussolini for his part gave these murders his personal approval, and telegraphed to Graziani on March 20: "I approve what has been done concerning wizards and rebels. It must continue until the situation is radically and definitely peaceful."<sup>114</sup>

Shootings and deportations accordingly continued apace, and on March 21 Graziani reported to the Duce that, "excluding the repressions of February 19 and 20", there had been 324 summary executions in a month, and that 1,100 men, women and children had been sent to the concentration camp at Danane.<sup>115</sup> A couple of days later the Viceroy despatched further telegrams to his commanders in many parts of the country to say that the "hermits, wizards, soothsayers and travelling minstrels",

whose "stupid prophecies" had created "excitement or at least perplexity" among the population of the capital, had been "in large measure eliminated". Those who enjoyed the greatest credit, and who were hence considered the most dangerous, had been shot while the others were deported. He went on to urge that "while this work of purification continued at Addis Ababa", it was "necessary that it should be extended to all the territory of former Shoa" as well as to "the various governors in the case that preachings or prophecies are directed against the Government or interfere with public order in any manner at all".<sup>118</sup> General Nasi replied on April 23: "Wizards and soothsayers will be shot without trial",<sup>119</sup> while other official Italian telegrams of this period give the details of numerous executions of persons considered guilty of "spreading false news", carrying out "anti-Italian propaganda", especially by "predicting the return of the reign of the Negus", and, in the case of two "vagabond prophets", "predicting for the next rainy season the return of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia."<sup>118</sup> Such prophets paid for their boldness with their lives, and on March 31 the Viceroy informed the Minister of Italian Africa in Rome that the number of executions had reached 1,439.<sup>119</sup>

The Viceroy's vengeance fell shortly afterwards on the monks and deacons of Debra Libanos, the principal monastery of Shoa. On May 20 Graziani ordered the summary execution of "all monks without distinction", and on the following day reported that orders had been given for the shooting of "two hundred and ninety-seven monks, including the vice-prior and twenty-three others also deemed guilty of complicity." In a later telegram he noted that "the complicity of deacons also being proved I have given orders to shoot them to the number of 129, at Debra Berhan. Thus there are left alive only 30 schoolboys, who have been sent to their native homes in various districts of Shoa. Thus, there remains no more trace of the Debra Libanos monastery."<sup>120</sup>

Efforts to disarm the population continued throughout this period, and led, on March 18, 1937, to the issue of a gubernatorial decree stating that Italians and "assimilated foreigners" could own no more than two long guns and the pistols and were prohibited from disposing of them without permission.<sup>121</sup> A few days later, on March 21, it was announced that up till then the Ethiopians had surrendered a total of 170,795 rifles, 1,380 pistols, 782 machine-guns and 165 cannon.<sup>122</sup> Polson Newman, a British sympathiser of Mussolini's, noted later in 1937 that he had seen "the natives bringing in their arms", and adds that "most of the piles looked more suitable for museum use than anything else" though others included "most modern weapons".<sup>123</sup> "The only natives allowed to carry arms", he explains, "were the Askaris, or 'native' irregulars, and those with special permits", and that, as a result, "the natives no longer carry rifles."<sup>124</sup> Opposition to the regime was, however, still very strong, Graziani complaining on June 7 that anti-Italian propaganda was being "intensified" by Ethiopian exiles in Jibuti, Berbera and Aden.<sup>125</sup>

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The first half of 1937 witnessed much fighting in Ethiopia. The battles of this period, as reported by the Italians, included a fascist attack

on the Patriot leader Haile Mariam Mammo on February 20,<sup>126</sup> followed by a "rebel attack" at Tarmaber,<sup>127</sup> and "rebel incursions" on February 27 "in various lands of Shoa".<sup>128</sup> Fighting in Harar province was reported to have culminated on March 5 in a "bloody battle" at Gure,<sup>129</sup> while on the following day the "rebels" are said to have suffered "very heavy losses" at Tarmaber.<sup>130</sup> The Jibuti correspondent of *New times and Ethiopia News* noted on April 9 that "everywhere the Abyssinian chiefs have collected bands, and sworn a solemn oath to liberate their country or die", and added that "strong Abyssinian bands have reappeared near Garamullata and between Hawash and Dire Dawa."<sup>131</sup> In June, just before the rains the Italians launched a fierce assault on Ras Abebe Aregai's positions in Shoa. "While we were staying in the districts of Morat and Inuari", that chief later recalled, "the Italians attacked us four times, and these attacks we repulsed. On the fifth the Italian army, armed with tanks and heavy weapons supported by aeroplanes, attacked us and forced us to retreat. After that they began to exterminate the population of the said districts, including children and the aged."<sup>132</sup>

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The rains of 1937 saw the Italian army once more seriously immobilized, with the result that the Patriots again grew more daring. *Gli Annali dell' Africa Italiana* admits that "rebel bands" increased in August, and became more "menacing", particularly in Lasta, under Dejazmach Hailu Kebede, and in Begemder and Gojam where there were numerous "rebel bands", the most "active" being those of Dejazmach Mangasha in southern and Belai Zeleke in eastern Gojam.<sup>133</sup> Woizerit Salome Gabre Egziabher later reported that "it was around August 1937 that the people of Gojam, seeing the atrocious deeds of the Italians, decided to fight and liberate first Gojam and then the rest of Ethiopia". The fascist air force was once more very active. Graziani, reporting on fighting near Ambo, only 130 kilometres from Addis Ababa, noted on August 24, and again two days later, that aviation had given "the maximum possible assistance and destroyed without mercy."<sup>134</sup>

The overall military situation of the Italians was, however, by no means healthy. Pirzio Biroli, the Italian Governor at Gondar, observed on September 2 that "the situation, especially in Gojam, was becoming graver",<sup>135</sup> and added, <sup>136</sup> on September 5, that "the rebellion seemed to be spreading to Begemder", while Graziani noted on September 3 that there was "rebellion throughout Shoa", <sup>137</sup> and on September 10 that "the revolt in the territory of the Amhara Governorate assumes ever larger proportions," and that Dejazmach Hailu Kebede had proclaimed a holy war against the invaders with the result that the "rebels' adherents" were becoming "ever larger".<sup>138</sup> Lessona, who could not close his eyes to these developments, observed on September 2 that the "progressive kindling and spreading" of rebellion in Lasta, Begemder and Gojam had led to "sad episodes", <sup>139</sup> and added, on September 4, that "the situation, especially in Gojam, was becoming graver."<sup>140</sup>

The fascist leadership, alarmed at these events and by the seemingly unending character of the war, now intervened to insist on the speedy pacification of the Empire. On September 5 Lessona sent Graziani the

first of several telegrams on this score. Explaining that incidents like those recently reported became known in the international field and were therefore harmful to fascist policy the Minister declared that "the situation created in these last days in many parts of the Empire necessitates decisive measures of a military and political character. It is necessary at all costs to cut short the activities of the rebels in the shortest possible time".<sup>141</sup> A few days later, on September 12 he despatched the Viceroy another telegram in which he stated that "given the international situation it is necessary that Your Excellency uses maximum energy in order that conditions in the Empire return to normal within the present month". He also quoted Mussolini as ordering that the Viceroy should "act with the maximum energy, using all means against the rebels, including gas. It is absolutely necessary", he added, "to recapture the infected areas as soon as possible because prolonging the uncertain situation favours extending the rebellion."<sup>142</sup> Three days later the Duce himself telegraphed to his Viceroy. "I am prepared", he declared, "to send battalions and aeroplanes, but the revolt must be cut short with the greatest energy and in the briefest possible time. Do not lose any more time."<sup>143</sup>

Conditions at this time were in fact so serious for the Italians that Graziani in the report of September 15 found cause to note that "in the present situation of agitation it is necessary that the movement of the railway does not suffer any interruption."<sup>144</sup> Negotiations were shortly afterwards opened with Ras Abebe Aregai in the hope that he could be persuaded to lay down his arms, though Graziani commented on September 19 that he had "no illusions" as to the chief's real intentions, but would leave no stone unturned in order to obtain the "pacification of the territories of Shoa."<sup>145</sup>

The disarmament of the "native" population continued to receive the highest priority. Thus Graziani telegraphed the Italian Minister of the Colonies on September 7, 1937, that it was necessary "to make the population well understand that the only way of living in peace" was by delivering up their arms.<sup>146</sup> Shortly afterwards he noted in a report of September 26 on the situation in Lasta that there was "only one end: to disarm the population".<sup>147</sup> The number of arms confiscated or surrendered throughout the country was by now reaching astronomical proportions, the *Daily Telegraph* of September 30 quoting Italian sources as stating that they amounted to 283,954 rifles, 1,422 pistols, 999 machine-guns and 196 cannon,<sup>148</sup> though it was only too clear that very large numbers of weapons were still in the hands of the populations, particularly of Patriot forces.

The Italians were now struggling to their utmost to crush the Patriot movement. On September 26 Graziani hopefully claimed that his forces had succeeded in strengthening their position in Lasta and Debra Berhan, and that the operations in those regions were "so favourable as to give me a clear feeling that in a short while the rebellion will be everywhere broken by the inexorable impetus of our force."<sup>149</sup> The situation of the Italians in the north-west was, however, far less promising, and on September 28 he was obliged to admit that "with so vast a territory, and with two regions, Gojam and Begemder, in ferment" it was essential to ensure possession of the more important garrisons, for their abandonment

"would signify a deterioration in our position", and thus encourage the rebels who were easily emboldened even by ephemeral successes".<sup>150</sup>

Fascist impatience at the slow progress achieved was meanwhile on the increase, and a few days later Mussolini returned to the need for a speedy conclusion of the fighting. On October 1 he telegraphed to Graziani announcing the despatch of four new battalions, and added that it was "necessary to cut short every revolt as soon as possible."<sup>151</sup> Lessona took up the theme a week later. "I repeat", he declared on October 8, "I am ready to send from here as many troops as Your Excellency considers necessary because I repeat the rebellion must be cut short".<sup>152</sup> The Viceroy, who had by now been attempting to crush Ethiopian resistance for two long years was, however, unimpressed by such apparently impossible demands. On the following day he bluntly replied that "situations in general cannot be resolved except gradually and methodically, because experience teaches us that a rebellion is easy to cause but difficult to resolve."<sup>153</sup> Graziani had not, however, lost his old ruthlessness. On October 21 he sent a telegram to General Nasi in which he declared that at Garamullata, which he termed "the fortress of Negusissm", there "must not (I say not) remain a sole Amhara chief whatsoever. This is my conviction which seldom errs."<sup>154</sup> A fortnight or so later, on November 3, he was, however, obliged to report that, despite his earlier more optimistic statement, the rebellion was "almost total in the territories of new occupation".<sup>155</sup> On the following day he telegraphed his recommendations for dealing with the crisis to Lessona. Noting that there were then 111,500 Italian soldiers in East Africa he declared that they were insufficient, as he had "always said", and urged the need 1) that the capital be defended "in a secure manner", 2) that in the area of the railway there should be a mobile force as well as a fixed guard, 3) that in Shoa, "the most hostile and warlike region", mobile forces should be massed at Debra Berhan and Fiche to protect the capital, and 4) that forces be stationed also in the west for indirect protection of the capital, as well as to guard communication routes.<sup>156</sup>

Fierce attacks were launched on the Patriots towards the end of the year. On November 5 Graziani announced that he was about to make a demonstration into Gojam and would issue a proclamation calling on the people to submit and give up their arms in return for a general pardon,<sup>157</sup> and on November 7 he claimed that the situation in Western Shoa, between Ambo and the Ghibe river, was "improving", and that in Eastern Shoa Italian forces had for the first time penetrated between Ankober and the Kassam river, though he admitted that there was still a significant rebel concentration at Guma between Jimma and Lekemti.<sup>158</sup> Such hopeful reports, however, soon proved unfounded, for the fact of the matter, as a correspondent of *The Times* reported from Jibuti on November 25, was that: "The improvement in the internal situation that was expected after the rains is still far from apparent. The roads leading from Addis Ababa to Jimma and Gore have both been cut recently within 50 miles of the capital, with the result that transport has to proceed under convoy."<sup>159</sup> Conscious of the danger of a further expansion of the revolt Graziani was obliged to warn the Italian commanders in Jimma and Harar, on November 9, of the need for "wise political action towards the natives to avoid inducing them to rebel", but continued to advise them "to eliminate

the Amhara without pity according to my directives", for "military conquest", he proclaimed, "imperatively excludes sentimentalism".<sup>160</sup>

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The Patriot leadership, though now under undoubtedly strong pressure, had by no means lost heart, for it knew that sooner or later it could count on help from abroad. Graziani admitted as much on November 9 when he stated that the "rebels" now "clearly thought in terms of a European war, and the return of the Negus." At about this time three Patriot leaders, Zawdie Asfaw, Blatta Takle Wolde Hawariat and Mesfin Seleshi, operating in Gudru and Gindabaret, drew up a manifesto to the people of Gojam and hurled copies of them by slings across the Blue Nile into Gojam where they came to the attention of fascist intelligence. The document, as Graziani later reported it, was addressed to the "notables and elders of Gojam", and declared: "Through Christian prayer and by the will of God we stand ready to fight and overcome for the freedom of our country and our religion, advancing and up to now always victorious not suffering any discomfiture."

Turning to the actions of the Italians the document declared that they had come "to make our race disappear, and to take away our property", for they "did not wish the Amharas and Gallas to live and rule".

As for Ras Hailu, the Italians' closest friend, it asked what territorial command the invaders has given him, and declared that while "the chiefs, notables and many of the people were being killed" he had "betrayed the Ethiopian people", for he piled up wealth in the capital, sought to register the inhabitants and cattle of Gojam for his own advantage, and, they asserted, had even begun to choose Ethiopian women as wives for the Italians. "Children of Gojam and Walata Israel", the manifesto concluded, "fight for the Christian religion. The more patience you have the worse things will be for your soul, your property, your children and your religion. Now by the will of God the rays of the sun are coming to our country. We will very soon send you a great announcement. In the name of our religion you must resist the enemy at the opportune time. Above all we advise you to fight, even with local weapons. If you do not have enough arms send us faithful persons, and receive arms from us. We beg you to send copies of this letter to all Gojam and Begemder. Pass on the word to the chiefs and nobles!"<sup>161</sup>

The Patriots were indeed very active, but their operations, at least in Shoa, as Graziani called on November 9, dated back from May of the previous year, and did not present any new element".<sup>162</sup> Reiterating his own point of view to the Minister of Italian Africa he urged that it was necessary to "lose every residue of sentimentalism regarding the Amharas and Shoans even outside Amhara territory." For his own part he had undoubtedly done this, for he speaks of the need to "Eliminate them, eliminate them, eliminate them, as I have been preaching against the illusions of others since I assumed my office."<sup>163</sup> In a later report of December 1 he again emphasised the continuous character of the rebellion in "various regions, especially those of Amhara and in a special

manner in Shoa", and warned of the danger of "foreign influence" which could increase Italian difficulties by "direct or indirect help" to the "rebels". Emphasising the two "dangers", of "internal revolt" and "external events", he once more urged the leadership in Rome to send him more troops,<sup>164</sup> and on December 12 revealed that informers had reported "considerable rebel activity" in Wallo,<sup>165</sup> a province hitherto scarcely affected by Patriot activity, though on December 23 he claimed that the situation was "everywhere improving", but added, very significantly, that the Italian position in Amhara had "still to be stabilised."<sup>166</sup>

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Graziani was dismissed as Viceroy on December 26 and replaced by the Duke of Aosta whose period of office was to run from the beginning of 1938 to the end of Italian rule three years later. Despite Graziani's optimistic forecasts of the previous months the situation at the time of Duke's assumption of power was by no means favourable to the Italians, for Patriot resistance was far from broken. The position at this time was frankly summed up by the Duke's chief of staff, Ugo Cavallo, who later admitted that though "the old Colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland could be regarded as completely organised .....large parts of the Shoa and Amhara territories were still in rebellion and some secondary pockets of resistance persisted in the Galla-Sidamo country." In the "southern fringes of the new Eritrea", i.e., parts of the Ethiopian Tigre province then recently annexed to the Italian colony, "a few bands of armed men of brigand-like character" had likewise "made their appearance". "The state of rebellion", he claimed, "was due above all to the presence in those areas of armed bands of varying strength obeying dissident chiefs, which imposed themselves on the people with threats or took advantage of their connivance, in both cases keeping alive a state of open hostility towards us". Turning to the strength of these forces he declared: "The people gave full support to the rebels, either from conviction or convenience and, many being armed, were ready, in the event of a clash, to swell the ranks of the combatants, who could thus in some districts reach a strength of several thousands. Every rebel group had following of a strong band of men without weapons, or armed only with spears and sticks who would pick up the weapons of the fallen and join fiercely in the exploitation of any success. Emphasising the constant difficulties created by the Patriots, he adds: "Although numerous guards for the protection of workshops and the more important places were posted along the roads which were then being built, work was often interrupted on many stretches by attacks from rebel bands, and safe passage could only be assured by strong mobile escorts."<sup>167</sup>

The extent of Patriot resistance was confirmed by an *Evening Standard* report of February 4, 1938, which stated that "bands of Abyssinian soldiers attack Italian outposts almost every night", and added: "The Italians are greatly handicapped by mass desertion of Askaris."<sup>168</sup> A modern historian Harold Marcus, summing up the situation three decades later, likewise declared that "insurgent activity" had at this stage "reached such proportions that, for all intents and purposes, the Italians no longer ruled in Gojam and Begemder".<sup>169</sup>



The Ethiopian people, it should be emphasised, were still by no means entirely disarmed. Early in January it was reported that they had by then surrendered 297,295 rifles, 1,542 pistols and 1,011 machine-guns,<sup>170</sup> but the *Daily Telegraph's* Aden correspondent significantly commented that this constituted "only about a third of the arms" which the Ethiopians had possessed at the close of the war. "This does not mean," he prophetically concluded, "that the Italian occupation is in jeopardy. So long as Rome keeps her peace with Europe, Egypt and French North Africa, she will hold her new empire; but in the event of her being involved in a war beyond her frontiers the Abyssinians might drive her out."<sup>171</sup>

The Duke of Aosta, not unreasonably concerned by the armed opposition to his regime, gave orders shortly after his appointment, for the renewed dropping of leaflets on Patriot-held areas. These documents, which were designed both to threaten and entice the Patriots to abandon their resistance, declared: "Hear! These aeroplanes which you see flying in the sky, and which are capable of hurling death and desolation, and these armies which you see marching upon the earth, have come to strengthen the work of pacification and peace. If, therefore, you hasten to deliver up your arms to our military chiefs, you will be pardoned, but, if you do not do so, I shall cause terror to rain down from the sky upon you, your goods and your kindred, who will necessarily include women, children and old men, and I shall destroy you all."<sup>172</sup>

The extent and geographical distribution of Patriot activity in the spring of 1938 was defined by the Emperor Haile Selassie in a long communique issued in London on May 7, 1938, shortly before the occupation's third rainy season. In this survey of his country's military fortunes he declared *inter alia*:

#### North and North-West

"During last autumn, and throughout recent months, there has been energetic opposition to the Italian operations, which sometimes developed into fighting on a considerable scale. There have been revolts in the provinces of Tembien and Sokota under Dejaz Hailu Kabbade and further to the north-east in Tigre under the daring Dejazmach Gabre Hewot. In the provinces Begemder and Lasta there has been almost continuous fighting, resulting in the destruction of Italian posts and the capture of supply columns . . .

"Reports have been received that fierce engagements are taking place at different points of the Ethiopian territory. Even in Tigre, the province bordering Eritrea, Italian troops control only the towns and villages where they have posted garrisons. The rest of the province is outside their control. In the province of Begemder there are only two garrisons, at Debra Tabor and Gondar, and these are isolated and have to be supplied by air.

#### West

"Gojam Province has violently broken its benevolent neutrality towards the invading army.....By way of reprisals, from thirty to forty aero-

planes leave Addis Ababa every day to go and bombard the towns and villages of the vast province, which was completely freed from Italian troops.

"In the Wollega region and more particularly in the districts of Chelleag, Gaidor, Gouder and to the neighbourhood of Ambo, to the south-west of the capital, the Ethiopians remain masters of the situation. The two garrisons in the province of Wollega.....cannot control the extensive hills and fertile country beyond their immediate neighbourhood.

#### **Centre**

"In the province of Shoa there have been revolts under Dejaz Fikre Mariam. The railway to Jibuti has been frequently attacked. Ethiopian armed troops are frequently raiding the main roads leading from Addis Ababa to the North and West.....The Ethiopians are gaining ground and there is a marked hardening in their resistance. Great aerial activity continues but is not having much effect.

#### **South and South-West**

"In the whole of this vast area of about 100,000 square kilometres there are Italian garrisons only at five towns, namely : Djiren, Yirga-Alem, Mega, Goba and Ginir. All other parts of the territory had to be abandoned owing to pressure of numerous guerilla bands.....In the provinces of Gurafarda, Gimirra and Kaffa many Italians have been forced to withdraw and the roads are unsafe.

#### **South-East**

"Reports received in recent month show that there have been numerous concentrations of armed Ethiopians which have attacked Italian convoys on the road through Harar to Jigjiga.....

#### **East**

"The Italians exercise no control whatever over the provinces Danakil and Aussa.

The Emperor's statement went on to observe that "the resistance of the population" was "more intensive, united and effective than at any time since the Italian Army extended its invasion in the autumn of 1936", and that there was "every reason to believe that armed resistance will be intensified on a greater scale during the coming rainy season when the Italian Air Force cannot be effectively employed.....The present situation in Ethiopia", the statement concluded, "will be appreciated if it is realised that over at least three-quarters of the country the Italian authorities have no military control beyond an area varying from roughly 10 to about 30 miles radius around the larger towns. In fact, over at least half the country there is no military control, the military posts only maintaining their existence through fortifications, and the troops being unable to venture to a distance or to penetrate the hilly and mountainous regions".<sup>173</sup>

The Emperor's assessment was later corroborated by George Steer who, after making careful inquiries at Jibuti, informed the *Manchester Guardian* in August that the Patriots of Gojam had succeeded for a time in "mastering the whole of that province west and north-west of Debra Markos," though they had been dispersed in May, albeit after fierce fighting. "For the whole of this year, indeed from October last", he declared, "the Italians have had to face really strenuous resistance in at least three parts of the territory—Gojam, Ankober, and Nonno". Until the previous month indeed two Patriot leaders, Abebe Aregai and Takale Wolde Hawariat, had never been more than eighty miles from Addis Ababa. Rebutting the repeated Italian claim that these and other leaders were "rebels", he pointed out on the contrary they included "men from the greatest and richest Amhara families, accustomed to a life of ease and comfort, who have found guerilla warfare all but intolerable, but go on fighting." One could therefore "still talk of a bitter resistance by leading Amharas."<sup>174</sup> Steer's analysis was accepted by a contemporary historian, L. Isaacs, who concluded: "The facts show that the conquest of Ethiopia is far from complete. Violent fighting is going on—most of it centred in Amhara."<sup>175</sup>

The attitude and aspirations of the Patriots a year or so before the outbreak of the European war is apparent from the petitions which they despatched to the Emperor Haile Selassie. One such document, dated July 12, 1938, declared: "The Italians occupy the towns of Debre Tabor and Gondar in the Province of Begemder; Lalibela and Waldia in the Province of Yejou; Dessie and Worreylou in the Province of Wollo. With the exception of these fortified districts all the Italian garrisons that had taken up positions in these three Provinces have been destroyed by us. All that territory is in our hands."

Notwithstanding this confident note the authors recognised the virtual invincibility of the Italian forts, and urged the need for modern weapons. "During the season of the rains," they declared, "we tried to attack the enemy in their forts, but they were too well guarded with their artillery and machine-guns and the barbed wire which encircles them from the plain onwards. For the future, what your humble servants need most of all are aeroplanes, also arms, as well as ammunition for the rifles we have captured from the enemy. Your people is not in want of soldiers."<sup>176</sup>

Another letter, written on July 25 by Lij Yohannes Iyasu, a son of the Emperor Menelike's grandson Lij Iyasu, emphasised the unity of the people in opposing the invader. It declared it is "evident that the Italians wish to exterminate the people of Ethiopia and not to establish justice there."<sup>177</sup> The actions of the Italians, the prince continued, had in this way unified the Ethiopians: "Our people," he claimed, "are united with one heart in this war. The Italians in Ethiopia live in little forts surrounded by barbed wire entanglements. But they have not been able to conquer the country".<sup>178</sup>

Another document, addressed to the Emperor Haile Selassie, at about this time was more declamatory in tone, and declared: "Our sufferings are mitigated and our hopes are raised by the knowledge that Your Majesty is standing before the Assembly of Nations, the Sceptre of

Solomon in your hand, to proclaim to the world how your defenceless people are being unjustly exterminated, to beseech the League of Nations to come to our aid, and, pointing out the unheard of atrocities that we are undergoing at the hands of the Italians, to obtain an equitable judgment, and to put an end to the scourge which has fallen upon us.

"Woe to those nations which will not accord equitable justice to this Emperor of Ethiopia, respectful and loyal to his engagements, who stands before them in his pure majesty to demand justice—for they will incur the responsibility of inciting the wrath of God...

"Let the Roman Caesar stay quietly in Rome; Ethiopia belongs to the Ethiopians."<sup>179</sup>

Further evidence of the spirit of the Patriots was afforded in a petition from three of the leaders of Shoa, Dejazmach Mangasha Wosseni, Dejazmach Abebe Aragai and Fitawrari Zewde Abbacorra, dated October 1, which the Ethiopian Government submitted to the League of Nations in the following year. Rejecting the Italian claim to be in effective control of the country they declared: "This is false. Apart from those dwelling in the neighbourhood of her fortifications and roads, the Ethiopian people—from the low-lying plain to high plateau—have not submitted to Italy. For this reason human blood flows in a stream each day..... We do not cease to shed our blood for the independence of our country, appealing for justice and hoping to obtain it from the League of Nations."<sup>180</sup> Letters were also submitted to the League by several other Patriot leaders, among them Dejazmach Mangasha Jembere and Lij Tafari Mangasha."<sup>181</sup>

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Conscious of the failure of Graziani's policy of terrorism the Duke of Aosta adopted a somewhat more liberal policy, and mitigated some of the worst excesses of his predecessor. One Eritrean observer, Fitawrari Asfaha Walda Mikael, later noted, "One could notice a tendency to reduce the number of crimes against the Ethiopians." Qualifying this statement he none the less added: "But that moderation was limited to Addis Ababa and other principal cities and areas immediately dominated by Italian garrisons. The policy in areas of active Patriot resistance remained relatively unchanged..... Burning, pillaging and murders were there regarded as a "military necessity."<sup>182</sup> Graziani's old policy of executions without judicial process nevertheless came in for official criticism. Thus on January 12, 1939, General Martini reported that "recently two gravely illegal acts have taken place, committed by officers and officials against natives who have been executed summarily without observance of judicial procedure." Explaining the new policy, he added: "Persons who are not killed in action or are not surprised in a criminal act must not be subjected to summary treatment and executed. They must receive the treatment prescribed by the regulations of the Viceroy or be brought before the judicial authority." Underlining the politically undesirable consequences of arbitrary repression the memorandum continued: "Acts of this kind caused revolt last year with well known consequences and

repercussions, perpetrating the general conviction of absolute lack of any juridical security provided by the Authorities."<sup>183</sup>

A new approach was likewise apparent in a memorandum by General Guglielmo Nasi issued on March 6, 1940, just over three months before Mussolini's entry into the European war, and entitled "*Voglio ascari, not voglio razziatori*" ("I want soliders, I do not want raiders"). Urging that "the moment has come to act against those remnants of rebel formations which, fed with hopes of a very active foreign propaganda", had "not wanted to believe in my offers of peace", he stated that "before giving orders to begin these police operations" he wished to express his will to all the troops that would be called upon to take part in the fighting, and enumerated the following points :

"1. The campaign is undertaken against rebels and not against the poor peoples of the regions haunted and plundered by them. So I do not permit on any condition raids, fires, acts of violence, or ill treatments which surely would not hit those whom we want to hit.

"2. The Commanders of battalions, of bands, and of smaller detached units, must prevent and repress these crimes for which, in every case, they are responsible.....

"3. The above-mentioned commanders, without thereby avoiding consequent penal or disciplinary action, must in every case on the spot compensate the losses suffered at the expense of those guilty, or collectively at the expense of the detachment.

"4. The people, who in the main have returned to their houses, prepared the soil for new sowing, have shown trust in us. That trust should be strengthened and confirmed by the *ascaris* who are fed, clothed and paid by the Italian Government, which they also represent."

He concluded by arguing that the soldiers had "nothing to do but to be honest men", and that they would "know how to be that if they are supported and guided by the iron will of the officer. But it is necessary that the officer should first be convinced that in fact it is not true that colonial warfare and raiding are synonymous and that colonial troops 'cannot subsist' without raidings.

"Of these dangerous supermen, carriers of infectious microbes, I have already made a clean sweep and I have decided to continue.

"**Moral :** I want to eliminate the rebels, I do not want to create new and more implacable ones, and I am even inclined to let some of the old ones escape rather than repeat the errors and the crimes which colonial history quotes as the reasons for revolts in all times and all countries."

Such broad-minded principles, however, were not easy to enforce, and a week or so later we find the general forced to repeat his instructions : "I earnestly recommend", he declared, "that rebels surrendering in battle or who are captured in any other way, should not be shot, but

be transferred to prison camps. It is necessary to put an end to the legend that our troops do not spare even those who surrender, which is always an act of cowardice, in order not to push others to a desperate resistance who today have no further will to resist." And lest it were thought that these recommendations were only altruistic he added: "These prisoners may supply us with precious forced labour."<sup>185</sup>

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By 1939, the year of the outbreak of the European war, something of a stalemate seems to have developed. The Italians, as we have seen, had failed to crush the Patriots who, on the other hand, found themselves unable to dislodge the invaders from their heavily fortified positions. A correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Egypt reported in February that he learnt from foreign traders in Ethiopia that the "rebels" were "very active" and roamed "the whole country. The Italians hold only the towns, and it is dangerous for anyone to venture even a few miles out of Addis Ababa." The consensus of opinion among merchants was therefore that Italy was "unlikely to attack France.....partly because the Abyssinians would take the opportunity to intensify their revolt".<sup>186</sup> Continued Patriot activity was likewise recognised by R.G. Woolbert, a student of Ethiopian affairs, who declared in June that "neutral observers are agreed that there is still considerable resistance on the part of the Ethiopians".<sup>187</sup> General Nasi, reporting on the situation in Shoa at the end of year, likewise estimated that Ras Abebe Aregay still had 18,000 rifles, and admitted that the chief's organisation, "which embraced all Shoa, was much more solid than we thought."<sup>188</sup>

Steer, who had a chance to talk to many of the Patriots, felt that by 1939 they had, however, lost their impetus. He declared that they had "long since ceased to attack Italian forts," and were "flagging.....in attacks on Italian communications. The enemy garrisons, by threats of reprisals on villages and property, were gradually extending their area of control and forming *Bande* of irregular submitted Ethiopian communities to protect it."<sup>189</sup> Discussing specifically to the Patriots of Gojam he observed that "though they could destroy bridges and create obstacles on the roads, they were by now unwilling to ambush effectively large Italian columns as they moved along the main communications of Gojam. When the Italian came out, the Patriot's first thought was of his wife and family. When he had driven these off to a place of safety and the enemy had entered his village, burned down his house, stolen his grain and honey, and broken his cooking pots, the Patriot returned and harassed the enemy on the way back to their fixed defences. He presented a supple front to the Italians, and by winging a few flank guards, usually collected a few rifles from every hostile raid. He kept in Gojam the sum of sixteen colonial battalions, four Blackshirt battalions and two regular *Bande* groups, not to mention the irregular *Bande* armed by the Italians.....But he was quite incapable of interfering effectively with their strategic distribution and with the movement of reserves."<sup>190</sup> Steer nevertheless recognised that in the country at large "the Ethiopian Patriot chiefs were still playing a sinister tune on Italian nerves and kept large Italian forces busy on the work of internal security."<sup>191</sup>

Though now perhaps on the defensive the Patriots, it must be emphasised, were in large measure merely biding their time, awaiting more favourable circumstances which were bound to arrive whenever Mussolini's international ambitions led him into conflict with Britain or France. A correspondent of the *Evening Standard* reporting from Jibuti in April 1939 quoted a Patriot leader as telling him quite frankly: "We have learned to be cowards. Once upon a time we fought face to face with our enemies. Now we know the value of guerilla warfare—we call it coward's fighting. But that way we shall defeat the Italians." Elaborating on these tactics, and the need to avoid outright attacks on Italian forts, he went on: "Do they think we are fools? Do they think we shall throw ourselves against these modern fortified works as we did during the campaign? No. We shall wait until the Italians are hard-pressed in Europe or by guerilla warfare here. Then we shall surround their cities and camps; we shall harass them but never attack them direct; we shall cut their communications; we shall starve them."<sup>192</sup>

In the last months before Italy's entry into the European war the Patriots were thus waiting upon international events. General Nasi who was not unaware of his enemy's tactics, reported in January 1940 that Shoa, as he put it, was "very sick", and instanced not only the large number of rifles in the possession of the "rebels" and population at large, but also the general "confusion of spirit", a euphemism, we may note, for discontent, which, he said, "we are only now able to estimate in its profundity."<sup>193</sup> A month later he reiterated that Shoa was "characterised by a profound disturbance of spirit", which was "kept alive, essentially, by uncertainty as to the European situation", and, encouraged by "insidious propaganda", resulted in a "painful quest for rifles and cartridges."<sup>194</sup> Talks with Ras Abebe Aregai were again attempted by the Italians, this time through the intermediary of the Ethiopian scholar, Tesema Eshete, but again came to nothing, the Patriot leader remaining poised to strike whenever Mussolini attacked the Allies.<sup>195</sup>

The degree of popular opposition to the fascist regime, and the military implications thereof, were evident to many Italians, and in May Consul-General Bonacorsi, the head of the Blackshirts in East Africa, produced a revealing report in which he complained that "the assassination of our officers from April 1939 until today has become a moral phenomenon," and added: "Throughout the Empire, there is a state of latent rebellion which will have its final and tragic denouement when war breaks out with our enemies. If at any point whatever of our Empire a detachment of English or Frenchmen were to enter with banner unfurled they would need little or no troops for they would find the vast mass of the Abyssinian population would unite themselves to that flag to combat and eject our forces. In the case of such an emergency we would find ourselves unable to withstand the enemy given the state of unpreparedness and the lack of equipment of our forces."<sup>196</sup>

The Ethiopian patriotic resistance thus constituted a serious and enduring challenge to Italian rule.

(TO BE CONCLUDED)

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## **Italy's Attitude to African Problems at the U.N. with Particular Reference to Decolonisation**

UMBERTO GORI

**T**HE purpose of these few pages is to illustrate the main trends of what could be called Italy's African policy at the United Nations. This statement obviously implies that the subject deserves much more space than available here. Within these limits, however, this article aims at giving a picture, as clear as possible, of the major points which characterised Italian attitude to the decolonisation process.

A second limitation is set by the other contributions to this issue of the journal devoted to Italy and Africa. It was necessary to avoid overlapping as far as possible and that is why only a few words will be said here on Somaliland, though for our research this is a point of paramount importance.

A formal objection could be made in this respect : Italy was not a member of the United Nations until December 14, 1955. Therefore the statements made at the UN by Italian political leaders with regard to African countries before that date are practically without any relevance for the decision-making process of the UN. Nevertheless, this chapter will also deal briefly with those speeches of the aforesaid period which are likely to throw light at the very roots of the future attitude of the Italian Government.

According to a joint declaration by France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, contained in Annex XI of the peace treaty with Italy<sup>1</sup>, the "Big Four" agreed that they would jointly determine the final disposal of Italy's territorial possessions in Africa to which, in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty, Italy renounces all rights and title". The Declaration added the following :

"If with respect to any of these territories the four Powers are unable to agree upon their disposal within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations for a recommendation and the four Powers agree to accept the recommendation and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it".



As the four Powers could not arrive at an agreement, the question of the Italian colonies was transmitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. A rapid analysis will show that the spirit of the Italian post-war diplomacy has been clearly anti-colonialistic and realistic since the very beginning.

In 1948 in the Senate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza, made these significant statements :

"... all the peoples of Africa, as those of Asia, want their independence; what they want is not to have protection. But if for diplomatic, historic and economic reasons they must choose, let us say, an older brother to help them toward independence, I believe that on the whole the local populations would prefer that the trusteeship be entrusted to Italy. I think this opinion is purely objective and not veiled by patriotic sentiments which could make me see as reality what is really our own desire. It is for this reason that we, with complete serenity and without any arrogance, have requested trusteeship of the ex-colonies"<sup>2</sup>.

The same Count Sforza, speaking before the first committee of the UN General Assembly on April 11, 1949, expressed the Italian wish to "hasten the realization of the independence of the African peoples"<sup>3</sup>. Though in this speech he asked for trusteeship over the Italian colonies; at a later stage, when the opinions expressed in the General Assembly debates were sufficiently clear, Italy rapidly modified her position, declaring her assent to immediate independence for all the Italian colonies with the exception of Somaliland which, according to Italian suggestions, was to be put under Italian trusteeship, in view of its difficult economic and social conditions. But in this case also Italy engaged herself to do the best to hasten the coming of independence of the Somalis. This engagement was fully respected, and Somaliland—as everybody knows—became independent much in advance of the prescribed date (December 2, 1960). The Minister of Industrial Affairs of Somaliland, Hagi Mussa Bogo, could say that "this event of historical importance has been made possible through the generosity of the Italian Government and through the foresight of the Administration of Somaliland"<sup>4</sup>.

This rather open-mindedness of Italian diplomacy was generally supported by public opinion which considered that colonialism, after the tremendous experiences of the war, was dead for ever.

Once free from the duties of trusteeship, and availing herself of her past experience, Italy did not abandon her interest in the African problems which were under consideration at the United Nations. This is confirmed by her active presence in the UN organs concerned with Africa, and by her coherent position shown in the voting on all those resolutions which were likely to bring about an effective improvement in the social, economic and political conditions of African countries.

As to the first point, Italy is to be found among the members of the Committee for Decolonisation, and of the *ad hoc* Committee for South West Africa.

As to the second point, we shall try to demonstrate that the Italian attitude at the United Nations with regard to Africa was generally inspired by realism, moderation, and a sense of responsibility, also if not without some consistent criticism.

What characterises the position of Italy is her firm will not to undermine the credibility of the General Assembly's resolutions and, by so doing, to strengthen the prestige of the United Nations.

For a number of reasons, this position generally took the form of *abstention*, except in regard to those cases in which the principles of decolonization, liberty, and non-discrimination were to be supported, in line with the San Francisco Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the basic ideas on which the Italian Constitution is based. This policy, compatible with the historic trends of our times, proved however to be coherently against the radical and rather unrealistic views of those who practically undermine the prestige of the United Nations by adopting resolutions which are unlikely to be complied with by the member States in the present state of international relations.

For the same reasons, Italian delegations to the UN considered the strict respect of the Charter as a prerequisite for giving their assent to any project of resolution.

At the same time, this strict standard of conduct was tempered by a deep sense of understanding with regard to the problem and idea of decolonisation. This helps to explain why Italy is so often found among those States which abstain from taking a clear-cut position on many cases.

Obviously, we shall not refer here to all the resolutions adopted by the UN bodies. We shall limit ourselves to mentioning a large part of those which seemed to us to be more significant and likely to illuminate and prove as valid some hypothesis on the attitude of Italian diplomacy<sup>5</sup>.

Apart from the declarations of Italian statesmen made in special circumstances to support the UN policy in favour of elimination of racial discrimination<sup>6</sup> it is important to say that Italian delegates voted *in favour* on a number of prospects of resolutions which correspond to important steps in advance on the way to decolonization.

First to be mentioned is the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples (G. A. Res. 1514—XV. Dec. 14, 1960)<sup>7</sup>. The same affirmative vote was given to G. A. Res. 1654—XVI (Nov. 27, 1961) on the implementation of the Declaration, to G. A. Res. 1565—XV (Dec. 18, 1960) which recognized that South West Africa had been administered in a way contrary to the Mandate, to the U.N. Charter, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to the G. A. Resolutions; to G. A. Res. 1810—XVII (Dec. 17, 1962) on the widening of the terms of reference of the Committee for Decolonisation, and to the subsequent confirmation of Dec. 11, 1963 (G. A. Res. 1956—XVIII), on which Belgium, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America abstained.

Particularly important is the affirmative vote given by Italy to G. A. Res. 2145—XXI (Oct. 27, 1966) in which the mandate of South Africa on the South-West Territory is considered to have come to an end, and the territory is declared to depend directly on the responsibility of the U. N.<sup>8 9 10</sup>

Also, in the field of technical assistance and economic and social development, Italy has shown herself extremely aware of the needs of developing countries and of her moral duty to support all kinds of initiatives such as contributing to their economic and social progress. It is the case, for instance, of Resolution G.A. 2407—XXIII on playing a larger role for UNIDO, or of the programme of scholarships for the autochthons of non-autonomous territories<sup>11</sup> and, in particular, for those of South West Africa<sup>12</sup> and Portuguese territories<sup>13</sup>. Italy also voted in favour of G. A. Res. 2431—XXXIII (Dec. 18, 1968) concerning the U.N. Teaching and Training Programme for austral Africa. It is perhaps the case that Italy was one of the rare so-called Western countries which offered scholarships for the autochthons of those regions.<sup>14</sup> This helps to demonstrate the Italian willingness to vote for those resolutions which, far from being controversial, worded in radical terms, and somehow abstract, are actually conducive to concrete steps in advance for emerging States of populations.

In many cases, Italy's abstentions can be explained as a consequence of a lack of realism pervading the G. A. resolutions. In these cases, as well as in others which Italian delegates could not agree upon, abstention is to be explained both as a proof of moderation and as a reflection of the anti-colonialist ideology of the Italian foreign policy.

Though other reasons—which will be explained later—for abstention may have played a role, the principal resolutions presenting the aforesaid features seem to be the following: the G. A. Res. 1535—XV (Dec. 15, 1960) which reiterates the request to member States to communicate information of a political and constitutional nature. Here the major reason for abstention seems to be the request to prescind from economic and social conditions in order to grant independence to a given territory (Par. 5).<sup>15</sup> Also the Res. 1542—XV (Dec. 15, 1960) in which the General Assembly defined some territories as "non-autonomous" against the will of the administering Powers is to be put among the resolutions considered non-realistic by the Italian delegates. Here again Italy abstained.<sup>16</sup>

Unrealistic appeared to the Italian delegates—and actually they were—also two resolutions of the General Assembly concerning Portuguese Territories (G. A. Res. 2107—XX, Dec. 21, 1965 and G. A. Res. 2184—XXI, Dec. 12, 1966). Here the G. A. invited member States to adopt a series of sanctions, political as well as economic, against Portugal, and made some recommendations to the Security Council.

Of the same kind was the G. A. Res. 2189—XXI (Dec. 13, 1966) on the theme of decolonisation in which member States were invited among

other things, to give material support to the Liberation Movements in the colonial territories. It goes without saying that Italy abstained.

Again, at its 5th special session in April 1967, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (2248—S—V) in which a Council of the UN for South West Africa was created with the task of administering that territory directly. Obviously, the project could not materialise due to the opposition of South Africa. This was the reason why Italy abstained, after having tried to contribute to a progressive solution of the problem through a more realistic proposal.<sup>17</sup>

The same happened also to the G. A. Resolutions 2307—XXII (Dec. 13, 1967) on *apartheid*; 2311—XXII (Dec. 14, 1967) and 2426—XXIII (Dec. 18, 1968) on the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples on the part of Specialized Agencies and others.<sup>18</sup>

Sometimes, the resolutions were at least premature, as is the case with G. A. Res. 2138—XXI (Nov. 17, 1966) on Rhodesia. In that resolution any agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the "illegal regime" of Rhodesia, such as neglect of the inalienable rights of the Zimbabwe people, was condemned *a priori*.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, Italy abstained on G. A. Res. 2403—XXIII on Namibia. Here, the motivation for abstention was both lack of realism in the resolution which asked the Council of U. N. for Namibia (South West Africa) to continue its functions (which?), and in the pressures exercised therein on the Security Council. But the problem of conformity of resolutions to the Charter is briefly dealt with in the next paragraph.

In many cases, Italian abstentions were motivated by juridical reasons. For instance, on the G. A. Res. 2465—XXIII on the application of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples, Italy abstained because any evaluation or condemnation of threats to peace and international security can be made by statute only by the Security Council. As to the request contained therein to dismantle the bases established in non-independent territories, Italian opposition was based on the ground that those territories being under the sovereignty of member States, any intervention was forbidden by Art. 2, Par. 7 of the Charter.

Some other resolutions were considered by Italy as contrary to the Charter, because they aimed at suspension of members to prevent them from the exercise of their rights and privileges. This happened, for instance, at the XXIII session for the General Assembly, and had a precedent in Res. No 26 of UNCTAD at New Delhi about the suspension of South Africa from the conference. Here Italy voted against the resolution on the basis of Art. 5 of the Charter, according to which it is the General Assembly that can suspend a State on the condition that: (i) a preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council against that member; (ii) a recommendation be made by the Security Council.

Clearly, this was not the case. Also the Communist countries did not vote in favour and abstained.

The same juridical reasons motivated Italian abstention on the following resolutions of the General Assembly : Res. 1817-XVII (Dec. 18, 1962) in which the declaration seemed to be that any attempt to annex Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland would be considered by the UN "as an act of aggression violating the Charter of the United Nations".

Now, according to Art. 10 of the Charter, "the General Assembly may discuss any questions or matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs....., and, except as provided in Art. 12, may make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters".

However, if this provision necessarily implies an evaluation of any given fact, it cannot be easily interpreted as allowing the General Assembly to make dogmatic statements and proposals for action which pertain to other qualified organs of the Organization.<sup>20</sup>

Again, on April 4, 1963, the Committee on Decolonisation decided to call immediately the attention of the Security Council to the situation existing in the Portuguese territories, in order that the latter could take measures, including sanctions.

On Nov. 13, 1963, in its Res. 1899-XVIII, the General Assembly called the attention of the Security Council to the situation in South West Africa, in that it represented a serious threat to peace and international security.<sup>21</sup> On all these resolutions Italy abstained as well as on others in which the General Assembly defined some particular situations as "explosive" and urgently asked for the intervention of the Security Council.<sup>22</sup> The more important of these resolutions are the following : 1883-XVIII (Oct. 14, 1963), and 1889-XVIII (Nov. 6, 1963) on South Rhodesia; 2372-XXII (June 12, 1968) on Namibia; 2396-XXIII (mentioned in Note 22).

In other cases, as in G. A. Res. 2446-XXIII, Italy abstained because the resolution dealt with questions (for instance, Rhodesia) already under the consideration of the Security Council and which, for their purely political nature, were not within the scope of the Third Commission.<sup>23</sup>

Finally, the G. A. Res. 2022-XX (Nov. 5, 1965) on Rhodesia asked Great Britain to use armed force. It is fair to say that, according to the supporters of this resolution, to ask for use of force did not mean interfering with the powers of the Security Council (Chapter VII), in that the use of force was the only way in which the administering power could comply with its obligations.<sup>24</sup>

Another series of resolutions in regard to which Italy chose the way of abstention were those containing accusations against Western countries including Italy<sup>25</sup> on both political and economic grounds. The fact that

Italy preferred to abstain rather than vote against once more proves the moderate line followed by the Italian delegations, and their appreciation of the non-polemic parts of these resolutions.

Essentially, the accusations were of two kinds : one referred to Western countries as members of the NATO; the other concerned these same countries in that they have relations, economic and other, with countries such as Portugal and South Africa.

As to the first point, we have to mention the resolutions of the General Assembly 2184-XXI (Dec. 12, 1966), 2270-XXII (Nov. 17, 1967), and 2395-XXIII (Nov. 29, 1968) on Portuguese territories in which the member countries of the NATO are asked to stop giving Portugal assistance which might make it possible for it to continue its repressive policy. Here Italy abstained on the ground that a defensive alliance like the NATO could not be construed to support the colonial policy of Portugal.

As to the second point, the pertinent resolutions of the G. A. are : 2189-XXI (Dec. 13, 1966) containing, among other things, formal condemnation of the big economic and financial interests which are prejudicial to the application of the Declaration on Decolonisation<sup>26</sup>; 2288-XXII (Dec. 7, 1967); 2383-XXIII; 2396-XXIII (Dec. 2, 1968) on *apartheid*; 2425-XXIII (Dec. 18, 1968); and 2439-XXIII in which governments that have any kind of relations with South Africa are severely condemned<sup>27</sup>. In all these cases, Italy continued its policy of abstention, as in its view the rupture of economic relations, far from helping the cause of the UN, would be against the interests of the neighbouring countries also and would increase the intransigence of the colonialist Powers.

At this point, it seems fair to say that it is not always possible to define very sharply the reasons why Italy voted in such and such a way. Certainly, in some cases, political sympathies may have played their role, as happens with all member States, or a given vote may have been the result of a number of interacting reasons. Among others, these doubts seem justified in the case of G. A. Res. 1650-XVI of Dec. 15, 1961, about the juridical status of the Algerian prisoners in France. Here, the motivation for Italian abstention was the doubt about the political expediency of the measure proposed by the resolution, as well as the validity of the procedure followed on that occasion.

The same doubts exist about G. A. Res. 2073-XX (Dec. 17, 1965) on the question of Oman, on which Italy voted against<sup>28</sup>; and about G. A. Res. 2229-XXI (Dec. 20, 1966) on Ifni and Spanish Sahara, and 2230-XXI on Equatorial Guinea on which Italy voted in favour in contradiction, it seems to me, to the policy of abstention followed, for instance, in regard to the G. A. Res. 2228-XXI (Dec. 20, 1966) on the decolonisation of the French coast of Somalis (Gibuti).

Other cases could perhaps be cited<sup>29</sup> but it seems not useful to insist on this point, given the nationality of the author.

In conformity with her attitude of respect for the provisions of the Charter, Italy complied with the resolutions of the Security Council which decided on an *embargo* of military and strategic goods against Portugal (Res. S/5380, July 31, 1963), South Africa (Res. S/5386), and South Rhodesia (Res. 253-1968).

In conclusion, apart from some discrepancy and incoherence here and there, due either to a lack of co-ordination or to political options, it seems that, generally speaking, Italian policy at the UN with regard to the decolonization problem can be defined as coherent. Judgments of value may however vary according to one's point of view. Honestly speaking, the use (and perhaps abuse) of abstention may give a false impression of Italian good intentions. And even in Italy not everyone agrees on this policy. It is good to mention here that on Oct. 2, 1968, three MPs of the Christian Democratic majority (*sic*) asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether it was true that Italy had abstained on a resolution condemning Portugal for using napalm and white phosphorus in its African territories.<sup>30</sup> It seems that the Italian delegations were not convinced of the full validity of these accusations.

Anyway, it is perhaps fair to admit that, in some cases, the Italian position was a bit too legalistic.

As a matter of fact, the Security Council itself seems to have followed the path laid down by the G. A. and other subsidiary organs of the latter<sup>31</sup>. However, though considered illegal to some extent, many resolutions have caused nothing more than abstention. And this is to be considered proof of the two souls of the Italian delegations: one strictly adhering to the Charter; the other sympathising with the sacrosanct feelings of the majority of member States. In any case, the moderate position taken by Italy with regard to extremist resolutions is to be considered with full respect. The spirit of the UN must be a spirit of moderation and objectivity.

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3. *Cfr. Italy and the United Nations*, cit., p. 46.
4. *Ibidem*, p. 64. For a radical criticism of the Italian Administration in Somaliland, Mohamed Aden Scek, v. *L'Italie et nous*, in "Presence Africaine", special number on Somaliland, 1961, pp. 180-84.
5. We are largely indebted to Dr. Maria Vismara, whose work "*Le Nazioni Unite per i Territori dipendenti e per la Decolonizzazione*", Padova 1966, pp. 614, was for us an invaluable reference book. The same can be said for the documentation and references contained in "*La Comunità Internazionale*" (Quarterly of the Italian Society for International Organization).

6. See e.g. Doc. A/AC. 115/L. 256. On the problem of racial discrimination, Italy voted in favour of G.A. Res. 2438-XXIII on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, G.A. Res. 2397-XXIII on the UN Fund for the victims of *apartheid*, and G.A. Res. 2400-XXIII against the death penalty in Rhodesia and South Africa. On this resolution, seven States abstained, among them Austria, United Kingdom, and United States of America.

7. Australia, Belgium, Dominican Rep., France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America abstained.

8. As to the Italian point of view in favour of the right of self-determination of the people of "Namibia", see A/7171 and Add. 1 to 5-S/8737 and Add. 1 to 5. In particular, Add. 2.

9. See also Doc. A/7171/Add. 2, and the affirmative vote given to G.A. Res. 2324-XXII (Dec. 16, 1967) and G.A. Res. 2332-XXII (Dec. 18, 1967) in which, among others, South Africa and Rhodesia are condemned for their policies.

10. Other Resolutions adopted with the votes of Italy are G.A. Res. 1603-XV (Apr. 20, 1961) establishing the sub-committee for Angola, and G.A. Res. 2351-XXII (Dec. 19, 1967) concerning information transmitted on the basis of Art. 73 e.

11. See Doc. A/6918 and Add. 1.

12. See Doc. A/6899 and Add. 1.

13. See Doc. A/6900 and Add. 1.

14. Another example : Italy voted in favour of the paragraph of G.A. Res. 2270-XXII (in which Italy abstained) concerning the exclusion of the help of the High Commissioner for Refugees in favour of the refugees of Portuguese territories.

15. As to G.A. Res. 1810-XVII (Dec. 17, 1962), it was approved by Italy, because the paragraph fixing a deadline for independence had been deleted. On the same paragraph Italy had voted *against* as it seemed unrealistic and such as would weaken the UN.

16. See also G.A. Res. 1747-XVI (June 28, 1962), concerning the definition of South Rhodesia as a non-autonomous territory and the subsequent G.A. Res. 1760-XVII (Oct. 31, 1962). On both of them Italy abstained.

17. The Council should have had the task of making studies, establishing contacts and making recommendations.

The Eastern European countries also abstained.

18. E. g., Res. 2372-XXII; the resolutions of the Committee on Decolonization adopted on May 16, 1962, on North Rhodesia (here Italy had voted *against*); the resolution, in June 1964, of the same Committee on grant of independence to British Guyana by inviting Great Britain to fix the date without any delay.

19. The Italian delegate considered it premature to affirm that the pending contacts between the parties would necessarily compromise the inalienable rights of the autochthons (Cfr. *La Comunità Internazionale*, XXII, 1967, 1, p. 114).

20. See the comment on Art. 10 of L.G. Goodrich and E. Hambro, *Commentaire de la Charte des Nations Unies*, Neuchâtel, 1948, p. 163-167. See also Art. 18, Par. 2 of the Charter.

21. However, Italy voted in favour of G. A. Res. 1979-XVIII (Dec. 17, 1963) in which the wording and evaluation are not so radical as in Res. 1899-XVIII.



22. In some cases (for instance, G.A. Res. 2396-XXIII of Dec. 2, 1968) explicit mention is made of measures contained in Chapter VII.

Even in the resolutions of the Committee on Decolonisation (e.g. those of March, 23 and 24 and of April 27, 1964) the attention of the Security Council is drawn to situations defined as "explosive". See also the Resolutions of the Committee on Aden (May 11, 1964) 1964; on Rhodesia (April, 22, 1965).

23. Another reason for abstention was in some cases the refusal of Italy to transform *ad hoc* groups of experts into control and inquiry bodies.

The same respect for a correct interpretation of juridical principles was shown by Italy with regard to motions by South Africa. For the rule of *sub judice*, see G.A. XV, Fourth Commission, 1063rd S.

24. See also the Declaration of the President of the Committee on Decolonisation on April 6, 1966, and the Res. of May 31, 1966, of the same Committee.

25. As in the case of G.A. Res. 2151-XXI (Nov. 17, 1966) on Rhodesia. The delegate of Guinea accused Italy explicitly.

26. The G.A. Res. 2105-XX of Dec. 20, 1965, on the non-application of the Declaration did not contain such condemnation.

See, however, the Res. of the Committee for Decolonisation adopted on July 3, 1964, with the abstention of Italy, in which the Sub-Committee is asked to study the activities of foreign interests which hinder the application of the Declaration.

27. On the paragraph of the Resolution containing such a condemnation, Italy voted against.

28. On the same subject, Italy voted against a project of resolution of the Special Political Commission on Dec. 14, 1961 (G.A.-XVI—plenary session 1078).

See also G.A. Res. 2424-XXIII (Dec. 18, 1968) on Oman on which Italy voted against.

29. See, for instance, G. A. Res. 1541-XV (Dec. 1960), Res. 1745-XVI (Feb. 23, 1962), Res. 2422-XXIII, etc.

30. The resolution had been adopted by the Committee for Decolonisation. The number of the resolution adopted by the G.A. is 2395-XXIII (Nov. 29, 1968). Also in this case Italy abstained, in spite of the interrogation made by the aforementioned MPs.

31. See also M. Vismara, *Appendix*, p. 250, in SIOI, "Conseguenze internazionali della decolonizzazione", Padua, 1968.

With regard to subsidiary bodies of the G.A., it seems correct to say that Art. 11, Par. 3 of the Charter is applicable to them.

## Italy and Africa: The Aid Policy

ROBERTO ALIBONI

IN commercial terms, the whole of the African continent<sup>1</sup> took in hardly 5.5% of 1968 Italian exports. In other words as a market it ranked a little bigger than East Europe. However, considered in the light of Italy's relations with other developing countries, Africa has a special and growing importance.

Latin America, still commonly considered Italy's most important partner among the developing countries, has lost its dominating position as a market since the period 1964-65 which saw the upswing of Asia and Africa. In 1968 Italian exports to Africa totalled \$565m., imports \$823 m., while to Latin America exports amounted to \$466m. and imports \$617 m. Even if the switchover is chiefly due, on the one hand, to the boom of the Libyan market, and to the slump, on the other, of the Argentine, this does little to diminish Africa's importance for Italy.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, in 1967 Africa benefited by receiving 57% of Italian official aid, in grants, net loans and technical co-operation, as well as 50% of private aid, in investments and net guaranteed credits. The high percentage of official aid depends partly on the fact that Europe and Africa together are the only continents to benefit from grants, while Latin America and Asia receive hardly any. Secondly, most of the technical co-operation goes to Africa: in 1967 \$7.21m. out of a total of \$10.23m. Finally, a comparison between the movement of gross credits and amortizations, both private and public, offers a further explanation for the special financial flow to Africa. In fact, Africa's amortization debts compared with those, for example, of Latin America are much less conspicuous. Hence, even from this angle, Italian-African relations are interesting as well as highly promising.

In the light of these facts, no justification is needed for taking Africa as a *test case* in a probe of Italian policy towards developing countries. The object of the present article, however, is not to deal with the bulk of financial, commercial and technical relations between Africa and Italy in the light of Italian policy towards the Third World, but to take a look at the financial policy in so far as it is an easy way of spotlighting standpoints and preferences in development policy.

We propose to examine this policy at three different levels. First of all, at the bilateral level. Secondly, at the regional, that is at the level of the special relations existing between the EEC and certain

African countries. And finally, at a general level, where bilateral and regional relationships should fit neatly into a strategic master development plan. As will be seen Italy has made some interesting changes in its bilateral policy, partly due to its increased interest in regional relations. However, the lack of a master development plan is likely to lead to contradictions both now and in the future.

#### **Bilateral Policy: Official and Private Aid**

Instead of examining commercial exchanges where only a few bilateral commercial agreements are involved, it will be more useful to take a look at the domain of financial aid, in order to have an idea of Italy's bilateral policy towards developing countries and to Africa in particular.

Two points should be cleared, however, before starting. When one sets out to examine the bilateral financial policy of a State towards the developing countries, it seems logical to begin with official aid, that is with grants and government loans, ignoring such forms of private aid as guaranteed credits. This reasoning however is typical of the traditional political approach which makes a clear distinction between State and private enterprise. In fact, in a modern society where State concerns play an important part, as they do in Italy, and where the State has many fingers in the national pie, this view of the link between State and private enterprise is completely out of date. An inquiry restricted to merely official aid will not therefore be sufficient for our purpose, which is to give an overall picture of Italy's bilateral policy towards developing countries. In fact, both private and official aid must be taken into consideration.<sup>3</sup>

When this has been done, however, once again traditional approaches would seem to suggest that private aid is a variable, determined exclusively by official aid, which thus becomes an independent function. The assumption underlying this type of equation is a corollary of the previous assumption of the division between State and private enterprise: foreign policy, and more especially bilateral policy, is traditionally considered exclusively the State's field of action. Even admitting that this may once have been true, it is hardly a convincing argument today. In practice, there is considerable interweaving between the government and the great contractors which holds out vast possibilities of interaction as well as reciprocal influence in policy-making. A bilateral financial policy towards developing countries is not merely the resultant of two forms of aid in which private enterprise is subordinated to government policy but is the outcome of a process of interaction between the two.

In spite of the distinction usually made between private and official aid, the Italian system of credits to the developing countries is a fairly striking example of what we have just said. There is no real separation between the financial sources at the State's disposal and those at the disposal of private enterprise as regards credits to developing countries.

There exists, on the contrary, a single financial system which is available both to the State and to private firms for their credits. Moreover, linked to the system of credits, there is a single system by which they are guaranteed. The financing, both of the State and of private firms for their respective credits, is entrusted to particular institutions, such as the Mediobanca, or Efibanca, which to a considerable extent are controlled by the government. Again, these institutions, to cash in on the effects deposited with them as security for the loans conceded, have to apply to an Institute of Public Credit: Mediocredito Central. And, finally, it should be remembered that the guarantee concession, both to State and private enterprise, is scrutinized by a special Inter-ministerial Committee, and is finalized by a public Institute of Assurance, the Istituto delle Assicurazioni.

In a system of this kind, even if it is possible to make a distinction, from a legal or institutional point of view, from a political standpoint it is far from easy to distinguish the dividing line between public and private enterprise. In reality, the system allows a decisive intervention to be made in the form of a loan, thus favouring private initiative, or in the form of private guaranteed credits in favour of State initiative.

The interweaving of State and private enterprise may also take on closer and more subtle forms. It is no longer a simple question of private firms being compelled to use the State's methods, or vice versa. It becomes rather a question of the power to get a particular project accepted at the political level. When this has been done, State and private enterprise, *together*, make a purely technical choice of ways and means, through either loans or guaranteed credits, whichever is considered best. This occurred, for example, in the case of the Inga dam in the Congo Democratic Republic where the Government gave political approval of the enterprise, but instead of conceding a loan as in other such cases (the Kainji dam in Nigeria, the oil pipeline Ndola to Dar-es-Salaam), joined with the private firm concerned in arranging a considerable amount of guaranteed credits.

Therefore in examining Italy's bilateral policy towards the African continent, we shall keep these preliminary observations in mind. Even though we are able to make use of data relative to official aid only, guaranteed credits being surrounded by a good deal of secrecy, the picture which emerges is one of a bilateral policy in which State and private initiatives converge. This picture will be interpreted in order to know which of the two, public or private enterprise, has been more successful.

#### **From the Mediterranean to N. Africa and the Sahara**

The table which follows attempts to analyse official aid to Africa. The figures are grouped in two three-year periods, 1961-63, 1965-67, and 1964 which stands by itself. This is the year, in fact, when Italian policy may be considered to have taken a decisive turn.

*Disbursements of gross loans by the Italian Government to African countries, 1961-67. (in millions of US dollars).*

Beneficiaries	1961-63	%	1964	%	1965-67	%
Africa	51.13	100	33.08	100	181.97	100
N. Africa	41.30	80.57	24.97	75.48	95.86	52.67
S. Sahara	9.83	19.22	8.11	24.54	86.11	47.32
Arab Countries	45.10	88.20	28.20	85.24	95.86	52.67
Ex-colonies	5.54	10.83	1.16	3.50	2.49	1.36

*Source :* OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flow to the Less Developed Countries, Paris, 1966, 1967, 1969.

The three-year period 1961-63 clearly emerges as one in which bilateral policy was slanted in favour of N. Africa which received 80% of official aid. A glance at the aid given to specific sectors shows that Italy followed two definite and distinct lines : on the one hand, to the Arabs (in N. Africa and the Sudan) which received 88%, and on the other to ex-colonies which received 11%.

These figures are a good index of certain attitudes common to the Italian political class. According to the memorandum presented by the Government to the Development Aid Committee : "Italy is not, and does not consider herself, a world power. She is, however, a European and Mediterranean power. For this reason, Italy concentrates its efforts in those regions where both historically and economically it has the biggest stakes."

Although this declaration is echoed in one memorandum after another, the fact is that the Italian political class has been reluctantly forced to commit itself more and more on international scale by certain Italian private contractors. Quick to see the difference in scale between the operations of a modern industrial country, competing all over the world for tenders and contracts, the latter managed to bring a good deal of pressure to bear on the Government and thus change the official outlook from its traditional bilateral policy convictions.

This was strikingly illustrated in the case of Africa in 1964; following the Impregilo Company's triumphant tender for the building of the Kainji dam in Nigeria, the Government was persuaded to make a loan of \$ 26.2m. to the Nigerian Government, and in the same year paid the first instalment of \$ 3.78m. This was why 1964 marked a turning point in Italy's bilateral policy. In fact, that year, as may be seen from the table, the lion's share which up till then had gone to N. Africa and the Arab countries began to dwindle, while sub-Saharan Africa began to enjoy increasingly bigger doles.

In the following three-year period, this tendency became more marked: North Africa's share, in spite of the continuance of massive refinancing credits to the United Arab Republic, and the payment of credits to Tunisia to enable it to indemnify the Italian farmers whom it had expropriated, dropped to 53%, while that of Africa south of the Sahara went up to 47%.

Italian firms in fact won three important international contracts. In accordance with current practice, the governments calling for tenders invite the winning firms to get financial backing from their governments. Italian firms—in which the State frequently owns shares—often have sufficient authority to exercise a strong influence on the government and to persuade it to favour a new Italian bilateral policy. After Kainji, it was the turn of the Ndola—Dar-es-Salaam oil pipeline—built by SNAM Projects, affiliated to the ENI—to lever a disbursement of \$ 17.98m from the Government for Zambia, and of \$ 8.98m for Tanzania. Meanwhile the deal for the Inga basin project pulled off by the Italinga consortium, headed by the IRI group's Italmimpianti, is causing a heavy outlay of export credit to the Congo Democratic Republic.

Due to the dynamic influence exerted by large firms, the last few years have thus seen an important change of direction in Italy's traditional bilateral policy towards Africa. The provincial and out-moded policy of a Mediterranean power has changed into a policy which is better balanced over the African continent as a whole and is more in keeping with present international dimensions and with the industrial standard Italy has reached.

### **Regional Policy**

In 1958, when the EEC came into being, an association was also set up between the EEC and the AASM, the 18 African countries south of the Sahara. This association envisages machinery for financial aid through the European Development Fund whose main task is to finance the execution and planning of projects with non-repayable aid or loans. Tenders are organised for this purpose, with both EEC and AASM firms taking part in it.

This special connection with Africa has played a considerable part in shifting the axis of Italy's traditional policy towards Africa south of the Sahara. Whatever judgement may be given on the association and its results, as regards Italy there is no doubt that it has had the merit of bringing the country more closely and more consistently in contact with development problems. The enterprise shown by Italian firms and the connection with the AASM have together prevented relations between Italy and Africa south of the Sahara from stagnating, or even coming to a full stop, with the end of the trusteeship in Somalia.

It was once again Italian business men who grabbed the chances offered by the EEC-AASM association, achieving quite unexpected results in the competitions organized by the Fund. As of December 31, 1986, Italy had pulled off 11.3% of the total awards, and this compared

with a 10.7% contribution to the Fund. Even though the impetus of Italian enterprise has fallen off in recent years, it still represents a real achievement when one remembers that, except in the case of Somalia, French and Belgian firms were already firmly established in all AASM countries.

If we look at the situation more from the point of view of this article, Italian business men have done even more. What they have done is to weld bilateral and regional policies together and turn them to their advantage, exploiting the expansion and financing opportunities offered by both.

Nevertheless it is also true that though the regional policy has had an influence for the good on the overall policy towards developing countries, it has also a limiting effect. The rest of Africa outside the association is one huge field of lost opportunities; and discrimination is at work as well. This is why the government is under increasingly successful pressure to take political action to remove the limitation imposed by the EEC-AASM association by proposing to the EEC that the association be widened to include other African countries. This problem came up during the renewal of the Arusha Convention which ties the EEC to the three countries of the East African Community. A fair number of the more authoritative business men were of the opinion that the Arusha Convention, which at the moment is no more than a limited trade agreement in practice, should be turned into an organization with wider powers and financing machinery.

#### **Development Strategy and Africa**

At the moment, therefore, this regional policy is liable to cause contradictions and new imbalances unless a strategy is worked out to modify it or guide it. Though it has played its part in evening up Italian bilateral policy by shifting the emphasis south of the Sahara, the pendulum has swung too far—a new imbalance is being created between the AASM countries and the rest of Africa. Such an imbalance is against Italian interests. The equal distribution of Italian aid between English-speaking and French-speaking countries also seems to show that Italy is moving voluntarily towards a wider policy which will include the whole of Africa without discrimination.

But this contradiction is no more than the reflection of a general political failing : Italy has no overall development strategy. In fact things are even more serious : no one mentions development except by chance. The only people who think about the problem at any length are those who compile the annual memorandum to the Development Aid Committee and those who deal with credit-guaranteeing operations. Both these sets of people, of course, walk the corridors of power, and public opinion, even parliamentary opinion, remains in the dark. The record shows only one brief debate on the matter, held in November 1966 in the Foreign Affairs Committee as a result of an equally brief report submitted by the Under-Secretary of State<sup>4</sup>.

It is only recently that the Institute of Studies for Economic Programming—one of the Budget and Economic Programming Ministry's

agencies—has mentioned the subject in its estimates for the next ten years. This is the so-called "Project 80," where one paragraph deals with development aid policy.

Obviously, in such a situation, private decisions are the ones that count; the simple fact is that the politicians have had little or nothing to say. So far private initiative has been heading in the right direction, opening up the way for Italian policy and clearing up a few misconceptions. But in the long run this dominance of private enterprise in joint decisive action might turn out to be dispersive or at odds with the more general requirements. And this is why Italy must now turn to account the experience she has gained in the last few years and work out a development strategy which will ensure her a place in the post-UNCTAD international scene.

This article is about Africa, and so is not the place to give a detailed examination of the problem of an Italian development strategy. What we should do is to discuss the part that Africa might play in any such strategy, and here the crux of the matter lies in the significance of the regional policy proclaimed by the EEC-AASM association.

This policy, as we have seen, has had the merit of modernizing Italian bilateral policy, but it contains certain discriminatory elements which might in the long run lead to undesirable developments. This discrimination not only does damage to the pattern of bilateral policy towards Africa, but also causes political complications with industrialized countries not belonging to the EEC and underdeveloped countries not belonging to the AASM.

Latin America, for example, has always protested strongly against the economic damage which the association is supposed to have done to her trade. I say "supposed to" because the figures do not bear out the claim—trade between the EEC and Latin America has gone up quicker than trade between the EEC and the AASM. Nevertheless the question of the discrimination practised by the association is still valid at the political level. There is no doubt that the methodology suggested by the EEC-AASM association is a wrong way to go about things in a wide-open and shrinking world. What is needed is a uniform (i.e., global) basis of procedures and interventions which may or may not be those of UNCTAD, but they must be there.

When this has been said, however, there is also little doubt that such a global framework will continue to contain some tie-ups which are closer or more convenient than others, and this fact is the rational basis for a regional policy. Particularly in the field of aid, when you have satisfied all the requirements of multilateral aid, there will always be something (and quite a large something) left over for bilateral aid, and this is where regional distribution will come into its own. In this sense Africa will be, as it is today, a priority sector for Italian aid.

Nevertheless, the type of regional policy in existence today is insufficient and irrational in the picture we have been describing. The



AASM accounts for only a part, and not even a homogeneous part, of Africa south of the Sahara. The time has come for a country like Italy to extend its association to other African countries and to fill in the gaps in its regional policy. The new Convention drawn up in Yaounde opens up a few doors, but to get them open still further we need to know what we want and to work for it. The business men who made such a decisive contribution to evening up Italian policy towards Africa as a whole are already appearing on the scene as a strong force for the evening up of Italian policy south of the Sahara. What is needed now is a timely and informed decision from the politicians.

#### REFERENCES

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## Quarterly Chronicle (Dec.-Feb.)

VANITA SABIKI

### INDIA AND AFRICA

**Indian Envoys to Africa Meet in Delhi :** A six-day conference of Heads of Indian Missions in countries south of the Sahara was held in Delhi from December 19-24. The conference, attended by 15 envoys representing 35 countries, was inaugurated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. India, she said, should take much more direct interest in African developments and have a feeling of involvement in the destiny of that continent. The fund of goodwill for India in African countries built over years on the basis of a common struggle against colonialism, Mrs. Gandhi warned, should not be allowed to run out. Towards this purpose, she underlined the vast potentialities of Indo-African economic collaboration and called on the envoys to examine the possibility of combining Africa's urge for development with Indian technical capacity to give a helping hand.

The conference advised the forging of close political and economic links with African countries in the context of changing conditions in that continent. The envoys noted with concern that economic relations were far below what was possible — India accounting for a mere 1 per cent of the total world exports to African countries—and evolved a new framework for Indo-African partnership. More trade agreements were called for and Government and private businessmen were urged to make timely and energetic efforts to capture the African market. The State Trading Corporation, the conference advised, should make a thorough study of African market potentialities and enter into contracts on a broad basis. It was felt that a direct shipping service between India and West Africa would facilitate a greater flow of trade. The envoys were of the view that the "vast opportunities" for joint ventures should be taken advantage of. Apart from the dozen ventures in operation the conference suggested that India should collaborate with the sugar and fertilizer industry in the Sudan, railway construction in Gabon, bauxite and iron development in Guinea, the inter-continental railway system in Nigeria, gypsum development in Somalia, high-grade potash production in Ethiopia and mineral exploitation in the Congo. During the conference the envoys also had discussions with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and highlighted the tremendous potentialities of the African market.

The problems of peoples of Indian origin in the various countries of the region were studied and the conference concluded that the policy followed so far was along the right lines, that wherever the roots of the people were deep enough they should be encouraged to take up the citizenship of the country of their adoption. In the case of people holding British passports the local situation should be taken into consideration to see what best could be done.

The conference reviewed the efforts made for forging a new Islamic grouping south of the Sahara, but noted that these efforts had not been successful. It was observed

that with the change of leadership in many African countries and gradual elimination of tribalism and colonialism, a qualitative change in the form of national upsurge was taking place. Asian and African countries were trying to consolidate themselves in various regional organisations.

Among other subjects discussed by the conference was the role of the Big Powers in the countries of the region. It was noted that South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies in Africa still constituted a social economic group and were forging ahead with the assistance of metropolitan powers. Apart from this the envoys were unable to formulate any clear picture and pointed out that conditions were still rather fluid. The conference concluded by emphasising the role India had to play in the coming years in the consolidation of African freedom and economic development, even as its contribution to the liquidation of colonialism in the earlier period was impressive.

The conference, which was the third of its kind to be called by the Ministry of External Affairs (the first was of Indian envoys in South-East Asia held in November last year), was widely commented in the Indian Press. The Hindustan Times in its editorial of December 19, hailed the exchanges to develop the country's diplomacy on Africa as "educative and useful". This would help in "the evolution of continental or regional and problem-oriented views rather than merely disparate country views". Such "integrated thinking", the paper believed, "would have a useful leavening effect on the conduct and content of the country's political, economic and cultural diplomacy". The Statesman (December 29) said that though such gatherings "were not without their uses", to attribute to them any greater usefulness "would seem to be an exercise in make-believe". It added: "There is nothing either exceptional or new in the decision to expand trade and economic relations with the emerging nations of the African continent. This resolve has been reaffirmed frequently, but, as usual, words have not been matched by deeds; less than 3 per cent of Indian exports go to Africa, notwithstanding the fortuitous advantage of the eastern seaboard of the continent arising from the closure of the Suez and barely 1 per cent of African exports find their way into India." Not many of the Indo-African joint ventures, it added, had been completed and it was "doubtful whether these projects would make much headway in these countries where problems have arisen over the future of the people of Indian origin, a problem on which very little seems to have been said."

On the espousal of the cause of the peoples of Indian origin by the Government, the Patriot sounded a warning note on December 25. The fact that most of these Indians were British passport holders, it felt, might arouse suspicions of the African governments. They might "misunderstand this interest and citizens of Indian origin, whose loyalties may appear to be as much to India as to their country of adoption may be placed in a different category", it said. The paper advised that economic and technical co-operation with African countries should be at a government-to-government level rather than between Indian businessmen and businessmen of Indian origin in Africa.

The Times of India (December 27) commented on the Indian naivety to win African gratitude by espousing the cause of anti-colonialism. "It is idle to pretend", it said, "that the newly independent countries of Africa are full of goodwill for India or that they are obsessed with the threat of neo-colonialism. The Africans are rather indifferent to this country; their attitude towards persons of Indian origin is determined primarily by domestic considerations such as the pressure for the Africanisation of trade and services; and they maintain close economic and cultural links with former imperial powers which grant them free access to their markets".

**Mauritius Prime Minister's Visit : Dr. Seewosagur Ramgoolam, Prime Minister**

of Mauritius, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Mr. Gaetan Duval, and Agricultural Minister, Mr. Satcam Sollel, paid a seven-day State visit to India from December 10. Talks were held with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Simultaneously, the Mauritius Foreign Minister exchanged views with Mr. Dinesh Singh, India's Foreign Minister, on the international situation, the security problems of the two countries in the Indian Ocean area, the future pattern of Asian co-operation, prospects of holding a non-aligned summit and the possibilities of developing economic and trade collaboration between the two countries.

A joint communique issued on December 16 reiterated the two Governments' view that the Indian Ocean should be kept a nuclear-weapon free zone. The countries of the Indian Ocean area should exert necessary pressure on the Big Powers to keep the area free from tension.

Mauritius would depute to India early in 1970 a trade-cum-industrial delegation to widen the area of economic collaboration. India in turn offered the services of technical experts and equipment for the implementation of irrigation and civil aviation projects.

A wide range of consumer goods, such as textiles, synthetic fibre, leather, agricultural equipment, cement and paper, will also be made available to Mauritius. It was agreed that a shipping expert would shortly visit Mauritius to explore the possibilities of establishing a direct shipping service between the two countries. Similarly, an Air-India expert will be deputed to study and assist in the development of Air Mauritius. Possibilities of developing tourism will also be explored.

In the cultural sphere India has agreed to assist Mauritius in establishing a Gandhi Memorial Institute as a centre of studies in Indian culture and traditions. All assistance was assured to make it a centre of advanced studies in fine arts, Indian subjects and current international affairs. Scholarships to students from Mauritius for higher studies in India were also promised.

At a special convocation on December 12, Dr. K. N. Raj, Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University, conferred the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws on Dr. Ramgoolam. Dr. Raj described the Mauritius Prime Minister as "a convinced socialist who combines in himself the best in the culture of the East and the West".

Trade between India and Mauritius is heavily in India's favour, exports to Mauritius being Rs. 131 million as against the meagre imports of Rs. 2.2 million.

**Six Million Indians Abroad:** An analysis based on official figures indicates that there are as many as 6 million Indians resident abroad. Out of these, a little over 2½ million have acquired citizenship of the countries where they have settled for generations. Indians are to be found in 126 countries. In Africa, figures show that the largest number is in Mauritius (520,000). All of them are citizens of the island. Indian populations in other countries are: Fiji 241,000—almost all of them Fijian nationals; Tanzania 102,000—50,000 are British passport-holders; Kenya 172,000—citizenship rights have been granted to 48,600 while the question of 8,000 has yet to be decided; Uganda 76,000; Malagasy 12,350—of whom as many as 9,000 are Stateless, while only 50 have been granted local citizenship; Zambia 11,450; Ghana 1,750—of whom 1,650 are Indian citizens and 100 British passport holders; and Nigeria 1,600—of whom 1,500 are Indian passport holders and 100 British passport holders.

The analysis highlights the difficulties confronting a large section of Indians who have either not made up their minds about their future or are facing other dilemmas as a result of the policy of nationalisation pursued by the countries concerned.

**Joint Ventures Approved :** A State Bank of India Bulletin issued in December indicates that the Union Government has approved the setting up of 68 joint ventures to be located in 26 countries spread over 4 continents. Of these 32 are to be in Africa. The largest number of joint ventures, nine in all, have so far been established in Kenya. According to the Bulletin, a wide range of products, including automobile components, cotton and woollen textiles, jute and vanaspati, are produced by these joint ventures. Non-traditional goods like air-conditioners, asbestos cement products, transformers, trucks, sewing machines, tractors, heavy engineering goods, pharmaceuticals and paper, pulp, hard board and razor blades also form a substantial part.

The Bulletin stated that proposals to set up an industrial estate in the UAR is under study. Views have also been expressed about the scope for multilateral ventures being established by India, the UAR and Yugoslavia (United News of India, December 12).

**Demineralising Plant for UAR:** A demineralising plant for the Suez thermal power station was formally handed over to the Ambassador for the UAR, Mr. Helmy-el-Thany, in Bombay recently. The plant, which cost Rs. 20 lakhs, has been manufactured by L.A.E.C. (Bombay) Private Ltd.

**India's Help to Save UAR Monuments :** The Government of India has agreed to offer services, supplies and equipment worth Rs. 300,000 to help save the monuments of Philae in the UAR. The decision followed an appeal from the Director-General of UNESCO for voluntary contributions from member States (Press Trust of India, December 17).

**Railway Wagons for Sudan :** The State Trading Corporation concluded in December a contract for the supply of 120 railway wagons to the Sudan.

**Congolese Minister in India :** Congo's Minister for Agriculture and Community Development, Mr. Jean Joseph Litho, paid a brief visit to New Delhi late in December to explore the possibilities of co-operation between the two countries in the implementation of his country's agricultural plans. The Minister met Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Mr. Jagjivan Ram, explained his country's anxiety to introduce latest techniques and mechanisation in agriculture and requested for technical knowhow and block development officers to train Congolese.

Congo, Mr. Litho said, has doubled its exports since 1965 when it first launched its agricultural projects, the co-operative and community development programmes and the pilot centres for utilising idle manpower. 40 per cent of the country's exports now consist of agricultural products.

**African Students Meet :** The 18th Annual General Conference of the African Students Association (India) was inaugurated in Delhi on December 29. Delhi University Vice-Chancellor, Dr. K. N. Raj, stressed the need for united efforts by all developing countries to eradicate the social evils confronting Africa. "Unless this is made possible we shall end up again in bondage by the end of this century", he warned as an economist.

A prominent activist of the ASA in his student days in Delhi Mr. Bayo Akinyehi, the First Secretary of the Nigerian High Commission, described the African student in India as "the happiest person in the world, because he has complete freedom to study". India, he said, has much to teach and underlined the need to foster a feeling of brotherhood among Africans in India.

Mr. John B. Ndeh, Chairman of the Conference, said the ASA was working for a closer relationship between African and Indian students while striving to strengthen the affinity among the Africans themselves. Over 20 African countries were represented at the conference.

**Sierra Leone Youth Leader in Delhi:** Mr. N. Dingabisi, a prominent youth leader from Sierra Leone and Secretary of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, visited Delhi in December to attend three youth and student conferences. Mr. Dingabisi, who is leader of the National Youth Movement in his country, described the various constructive activities of his organisation to ensure national regeneration. "We work in community development schemes and have 5,000 active cadres", he said. The National Youth Movement, Mr. Dingabisi added, was presently rendering active assistance to Mr. Siaka Steven's ruling All People's Congress. He praised the present regime for its earnestness to introduce socialistic measures, including nationalisation of banks, and the setting up of new industries based on agriculture in the country and expressed that this was a testimony to the influence wielded by democratic institutions in the country of which the youth were not an inactive part.

**Africa and India Were One Land :** The finding of a 200-million-year-old reptile skull near the South Pole by Dr. Laurence Gould, one-time chief scientist of the 1933 Byrd Expedition to the South Pole, establishes the theory that most of the Southern Hemisphere was once a single land mass, the great southern continent of Gondwanalands. The theory is that Gondwanalands spanned the South Atlantic Oceans and included most of what is now Africa, South America and India in a single land mass. (Associated Press, December 6).

**Delhi Mayor Visits Nairobi :** The Mayor of Delhi, Mr. Hansraj Gupta, visited the East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius in December.

**Indian Trade Delegation Visits Malawi :** A four-man trade delegation, sponsored by a semi-governmental body, the Bombay-based Pharmaceutical and Soap Export Corporation, visited East Africa to explore trade possibilities in pharmaceuticals and chemicals. It is believed to have secured a number of orders in Malawi and East Africa. (Mana Daily Digest, December 4).

**More Indians Forced to Leave Kenya and Uganda :** Implementation of the provisions of the Trade Licensing Act, which prohibits non-citizens from trading in certain areas, is likely to force a large number of Asians to leave Kenya and Uganda this year. The Uganda Government's latest directive is that shops of those traders who have not yet received licences for the current year should remain closed. Reports from Kampala and other Uganda towns indicate that many Asian shops are closed and that as many as 3,000 Asians would be forced to leave within the first half of this year.

In Nairobi, though the exact number of rejected applications is not available, it is estimated that over 10,000 Asians will have to leave Kenya this year. In Nairobi's Indian Bazaar, 17 Indian firms have been served notices to close business. Rejection of applications is final and no appeals are entertained (The Hindu, January 7). In Britain, the Home Secretary, Mr. James Callaghan, told the House of Commons in reply to questions on Britain's moral commitment to Asians in Africa who hold British passports that the Government would adhere by the quota fixed by it and would not allow any queue jumping despite the fact that the number of Commonwealth immigrants had declined from 53,069 in 1968 to 36,557 in 1969. (The Times of India, February 10).

**Indians in South Africa Subjected to Torture :** Testifying before a UN Experts Committee investigating violations of human rights in South Africa, Miss Mary Benson, a South African exiled author and journalist, spoke of the 'extensive tortures' inflicted on prospective witnesses and accused and also of the numerous deaths of prisoners in jail. Miss Benson told the committee that the security police in South Africa appeared to be particularly harsh and violent to Indian political suspects and often used or threatened to use violence and disfigurement of their sexual organs. Miss Benson testified to the tortures inflicted on Miss Shahti Naidoo, daughter of Mahatma Gandhi's adopted son, the late Mr. T.N. Naidoo, formerly Chairman of the Transvaal Indian Congress. Miss Naidoo had been subjected to five days of torture when she was forced to stand continuously and not allowed to sleep till she broke down. However, when she appeared in court, Miss Naidoo spoke of her tortures and refused to testify so that she was again sentenced to two months imprisonment. (Press Trust of India, January 10).

**Indian Official Discusses Plans for Non-aligned Summit :** Mr. Nagendra Singh, head of the International Organisations Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, in January visited Dar-es-Salaam, Addis Ababa, Cairo and Algiers to discuss plans for a third non-aligned Summit Conference and matters connected with the Preparatory Committee meeting at the ministerial level scheduled to be held in Dar-es-Salaam in April. (Reuter, January 17).

**UAR Planning Experts' Visit :** UAR planning experts, led by the Director-General of Industry, Mr. Omar Abbas Mohammed Mokhtar, paid a fortnight's visit to India in January. They held discussions with the Planning Commission Secretary, Mr. B. D. Pande, and other senior officials and met members of credit institutions and economic organisations, including the Reserve Bank of India and the National Council of Applied Economic Research. The team, whose principal aim was to study the working of Indian industries and development projects, formulation of industrial plans, the role of private and public sectors, and the techniques for implementation of development programmes, visited several developmental centres around Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore and Mysore.

India has already entered into agreements with the UAR to provide about Rs. 12 crores (Rs. 120 million) worth of machinery for its textile mills. Studies are reported to be under way for possible supplies to the fertilizer and steel sectors. In the field of trade, non-traditional items accounted for 13 per cent of India's exports to the UAR in 1966-67, 40 per cent in 1967-68 and currently for half of India's exports. 132 Egyptian technicians are undergoing training in various Indian institutions in subjects like refrigeration, food canning, surveying and diesel mechanics. (Press Trust of India, February 17).

**Indians in Somalia to Lose Jobs :** A Reuter report from Mogadishu on January 20 stated that Indians and other non-Somali nationals were likely to lose their jobs or business to the Somalis under a new law introduced by the Supreme Revolutionary Council. The law has been introduced following the report of a commission set up in October, which advised that one of the ways of settling the country's unemployment problem would be to give to the Somalis the jobs presently held by non-nationals. The Somali Revolutionary Council has now appointed a five-man committee to review the work permits of non-nationals and to determine whether non-Somalis can be replaced by Somali citizens.

**Ethiopian Minister in India :** Mr. Ato Assefa Defaye, Ethiopian Irrigation and Power Vice-Minister, visited India for two weeks in January. He held discussions with the Irrigation and Power Minister, Mr. K.L. Rao, and other officials and experts of his



Ministry on matters of mutual interest, particularly in the field of irrigation and power development.

**Mauritius Likely to Import Indian Drugs and Medical Instruments :** During his visit to India, the Mauritius Health Minister, Mr. K. Jagat Singh, held talks with Union Health Minister, Mr. K.K. Shah, and showed his country's eagerness to buy drugs and surgical instruments from India. He said a trade delegation led by the Mauritius Commerce Minister would soon visit India. (The Hindustan Times, January 27)

**Nigeria Appeals for Relief Assistance :** At a Press conference in Delhi on January 29, the Nigerian High Commissioner, Mr. J.N. Ukegbu, made an appeal for relief aid from "friendly governments, organisations and the UN to supplement the national efforts of rehabilitation in the former territory of Biafra". He listed three fields of assistance—medical aid, transportation and financial grants—and said this could be rendered on a government-to-government basis or through the Nigerian Red Cross. He added that all necessary relief measures to rehabilitate the war victims were well under way and reports about thousands starving to death were baseless. Under "the able and human leadership" of Major General Yakubu Gowon, the envoy said, his Government had "set a standard of magnanimity perhaps unknown in the history of wars". General amnesty to all rebels had been ordered and they would be integrated without discrimination.

Mr. Ukegbu made two important policy pronouncements. The Federal Government having "overcome" the rebellion and Nigeria having regained its territorial integrity, he said, "no further need exists for peace negotiations between the Federal Government and the secessionists under the auspices of the OAU or any other body". Secondly, he made it clear that the term "Biafra" was a misnomer and that it was not only "an anomaly to describe any part of the Federation as such but should be regarded as provocative and hostile to the Government and the people of Nigeria."

**Indian Parliamentarians in Africa :** Three groups of Members of Parliament representing all parties visited African countries in February to promote better understanding. A seven-member delegation headed by Mr. B. Barua toured the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia. In Kenya the parliamentarians held discussions with the Speaker of Kenya's National Assembly, Mr. Humphrey Slade. They also called on Kenya's Vice-President and Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Njorge Mungai, and exchanged with them views on the working of democracy in Kenya and India. (Press Trust of India, February 3).

In Uganda Mr. Sam Odaka, Foreign Minister, in his talks with the Indian parliamentarians stressed the importance of maintaining good relations between India and Africa, which were not affected by the problem of non-citizen Indians holding British passports. (Reuter, February 10).

The second group visited Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea and Ghana in West Africa. In Accra, on February 2, the ten-member group led by Dr. Mahadeva Prasad, Government Deputy Chief Whip, called on Brigadier Akwasi Afrifa and Lt-General Albert Ocran, Chairman and Member respectively of Ghana's Presidential Commission. The purpose of the visit, the parliamentarians said, was to strengthen the already cordial relations between Ghana and India. (Reuter, February 3).

The third goodwill delegation visited the North African countries of the UAR, the Sudan and Algeria. Mr. Fakhruddin Mohsen, head of the delegation, said they had ex-

pressed their unqualified support for the Arabs with whom the Indian people maintained the strongest bonds of friendship and in whose just cause they believe to the full".

**India Represented at International Conference of Parliamentarians :** Representatives of Members of Parliament headed by the Deputy Speaker, Mr. G. S. Swell, attended recently in Cairo the International Conference of Parliamentarians. The team expressed its strong support to the Arab cause. Mr. Swell, Mr. Nurul Hasan, who was elected Chairman of the main Political Commission, and Mr. Sitaram Kesri spoke in different committees emphasising that the aggressor should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits of aggression. Israel was accused of intransigence. Mr. Hasan lay the responsibility for Israeli intransigence on the U.S. and Mr. Kesri strongly blamed Israel for flouting the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The Indian delegation suggested to the conference that the parliamentarians should mobilise world opinion to call for a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss Israel's non-implementation of the Security Council Resolution. (Press Trust of India, February 4).

**Indian Officials Visit UAR :** A four-member team of officials from Rajasthan left for the UAR in the third week of February to study various aspects of the reclamation programme in that country keeping in view the conditions prevailing in the Rajasthan Canal area.

## UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

**Burundian New Security Council President :** In the normal year-end rotation, Burundi and Sierra Leone along with Nicaragua, Poland and Syria replaced Algeria, Hungary, Pakistan, Paraguay and Senegal in the Security Council. Mr. Terence Nsanze of Burundi was voted the new President of the Security Council.

**Trusteeship Committee Recommends Independence to 30 Territories :** The General Assembly endorsed in December a number of recommendations by its Trusteeship Committee to grant independence to more than 30 territories in the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific.

**India Calls for Removal of Portugal from Africa :** In the Security Council on December 20, the Indian delegate, Mr. Samar Sen, condemned Portugal's attacks on Guinea-Bissau and said measures should be taken to make it impossible for the Lisbon Government to maintain "aggression" in Africa. The Security Council was considering a Guinean complaint of aggression by Portugal. The Portuguese delegate, Dr. Bonifacio de Miranda, after his own address to the Council walked out in protest against India's presence at the meeting.

**International Day for Elimination of Racial Discrimination :** The United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid has called for world-wide observance of March 21 as International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

**Higher Growth Rate for Developing Areas Urged :** An expert committee, under the UN Economic and Social Council, comprising 18 countries, including India and Congo (Brazzaville), the UAR and Ghana from Africa recommended that the second U. N. Development Decade, 1971-80, aim to boost the average rate of growth in total gross product of more than 100 developing countries to between 6 and 7 per cent a year compared with about 5 per cent now.

The Committee for Planned Development further recommended that the developing countries seek to increase their savings to 20 per cent of gross domestic product from the present 15 per cent or so. (The Hindustan Times, January 27).

**U Thant Tours African Countries :** The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, started on December 29 a tour of African countries which had to be put off twice before because of the Middle East crisis. The tour will take U Thant to 10 African countries—Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, Togo, Niger, Upper Volta and Ivory Coast.

**Biafra Secession Unacceptable To U.N. :** U Thant, after an on-site inspection of Nigerian aid facilities in the aftermath of the civil war, said "the situation in the fighting zone is peaceful and there is even fraternisation between the peoples of the zone, including the Ibos, with the Federal Government armed forces." He characterised reports on the famine in Biafra as inexact. (AP, AFP, UPI, Paris, January 20).

Earlier in Dakar, Senegal, U Thant made it clear that Biafra's secession was unacceptable to the U.N. and in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, he underlined that Nigeria would honour its assurances of Ibos' well-being. U Thant told his audience here that throughout his 10-nation African tour he had been struck by the contrast between Western and African attitudes to the problem. The African leaders with whom he had talked did not share the concern expressed in the West about the condition of the Ibos after the end of the civil war. Most of them had expressed confidence in the actions of the Nigerian Government that it would honour its assurance concerning the well-being and security of all the peoples of Nigeria, including the Ibos.—See also under Nigeria: UN Observer Team Report.

**Dayal to Head U.N. Body :** Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, former Indian Foreign Secretary, was elected Chairman of the U.N. Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination on January 19. Mr. Muchkund Dubey, First Secretary in the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, was also elected first Vice-President of the Governing Council of the U.N. Development Programme.

**U. N. Body to Study Steps to Oust S. Africa From Namibia :** The Security Council on January 30 decided to establish a sub-committee to study and recommend within three months how best South Africa could be got out of its former mandated territory of Namibia (South West Africa). Before the Council adopted this Afro-Asian resolution, voted by 13 votes to none with Britain and France abstaining, India intervened in the debate to ask the Council for steps to ensure that no arms flowed to South Africa, either directly or indirectly, and for adoption of other interim measures pending enforcement by the Council of sanctions against South Africa. India's deputy permanent representative suggested that effective steps be taken to prevent the flow of arms and other military hardware to South Africa either directly or through third countries; all States must take suitable measures to stop fresh investments in Namibia by their nationals or private companies; all States must be asked to ensure that their companies and nationals pay taxes and levies for operations in Namibia to the Security Council for Namibia and not to the South African regime; and members should not recognise travel documents for Namibians issued by the South African regime but instead extend recognition to travel and visa documents issued on behalf of the U.N. (The Times of India, January 31).

**U. N. Panel Report on Southern Africa :** A report submitted by a panel representing six countries, including India, to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights covers alleged infringements of human rights in the whole of Southern Africa. It also affirms, on the

basis of declarations by witnesses interviewed by the group, that "the most inhuman form of forced labour prevails in the Portuguese colonies of Africa. It further charges South Africa with using African reserves as "reservoirs of cheap labour for industrial areas in Namibia and South Africa".

In a series of recommendations and conclusions on Rhodesia, the report states that the 1969 constitution of Rhodesia is "an illegal as well as pernicious document" while the "declaration of rights" contained in the document confers "few, if any, rights on non-whites". Parts of the "so-called constitution" are said to bring out "the authoritative and racist character of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia". The group recommends that Britain should take action "with a view to revoking the entire so-called constitution of Rhodesia of 1969", intervene in Southern Rhodesia with a view to liberating the Africans from the reserves in which they are concentrated in conditions of near captivity and bondage". (Reuter, February 15).

## EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

**President Tito Tours African Countries:** President Tito embarked on a tour of African countries on January 25 to hold consultations to prepare for the uncommitted Summit Conference scheduled to be held in Dar-es-Salaam in April this year. The tour, the longest that the Yugoslav President has undertaken in recent years, took him to several African countries including Tanzania, Zambia, Ethiopia. From East Africa President Tito went to the UAR. The tour emphasises the importance President Tito attaches to relations with the uncommitted world. This he regards as an important step towards an international affirmation of uncommitted countries as a cohesive and active force in world affairs. As a staunch champion of the ideal that uncommitted countries ought to provide moral and political alternatives, President Tito has been apprehensive of late of the developing trends.

**Sixth East and Central African Summit Conference (Khartoum) :** The sixth Summit Conference of Heads of State and Governments of East and Central African States was held in Khartoum from January 26-28 under the chairmanship of Major-General Numeiry (the Sudan). The conference was attended by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Bokassa of Central African Republic who also represented Chad, and delegates from Burundi, Congolese People's Republic, Congo (DR), Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda, Somali Democratic Republic and Tanzania. The Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Mr. Diallo Telli, was also present.

**Ministerial Meeting :** The conference was preceded by a preparatory meeting of East and Central African Foreign Ministers in Lusaka from January 5-8, which considered reports submitted by the five sectional committees established by the Lusaka Summit in April 1969. These committees covered regional co-operation in the fields of agriculture, industry, and energy, transport and communications, trade and human resources. The Ministers decided that by their outright rejection of the "Lusaka Manifesto" on Southern Africa the Governments of South Africa and Portugal had "closed the door to the possibility of a peaceful solution" and "further deplored the growing collusion of certain Western Powers with Portuguese colonialism."

The meeting considered that the impending declaration of a republic in Rhodesia could only aggravate the "explosive" situation there. It held the U.K. responsible for this marked deterioration, and urged her to fulfil her obligation towards the majority of the people in Rhodesia. The meeting reaffirmed its commitment to continue its support for all liberation movements in the Portuguese and other territories under colonial rule.

**Malawi Dissents :** The Malawi Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Mr. R.B. Chidzanja, said afterwards that his country would co-operate with Mozambique and that it believed in "peaceful solutions" of Africa's problems. Malawi, he said, did not agree with the solutions recommended by the meeting for the transfer of power to Africans in White Southern Africa. Mr. Chidzanja added that Malawi also dissociated itself from the meeting's expression of sympathy with victims of bombings by Portuguese troops fighting nationalist guerillas in Portuguese Guinea. It also refused to agree with the Minister's praise for Sweden for ordering Swedish firms to withdraw from the Cabora-Bassa Dam hydro-electric project in Mozambique. Malawi, he went on, fully supported the Cabora-Bassa scheme, because it would get cheaper power from it. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), he said, had recommended that African countries should share their energy sources with neighbours and Malawi saw nothing wrong with sharing Mozambique.

The Zambian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Moto Nkama, who presided discounted reports that Malawi would be expelled because of its non-co-operation at all conferences. Mr. Nkama said that the qualification for membership of the conferences of the Central and East African grouping was that a country should be within the region and should be independent. It would therefore be inadvisable to expel Malawi from the grouping. "The move will be disastrous, not to this region alone but to Africa in the long run," he stressed.

**Joint Communique :** A joint communique issued on January 28, stated that the conference had approved the amended recommendations of the Foreign Ministers' conference in Lusaka dealing with questions of co-operation between East and Central African countries in the political, economic, and social fields. The conference had given priority to the "Lusaka Manifesto" on the southern part of the continent which called for a serious study of ways to enable the countries represented at the conference to confront the challenge which South Africa and Portugal presented to the continent and to the world as a whole. The conference also resolved that efforts should be stepped up in every possible way to support the African national liberation movements by mobilising all resources. The conference authorised Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to contact all African Heads of State and Governments to implement the resolutions on the African liberation movements, and to call upon the liberation movements themselves to co-ordinate their efforts.

On Nigeria, the conference noted with satisfaction the end of the war, and called upon the Federal Government to make every possible effort to safeguard national peace. It expressed its gratitude to Emperor Haile Selassie and the OAU Consultative Committee for their work to resolve the Nigerian problem.

On the Middle East question, the conference noted with concern the worsening of the situation in the area which stemmed from the non-application of the Security Council resolution, and called for prompt enforcement of the Security Council resolution of November 1967 calling for the complete evacuation of Israeli forces.

The conference also passed a number of resolutions on communications and air transport, and announced the formation of the following special committees and sub-committees: an agricultural committee with its centre in the Sudan; an industrial and power committee with its centre in Zambia; a communications committee with its centre in Ethiopia; a commerce and tourism committee with its centre in the Central African Republic; and a human resources committee with its centre in Uganda.

The conference resolved to hold its next session in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in June 1971.

**Malawi Again Dissents :** The Malawi Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Richard Chidzanja, who led his country's delegation to the conference, said in Khartoum on January 29 that he had placed on record his country's disagreement on certain resolutions adopted by the conference. Malawi, said Mr. Chidzanja, disagreed on Southern Africa, and in particular "we disagreed on intensification of the liberation struggle". (Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 15).

## Kenya

**Country Goes to the Polls :** For the first time since their independence in 1963, Kenya's 3.3 million people went to the polls in the country's first primary elections on December 6. Organised to elect the new Parliament for the next five years, the contest was essentially a family affair within the Kenya African National Union (KANU), for the Kenya Peoples' Union (KPU) has been banned for security reasons. As many as 600 candidates on the KANU ticket contested the 158 seats for the National Assembly.

Most of the old National Assembly members, including 5 Ministers and 13 Assistant Ministers in President Kenyatta's Cabinet, were defeated as also all Asian candidates. Mrs. Grace Onyango, a former woman Mayor who defeated 5 male opponents in the Kisumu constituency, is the first woman MP in Kenya.

President Kenyatta announced his new Cabinet on December 22 after reshuffling portfolios. The Cabinet contains six new Ministers besides all the Ministers of the old Cabinet successful in the recent elections.

Commenting on the election results, the Hindu in a special feature by Batuk Gathani said on December 9 that this did not mean that the people "disapprove of KANU and Government policies. In fact there appears to be a general satisfaction among the emerging middle class about the economic reforms in the country." For the next five years, he pointed out, "Kikuyu domination is inevitable because compared to other tribes Kikuyus are more hard working, resourcesful, enterprising and even diligent." They along with their Wakmaba allies could expect to have the same strength as in the last five years in the new Parliament despite the many new faces. The fact that all Luo Ministers lost their seats in the Nyanza province revealed how deep was the political frustration of the group.

On December 23, Gathani lauded President Kenyatta's choice of Ministers, for it was an attempt to "accommodate all tribes, religions and peoples from all walks of life in the country". All this tended towards an "era of unprecedented political stability". "Kenya", he added, "is poised for a grand economic takeoff and it would not be rash to say that during the next decade Kenya may be the most advanced and prosperous country in Africa".

**Second Five-Year Plan Launched :** On the occasion of the country's independence anniversary on December 12, President Kenyatta announced at a rally in Nairobi the launching of the Second Five-Year Plan. The Plan, which aims at increasing the growth rate from 6.3 per cent to 6.7 per cent, would also raise the Central Government's budget by £300 million to a total of £720 million. In agriculture, the main source of national wealth

the Plan target is to raise crop and livestock production by more than a third. A 75 per cent increase in industrial output is also envisaged requiring an investment of £90 million by the private sector. Under the new Plan tourism would be the fastest growing industry with its foreign exchange earnings reaching a total of £37 million by 1974.

**More Executive Posts for Kenyans :** In Nairobi, on February 8, President Kenyatta in his address to the newly elected National Assembly said the number of non-Kenyan executives in the banking, insurance and oil industries in Kenya would be heavily reduced this year. He explained that as a result of training schemes a large number of Kenyans were now prepared to man these posts and hereafter only 300 ex-patriates would be needed in these industries. The President also indicated that private firms would have to pay a levy which would go to a central training fund to prepare Kenyans for work of all kinds in the private sector.

**Asians Enrolled as Life Members :** A group of 101 Asians were enrolled as life members of the ruling Kenya African National Union on December 17. Presenting them life membership certificates, President Kenyatta said the example of these Asians would show that KANU was open to all.

## Tanzania

**State Takes Over Trade :** President Nyerere, in a broadcast to the nation on February 5, the third anniversary of the Arusha Declaration—Tanzania's manifesto on socialism and self-reliance—announced that the most important items of export and import would be taken over by State institutions this year. The President said: "One field of public enterprise where much improvement is still necessary is the distribution of goods". It was important that this be "in public hands as soon as possible".

**"The Standard" Nationalised :** The Government on February 4 announced nationalisation of The Standard, the only remaining English language privately owned daily newspaper in the country. The Government also took over control of the sister paper, Sunday News. The Standard hereafter will be an official newspaper receiving directives from President Nyerere.

**Tanzanians to Help on the Zambia-Tanzania Railway :** The Ministry of Communications in Dar-es-Salaam has called on young Tanzanians to volunteer to help build the Chinese financed Zambia-Tanzania railway. The announcement made no mention of pay but asked young men to come forward in a spirit of national reconstruction. (The Nationalist, Tanzania, February 9).

**Partymen Made Magistrates in Zanzibar :** Vice-President Karume announced late in December that all the functions of the present magistrates' courts on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba would be taken over by the branch chairmen of the ruling Afro-Shirazi Party. The old judicial system, he said, reflected the interests of colonialists, but now under the new system citizens of Zanzibar and Pemba would have no legal recourse other than through nominated officials.

**U.S. Loan for Tanzam Highway :** The U.S. is to extend a loan of about Shs. 53.55 million to Tanzania for the construction of the 150-mile Dar-es-Salaam-Mogoro section of the Tanzam highway. The new loan agreement brings the U.S. contribution to just over Shs. 150 million. The other participants in road construction are the World Bank and the Government of Sweden. (The Standard, Tanzania, January 8).

## Uganda

**President Obote Shot at and Wounded :** Dr. Milton Obote was shot at and injured by an unknown gunman on December 19 in Kampala as he left the annual conference of the Uganda People's Congress. A man was later arrested. The conference had adopted resolutions to implement the "new move to the left" socialist strategy recently announced under the title of the Common Man's Charter. It also urged the Government to amend the Constitution and make Uganda a one-party State. President Obote had said that this resolution would be implemented without delay.

The attempt to assassinate Dr. Obote comes barely two months after the assassination of President Shermarke of Somalia and within six months of the gunning down of Mr. Tom Mboya, Kenyan Minister for Economic Planning and Development, in a Nairobi street, and alleged plots to overthrow the governments of nearby Tanzania and Burundi.

**Opposition Leaders Arrested :** The National Assembly at an emergency meeting, called after the shooting incident in Kampala in which President Obote was wounded, banned all political parties in the country describing them as "dangerous to peace and order" and put the country under a state of emergency. Among the leading politicians arrested were Mr. Ben Kiwanuka, President of the Democratic Party, former Vice-President of Uganda, Sir Wilberforce Nadiope, and prominent officials of the opposition parties. The late King Mutesa's sister, Miss Nalinya Mpologma, was also arrested.

**East African Federation Ideal Revived :** An important outcome of the Annual Session of the Uganda People's Congress in Kampala in January was the revival of the ideal of an East African Federation. At the conference, attended by four African Presidents—those of Uganda, Tanzania, Congo-Kinshasa and Zambia—the Federation ideal was boldly put forward by Presidents Obote and Nyerere. Dr. Milton Obote said in his address that the Uganda People's Congress and the Uganda Government took very seriously its association with Kenya and Tanzania in the East African Community.

## Zambia

**Loan for Kariba Scheme :** Britain has agreed to take over all repayments of the World Bank loan for the Kariba power scheme. The need for Britain to repay the loan—originally worth £28 million and made to Rhodesia and Zambia jointly — has come about because of UDI and the resultant international sanctions campaign. The agreement, announced in the British Parliament in December, will enable Zambia to contract a new loan—of some \$35 million—for construction of a power station on the north bank of the Kariba gorge, a duplicate of the station on the south bank which is currently being operated close to capacity by Zambia and Rhodesia jointly. (*Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Vol. 6, No. 12*).

**Wilson Assures Arms Ban on South Africa will Stay :** In a letter to President Kenneth Kaunda, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, has assured that Britain will not lift the embargo on arms deliveries to South Africa. The assurance was given soon after Dr. Kaunda's speech which warned Britain of the consequences of lifting the embargo. (*The Times, London, January 13*).



## **Somalia**

**National Budget :** In Mogadishu, Mr. Mohammed Abdi Arraleh, Secretary of State for Finance, told a public forum 70 per cent of the national budget went towards the payments of salaries and only 8 per cent towards development.

## **Ethiopia**

**Telex Link with Japan :** A direct telex link which will operate on a semi-automatic basis has been opened between Ethiopia and Japan. Ethiopia will no longer have to use European telex links to reach Japan and other Far East countries. (The Ethiopian Herald, December 13).

## **Burundi**

**Plotters Executed :** At Bujumbura, 23 people were executed on December 22 for trying to overthrow the Government of President Micombero, for participating in last September's coup attempt and for allegedly planning the massacre of the Tutsi tribe. The Tutsi have been dominant in Burundi for many years although they are a minority tribe, smaller than the Hutu with whom they are often in conflict. Those executed included 19 military men and 4 civilians among whom were a former Minister, a former senior official in the Economic Ministry and the First Secretary of the Burundi Embassy in Washington.

## **WEST AFRICA**

**UDEAC Summit Conference :** A summit conference attended by the Heads of State of the four members of the Central African Customs and Economics Union (UDEAC)—Gabon, CAR, Congo Republic and Cameroon—was held in Libreville (Gabon) from December 21-24. A joint communique issued stated that committees would be established to study an industrialisation plan for the four countries. The summit also discussed fiscal arrangements between the member countries and a possible regional telecommunications schools. President Bongo of Gabon said the conference had achieved "very positive results", but much remained to be done especially on the industrialisation plan.

**Heads of State Conference of Afro-Malagasy Joint Organisation (Yaounde) :** The sixth summit conference of the OCAM was opened in Yaounde on January 28 by President Ahidjo of Cameroon. All 15 member countries were represented, nine of them by their Heads of State. President Tombalbaye of Chad succeeded President Diori of Niger as chairman of the organisation. After referring at the opening session to certain unsatisfactory aspects of the new Yaounde agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) President Diori spoke on the situation in Nigeria and said "whatever were our sentiments today we have one duty—to make every effort to aid our Nigerian brothers to heal their wounds".

The final communique stated that special consideration had been given to ways of achieving a closer understanding between member States, especially those in Central Africa, and the efforts of several members towards this end were applauded. The conference deplored what it called "Press campaigns against certain member States".

**Mauritius in OCAM :** The Heads of State confirmed their intention of forming closer ties within the organisation and measures were taken to reinforce co-operation with Mauritius, which has recently joined OCAM. In the sphere of cultural and social affairs the conference approved recommendations to bring their peoples into closer unity and created for this end joint awards for literature and art. The 15 member countries of OCAM are: Cameroon, Congo (DR), Congo Republic, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Togo, Ivory Coast and Mauritius.

## Dahomey

**Army Coup :** President Emile Zinsou was overthrown in Cotonou on December 10 in a coup—the sixth since 1963—engineered by the army. The coup leader, Dahomey's Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Maurice Kouandete, took over the Presidential palace and announced that a new government would soon be formed to replace Dr. Zinsou's regime which had created a situation of "total insecurity". Dr. Zinsou was designated Head of State by the Military Revolutionary Committee on July 17, 1968.

Commenting on the coup *Le Monde* on December 17 observed: "Since it gained independence on August 1, 1960, the Republic of Dahomey has experienced a steady decline in production while labour, both in the private and public sectors, has been multiplying demands for better wages and working conditions. These demands appear to have been made with no reference at all to the economic state of the country. The coup climaxed the crisis".

## Nigeria

**End of Civil War :** Biafran resistance to the forces of the Federal Military Government (FMG) collapsed on January 12 following the capture of Owerri, the last major town in rebel hands, the departure of General Ojukwu for an undisclosed destination, and the capture of Uli airport, Biafra's only link with the outside world described by observers as "Biafra's umbilical cord".

Five States had recognised the Biafran Republic although both the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN Secretary General, U Thant, had officially condemned the secession. These five were Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Zambia and Haiti.

According to *Agence France Presse* since May 30, 1967, when General Ojukwu proclaimed the Republic of Biafra, an estimated 2 million people have died on both sides, and to its original population of 12 million the new State had to add some 2 million Ibo refugees who fled to their homeland from Federal Nigeria.

Announcing Biafra's surrender in a broadcast on January 12 Major-General Effiong said, "Our people are now disillusioned and those elements of the old Government regime who have made negotiations and reconciliation impossible have voluntarily removed themselves from our midst". Urging General Gowon in the "name of humanity" to order his troops to halt, he added that they were ready to meet representatives of the Nigerian Federal Government anywhere to negotiate a peace settlement on the basis of the OUA Resolution.

Major-General Yakubu Gowon said on January 12 that he had promised amnesty to "all those who were led into futile attempts to disintegrate the country". "The fall of Biafra", he declared, "was a great victory for national unity and reconciliation". General Gowon continued: "I accept in good faith Lt.-Col. Effiong's declaration accepting the OAU resolution providing for the unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria".

On January 14 Radio Nigeria said the National Commission for Rehabilitation had asked all foreign Governments which intended to send relief supplies to war victims to channel supplies through the Commission. In an address to the nation on January 15 Major-General Gowon said the Federal Government had mounted a massive relief operation and while it might ask for the assistance of friendly foreign governments and bodies, assistance from "certain" foreign governments and organisations which had sustained the rebellion was not welcome.

As to the future, he went on, it was intended to maintain the existing political structure of a minimum of 12 States. He expressed Nigeria's gratitude to the OAU for its support of the Federal cause and to U Thant for his understanding attitude.

Most African States welcomed the Federal Nigerian victory and described it as Africa's victory over the interference and manoeuvres of non-African States.

Emperor Haile Selassie in a message to General Gowon assured him that the OAU Consultative Committee on Nigeria would help to bring about a reconciliation in the country and he ordered the transfer of Ethiopian \$50,000 to the Nigerian Federal Government to "alleviate the sufferings of the women, children and the aged".

President Bongo of Gabon said by recognising Biafra his country had not sought to divide Nigeria. "The decision was taken on humanitarian grounds". Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny said he believed history would be very critical of the present generation of Africans since they had been practically incapable of ending the fratricidal war in Nigeria. He sincerely hoped the Nigerians would also be able to achieve a reconciliation". (See also under West Africa—Heads of State Conference of Afro-Malagasy Joint Organisation).

The Nationalist of Tanzania in a commentary on January 14 wrote that against the background of an indifferent world and a cynical Africa faced with mounting arms deliveries from Britain and Russia, there was not much doubt, in military terms, about the eventual fate of a beleaguered Biafra. "Yet the Federal Military victory does not mean that Biafrans and their supporters did not have a case". The Times of Zambia on January 13 called for international observers to be based in Biafra to prevent any massacres of civilians.

**World Reaction :** Le Monde, on January 14 said the war in Nigeria and the position of the Ibos is an indictment of human progress and the "technological revolution". The damage would have been largely reduced had the great Powers not put their technological skill and arms at the disposal of the combatants. The main reason why Biafra was comparatively isolated in Africa was that almost all the continent's other governments were reluctant to give any encouragement to a movement of secession which might then be repeated in other countries. The inaction by the UN may be explained by the same reason.

The paper said while the tragedy of Biafra received much sympathy from world public opinion, it was always regarded as less important than the war in Vietnam or the

Middle East, although the Ibos endured the greatest sufferings. It concluded that unless the great Powers are actively involved in a war, and the people come to feel it as a threat to themselves, public opinion cannot be very seriously aroused.

In an editorial comment on January 13 *The Times*, London, underlined the urgent need to rush relief and felt that "valour and self-sacrifice have been shown in both armies. Nigeria, if it is to be a nation, has to absorb and accept this dual memory—must make it both a national tradition and a basis for reconciliation. If this is done, if the Ibo becomes respected and valued for the feats of endurance and courage he has shown in the past 20 months, some good for Nigeria may come out of this disaster, even though the cost in human and economic terms will remain beyond computation". The British Cabinet, which met in an emergency meeting, worked out a crash programme of relief for victims of the civil war.

U. S. President Nixon on January 12 in a personal message to General Gowon renewed an earlier offer to supply eight C-130 cargo aircraft and four helicopters to international aid organisations working under the supervision of the Nigerian Government. The U.S., he said, would contribute another \$10 million for the purchase of food and medicines for war victims. This would bring to \$80 million the total of American aid to Nigeria and Biafra.

*Izvestia* of January 13 expressed the feeling of "profound satisfaction" with which the Soviet people received the news. "The secessionist movement in Nigeria's Eastern Region has been fed ever since its emergence by two sources, the support of the international imperialist forces connected with the exploitation of Nigerian oil deposits and the unsettled situation at home". Radio Moscow commented on January 15 that the success of Nigeria's progressive forces had been due, above all, to the fact that the majority of the independent African States and other countries, including the Soviet Union, had supported them from the very beginning. "Many Nigerian newspapers are now talking about this: they note that General Gowon has expressed sincere and profound gratitude to the Government and the people of the USSR which has supported Nigeria in difficult times". It added: "Events in Nigeria have clearly shown what a great force the independent States of Africa become when they meet imperialist interference and pressure with firm unity and cohesion".

**Indian Reaction :** Newspapers in India hailed with relief the end of the civil war and the report of the international team of military observers in Nigeria that there was no evidence of genocide in Ibo territory and stressed the need to get famine relief quickly under control so as to enable the Federal Government to devote itself to the tremendous task of political reorganisation on a national scale.

The *Hindustan Times* special correspondent, commenting on the absence of any official reaction by the Government of India on January 14 quoted Foreign Office sources to underline that it was in deference to an appeal some time ago by General Gowon to all friendly nations not to interfere in Nigeria's internal affairs. India had, it was said, throughout the 30-month struggle for regaining national unity, stood unambiguously by the Federal Government. The triumph of the Federal Nigerian authority was a vindication of a central principle the Government of India has advocated since it became independent 22 years ago. "It has maintained, occasionally in the teeth of opposition from mighty nations, that the right of self-determination was exercisable by a nation as a whole, but not by any region or a part of it." The same principle was being espoused, to India's satisfaction, by no less a person than Secretary-General Thant.

**UN Observer Team Reports :** Brigadier Saiduddin Khan, UN Observer and Secretary-General Thant's special representative in Nigeria, issued two reports following the closure of the war in Nigeria. The reports, issued on January 26 and February 4, were based on visits to the war affected areas in the Eastern Region and the former Biafran enclave. In the first report, based on visits to Uli, Orlu and Owerri, the main centres of distress, Brigadier Khan found no justification for allegations of killings, but said there had been cases of molestation of women and many more of looting. Some soldiers in detachments in fairly remote areas had been disorderly but senior officers had maintained a clear code of conduct and enforced it strictly. The change in the army's role from tactical deployment to garrison concentration, the report said, had put a severe strain on officers and transport and restricted their contributions to the relief efforts. On relief, the report said that the Nigerian Red Cross distribution of food in the war affected areas was not adequate. Thus though the period of anxiety over bloodshed and violence in Nigeria would soon be ended the question of malnutrition, poverty and death would remain a cause of alarm for many months.

The second report considerably revised the earlier views and gave a more hopeful assessment of the situation. Law and order, it said, had been almost restored and the relief picture was gradually improving. Transport was no longer a serious problem and distribution of food had almost doubled. Brigadier Khan also explained that the Federal Military Government had inherited overnight the problem of caring for a million hungry people but that, given time, the Government and the Nigerian Red Cross should be able to devise ways of solving it. (See also under "U.N. and Africa" for U Thant's visit and "India and Africa").

**Ivory Coast Gives Asylum to Ojukwu :** The Government of the Ivory Coast, in an official statement issued on January 23, announced that General Ojukwu, the former Biafran leader, had been granted political asylum. The statement, which ended much speculation about Ojukwu's whereabouts, said, asylum had been granted on the condition that the leader would not use his refuge for "subversion or political activity" and that the Ivory Coast Government would not permit a government in exile to be set up on its territory. "Our dearest wish is to see a general reconciliation which will allow all those who left Nigeria to return", it said.

## NORTH AFRICA

**Fifth Arab Summit Meets at Rabat :** Leaders from 14 Arab countries met in conference at Rabat, Morocco, from December 21-24. Arab Heads of State—Presidents Boumedienne of Algeria, Nasser of Egypt, Moammar al-Kaddafi of Libya, General Numeiry of Sudan, Adbul Rahman al-Iryani of Yemen, Salem Alibrabyee of South Yemen, Kings Hussein of Jordan, Hasan of Morocco, Feisal of Saudi Arabia and the Sheikh of Kuwait—represented their countries at the summit meeting. Others present were Syria, Iraq, Tunisia and Lebanon though not represented by their Heads of State. Also present was a Palestinian delegation headed by the Palestinian guerilla leader, Mr. Yasser Arafat, and the chairman of the Arab League. In his speech, General Numeiry attacked by name the United States and hailed the Soviet Union. "No matter what explanations it puts forth," he said, "the United States must know it has become the declared enemy of the Arab nation". He then praised "the Socialist camp with the Soviet Union at its head" and also France "which has shown itself to be a true friend". King Hasan did not mention either the United States, the Soviet Union or the placing of Arab territories at the

disposal of the Palestinians. He compared their struggle to the Algerian war of independence and said: "We await the day when (the Palestinians) will recover all their rights."

The conference ended on December 23 without agreement on the aid to be given to the countries bordering Israel and the attitude to be adopted towards Israel and inter-Arab relations generally. There was no final communique. The formal closing session was boycotted by Syria, Iraq and South Yemen.

According to the UAR Government the principal aim of the conference was "to mobilise the energy of all the Arabs in order to confront perpetual Israeli aggression and to translate into deeds the decisions taken in this connection on November 8 last in Cairo by the Arab Defence Council.

The conference was preceded by a visit to the UAR by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia from December 18 to 20. Cairo's *Al Ahram* commented that this meeting was designed to avoid a confrontation at Rabat between the progressive and conservative factions. The difference however in the attitude between the so-called "revolutionary" and conservative countries was shown immediately in the opening speeches in Rabat by King Hasan of Morocco, and General Gaafar Numeiry, President of the Sudanese Revolutionary Council. The crisis came to a head when President Nasser walked out of the Council room during the morning session. It was later learnt he had been angered by the refusal of the wealthy oil States to contribute financially and in troops to the military efforts of the countries bordering Israel, particularly Egypt and Jordan. Only Libya and the Sudan, according to *The Times* (London) of December 24 expressed unqualified support for President Nassar on the question of military aid.

Speaking at a Press conference later, King Hasan said there would be no final communique because it was impossible to make public all the decisions that had been taken and described the most significant element during the conference as the presence of the Palestinian delegation led by Mr. Yasser Arafat, and the way in which it had behaved. He added that the big-four Power talks on the Middle East had not been discussed at the summit but they "affected our thinking and our appreciation, and the realistic results that we thought the conference could achieve."

*Al Ahram* stated that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation obtained £24 million at the Rabat summit conference and that Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait would maintain their aid to the countries bordering Israel at the level agreed on at the Khartoum Summit in 1967. But an additional £ 35 million would be contributed in a "special arms agreement". Algeria, Libya and Morocco would also furnish supplementary military aid to the Arab countries bordering Israel.

President Nasser, commenting on the Rabat Conference, said at Algiers on December 26 that it "had achieved some positive results despite disagreements among the participants". He added: "Differences always appear in Arab and non-Arab conferences, but this time and because of the delicate circumstances regarding our confrontation with Israel and imperialism, particularly the U.S., we decided not to issue a vague statement which might give the Arab people unrealistic hopes".

**Big-Four Powers' Agreement on West Asian Crisis :** The Big-Four Powers—the U.S., Russia, Britain and France—were said to have reached agreement on the following points during their talks on West Asia at the United Nations. The Soviet Union accepted that Israeli forces should pull out of Arab territories occupied during the 1967

six-day war only after a West Asian peace settlement was reached. The Soviet Union also acknowledged that West Asian countries, including Israel, had a right to sovereign existence behind firm and recognised frontiers. The United States agreed that Israeli occupied territories must be evacuated. U.N. troops who would replace Israeli forces in the occupied territories after nearly three years would only withdraw with the agreement of the Security Council and its Big Four permanent members.

The Big Four also agreed on the principle of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Tirana Straits. The Statute of Jerusalem, presently occupied by Israel, it was suggested, should be drawn on the Tangiers model, enabling it to retain an Israeli character while having an international statute. The refugee problem, the Big Four agreed, could be solved by giving the Palestinian Arabs a choice of staying where they were or returning to Israel. The United States however felt that the number of returning refugees should be limited and their return staggered over a long period. (The Hindu, January 11).

**UAR-Libya-Sudan Co-operation and Integration :** The Foreign Ministers of the UAR, Libya and the Sudan held meetings in Cairo from January 11 to 13. They agreed on the formation of joint Ministerial Committees in various fields to lay the foundations for co-operation among, and integration of, the three countries. The committees will pass recommendations and resolutions by March to be submitted to the Heads of the three States at their next meeting. In an interview to the Egyptian Gazette on January 14, Major General Numeiry said this grouping was not "a regional one but an Arab grouping for marshalling the potentials and unifying the capacities of the three States in order to achieve full integration cherished by the people".

## Libya

**Plot to Overthrow Government Foiled :** The Revolutionary Command Council, in a statement issued on December 10, announced that a plot to overthrow the Government had been foiled. Though at first no names were mentioned later it was revealed that the Defence Minister, Lt. Col. Adam el-Haqaz, and the Interior Minister, Lt. Col. Moussa Ahmed, were the masterminds of the plot. A court martial will try the two Ministers for high treason. Col. Moammar al-Kaddafi, Chairman of the Ruling Command Council, said "as the people have demanded, there will be no mercy for the traitors."

The Indian leftist daily, Patriot, December 12, commenting on the abortive coup, placed the responsibility on America and Britain. The revolution in Libya, it said, "had altered the military balance of power in the Mediterranean and it was expected that an attempt to overthrow the new regime would be made". Britain and the U.S. however decided against it, but it was not unlikely, in the view of the paper, that they would not manipulate any such attempts to their own advantage.

**New Constitution :** The Revolutionary Command Council on December 11 announced a new Republican Constitution which would replace the country's 1951 Constitution. The new Constitution legalises the country's policy of socialism, promises the liberation of the economy from foreign influence and guarantees an independent judiciary. The declaration said the Government would work to achieve Socialism in Libya, that Libya was a free democratic republic and that all Libyans were equal before the law.

**Western Bases to be Evacuated :** The accord for the termination of British bases was reached in Tripoli on December 14 following negotiations at a Government level bet-

ween Capt. Abdel Salam Galoud, member of the Libya Revolutionary Council, and the British Ambassador. Under the agreement, Britain will withdraw all its 1,700 troops and its military equipment stockpiled at the base at El-Adem and the garrison at Tobruk by the end of March 1970, more than three years before the originally stipulated 1963 agreement of Anglo-Libyan friendship is due to expire.

The United States agreed on December 24 to evacuate the giant Wheelus Airbase by June 30, 1971. The announcement, made in a joint Libyan-U.S. communique issued after the negotiations between Capt. Abdel Salam Galoud and the Americans, stated that "the withdrawal will be carried out on a phased basis and will be implemented by June 30, 1970. During this period the two governments will co-operate to assure that the withdrawal takes place in an orderly and dignified manner". The agreement ends a 20-year treaty due to expire in 1973 under which the U.S. maintained the base.

**Arms Agreement Concluded with France :** An arms agreement has been concluded with France according to which Libya would be supplied 50 Mirage jet-fighters, 200 tanks and other equipment worth \$400 million. The announcement, made in a statement issued in Paris on January 9, said 15 of these sophisticated planes would be delivered to the Revolutionary Government during 1971, while the remainder would be delivered over a "long period of time". The contract between the French aircraft firm and Libya includes a clause which prohibits transfer of the planes to a third Power.

Under the French definition of the Middle East "embargo" no weapons can be sold to countries that participated in the 1967 six-day war. Libya, at that time ruled by King Idris and strongly pro-Western, did not participate.

## Morocco

**France Renews Diplomatic Relations :** On December 16, France renewed its diplomatic relations with Morocco which had been severed in 1966. The breach between the two countries had been provoked by the Ben Barka affair and the sentence passed by a French Assize Court of General Oufkir, Moroccan Minister of the Interior, for complicity in the kidnapping and "elimination" of the left-wing Moroccan nationalist leader.

Reporting a private visit to France by King Hasan, The Times stated that diplomatic relations between the two countries had been restored because "the French Government had become acutely aware that the absence of normal relations with Morocco served only American political and economic interests". It added: "The reconciliation with Morocco and King Hasan's visit fit into the framework of France's new Mediterranean policy which involves the "neutralization" of the area and its restriction to the countries bordering it. . . . American and Russian influence are to be gradually eliminated from what France chooses to regard as something in the nature of a private hunting ground". (The Times, London, February 3).

## Tunisia

**Political Prisoners Freed :** The National Assembly on December 7 approved an amnesty law which would set free all political prisoners in the country. The official newspaper *Action* said the law would affect 43 prisoners. Most of them are teachers and students with Communist, Trotskyist and Ba'athist tendencies and were arrested after the disturbances at Tunis University in March last year.



## SOUTHERN AFRICA

**Military Build-up South of the Zambezi:** The Institute of Strategic Studies, London, has presented the following figures about the military build-up south of the Zambezi. South Africa has 39,000 regulars under arms, 85,500 when fully mobilised, for a population of 20 million. Defence costs have risen sharply over the past decade to 272 million for the 1967-70 estimates. Almost all the forces are drawn from the 3,720,000 white population. The armour consists of 100 Centurion, and about 100 Sherman Scout cars and armoured personnel carriers for the army. The Navy has 2 destroyers with helicopters, 6 frigates, 12 minesweepers and 10 seaward defence boats; three deep diving submarines are expected to be delivered during 1970-71. The country's Air Force, better equipped, has 230 combat aircraft, including 15 Buccaneer and 9 Canberra light jet bombers, 20 Mirage fighter bombers, equipped with air-to-surface missiles; 16 Mirage interceptors and at least 40 Vampires, plus maritime reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Apart from this the training force consists of a large number of jets and helicopters, while surface-to-air missiles have been ordered from France. The South African Police Force number 32,700 with 12,000 reservists. There is also a part-time rural militia, the Kominandos, numbering 58,000.

The Rhodesian Army has 3,400 regulars divided among a special air service squadron, two infantry battalions and one artillery battery.

The establishment for three infantry brigades rests entirely on the calling out of the territorial battalions—light infantry and one field artillery battery. Those Europeans who have completed their national service are assigned to territorial battalions for three years' part-time training. These units are "active" if based in the cities and "in reserve" if based in country districts. But as with South Africa, the dividing line between military and para-military forces in Rhodesia is purely nominal in the context of guerilla attacks by liberation movements.

Apart from the Army, the British South African Police (it is neither British nor South African) with 6,400 on its active list and 28,500 on the reserve is well-armed and in service. The Institute's Report emphasized that it is the BSAP which would be responsible for much of the security of Rhodesia in the event of internal disturbances or external aggression.

The Rhodesian Air Force, working closely with the Army and the Police, consists of 1,200 regulars and 4,000 reserves. The Air Force, like the Army, is heavily dependent on its reservists.

Of Portugal in Africa, the Institute states that it has 25 infantry regiments stationed in its colonies. Neither the divisions at home or assigned to NATO are anything up to the strength of the forces in Portuguese Africa. The deployment of the 4,000-strong paratroop regiment is a good example. One battalion is on home duty, the other three are in Africa. Portugal's considerable Navy is also stationed in provincial waters. Though the Institute does not give any detailed indication of the strength of the Portuguese, probably a fair size of their force is on duty in Africa, for only the Neptune anti-submarine reconnaissance squadron is actually assigned to NATO.

**Botswana Sanctions Against Rhodesia:** Botswana has imposed a ban on imports of Rhodesian beer and tobacco effective from March 1 which would cost Rhodesia an estimated £ (Rh.) 850,000. This is Botswana's first move to introduce sanctions against Rhodesia other than the ban on Rhodesia-destined arms passing through the country.

**Chief Jonathan Declares Emergency :** A state of emergency was declared on January 30 in this tiny Southern African Kingdom, the Constitution suspended and King Moshoeshoe and the two leading opposition leaders—Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, Chairman of the Congress Party, and Mr. Khasu—arrested as they claimed victory in the first general elections since independence in October 1966. Making the announcement to the nation in a radio broadcast, the Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, said: "This drastic step has been taken not only to protect the individual but also law and order. An atmosphere of threats and violence was spread throughout the country by the opposition on the eve of the elections. The elections were marred by actual acts of violence all over the country. Now that I have declared a state of emergency, I hereby suspend the Constitution pending the draft of a new one".

The last elections were held in 1965, the year before independence, when Chief Jonathan emerged with an overall majority of two and a majority of six over the opposition Congress Party in the 60-member Parliament. Chief Jonathan's National Party is a middle-of-the-road conservative party whose main aim is to foster good relations with South Africa. The opposition Congress Party, led by the more radical Mr. Ntsu Mokhehle, is a Pan-Africanist organisation known to have received financial support from Chinese sources via Tanzania. The party's main aim, which lay at the heart of the latest elections is, to reduce Lesotho's dependence on South Africa as far as possible. The other opposition group, the Marematlou Freedom Party, has Moscow's support, but is small and politically not very significant. (The Times, London, January 31 and February 6).

Mr. Mokhehle's Congress Party has appealed against Chief Jonathan's action to the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth.

Tanzania's Nationalist commenting on this development on January 31 said "an election that could have changed the trend of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa has just been aborted in Lesotho.

## Malawi

**Speaker Visits South Africa :** The Speaker of Parliament, Mr. I. K. Surtee, visited South Africa early in December. In Johannesburg and Pretoria, he had talks with South African business men who expressed a keen desire to establish contacts with Malawi. (The Manu Daily Digest, December 8).

**United States Peace Corps Banned :** In Blantyre on January 28, the Government announced that American Peace Corps volunteers should withdraw from the country by August. This development follows a recommendation by President Banda's Malawi Congress Party last September that the Peace Corps should be withdrawn within 18 months as it exercised a bad influence on the country's youth. There are in Malawi about 150 volunteers, most of them engaged in health and educational work.

## Rhodesia

**Rhodesians Expect Economic Boom :** In a New Year Day broadcast, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, said that Rhodesia, which had been the target of United Nations economic sanctions after its unilateral declaration of independence from Britain, had

managed to move from a trading deficit in 1968 to an expected economic boom in 1969. Mr. Smith gave no figures but said the preliminary estimates of the gross domestic product for 1969 indicated a growth of at least 13 per cent to more than £(Rh) 400 million. He added: "The evidence before us points conclusively to the fact that the tempo of economic development will increase and our problem will be to control and maintain a balance in the surge of expansion which we anticipate."

## South Africa

**Understanding on Gold Sales :** The South African Government, under pressure of falling gold prices on the world's free markets, had agreed to make concessions on the sales of newly mined gold, setting an impasse which posed a potential threat to international monetary stability for nearly two years. An understanding has now been reached following high-level negotiations in Rome between the Americans led by Paul Volcker, United States Treasury Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs, and a South African team led by the country's Finance Minister, Dr. Nicholas Diederikhs, which allows South Africa to sell some of her newly mined production to the International Monetary Fund when the price on the free market falls to \$35 an ounce. The size of the sales however is to be regulated by a formula based on South Africa's balance of payments requirements. This understanding was announced in a communique released simultaneously in Rome and Washington on December 16.

Commenting on this settlement, The Times (London) in a special feature on December 16 observed: "Indirectly, though, this will presumably open the way for the IMF to resell this gold to countries which have a stronger balance of payments position and who want to increase the proportion of gold in their reserves, Japan being a case in point, it could also influence the arrangements on IMF quota increases of over \$7,000 million... Under IMF regulations, a quarter of the quota increases have to be in gold".

**Cape Town Conference Studies Apartheid :** A conference held in Cape Town late in January re-examined South Africa's apartheid policy for the first time since the Nationalists introduced it in 1948. Organized by the South African Institute of Race Relations, an island of integrationism in a sea of segregation, the conference persuaded three senior Government officials with key roles in administering apartheid to discuss it publicly before a liberal audience. With the elections due on April 22 and because of the rebellion by the "verkrampers" who broke away from Mr. Vorster's Nationalist Party and who fought the elections on the issue of the application of apartheid, the relevance of this conference is obvious.

**Japan and South Africa :** The Transvaal Coal Owners' Association has received a letter of intent covering the supply of between 20 and 28 million tons of coal to Japanese steel mills over a 10-year period beginning April 1972. A delegation of the association members returned from Japan after negotiating the deal in December.

Japan's seven biggest steel mills have also indicated their intention of buying about 10 million tons of ore a year from South Africa. This is outlined in a letter of intent signed by the Japanese in Tokyo after negotiations with South Africa's quasi-Government steel manufacturer, ISCOR.

## Portuguese Territories

**Portugal Claims Defence of Territories in Africa :** The Portuguese President, Mr. Americo Tomas, in a New Year message to the nation, whose main theme was Portugal's war with the guerillas in her African territories during the past decade, said: "Portugal continues to fight alone the terrorism in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique which is supported with modern arms and money by foreign interests". The foreign interests were identified as Russia and China. The President also accused neighbouring countries in Africa of giving refuge to the guerillas.

President Tomas' message, it may be mentioned, coincided with the publication of the Government's annual estimates of revenue and expenditure for 1970 which show that nearly 58 per cent of the expenditure will be utilised for Portugal's armed forces, particularly those overseas.

## Activities of the Council

The following is an account of the activities of the Council during the quarter :

The Council received donations of scientific and laboratory equipment for the new University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana, from the following Indian manufacturers in addition to what was received earlier :

Messrs. Joseph Leslie & Co.,  
Bombay

M/s Bombay Surgico Medical Agency Pvt. Ltd.  
Bharuch Bldg., 182 Princess St.  
Bombay-2.

Associated Instruments Mfg. Co.  
Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi.

Republic Scientific Supply Co.  
Munshi Niketan  
Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi.

Messrs. Toshniwal Bros. Pvt. Ltd.  
Round Tana, Mount Road  
Madras 2.

Messrs. Cieco Pvt. Ltd.  
21, Barrackpore, Calcutta-50.

The Council records its appreciation of the Shipping Corporation agreeing to transport the donations free of cost to Ghana.

### **Exhibition of African Arts & Crafts**

The Council organised an exhibition of African Arts and Crafts at the Triveni Kala Sangam from February 19 to 28, 1970. The President of India, Mr. V. V. Giri, inaugurated the exhibition in the presence of a distinguished audience. Speaking on the occasion the President congratulated the Council for organising the exhibition which, he said, was a major step towards spreading knowledge about the people of Africa, their achievements and aspirations. "I am sure efforts like this will bring the people of Asia and Africa nearer". He deplored the regimes in South Africa which preached and practised the gospel of racial superiority.

"These regimes, founded on tyranny and racial discrimination, are an outrage to mankind", he said. "The most remarkable event of this century," he continued, "was the awakening of Asia and Africa and no power on earth can stop them from their onward march. They refuse to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for other nations".

The exhibition, the first of its kind to be organised in India, was divided into different sections—African Civilisations, Traditional Religion and the Role of Fetishes, Masks and Music, African art forms—ritual art, ceremonial secular art, art in everyday life and African art forms of world interest. The exhibits included photographic reproductions, replicas of museum originals and craft objects.

#### **Profile of Africa**

The Council brought out an explanatory guide to the exhibition and an illustrated booklet "Profile of Africa" edited by Dr. Mulk Raj Anand, member of the Council and Chairman of the Lalit Kala Akademi. The booklet contains a selection of African poems and carries a preface by the President of the Council, Mr. Asoka Mehta. The exhibition received wide and favourable publicity in the press, radio and T.V. and over 500 persons visited it. A short talk on West African music was given by the Executive Secretary of the Council on All India Radio as an introduction to the music of Nigeria and Ghana which was later relayed by the Delhi Radio.

## Book Reviews

VUTA KAMBA : The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika,  
William H. Friedland, Hoover Institute Publication, p 280, \$-2.80

VUTA Kamba—"Shut 'er down", "hit the bricks" or just plain "strike"—is the key slogan with which trade unionism took its birth in Tanganyika. Although Tanganyika has since 1964 become part of the United Republic of Tanzania, the author's explanation for mentioning Tanganyika even now is that the Union is still "far from complete" and this study relates only to the mainland component of the Union.

It is often believed, and with good reason, that industrialization having hardly taken any plausible roots in Africa and agriculture being mainly on a subsistence level, there is no class war in Africa, as it is understood in communist countries. However, even though class struggles of this type even after about a decade of independence are not heard of in Africa, labour has tended to organize itself mainly on a professional basis, to protect its interests and to project its demands against whoever is the employer—private entrepreneur or Government.

Colonialism hardly ever encouraged the formation of unions and if the colonial governments did anything it was mainly to give an unruly and unmanageable mass an organized and disciplined shape, the mass could then become a manageable group for the rulers. It is thus believed that colonialism did not have much impact either on the evolution or on the organic development of trade unions in Africa. If Tanganyika's case is taken, then one would agree with Mr. Friedland that "Unions were not brought from England to Africa, instead a set of ideas about a constellation of roles organized to carry on particular activities and solve certain problems was transferred."

Elaborating his point the author observes : "In most of sub-Saharan Africa, the idea of trade unionism was taken over directly by Africans without the cultural background or socialization appropriate to modern social institutions. In contrast, European workmen with long experience as trade unionists in the United Kingdom and elsewhere carried the idea of unionism with them to South Africa as well as to Southern Rhodesia and Katanga".

According to the present study, the evolution of trade unionism in Africa, especially in Tanganyika, was not marked as much by a process of social consciousness as by a desire to protest for immediate material demands. And these protests were carried out, in the initial stages, on a

tribal basis. If a section of labour was in trouble, the sympathies of the fellow workmen of the same tribe were spontaneous.

In Tanganyika trade unionism developed with greater strength than elsewhere in East Africa. It was in 1931 that first references were made to labour discontent in that country. But it was based mostly on clannish lines. A more modern manifestation of labour unrest was available only in 1938 when there was a strike by dock workers in Tanga. Yet no union emerged. A union became possible only as late as 1947 when a strike of dock workers occurred in September and lasted for a week. The strike soon spread to other sections of employment.

A Dock Workers Union emerged from this deadlock and was the outcome of a deliberate attempt by the Labour Department to turn workers into a well-knit body. Then the Department instituted joint consultation as a mechanism for handling grievances and stalling hasty creation of trade unions. Although, gradually, educated and westernized clerks had taken up leadership of some unions, a real growth of unionism was evident only after 1955 when Mr. Tom Mboya, then leader of the Kenya Federation of Labour, visited Dar-es-Salaam and gave a new incentive and direction to trade unionism which led to the formation of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL).

But despite this new organization, the inherent weaknesses, mainly financial, of trade unionism could not be removed and continued to eat into its vitals. Meanwhile, the TANU political party came into conflict with the TFL, a conflict that came into the open in January 1964 when most of the union leaders were arrested on charges of complicity in the army mutiny. In February 1964, the National Assembly (Parliament) adopted legislation for the abolition of the TFL and other unions. A single national union, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), was created. Its top officials were to be appointed by the President of the Republic. Thus trade unionism was "nationalised" in Tanganyika and a new pattern of unionism emerged in Africa.

The author's treatment of the subject is sympathetic and analytical and develops a thesis to prove that the character and content of trade unions in Africa have changed with the times and have evolved a pattern of their own. The experience of Tanganyika would thus be a lesson for many other countries where trade unions have often become a political factor challenging the very regimes of their countries.

MADAN M. SAULDIE

**African Penal Systems.** Edited by Alan Milner, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, XIII and pp. 501, £3-10s.

ALAN Milner, the writer of this work, is a reputed writer of criminal law and is the editor of *The African Law Reports*: Malawi 1923-1960. In the present book he has contributed two essays, "Sentencing Patterns in Nigeria" and "Psychiatry and the Criminal Offender in Africa".



The book is divided into two parts. The first contains a general treatment of penal systems in Africa concerning countries—the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Liberia, the UAR and Zambia. Essays in this part are contributed by nine writers drawn from varied disciplines. The second part contains six essays dealing with various specific problems.

Although the editor's claim in the preface that the book is the first attempt to create interest in the subject is not entirely well-founded (see, for instance, the earlier monographs by James S. Read & Hilary Cartwright, *The Penal Codes of East of Central Africa and the Gambia*, 1963, pp. 57 (mimeographed); and Robert B. Seidman, *A Sourcebook of the Criminal Law of Africa* (1966), pp. xi and 634) the book is marked by its different content and treatment. Unlike Seidman's American style case book, Milner's is valuable from the jurisprudential point of view. In view of authentic information lacking on many problems one may not be led to draw definite conclusions from it but it helps to know the possible areas where reformation of penal systems is desirable. Some very penetrating observations have been made by Seidman and Eyison, writers of the Ghana penal system. They have observed that recidivism is growing in Ghana. This observation is useful in that it may lead legislators to adopt more deterrent measures in respect of recidivists. Within the limitations of available statistics, figures for various types of crimes are also given.

Capital punishment is prevalent in all African countries. It is, however, interesting to note that President Tubman of Liberia has refused to sign, on grounds of conscience, any death warrant since 1954. In Ghana all capital sentences are automatically reviewed by the Executive. Corporal punishment (whipping and lashing etc.) is being gradually abolished. According to the Minimum Sentences Act, 1963, Tanganyika, there is automatic imposition of corporal punishment on persons receiving the minimum sentences. (The Minimum Sentences Act is said to be a unique innovation of the East African penal systems). Greater efforts are being made to remedy juvenile delinquency. One thing which clearly emerges is that the type of crime in a particular country can be explained by the social conditions prevailing in it, for example, in Liberia the breakdown of collective security has resulted in an increased rate of crime. In the UAR the unskilled labourer is more often found committing an offence against property. These examples can be multiplied.

This reviewer agrees with the editor's criticism of the tendency on the part of newly independent countries to blindly follow the penal developments in foreign countries (often their erstwhile colonial masters) without regard to their contrasting cultural and social needs. There is thus a greater need in the new and developing countries to cultivate independent judicial systems.

The book is welcome for its many new insights.

SUBHASH C. JAIN

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#### **REPLICAS RECEIVED FOR EXHIBITION OF AFRICAN ARTS AND CRAFTS**

##### **I. Belgium, Musee Royal de L'Afrique Centrale**

1. *Statue of King Kata-Mbula* (Ethnic group : Kuba) Kasai, Congo.
2. *Woman with bowl* (Ethnic group : Luba) Kwango.
3. *Chief's stool* (Ethnic group : Badjok) Angola and Congo.
4. *Male figure with elongated face* (Baluba) Congo.
5. *Statue of man with upturned nose* (Ethnic group : Bayaka or Suku) Kwango, Western Congo
6. *Mother and Child* (Mayumbe district) Lower Congo
7. *Standing female figure* (Ethnic group : Lulua) Kasai, Congo
8. *Mask* (Ethnic group : Bwaka) North Western Congo
9. *Standing figure of a woman with pestle and mortar* (Ethnic group : Tshokewe)
10. *Standing male figure* (Butti) (Bateke style) Stanley Pool, Lower Congo

11. *Male figure* (Nkiba) (Bateke style) Stanley Pool, Lower Congo

**II. New York Alva Museum**

1. *Ceremonial sword* (Orig : Bronze, goldweight) Ashanti, Ghana
2. *Woman with pot* (Orig : Brass) Dahomey
3. *Animal with long horn* (Bronze, goldweight) Ashanti, Ghana
4. *Seated figure holding a fetish* (Bronze, goldweight) Ashanti, Ghana
5. *Two birds* (Bronze, goldweight) Ashanti, Ghana
6. *Seated figure with raised arms* (Bronze, goldweight) Ashanti, Ghana
7. *Head Rest* (Carved wood) Lulaba Region, Central Congo
8. *Bateke Figure* (Carved wood) Bateke Tribe, Northern Congo
9. *Laughing Mask* (Brass) Cameroon
10. *Man tressing his beard* (Carved wood) Ivory Coast, Ghana
11. *Mother and child* (Bronze, goldweight) Gold Coast, Ghana
12. *Leopard eating man* (Bronze, goldweight) Gold Coast, Ghana
13. *Bull, servant and goat* (plaque) (Tinted Stone) Egypt
14. *Amenhotep II* (Limestone) Egypt, Boston Museum
15. *Head of a man* (Limestone) Egypt, Boston Museum
16. *Shawabti of King Aspelta* (faience) Ethiopia, Boston Museum
17. *Head of a Princess* (dark brown stone) Egypt.

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
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